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Problems of Communism

JANUARY-APRIL 1992

Toward A Postcommunist World

40th Anniversary Conference Proceedings

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Problems of Communism

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JANUARY-APRIL 1992 VOL XLI

Problems of Communism (ISSN 0032-941x) is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

On all editorial matters, communications should be addressed to: The Editors, *Problems of Communism,* US Information Agency, United States of America, 301 4th Street SW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA. Telephone (202) 619-4230; FAX (202) 619-4173.

On subscriptions, communications should be addressed to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, preferably using the subscription form provided at the back of this issue. Outside the United States, please address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America.

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An annual index for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI, Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales (all Sections), Current Contents, Current Military and Political Literature, Economic Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Index to US Government Periodicals, International Political Science Abstracts, Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences Citation Index, Social Sciences Index,* and *United States Political Science Documents.*

40TH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE
OF *PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM*

Proceedings of an international conference "Toward a Postcommunist World," held on October 22–23, 1991, at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, DC.

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COVER: Jubilant crowds pull down the Berlin Wall on Nov. 10, 1989. Photo by S. Ferry/Gamma-Liaison.

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Toward a Postcommunist World

Proceedings of the **Problems of Communism** *40th Anniversary Conference, held in Washington, DC, October 22–23, 1991*

For 40 years now, *Problems of Communism* has been privileged to share with its worldwide readership the insights of some of the most distinguished and energetic observers of the Soviet Union, China, and other communist states and movements. The clash between an ideologically-based, expansionist system and a competing vision of a world defined by more benign competition within a framework of mutually accepted legal norms and responsible self-interest has been an engrossing process, one that led at times to the brink of nuclear war and at other times to measured attempts at accommodation and coexistence.

Looking toward our 40th birthday, in January 1992, we decided to organize an international scholarly gathering in Washington, DC, as a means of capturing and reflecting on the major changes that were afoot in the communist world, in order to inform our readers of where things were headed and how fast. It would be an understatement to suggest that our plans were "overtaken by events." In August 1991 came events that signaled the total collapse of the Soviet communist edifice, adding new drama to our impending deliberations. The collapse of the walls—physical and political—that divided Eastern Europe from Western Europe had, of course, already occurred in 1989, although the process of creating stable democracies there still has a long way to go.

It is not unwarranted for us in the West to claim, as Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick did in her opening address to the conference, that "we won." However, as so often is the case, winning the peace can prove to be almost as difficult as winning the war. Those who believe in democratic governance and market economics can only be thrilled at the efforts of former communist states to move toward such political and economic solutions. That is the good news. The bad, or sobering, news is

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that the transition from Leninist totalitarianism is a difficult, untried process; it is a costly one in terms of investments and human dislocation; and the residue of past political structures and ideas severely hinders its progress. Thus, it is better to study the transition in a spirit of understanding, sympathy, and patience than in a mood of euphoria or impatience.

The Soviet and East European transitions are not occurring in isolation. Political transition from authoritarian and statist systems is also occurring elsewhere on the globe—in Latin America, Africa, Asia, South Asia. The challenge for scholars is to examine whether there are useful comparative insights that can be shared among societies apparently undergoing similar experiences. Is transition from communism a rara avis, or are there lessons to be learned from other settings? We have only begun to ask such questions, and there is much to be studied and learned.

The collapse of communism throughout the Soviet bloc has also afforded exciting new opportunities to delve deeper into murky episodes of the Soviet past, to fill in what those in the Soviet Union have called "blank spots." Already under Mikhail Gorbachev and his policy of *glasnost'*, the USSR had begun this search, albeit in what was evidently hoped to be a controlled manner. The controls proved inadequate, and scholars have been inundated with a wave of valuable new information on key problems.

The façade of communist "order" concealed much disorder. A case in point is that of interethnic relations. The apparently orderly structure of ethnically-based administrative-territorial units in the former USSR and other communist states proves not to have reflected socialist brotherhood, but to have concealed intense animosities that have since resurfaced and even led to virtual civil war, as seen in Nagorno-Karabakh and eastern Croatia.

If anything is certain, it is that one must be humble in offering solutions and generous in listening and observing as societies struggle with old and new problems. The effort to compress into a few brief months or years what took decades, generations, even centuries to accomplish in Western societies seems almost foolhardy, however understandable. There are countless opportunities to go wrong, and painfully few roadmaps to success.

In planning for our October 1991 conference, we recognized that it would be possible only to scratch the surface of the many issues confronting students of the dramatic political processes unfolding before our eyes. Our hope was to accomplish three goals: (1) to capture the state of affairs in the so-called communist world at the end of 1991, 40 years after the founding of the journal; (2) to participate in what we hope is a fruitful, serious discussion of the problems, processes, successes, and failures of political transition from both totalitarian/communist and authoritarian political systems; and (3) to investigate the kinds of political forces and issues that will engage billions of people and their respective governments in a postcommunist setting. Our intent was to involve scholars, officials, and journalists from this country and abroad in a wide-ranging exchange of views—both theoretical and practical—on these matters.

The deliberations were organized into a number of panels and individual addresses. In her opening remarks, Ambassador Kirkpatrick reminded everyone of the truly dramatic nature of the collapse of communism in our time, and predicted the extension of the process to other areas of the world. She also spoke of the

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complexity and pain of the transition process awaiting the former communist societies.

The first panel looked at the issue of modernity—in particular, at the ultimate failure of Marxism as a guide to political action in the contemporary world. It also explored some alternatives for dealing with the issues of political life in the late 20th century. Given the important role that ideology played in Marxism's advance, it was deemed of interest to examine Islam, as a theology enlisting the loyalties of one-sixth of the people of the globe. We also invited specialists to talk about the role of the nation-state at the end of the 20th century and about the functioning of international organizations in promoting international security.

A second panel moved directly to the issue of transition in Eastern Europe. American and East European scholars and practitioners laid out conceptual prescriptions and shared practical experience. These deliberations were greatly enriched by a special address from Minister of Finance and Deputy Premier of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Václav Klaus, who provided an "insider's view" of his country's economic transition. Cinematographer Arnost Lustig added some thoughtful comments on the issues of political morality in the transition from communist rule. At the end of the day, Senator Richard Lugar addressed a dinner meeting on the challenges of transition and of knowing how best to understand and encourage the process.

Former *POC* Editors Abe Brumberg and Paul Smith kicked off the second day with reflections on the genesis of the journal, the shifting currents of political fashion that buffeted the craft as they guided it on its steady course of serious, responsible analysis, and the pride and dedication with which a staff of government employees has labored these 40 years to produce a journal that was timely, relevant, and widely accepted as a major scholarly asset.

The next session focused on multiple dimensions of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the issue of why so few Western scholars had predicted this precipitate dénouement. A second discussion focused on the impact of national cultures on efforts of nations in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union to modernize. In a third discussion, American and East European specialists reflected on the post–cold war security structure in Europe.

Voice of America Director Chase Untermeyer addressed a luncheon session on the role that international broadcasting played in the rejection of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. He also discussed the contribution that such media can make to the process of transition, and discussed current proposals for a "Radio Free China."

This provided a remarkably apt transition to an afternoon panel on developments in Asia. A first discussion provided contrasting views of the direction of political change in China. A second exchange centered on the interaction of modernization and political revolution in the remaining countries of East Asia. A final panel provided particularly stimulating discussion of political transition in other parts of the world; the focus was on the disheartened state of the Latin Left and on prospects for Africa's Second Liberation.

This adds up to very rich fare, and without more ado we commend it to you for your consumption.

—The Editors

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Introductory Remarks

Paula Dobriansky

How does one introduce two days of discussion, certain to feature profound thoughts, witty observations, and a diversity of views on the prospective configuration and policy ramifications of a postcommunist world? It is a difficult, if not impossible, task. However, some opening remarks are in order. This conference was prompted by the congruence of two distinct events. Our immediate purpose was to observe the 40th anniversary of USIA's journal of political analysis, *Problems of Communism* (*POC*). Fortuitously, as *POC* was getting ready to celebrate its 40th birthday, events of profound historical significance unfolded before our eyes. Beginning with the "velvet revolutions" of 1989 and concluding with the failed August 1991 coup in Moscow, the entire communist edifice—with the notable exception of China, Cuba, and a few other, Third World Marxist regimes—crumbled. Not surprisingly, presented with these momentous geostrategic transformations, the broader purpose of this conference evolved to encompass the examination of the geopolitical, ideological, and economic consequences of the "end of communism," and of their implications for US policies.

Paula Dobriansky is Associate Director for Policy and Programs at the US Information Agency. She served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Director of European and Soviet Affairs at the National Security Council, the White House, and Deputy Head of the US delegation to the Copenhagen CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension. She has delivered numerous papers at professional conferences and has published articles, book chapters, and op-ed pieces on a variety of topics, including Soviet foreign and defense policies, US human rights policy, arms control, and Central America.

Since its founding in 1952, *Problems of Communism* has enjoyed a unique reputation in this country and abroad. Its comprehensive and objective analysis of developments in communist states and movements has been widely respected and become a standard reference among Sovietologists and students of communist affairs. Given the often contentious nature of the field, this is no mean feat. As past *Problems of Communism* editors Abe Brumberg and Paul Smith will stress, the journal's consistent key mission and major accomplishment has been to portray to international and domestic audiences the serious analytical discussions and debates that underlay the development and implementation of United States and Western foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, China, Eastern Europe, and their Third World proxies and clients, while at the same time enabling foreign scholars to participate in the debate in the pages of *POC*.

Events in the world are unfolding at an ever faster rate. We are faced with the challenges and opportunities of transition from statist political systems to societies that are more pluralist politically and market-oriented economically. USIA, as an agency tasked with the primary responsibility for the conduct of US public diplomacy, has a keen interest in these emerging developments. The conference addressed a number of these important issues. In particular, it attempted to digest the dramatic events of the last several years in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, not to mention in Tiananmen Square, Latin America, and Africa, and to rethink our understanding of the world as the influence of Marxism-Leninism declines.

We discovered that even in a postcommunist world, there is no guarantee that human affairs will proceed smoothly—free from conflict, regional rivalries, ethnic, cultural, and religious disputes. On the positive side of the ledger, however, the advent of new democracies, the strengthening of international organizations, and

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the growing respect accorded to international legal norms all combine to make the creation of a "new world order" a realistic, albeit still challenging, undertaking.

The conference speeches, articles, and commentary that follow remind us of several important propositions. It matters greatly how political change unfolds in the former Soviet Union, and without analysis of such changes, it is impossible for Western policy-makers to determine what kind of assistance to give and to whom. Likewise, we need to know how the future relations among former constituent parts of the USSR will affect security globally as well as in Europe in particular. It matters greatly whether the former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe can successfully overcome the burdens of communist ideology, ethnic animosities, and economic stagnation to create viable free market democracies. It matters greatly whether or not more than 1 billion Chinese continue to live under the thumb of a small Chinese Communist Party gerontocracy, which appears to place its own survival in power above all other national priorities, and whether the current regime or any successor regime in Beijing is inclined to cooperate in solving international problems or would prefer to cling to a narrow and obsolete vision of the international system and the PRC's place in it. And finally, it matters greatly whether or not societies from Africa, to Latin America, to South Asia—currently disabused of the promise that Marxism-Leninism once held out—can find liberal, democratic solutions to their pressing social and economic problems. In sum, we have our work cut out for us.

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After Communism, What?

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

I will address the question "After Communism, What?" but like any good professor, I think it requires just a bit of background. And I think we have to begin by mentioning what a fantastic surprise the collapse of communism was. I believe there has been no greater surprise in modern history—and we should admit it—than the speed and the totality with which communist regimes fell in Eastern Europe and in the socialist fatherland itself—the Soviet Union.

It was less than three years from the opening of Hungary's border in early May 1989 (with the acquiescence of Mikhail Gorbachev) to the failure of the "Gang of Eight" in August 1991. How fantastic! Here, at last, we had our dominoes falling almost mechanically, one after another, after another, after another.

As each domino fell, there was some expectation that the next domino was going to prove more resistant to falling, that it would be a little more stable than the last. The East German regime, experts said to one another (even as Hungary transformed itself), the East German regime would resist. And if not the East German regime, certainly the Czechoslovak regime would resist. It looked like a stronger, more stable regime. The Romanian regime—here was one that would surely resist. The Soviet Union. How incredulously the world watched while each fell, one after another. How quickly they collapsed once they could no longer rely on the massive use of force to sustain themselves.

This, it seems to me, is Gorbachev's great contribution, and I think it is an important contribution. I don't mind putting him on the cover of *Time* magazine or even giving him a Nobel Prize. The contribution was a negative one, it seems to me, but no less important for that fact. This contribution was to keep the Soviet troops in the barracks and Soviet tanks in their garages as one after another of the peoples of Eastern Europe reclaimed control over their own lives and their own societies. This is what distinguishes Hungary in 1989 from Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1989 from Czechoslovakia in 1968, Moscow in 1991 from Moscow in 1917.

Soviet leaders in previous eras had, like the Bolsheviks of 1917, used all the force at their disposal, brutally, quickly, without hesitation, to crush resistance to Soviet power. I believed then and believe now that the secret of Bolshevik success was just that—force and ideology—and that the explanation of Bolshevism's collapse is found in the ideological revisions that led the Soviet elite to hesitate to use force to maintain their East European empire and then hesitate to use force to maintain their internal empire.

The desire for a new kind of acceptance, conceivably even a new kind of legitimacy, it seems to me, brought down the Bolshevik structure. *Glasnost'* was crucial. It really was not possible to correct history and yet maintain the legitimacy of the Soviet enterprise in the Baltic states, for example; or to correct the history of collectivization and the man-made famine in Ukraine and maintain the legitimacy of Soviet power there.

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick is Leavey Professor of Government at Georgetown University (Washington, DC) and a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Washington, DC). She served as US Ambassador to the United Nations and as a member of the US Cabinet and National Security Council. Among her numerous books on international politics and US domestic politics are The Withering Away of the Totalitarian State and Other Surprises *(1990),* Legitimacy and Force: State Papers and Current Perspectives, 1981–1985 *(1987),* The Kennedy-Khrushchev Pact and the Sandinistas *(1985),* Dictatorship and Double Standards: Rationality and Reason in Politics *(1982), and* Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study of Peronist Argentina *(1971).*

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Inasmuch as Marxism could not explain Soviet success, and I do not believe that it could, in the expansion and consolidation of power, Marxism could not explain the Soviet collapse. I think that the collapse of communism, of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, more closely resembles Plato's description of the collapse of an ideal state than anything that Karl Marx or Vladimir Il'ich Lenin ever wrote.

As a consequence of marginal changes in the values and goals of the ruling elite, which in turn were the consequence of generational changes, the communist edifice came tumbling down. Inhibition in the use of force was itself a consequence of a growing distaste for the massive use of force. This distaste, which manifested itself from the very first days of Gorbachev's accession or, if not from the first days, at least after the first year of Gorbachev's rule, brought this edifice tumbling down and revealed Bolshevism as a system which, like the Soviet Union itself, is all superstructure, a superstructure constructed and maintained by force. This society and state, whose organization had been contrived and imposed by something called the revolution, turned out not to be the product of a mass movement at all, but the work of a small elite who had, with years of study and a lot of what Leon Trotsky called invisible practice, made themselves what Lenin thought himself to be—a master of the science of power.

The accomplishments of the Bolsheviks were both more and less than is usually appreciated. More, because it takes a great deal of skill in the use of power to impose on a society and a state of reluctant peoples a pattern of political organization that is foreign to their history, culture, tastes, desires, and ethics. The accomplishments were less than they appeared to a good many of us, including me, who were students of totalitarianism and who worried that the Bolsheviks would succeed in bringing about the internalization of the revolution and its values, such that people would desire for themselves what the regime and their rulers desired for them. It seems to me that it is quite clear that communist elites were able to rule, but not to create a Soviet man, woman, or child. Finally, they did not succeed because they did not achieve the goal of making might right in the eyes of the people they ruled.

I labor this point because I think it is absolutely essential to answering the question posed at the outset—"After Communism, What?". I think communism in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union has left many terrible problems, many deaths, and much human tragedy, but it has left no discernable legacy in the affections of the people. And I think this is very important. The very foreignness of Bolshevik culture and its products means that it will be all the more readily replaced. The culture of Bolshevism was so foreign, so unnatural that it was simply not assimilated and could not be assimilated. The Soviet pattern of social organization did not fit the societies on which it was imposed. So, given a chance—wherever they are given a chance, whenever they are given a chance—people reject it. This rejection of communism in all countries where people have experience with it is perhaps an even more impressive and universal aspect of communism than its long duration.

The people turned out to prefer other values and principles. They preferred the languages they spoke before the Bolshevik conquest. They preferred the borders that they had before they were incorporated into the socialist fatherland. They preferred the loyalties of their ancestors to the socialist loyalties that were imposed on them.

This is really quite remarkable. Presumably, these loyalties, these borders, these languages, and these preferences had been eradicated. I think this is what the Bolsheviks thought. And if not eradicated, at least weakened, which is, I think, what most of us feared during those decades of repression, indoctrination, forced relocation, and mass purges.

And yet it turns out that the traditional societies, with all of their unique characteristics, are more enduring. Revolution turns out to have been an ineffective instrument of change, as ineffective as it was violent. It turns out to have been an ineffective tool of political transformation and, of course, an ineffective instrument of economic modernization.

The fact is, of course, that there is no socialist road to economic modernization, just as there is no socialist road to democracy, no socialist road to utopia. One cannot substitute the plans of the few for the natural creative proclivities and energies of the many and produce the same results. It is impossible.

After communism comes something very unlike it, something very un-communist, as un-communist as the Federal Republic of Germany is unlike the German Democratic Republic. Thus, the reconstruction of formerly communist countries will not begin where communism left off.

This rather obvious point has some less obvious implications. It means that the structures of the Soviet Union and what we used to call its communist satellites will prove to be weak and unstable. Whether efforts to preserve the political, economic, and juridical structures of communist regimes are undertaken, whether the efforts to preserve them or elements of them are reinforced by Western leaders (and there have been some), those efforts will fail. I have really no doubt about this.

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Does 50 years count for nothing, Mikhail Gorbachev once asked Lithuanians in lobbying them to choose a continued relationship with the Soviet Union, a continued life inside the Soviet Union. The answer, of course, is that 50 years count for a great deal. They also count for less than nothing, so to speak. Instead of being the kind of experience that bred affection and affectionate habits of the heart, it was the kind of experience that bred revulsion in Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and Ukrainians. These nations have no affection for their conquerors. Ukrainians have no nostalgia for their victimizers.

What is true of the Soviet Union as a political structure is, I believe, also true of all its products—the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance and other social and economic military artifacts of the period of communist domination. This has very important implications for the people in the region, and especially for Western policy, including American policy. Normal social and political tendencies toward stability and the preservation of the existing order simply do not, will not, and cannot apply in the former Soviet empire. Neither will they apply, I believe, in Yugoslavia. The governments of forced unions are artifacts of a regime of force. The party of order cannot prevail where that order was imposed by force and at great human cost to the people who lived under it. And so the party of freedom will win in all these areas.

One thinks about John Stuart Mills's essay on representative government in relation to the collapse of communism, more specifically about Mills's discussion of the party of order and the party of progress. He describes progress as the increase of all the values in the existing order. This is usually true, because usually order consolidates goods attained by a people in a society up to that time.

But where the order was imposed by force, by heavy-handed force, on a people, then the order obviously has a different meaning for them and a lesser value. The party of freedom, I think, and the party of rupture will win elections over the party of stability in every country where elections are held—in Russia, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia—at least for the foreseeable future.

But I believe East Europeans have developed a passionate appreciation for limited government not unlike the passionate appreciation for limited government felt by the American founding fathers after they had thrown off a much less onerous regime than the one that afflicted the peoples of Eastern Europe. These peoples have today an extraordinary appreciation of the importance of government based on consent, and I believe that they will cling—with a tenacity that will prove surprising to all who have not shared their experience—to the project of constructing limited government based on consent.

The second general point I would like to make about what comes after communism is that East Europeans will prove enthusiastic and determined supporters of association with the West. I think there are some elements in common with the post–World War I period, but it's not 1919, 1921, or 1933, because the peoples of the region have had terrible experiences and tragedy with home-grown fascism, as well as with imported Bolshevism. They are not nostalgic for these experiences. They will, I believe, insist on association with Western Europe.

However desirable it might seem to some members and leaders of the European Community to "deepen" rather than to "widen," I believe that insistent demands from Eastern Europe will ultimately overwhelm them, and that the manifest need of Eastern Europe for closer association with the West will force the EC to adopt an inclusive policy. The desire for a common European home grows stronger, not weaker, in the wake of the collapse of communism and the overcoming of the division of Europe. The need to reinforce the institutions of the new democracies, their desire to share Western economic prosperity, and their longing for a new, more successful, more European identity all suggest to me that the EC will turn out to be the integrating institution of the new Europe.

I think François Mitterrand was right when he said in a radio interview this past summer that such diversity as implied in the admission of large numbers of states that have had very different experiences over the last 50 years would make it more difficult to achieve a single community, and more difficult to achieve the kind of integration that he desired. To be sure, integrating Eastern Europe will make it more difficult to achieve a United States of Europe, of which Helmut Kohl has been speaking of achieving by the year 2000. But there is a specter haunting Europe today, and it is the specter of Europe itself. Thus, something more than a free trade zone, which is what Mitterrand suggested was the alternative, will, in my judgment, be developed well before the year 2000. It will embrace all of Europe.

Now, where does this leave the United States? Well, first of all, I think it leaves us victorious, really victorious in some of the most basic possible ways. It leaves people who took communism seriously exonerated by its lack of viability, and by the judgment of the people themselves who lived under it. I think that the United States, freed of the burdens of cold war, will be able to tend to some affairs that we have neglected—upgrading our schools, fixing our highways, and strengthening our competitiveness. But we will not, in my opinion, retreat to some sort of isolationism.

Frankly, I think the discussion about whether Ameri-

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ca will return to isolationism is frivolous. I think isolationism is not an alternative for our times, for the last decade of the 20th century. Rather, it is a kind of utopia. The reality and the reach of industries, weapons, economies simply makes isolationism impossible. So, I do not think there is any chance of America becoming isolationist. But I do believe that the United States will be relieved of some of the very extraordinary burdens that it has borne over the long period of the cold war with unusual generosity and tenacity, and, yes, if I may say so, intelligence. And that is a very good thing.

I also do not think that military power has become obsolete or that it will be unnecessary in the new world. I think Saddam Hussein effectively demonstrated that such a position was not tenable. I do not think that the United States will be ready to bear all the military burdens of the world, but, as in the case of the Persian Gulf, it may be ready to participate in stemming clear-cut cases of aggression, and from time to time perhaps assume a leadership role in those efforts. The very preoccupation of the Europeans with Europe may make it more difficult for them to assume such a role, as is shown by the ineffectiveness of the EC in dealing with both the Gulf crisis and Yugoslavia.

It may be that the EC will work out some of those problems. It may be that it will not. We, in any case, will still be here. So what will we do with our foreign policy? I think we need to remember, of course, that we will have a mission. It is not necessary to be messianic in order to have a mission. Our mission is freedom and the spread of human rights—and they are spreading rapidly in the contemporary world—and we will continue to encourage, support, promote, and sustain new democracies as the opportunity arises.

I think we can say communism is dead, frankly, not only in Europe, in the West, but also in Asia, although China's leaders act as though they do not know it. I sometimes think that surely they must know it, because their own people taught them at Tiananmen Square the lessons of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and I do not think that they are slow learners.

Finally, I would simply say that this is a fight, an effort in which USIA has played, in my judgment, a most important and sustained role. Information, I continue to believe, is the most effective, most important, the safest, and the most inexpensive instrument of foreign policy, and for decades it has been wielded by the US Information Agency with great skill and effectiveness.

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Marxism as Politics: An Obituary

Ferenc Fehér

Not since the rise and spread of the Christian Church has "Western" (or "European") culture seen a success story like that of Marxism. What began as an abstract philosophical disputation among radical German émigrés in Paris, during the time of the dissolution of Hegelianism, within three generations grew into a political "ideology" dominating huge parts of the globe and attracting zealots and militants on every continent. To reinforce the Church simile, Marxism offered to impoverished workers, living an atomistic life, a kind of congregation, and to intellectuals, dissatisfied with their lives, a new existential creed. The first Marxist organizations were unique and inventive combinations of all the streams of the Enlightenment as well as early modern politics: political parties qua electoral machines, free-masonry with its cultic ceremonies and rites, the debating clubs that formed "opinion," and small, semi-conspiratorial groups of neo-Jacobin "professional revolutionaries."

Marxism's unparalleled success had a simple cause: Marx meant very seriously his insistence on the unity of theory and praxis, and he staked the whole future of his doctrine—philosophically as well as politically—on the rising star of a new social class, that of the modern industrial workers. Earlier socialists had not been too utopian, as Marx himself claimed—certainly not more utopian than Marx ultimately turned out to be—but rather, far too intellectually-minded. For them, socialism was "a new science of society," that is, a powerful corrective to modernity (sometimes favoring a new community or, eventually, a new Christianity). By contrast, Marx was convinced that the "social question" was not an "anomaly" of recently emancipated civil society, but an integral part of the emancipation process. When political rights are given to everyone, at least in principle, everyone's needs have to be recognized; hence the appearance of "the social question," which was unknown in precapitalist societies. Precisely for that reason, a second emancipation had to follow, one that Marx termed "human," and that could result neither from a new socialist science nor from a Christianity distinguished by a socialist spirit, but that could only be the practical deed of those whose very existence constituted "the social question," i.e., it could only be a deed of proletarian self-emancipation, simultaneously a political and a philosophical act.

This proposal was combined with a new invention of modern politics, "radicalism." Radicalism—or "grasping everything at its root: Man," as Marx put it—had several features. First, as Robespierre had stated and Marx repeated, it was about "making true the promises of philosophy," and not just about managing the affairs of a given social order. Second, it was permanent revolution, a process that knew no terminus or closure so long as any institution of either "the base" or the "superstructure" of the existing civilization survived. Finally, it was an anthropological revolution, a dynamic that could be satisfied not by alleviating, or even abolishing proletarian indigence, but only by bridging the gap between the impoverishment of the individu-

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al and the creative wealth of the human species.

With the proverbial benefit of hindsight, one can now have very little doubt that Marx's project, despite its self-delusory, and sometimes pernicious, components, played a crucial constructive role in the ascendancy of modernity as a world of freedom. Ultimately, the project turned out to be a proletarian mythology that has been "scientifically falsified" several times. However, as Hans Blumenberg rightly pointed out, the *absolute* contrast between Logos and Myth is one of the myths of the Enlightenment. "Work on myth" remains necessary even in the creation of a rationalized modern world; what counts is the *message* of the "rationalized myth." In Marxian mythology, the proletarian, society's pariah, was not a humble petitioner, admitted into good society on the condition that he mind social and cultural hygiene, but was, instead, the repository of a new civilization. (Georg Lukács, the only great and original philosopher in the Marxian tradition, worked out the philosophical foundations of this transition to a new civilization, in *History and Class Consciousness*.)

Boosting proletarian morale and raising the social outcast to the level of the political and cultural subject of modernity was perhaps an unintended consequence of the Marxian theory (indeed, its creator would probably have regarded the proletariat as hopelessly confined to the world that had to be transcended). And yet, it was a crucial and beneficial influence. For, throughout the 19th century, the story of modernity threatened to turn into a tale of domestic colonization and Caesarism; threatened to revert "emancipated slavery"—the existence of the industrial worker—to unemancipated slavery pure and simple.

The self-emancipation of the working class, that is, its increasing participation in politics and in forging and expanding democratic institutions, was central to the emergence of modernity as a domain of freedom. In this process, the Marxian mythology of the proletariat was by no means the only morale-booster. In the United States, it played no role, and in Great Britain, where theoretically much less homogeneous philosophies of liberal socialism gained the upper hand, and where trade unions did a considerable part of the job without any kind of philosophy, it played very little role. Generally speaking, and for good reason, Marx's mythology was only influential where liberalism was not part of the political culture and democratic institutions were all but absent. However, in continental Europe, and for a while in the Orient, it is hard to imagine the self-emancipation of the working class into a political existence without Marx's influence.

For Marx, staking his bet on the proletariat was also a wager on industrialization. In his theory, industrialization appeared as revolutionary, and the age of revolution was the age of industrialization. This linkage was incomparably more than a mere superficial "correlation." Industrial capitalism was not less revolutionary for Marx than proletarian socialism, for it had eroded and destroyed the foundations of the old world order with an uncompromising ruthlessness. The proletariat as a class and its revolutionary spirit were in fact forged in the workshop of revolutionary capitalism, which held no sacrament of ancient times in awe. In combining revolution and industry, Marx was in the mainstream of modern thought. This combination also provided his anthropology with a new dimension: the human being appeared as revolutionary not just in its capacity as *homo politicus*, but also in his capacity as *homo faber*. The journey of Prometheus Bound toward the direction of Prometheus Unbound (Prometheus being the titan Marx regularly associated with the proletariat) underscored that in the proletarian mythology, the function of breaking God-imposed chains was equivalent to setting the prerequisites for modern production. Through the personal union of *homo faber* and (revolutionary) *homo politicus*, the substance of modernity, in good Hegelian fashion, turned into (a functionalist) subject.

The dual wager on revolutionary industrialization and the revolutionary proletariat made it possible for Marx to



Karl Marx.

—The Bettmann Archive.

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build a vocabulary that has shaped the language of politics right up to the present day, based on the overarching and opposing categories "capitalism" and "socialism." These binary terms indicated alternative ways of "instituting society," which for all of the 19th and most of the 20th century, were equivalent to establishing particular economic orders (capitalist or state-socialist). Insofar as modernity was identified as either "capitalism" or "socialism," the entire new epoch, born in libertarian revolutions, was reduced to a specific way of organizing the economy, with the commonality that in both versions, industrialization remained a constant. It also meant that the freedom of the moderns was a mere "superstructure," which occasionally could be dispensed with.

By introducing the language of "capitalism" and "socialism," by suggesting that economy was the center and the substance of social existence, which determines every other sphere—an assumption of classic English political economy that was philosophical dogma from Adam Smith onward, and that Marx fully adopted—Marx set the dominant tone of early modernity. He invented the language not only of socialists, but also that of their enemies. But in proportion to modernity's coming of age, the vocabulary focusing on the contrast of "capitalism versus socialism" gradually gives way to a new vocabulary, one in which no single determining center of social life is distinguished, in which the separate dynamics of the economy, the functional division of labor, cultural trends, and ways of organizing political freedom are recognized in their own distinct rights.

Almost as important as its wager on the nascent working class movement was Marxism's century-long power to attract intellectuals. For Antonio Gramsci was right (although today, in an age when flocks of intellectuals are rushing to leave a barren and spiritually depleted communism, his observation has boomeranged): domination is firmly rooted only insofar as it is primarily cultural hegemony, and not just the naked power of coercion. A quick glance at Marx's personal lifestyle explains much of this attraction. This German-Jewish émigré in London, unknown for decades in his own native country, cut off from the academe that he despised, never having held or sought a job in his whole life, acting the literary gentleman but without the independent means, this quarrelsome literatus and free-lance journalist who participated in the emerging international working class politics only from a distance, became suddenly a mythological father figure of a powerful global movement. This happened at the end of his difficult life, when he was primarily absorbed by family affairs, which he handled in a rigidly Victorian manner. Add to this the contemptuous superiority Marx felt toward the very establishment his own work had created—the best expression of which is his haughty remark that he was not a Marxist—and one observes the epitome of an attitude that has been, overtly or covertly, the *Wunschtraum* (wishful dream) of a philosophically collectivist, but personally highly individualist, radical European intelligentsia.

With its polyphony, Marx's theory catered to almost all the major cultural needs and diverse tastes of the modern intelligentsia. The author of the first volume of *Das Kapital*, who described "the dark, satanic mills" of early capitalist sweatshops in a style evocative of William Blake, gave expression to intellectuals' rebellious social consciences as well as to their malaise concerning their own "privileged" lifestyle. This philosopher who considered Darwin to be the Newton of biology (in an unstated polemic against Kant) and promised a science of society suffused with Darwinian rigor was the century's most passionate spokesman for a secularization in which Science, the new god, would replace a dying religion. But for many radicals with mystical leanings, that same prophet of science was also a prophet pure and simple. He appeared as the messianic founder of an eschatological-revolutionary religion in which ancient Jewish messianism blended with radical Enlightenment, and in which the words of Jesus, *ego sum via, veritas, et vita*, only had to be translated into the first person plural to apply to the new collective Redeemer—the proletariat. Marx, the devoted reader of Greek tragedy, also displayed a fine sense of tragic grandeur that the intellectuals so sorely missed in the prose of the modern and "artificial" society. In his pamphlet *The Civil War in France*, which was written after the fall of the Paris Commune, during the days of the white terror, and in which a heroic proletariat was presented as the protagonist of a passion play, nailed to the cross of history, Marx generated a lingua franca for isolated intellectuals who yearned for drama, greatness, and a new historical hero.

Not least of all, and presenting a great and not entirely innocent temptation for intellectuals, there was the personal story of the private scholar, who, by the sheer power of his mind, was catapulted to the peaks of worldwide political recognition. This was the story of a man who, had he lived longer, could not have avoided becoming Marxist, that is, a power politician of the first magnitude. It had been clear for decades before World War I—when this truth dawned upon everyone—that the old political elite, still selected halfway on the basis of aristocratic principles, on the one hand was increasingly unfit to manage modern political affairs, and on the other hand was blocking access to power of new

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and ambitious groups. Marxist politics now offered this new elite a possibility of breaking the hold on power by the social gerontocracy. Almost the only dimension missing from Marx's wide diapason was the psychological—crucially important for introspective and often narcissistic modern intellectuals. Hence the subsequent repeated attempts by Marxists and *marxisants* to reconcile Marx with Freud, the last, somewhat bizarre, chapter of which was Jean-François Lyotard's thesis of Marx's "libidinal economy."

This multidimensionality of Marx's philosophy, which was a major source of the breadth and variety of its appeal, at the same time created a political dilemma for a theory famously destined not just to interpret but to change the world. While indeed Marx is not responsible for the Bolshevik doctrine of the "unity of will"—a code word for totalitarian submission and brainwashing—his philosophy did present a dogmatic claim to monolithic truth (which could not be substantiated in terms of his own theory). And this claim, so attractive to poor-spirited types afraid to have an opinion of their own, embarked on a collision course with the multilayered character of a theory that also appealed to diverse groups of influential intellectuals. Marxism, still in the cradle, was torn between trends promoting the unity of the "Church" and others promoting heresy—both fueled by the very structure of their common philosophy.

Politics without Political Theory

The worldly fortunes of Marx's philosophy—its spectacular rise to power and the equally spectacular downfall of the power that called itself Marxist to its dying moment—were grounded in a paradox: the most politically minded of all philosophies had no political theory. There is a striking similarity between Marx's eschatology and that of early Christianity, which arose from the Old Testament and Jewish Law. The Redeemer, who met God face to face before and not merely after crucifixion and resurrection, and who therefore already knew the Father while in this world, made no statement on God or what Christians had to do, except that they had to follow Him and turn away from the world. So too, Marx's eschatology, which "knew" the "other world," since it had deduced it from the present one, made no statement about this transcendent realm other than that it should be constituted by the absolute negation of what existed. This crucial lacuna in the "philosophy of praxis" severely perplexed its greatest pragmatic student, Lenin, in that hour of truth when the most orthodox version of implementation—war communism—had failed and new paths had to be broken.

Whatever Marx had to say about the future has been enveloped in certain "great negations" of his philosophy. "The society of associated producers"—his theoretical term reserved for the future state of affairs, whose popular name in Marxist politics is "communism"—is perhaps the most ambitious of such negations. For what it means to transcend is not merely "capitalism," but also "society." In premodern times, the name of the human domain was "the world," an empty term whose main and perhaps sole function was to separate the human habitat from "nature." The concept "world," as the domicile of humans in the universe, asserts nothing collectively or individually about its inhabitants, nor does it make statements on the ways they organize their lives. In modernity, the name of the human domain is "society," which is understood in terms of its "science," sociology, as an aggregate of individuals and their arrangement into institutions and clusters (classes, strata, estates, castes, and the like) and the network of cohesions and conflicts among them. But "the society of associated producers" is *beyond society*. It is an association insofar as it will contain no gap between the individual and the species. As a consequence, within this framework, no aggregates of "species-beings" or institutions sensu stricto are necessary, or even conceivable.

The second "great negation" is that of the economy as a separate domain of human activities, as a "sphere." Early on, at the time of his conversion to Marx, Luckács observed that the implicit message of Marx's philosophy of history was that capitalism could be perceived as the only society where the economy was a separate sphere. (Put another way, "capitalism" is "society" precisely because one major institution, the economy, arranges its individual persons into aggregates called socio-economic "classes.") Exactly for that reason, capitalism is the eschatological moment after which the separated economy will vanish for good, and people will either make short guest appearances in the "realm of necessity" or they will stand beside the economic automaton and supervise it. This is why Marx never conceived an economic doctrine sensu stricto so much as an eschatological anti-economy, whose major messianic postulate was that it is neither human nor necessary to live in scarcity.

The final "great negation" of Marx's philosophy, and perhaps the most astonishing, is the negation of the relevance of politics for the future "society of associated producers." In the same breath as the economy, law (qua regulative texts, interdictions, and penal institutions) is abolished as well. Once these premises are accepted, it stands to reason that in an "association" based on an existentialist anti-economy in which the

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"management of things" can be settled in a minimalist fashion, and where in terms of the theory, no (legal or extra-legal) coercion or violence is acceptable or conceivable, politics can only be an empty name. It is not so self-evident, and yet it is true, that the so-called "transition" from capitalist "society" to "association"—the substance of Marxist politics—was for Marx a nonpolitical issue. So long as his philosophically constituted protagonist—the proletariat—involved itself in activities like electoral campaigns, movements for social reform, constitution-making and legal changes, and imposing its will on parliaments and governments; in other words, so long as it engaged in politics, in Marx's estimation it was on the wrong track, for it remained bogged down in "society," instead of negotiating the transition to "association."

Marx's politics was a politics of the Apocalypse, much better grasped by intellectuals like Georges Sorel, Lukács, Jean-Paul Sartre, or Maurice Merleau-Ponty than by social democratic or communist politicians making frequent references to him. All hairsplitting on a "theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat" was therefore either hypocritical window-dressing, a façade drawn in front of the technology of coercion, or as the ingenious German term has it, a *Wissenschaft des Nicht-Wissens-Werten* (the science of that which is not worth knowing). For "the dictatorship of the proletariat" was meant to be a point in space, not a successive line; a frozen moment, not a duration; a launching pad from which the proletariat could be catapulted into the new world.

The other face of the paradox is that precisely this philosophy, with its gaping lacuna in the place where political theory was supposed to be, by virtue of its many fundamental constituents, proved to be an inspiration for modern radical politics. To begin with, modern political radicalism was universalist, a solution to the problems of the human race, not just those of a nation, region, or ethnic group. Thus, it could find no better background and foundation for itself than Marx's ultra-universalist philosophy of history. Second, the premise of modern political radicalism is the belief in the endless "makeability" of that artifact, the modern world. Marx's philosophy provided a complete explanation for the penchant of "making the artifact," with its idea of a social project, a "plan," and with its fixed telos of historical dynamic.

Finally, radical politics could be understood in Marxian terms as a fusion of two disparate concepts. On the one hand, it was perfect *techne* with a greater degree of "realism" than *Realpolitik*, because it was supposedly grounded in the most objective "science of society." On the other, it was a politics of fate, for in order to come true, historical-political necessity required the most heroic deeds of actors who would risk everything and challenge fate. This combination of extreme objectivity, posing as the natural science of the arbitrary, and the provocatively subjective, which at crucial junctures simply dismissed the results of its own science, appealed enormously to the type of radical actor who was both more calculative, and therefore pragmatically more successful, than the traditional Machiavellian, but who, nevertheless, finally leaped into the abyss.

Marxism's Offspring

The two political alternatives that grew out of the Marxian inspiration—the social democratic and the communist—each made arbitrary selections from the dimensions of Marx's philosophy, although for a long time both of them claimed orthodoxy. Social democracy, whose adequate self-understanding can be found in Eduard Bernstein's pronouncement that the movement is everything, while the goal is nothing, shed all the apocalyptic-eschatological elements of the original vision. It was the embodiment of a genuinely and completely secularized politics, but with a bad conscience. While it prudently opted for the immanency of modernity, which it intended to critically rearrange again and again, instead of committing itself to the adventure of its absolute transcendence, while it represented the hyper-rationalist spirit of Marx, "the Darwin of society," nevertheless, it often felt pangs of conscience for abandoning the greatness of eschatological politics, and it apologized for its own "cowardice." Moreover, in order to ward off the temptation of a ruthless and dangerously reckless politics of the apocalypse, social democracy first ditched Marx and later jettisoned theory and cultural imagination altogether. As just punishment for this self-castration, it remained confined to the First World, because what seemed in that setting to be simplistic, albeit attractive, politics, in the so-called Third World proved a much too complex, as well as an insufficiently radical, formula.

The second alternative, "Marxism-Leninism," was an even more arbitrary selection from the menu of Marxian philosophy, and resulted in the philosophy's curtailment and fragmentation. Although it kept Marxian phraseology, Marxism-Leninism threw overboard the entire "humanistic" legacy of Marx's philosophy, and used what was left as the justification for the communist contribution to political technology: the theory and practice of totalitarianism. In a perverted sense, this too was a reflection upon, and a solution for, a difficult postulate of Marx's philosophy: the one that required the

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

Eduard Bernstein, whose elaborations of Marxist theory inspired West European social democracy.

—The Bettmann Archive.

collapsing of theory into practice, creating the unity of the two by realizing, and thus sublating, philosophy. In a similarly perverted fashion, it was also "faithful" to Marx's universalist spirit, because the communist innovation, the updating of the traditional *techne* of tyranny, was spreading on all continents. For a while, it had a spectacular success in the Third World, because it was the simplest possible way of eliminating the traditional order and establishing a new type of power for a new type of elite.

The catchword of the new elite's self-advertisement was "modernization." But instead of slowly nurturing a just-nascent individuality, promoting a complex culture of emotions and lifestyles, encouraging citizenship as a replacement for the ties of blood and kinship, establishing the equality of the genders, developing a legal consciousness, and writing good laws by testing them via trial and error, the new elite was content to organize its power in imitation of the communist apparatuses, parrot the clichés of Marxism-Leninism, and above all, confiscate the whole wealth of society.

Since both political alternatives inspired by Marx's philosophy discarded fundamental dimensions of that philosophy, the bifurcation provoked recurring waves of an internal opposition, each accusing the other of falsifying the original intentions. The early "leftist" radicalism of the pre–World War I period of the Second International and the late "rightist" opposition to post-Stalinist communism—both claiming to be the repository of the genuine message (which, they claimed, had been distorted by the dominant pseudo-orthodoxy) and both cherishing the self-delusory ambition of reconstructing a Marxian text beyond the political division into social democratic "opportunism" and communist totalitarianism—belonged structurally to the course of Marxism as politics. And, in turn, every wave of oppositional Marxism had its own "dialectic." As long as it fought its Marxist counterpart, it was defending one or another progressive aspect of modernity. This is particularly true of anti-totalitarian revisionist Marxists during the last decades of "real socialism." But once the position they were attacking was weakened or toppled, and whenever they tried to assert their thesis as a synthesis of all the "emancipatory elements" of the original text, they either took illusory positions or simply degraded into a vulgar reaction.

In proportion to and as a reaction against the gradual social democratic self-distancing from Marx's text, building a new orthodoxy has become the backbone of communist politics. The term came later, with the publication of Lukács's famous essay in the early 1920's, but in retrospect, the trend toward orthodoxy is discernible already *avant la lettre* in Lenin's party, before it adopted the official self-appellation "communist." In all probability, the Bolsheviks—their leading mind, Lenin, included—had no idea of how seriously Lukács meant the term "orthodoxy"; because for them, theological niceties were terra incognita. Lukács, however, in anticipation of Gramsci, was acutely aware of the fact that our culture has traditionally been organized around a major text. Building the authority of the key text and controlling its interpretation is the source of enormous power, greater than any apparatus of coercion and terror. The Bolsheviks captured Lukács's basic message and translated it into the orthodoxy of the Church of the Grand Inquisitor, which was called "the purity of Marxism-Leninism."

But they never understood the warning of Hegel, who had known very well that the monopolization of and the control over the text is never sufficient. In our culture, the future of a great text, as well as that of the "church" in which it is embodied, depends on the text's richness, on the possibility of its heretic reading, and on the internal reserves and elastic ability of the "church" to reintegrate the heretic interpretation into the orthodoxy. The

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communists went about this business with their usual heavy-handedness, entrusting it to their ruthless and narrow-minded St. Felix. When Lenin curtly dismissed Lukács's theory as "too abstract and bad," he ushered in the ritualization of the poorest possible interpretation of Marx's great text. And under Stalin, heresy was not "improved on," repressed, *and* reintegrated, but rather was exterminated in the GULag. The result was the total intellectual-spiritual depletion of Marxist orthodoxy by the time communism was ripe to fall, which is the major explanation for the communists' inner defenselessness, once the apparatus of oppression was gone.

Le bilan (du communisme) est globalement negatif (to turn on its head Georges Marchais's well-known 1968 positive assessment of the situation of communism); indeed on all counts, communism can be accused of the wholesale corruption of a still-young modernity with its sophistry termed "dialectic." For what "the tyranny of freedom" left behind were the monuments of mass extermination in the same class as Hitler's camps; together, they constitute a museum exhibiting the fragility of the Enlightenment. It also triggered, primarily but not solely among intellectuals, a cynical indifference toward that foundational value of modernity, freedom. It enhanced all the traumatic features and genetic pathologies of modernity. The time of revolutions, with their excessive speed, accelerated pulsation, and hysterical rhythm, was declared to be the "normal time" of modernity, and it has been imposed on whole epochs, whose participants suffocated under its burden. The dictatorship of the future, itself an outgrowth of future-oriented modernity, was theoretically reinforced and solemnly proclaimed for the present. "Society as artifact" was experimentally produced in gigantic laboratories where the lives of the human guinea pigs were treated as *quantités négligeables*. The swing of modernity's pendulum was halted at one extreme; the swing back was forbidden and blocked. The usual modus operandi—trial and error—was excluded, and thus the economy was paralyzed. The monumental collapse and bankruptcy of the economic miracle of the century, the blitzkrieg-like Bolshevik industrialization, was a direct and inescapable result of this stopping of modernity's pendulum. With this crash, not just the unfounded and overambitious claims of a hyper-rationalistic management of society's economic affairs were destroyed. That in itself would be a net gain without losses. But modernity has also been left with deep scars: a temporarily paralyzed "social imagination," and a dangerously reduced self-confidence in project-making.

In the communist experiment with translating philosophy into praxis, not a single constituent of the original

Hungarian Marxist philosopher Georg Lukács.

—Archive Photos.

Marxian project has been "realized," and the project as a whole has been irretrievably compromised politically. A philosophy of absolute autonomy generated a world of almost complete heteronomy, through a type of politics that acted in its name. "Planned society," "scientifically" deducing the future from the present (a procedure that was supposed to put an end to the opaqueness of society, which was the result of reification), turned out to be a world of ultimate and irrational chaos. Now, after seven decades of communist instigation and administration of revolutions, there is not only no "revolutionary subject" left, but the very project of revolution has been terminated and discarded. When Jürgen Habermas called the upheavals of Eastern Europe "restituting revolutions," he meant it as a critique, not as a compliment. But in fact, this somewhat bitter description is the highest praise of the epochal events of 1989–91. For the last political revolutions of "the West" have finally overcome their offspring and aberration, "the permanent social revolution," and have restored modernity to a state of normalcy—in itself highly prob-

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lematic—from which the work of genuine social reform can depart.

Marx's Responsibility?

To what extent is Marx responsible for the crimes and fiascos of "Marxist politics"? There seems to be very little need to enter into one of the most sterile discussions of cultural history, one that tries to establish Marx's accountability for the GULag or Nietzsche's accountability for Auschwitz. Philosophers, for example, Lukács or Martin Heidegger, bear responsibility only for such deeds as were committed with their participation and support as private persons and members of totalitarian parties; and Marx was not a Marxist. But the opposite position can hardly be blown into a new myth either, i.e. the myth of Marx standing aloof from Marxist politics, having nothing to do with it, and waiting for his "genuine historical hour" to come. This would be a shallow myth, to which few would subscribe, and one that would hardly shape the "social imagination" of modernity.

Marx, the great philosopher and sociologist, the critic of instituting society exclusively in the sign and under the domination of a particular organization of the economic order, will remain important to many who preserve the critical edge of their view of modernity. But so long as modernity remains free and "normal," it will carefully avoid the guidance of the kind of politics that is based on a radical scenario of theoretical reason. As Odo Marquard wittily and rightly remarked: the time has come for the world, changed so many times by so many philosophies, to be finally spared. And sparing the world means primarily the separation of theoretical reason, in which all experiments are permitted, from practical reason, the reason of politics, in which experiments must remain the exception rather than the rule.

Commentary

Marxism, Communism, and the Good Society

Svetozar Stojanović

IT is both easy and at the same time difficult to comment on a paper of such high quality as Ferenc Fehér's. I share his position, which is formulated succinctly in the following two statements:

In the communist experiment with translating philosophy into praxis, not a single constituent of the original Marxian project has been "realized" and the project as a whole has been irretrievably compromised. . . .

. . . Marx's project, despite its self-delusory, and sometimes pernicious, components, played a crucial constructive role in the ascendancy of modernity as a world of freedom.

Consequently, I will simply elaborate on several of the topics addressed by Fehér.

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On Marx's (Co)Responsibility

I would like to begin with Fehér's question as to whether Marx bears some responsibility for the fiascos of "Marxist politics." On this issue, Fehér tries to avoid both extremes. On the one hand, his answer is clearly negative, since "philosophers . . . bear responsibility only for such deeds as were committed with their participation and support. . . ." On the other hand, Fehér says, "the opposite position can hardly be blown into a new myth either, i.e., the myth of Marx standing aloof from Marxist politics, having nothing to do with it . . . ." It is a pity that Fehér chose not to elaborate that point.

Indeed, in which sense and to what extent did Marx have something important to do with that politics? Since Marx was for the most part a theoretician, in my view, one should concentrate on the influence of his theory on the Bolsheviks. It is my thesis that Marx in the way he theorized not only opened up the possibility for the Bolshevization of his thought through reinterpretation, reduction, and transformation, but to a certain extent, inadvertently lent a helping hand. Namely, Marx was responsible for using an essentially unproblematized idea—the "dictatorship of the proletariat"—which, because it provided fertile ground for ideologization, was extremely dangerous from the start. Moreover, he designated this idea as his only original contribution to the theory of class struggle. The concept was the main ideological bridge between Marx's theory and Bolshevik practice, even if Marx meant something rather different from what the Bolsheviks had in mind and realized.

Marx was a philosopher and thinker of emancipatory practice, a staunch critic of utopian socialism and communism, a great critic of ideology, and a major critic of alienation. We must, therefore, include in the core of Marx's normative theory not only distant objectives of the communist movement ("the society of associated producers" with its "great absolute negations" of the existing society—of which Fehér speaks at great length and very eloquently), but also the ways and means by which they were to be achieved, for Marx wanted to be different from the utopians.

Consequently, the question of whether an idea such as the "dictatorship of the proletariat" could actually be realized should have been the focal point of attention for Marx. The plausibility of the dictatorship of the proletariat hinges on the answer to the question of whether the proletariat has sufficient power and means to introduce its dictatorship during the period of transition from the old society to communism. But, instead of perceiving and examining this problem, Marx wrongly believed that the proletariat was ontologically predetermined to perform that task.

In conceiving a new society, it is no small oversight to set out from the most optimistic assumptions, where no real thought was given to measures and guarantees against the abuse of power. Humankind had had plenty of bad experiences with rulers, and these lessons had been wisely remembered by liberal thinkers, not to mention Pierre Proudhon's and Mikhail Bakunin's direct warnings against the "dictatorship of the proletariat," warnings that Marx arrogantly derided.

As an economic class (and for that matter, one that possessed only its own labor power), workers did not, nor could they, become the ruling, let alone the dictatorial class. No matter how we look at it, Marx's idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat was practicable only by having some other group rule in the name of the proletariat. In the best of cases, such a group would rule in the proletariat's interest and under its control. In the worst case, the group would rule without any kind of supervision by the proletariat and against its vital interests. I, thus, take the usual criticism of Marx's utopianism a few steps further and claim that the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat was itself utopian.

A further problem arose in that Marx, for all his criticism of the ideologies of the time, failed to perceive that his own theories might lend themselves to "ideologization" and thereby serve as a justification for political domination and repression. Of course, no thinker can completely prevent the ideologization and alienation of his ideas, but he has the obligation to oppose explicitly and fully such a tendency, especially if, like Marx, he is himself a vigorous critic of ideology and alienation.

The founding fathers of political and cultural orientations, even the greatest and most humanistic, have no right to reserve for themselves an exclusive claim to creative influence, and to shift completely onto their followers the responsibility for the ideological outcome of their ideas and deeds, particularly if we are talking about those with an explicit and pronounced emancipatory interest at heart. Naturally, their responsibility is not restricted to the intended and predicted meaning and outcome of their ideas and acts, but must include the whole predictable meaning and all the predictable consequences.

Practical application is not a marginal dimension of Marx's theory, and still less is it an external approach to his theory. After all, he is renowned for his 11th thesis on Feuerbach "that the philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it." I am not trying to suggest, of course, that Marx, with his theoretical approach, could have entirely prevented unwanted practical interpretations. Rather, I only point out that he did not do nearly enough to narrow down the possibility and probability of at least the

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most dangerous practical interpretations. It was the "dictatorship of the proletariat" that was to become the central idea in the whole political and ideological "proletarian mythology" (Fehér).

I would like to conclude this section by saying that just as the full intellectual potential of Marx's work has still not been tapped, so, too, its ideological vulnerability has yet to be sufficiently studied and elucidated.

Post-Marxism and "Social-Eco Democracy"

Marxists' criticism of ruling communism in the name of Marx's communism used to have a progressive and even subversive character. This criticism (1) successfully questioned the system's Marxist legitimacy; (2) challenged the ideological monopoly of the ruling class on public discourse; and (3) by attracting the system's main counterattack, contributed considerably to the creation of some free space, not only for Marxists, but for non-Marxists as well.

The bitter reaction of communist officials and the persecution of Marxist critics showed that pointing to the gap between "Marxist-Leninist systems" and Marx's communism did indeed touch some tender spots. More often than not, unfortunately, it is now forgotten that the now victorious and dominant nationalistic and liberal orientations were preceded by the Marxist challenge made to the system by distinguished philosophers, sociologists, historians, cultural anthropologists, etc.

True, it was only as long as the system invoked Marx's communism as the basic criterion of its legitimacy that such efforts at de-legitimation of the system were germane. When the system made the ideological transition from "socialist realism" to "real socialism," the criticism from the standpoint of the communist classless and stateless society became quite ineffectual. As soon as the main ideological reference point became "reality" rather than the utopian communist future, official communist policy was unavoidably judged by its practical performance, so that nobody was willing any longer to forgive its faults in the name of the alleged communist future. In other words, communist reality looked increasingly bad, especially in comparison to the rich and democratic capitalist West (this was what might be called the "comparative crisis" of communism).

The greater the prospects for liberalization and democratization of the system (decentralization of government, permitting the re-emergence of some market forces and private property, partial reconstitution of "civil society," and establishment of the *Rechtsstaat*), the less effective the Marxist critique of the system became. Naturally, critical Marxists could, and many indeed did, support such measures—but only as pre-Marxists and post-Marxists (whether or not they realized or acknowledged the fact), and no longer as Marxists.

Those critical Marxists who could not adjust to this change and turning point were in real danger of becoming not only irrelevant, but conservative and even reactionary, obstacles to progressive change. Unfortunately, it is easy to turn the Marxist critique of bourgeois political economy and liberalism against liberalizing, democratizing change. It is not hard to guess what Marx would have said about privatization and marketization, since he characterized as "bourgeois" even non-market distribution of society's goods according to the amount of work a person performed.

Moreover, criticism based on the utopian concept of the "withering away" of the state had a conservative potential from the very beginning. But how, one might ask, could such an idea contribute, if only inadvertently, to the preservation of a social order whose essence is structural control of one group over the state and, through it, over all key areas of social life? It was by drawing people's attention away from real problems and realistic ways of resolving them that the utopian critique might have indirectly helped sustain the status quo. Contrary to such a critique, a realistic criticism and program had to focus on reducing (liberalization), and later on, eliminating (democratization) the dominant group's structural control over the state and social life.

The watershed of the transition from the revisionist-critical Marxism to post-Marxism is the rejection of Marx's crucial idea that in the new society, the dichotomy between state and "civil society" has to be overcome (*aufgehoben*). It was already both pre-Marxism and post-Marxism to conclude that this dichotomy ought to be preserved and that progressive structural transformation of existing communist systems was unthinkable without the renewal of the sphere of "civil society," independent from the state.

This break with Marxist tradition was rendered quite radical once the painful conclusion was reached that "civil society" is not feasible and viable without strong capitalist components, involving the market in all its dimensions (goods, services, capital, and labor), and secure rights to private ownership of productive forces. There is a crucial lesson to be learned from the fact that the most productive and most humane countries are "capitalist countries with a social democratic face." It is imperative now that progressive thinkers start anew from this amalgam of capitalism, democracy, and socialism.

In conceiving a feasible and viable good society today, which I would call "social-eco democracy," one has to assume a post-dialectic preservation of contradictions rather than the Hegelian-Marxist dialectic of

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overcoming them. Contradictions between "civil society" and state, market forces and social regulation, private property and state property, representative and participatory democracy, institutionalized democracy and social movements, competition and solidarity, freedom and equality, etc., ought to be creatively built into social organization and at the same time be prevented from becoming destructively divisive.

Marx's idea of the elimination of the capitalist mode of production and distribution has to be given up. If Leftism is to remain relevant, it must be "Leftism with a capitalist face." The enterprise must be a profit-making institution, not a basic unit of social policy of the state. The broader society, secondary (re)distribution, and state should simultaneously function according to the opposite principles of upholding community and solidarity and preserving the physical environment.

I also believe that post-Marxists should introduce a fundamental distinction between Marx's principles of radical humanism, on the one hand, and his idea of communist social organizations, on the other. The former, as is well known, include a conscious control over the socio-historical process, praxis, de-alienation, de-reification, meeting authentic human needs, pursuing the freedom of each and every individual as a precondition of freedom for all. Marx expected these principles to be fully realized in a new classless and stateless society, where private ownership of the forces of production and the market economy were to be completely abolished, and the distribution of social product was to be made, in the first phase, in accordance with work invested, and later, in accordance with needs. However, life has proven Marx's idea of a society without private property, market, "civil society," state, and law to be incompatible with feasible and viable programs of the good society.

In my judgment, though, this is not to say that Marx's radical humanistic principles need have the same fate. Provided they are separated from communist utopia and understood only as ultimate regulative-critical ideals, and not as constitutive-operative principles as well, those principles can—in revised form and combined with numerous mediations—be useful for the humanist evaluation of existing societies and projects of the good society.

I have to admit that these thoughts on the quest for the good society are questionable when one looks at matters on a global scale. Ecological catastrophies, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the growing North-South gap, etc., with all their ramifications, will continue to loom like the sword of Damocles over humanity. The apocalyptic potential raised by the disintegration of the USSR has, hopefully, reminded us of the brink on which we have been teetering. Market forces, private property, profit, capitalism, nation-states and their regional integration—are all, unfortunately, inadequate for coping with those problems and dangers. Thus, instead of taking a Western-capitalist triumphalistic turn, our thought and action—philosophical, theological, scientific, and political—should take an apocalyptic turn, focusing on ways and means of reducing the probability of humankind's self-destruction. In other words, humanity cannot survive without becoming a world community that is much more democratic-socialist and federalist than democratic-capitalist and sovereign nationalist in character.

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Commentary

The Message of Marxism

Giorgio Napolitano

MARXISM as a political ideology embodied in the communist regimes ended in tragic failure. But Ferenc Fehér's paper started by reconstructing the reasons for its "unparalleled success," and he was right to do so. So much of world history in this century has hinged on the actions of those movements and those regimes: one cannot now present as mere mistake, mere aberration, the theory on which they were based. Were one to do so, the long and tough confrontation that has just come to an end would make no sense. We still need to reflect on why the confrontation was so long and tough, and hence on the trajectory and collapse of communism; we may then be able to better grasp the size of the problems it has left behind.

Fehér was particularly convincing in reminding us of the "crucial constructive role" Marx's project played in the "ascendancy of modernity as a world of freedom," the crucial element of which was "the self-emancipation of the working class, that is, its increasing participation in politics and in forging and expanding democratic institutions." One could well claim, in fact, that the passage from liberalism to democracy in Europe bore the mark of the struggles and achievements of the workers' movement, and that the latter was, though perhaps not everywhere, strongly influenced by Marxism.

But what were the most characteristic features of Marxism as a "political ideology"? There are two points I would like to make, and I want to address them in the light of my experience as a politician who was for decades engaged (not the least, culturally) in a party of Marxist inspiration—the Italian Communist Party (PCI).

THE first point concerns what Fehér calls "proletarian mythology." He puts in evidence that Marx's project turned into mythology, into utopia, into an "eschatological-revolutionary religion." But, paradoxically, says Fehér, the fatal weakness of Marx's hyper-political philosophy consisted precisely in the lack of a political theory; it simply relied on the advent of a future realm identified only by some "great negations."

What comment might one offer? It seems to me that one should speak of a singular mix of utopianism and realism, of mythology and the representation of interests. One should not forget that in any Marxist party, the belief was held—on the basis of a famous pamphlet by Friedrich Engels—that Marx was responsible for "the evolution of socialism from utopia to science." Marx found a tremendous source of power in the incontestable fact of the development of the working class and in this class's capacity to organize itself in defense of its own material interests and political rights. The myth of the historical certainty or ineluctability of the victory of the proletariat drew its strength from claims that this proposition was grounded in science. Subsequently, what gave further impetus to communist messianism was the idea, after 1917, that a social alternative to capitalism had emerged—Soviet Russia. Thus, socialism had not only passed from utopia to science, but in one part of the world it had turned into reality. This was the illusion that proved so suggestive and so tenacious.

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Fehér has adequately set out the degeneration and the reasons for the final collapse of the "communist experiment with translating philosophy into praxis," but there were, especially in the early phase, sufficient accomplishments—and sufficient international appreciation—to foster enthusiasm and hope, and to build mystifications.

THE second point I would like to discuss is Fehér's assertion that "Marx's politics was a politics of Apocalypse." In my view, from the earliest days of Marx-inspired socialist movements, "the apocalyptic-eschatological elements of Marx's vision" were tempered by the commitment to attain immediate, concrete goals through political action (though they never lost sight of the "ultimate goals"). Subsequently, social democratic parties opted for "a genuinely and completely secularized politics"; but, says Fehér, "with a bad conscience." It could be that "a bad conscience" plagued those parties that jettisoned "theory and cultural imagination" along with the "politics of the Apocalypse." But not all of them did so. The effort not to do so was made—in the better periods of its history—by the PCI, a party that was sui generis. In fact, this party was fully involved in the democratic political life of Italy, and was behaving in ways similar to those of a large social democratic party—although it used to deny it. And at the same time, it was attempting to establish theoretically its own version of Marxism and socialism, taking account of the complexity of Western societies and of the richness of liberal and democratic values, and providing for autonomy of cultural experiment.

Antonio Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* was for the PCI a potent antidote to the impoverished, dogmatic, manipulative versions of Marx's thinking that made up the official doctrine of the communist parties in power. Gramsci worked on certain key ideas, among which, as Fehér reminds us, was the concept of "hegemony," based on the distinction between "the two modes," in which "the supremacy of a social group" may manifest itself as "dominion" or as "intellectual and moral direction." And he emphasized the relationship between the state and civil society, deriving from this relationship a fundamental distinction between the East, where "the state was everything [and] civil society primordial and jelly-like," and the West, where there was "a just relationship between the state and civil society and in the quiver of the state could be made out the solid structure of civil society." The complexity and ambiguity of these concepts demand further scrutiny; and positions cannot today be attributed to Gramsci that belong to later phases in the political evolution of his party. But the PCI, in its reading of Gramsci, was able to find a theoretical source for what became its democratic strategy, and for a deepening of its criticism of the Soviet model and of the ideological schemes dominant in the communist movement.

The dialectic of heresies and revisionisms, the dialectic of the Marxisms—not just one, but many—has historically yielded its fruit and shown the limits beyond which it could not go. We must distinguish (as does Fehér) what is alive and what is dead in Marx's work, and emphasize what is fruitful in the sphere of "theoretical reason," and what instead leads astray in the sphere of "political reason." But the chapter on Marxism as a "guide to action" is closed forever.

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Commentary

Secular Prophecy and Radical Dreams—Reflections on the Fate of Marxism

Vladimir Tismaneanu

ACCORDING to a joke circulating in Moscow during Brezhnev's time, Karl Marx asked the Politburo's permission to address Soviet workers on television. When offered this opportunity, instead of haranguing about the evils of capitalism, the founding father of scientific socialism exclaimed, "Proletarians of all countries, forgive me!" This sentence sums up the whole tragedy of Marxism, the chasm between what Karl Marx envisaged and the realities of "really existing socialism."

The eclipse of Marxism as a strategy for social transformation ends an age of radicalism and justifies a number of reflections regarding the destiny of utopian thought in this century. I agree with Ferenc Fehér's masterful obituary of "Marxism as politics," but I want to discuss Marxism's utopian component, something that Marxism has never acknowledged. On the contrary, both Marx and Engels, as well as their positivistic epigones, went out of their way to insist that the Marxian paradigm is true because it is scientific. The ethical dimension, detected by some neo-Kantians and delineated in Karl Popper's devastating reading of the Marxian project, was subordinated to the scientific, hyperrationalistic, and potentially terroristic elements.

With characteristic 19th-century hubris, Marx declared his social theory the ultimate scientific formula, one as exact and precise as the algorithms of mathematics or the demonstrations of formal logic. Not to recognize their validity was, for Marx, as for his successors, evidence of historical blindness or "false consciousness," which was characteristic only of those who opposed Marxist solutions to social questions. Prisoners of the bourgeois mentality, alienated victims of ideological mystifications, non-Marxist theorists—all purveyors of false consciousness—were scorned and dismissed as supporters of the status quo.

At the opposite pole, the proletarian viewpoint, celebrated by Marx and crystallized in the form of historical materialism, was thought to provide ultimate knowledge and the recipe for universal happiness. Thanks to the proletarian class conscience, the doctrine maintained, a revolution would occur that would end all forms of oppression. Mankind would undertake the world-historical leap from the realm of necessity (scarcity, injustice, torments) into the realm of freedom (joy, abundance, and equity). This would end mankind's prehistory and begin its real history.

The Communist Manifesto

My intention is not to examine the whole of Marxist ideology with its underlying myths, chimeras, and rationalizations, but only one text, perhaps the most inflammatory and impassioned ever written by a philosopher—*The Communist Manifesto.* In this scathing, bellicose, vitriolic, and incandescent pamphlet, Marx (in co-authorship with his loyal friend Friedrich Engels) pilloried a whole social class—the bourgeoisie—and a whole social order—capitalism—and proclaimed, in a moment of prophetic ecstasy, the "objective, inexorable necessity" of their overthrow. It is in the *Manifesto,* more than in any other Marxist text, with a tone that was

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later echoed in George Sorel's hymns to unbounded violence, that the moral legitimacy of total rebellion was first proudly heralded.

Written in the middle of the 19th century, *The Communist Manifesto* became the charter and the vital substance of the Marxist faith. Marxism, for all its scientific pretense, did in fact represent a secular substitute for traditional religion. Its millennialist nature explains its magnetism, the capacity to elicit romantic-heroic behavior, to generate collective fervor, to pit social groups against one another, and to instill enthusiasm, hope, and mystical delusions in large social strata. Furthermore, this religious element explains the attraction exerted on the disenchanted and alienated intelligentsias of the West as well as on Westernized radical groups of the Third World. Precisely because of its deliberately simplified rhetorical devices, the *Manifesto* became the *livre de chevet* for generations of professional revolutionaries. It was the political counterpart to Marx's 11th Thesis on Feuerbach, in which he proclaimed that the issue was not how to interpret the world, but how to change it. *The Communist Manifesto* represented an apocalyptic formulation of this eschatological-salvationist dream of universal liberation. It did not matter that the classes it was depicting were moral constructs of a feverish imagination; the pamphlet became the epitome of revolutionary imagination.

The eventual exhaustion of the *Manifesto*'s promissory content was also indicative of the extinction of Marxism as an oracular creed. It was precisely in the professed unity between theory and praxis that Marxism found its historical cul-de-sac: its practical failure was the confirmation of its theoretical fallacies. In other words, a philosophy that proclaimed praxis as the criterion of truth, and maintained that concrete reality is the test of its validity, was dramatically belied by the practical impossibility of its implementation as originally designed and by the human costs linked to its Leninist and post-Leninist revisions and experiments. As Leszek Kołakowski concluded in his unsurpassed trilogy, "The self-deification of mankind, to which Marxism gave philosophical expression, has ended in the same way as all such attempts, whether individual or collective: it has revealed itself as the farcical aspect of human bondage."[1] This is a theme that can be further discussed, and I agree with Fehér that the issue is not to engage in preposterous and certainly fruitless indictments of Marx's culpability for the Stalinist GULag. The problem is not guilt but intellectual responsibility. Marx was not the philosopher of the GULag, but there were components of his doctrine that permitted the grotesque caricature of dialectics codified by Stalin and turned into the state religion of all Soviet-type regimes.

Ironically, this left-wing Hegelian philosopher who wanted to redress millennia-long injustices opened the door to the creation of a system that established a tyranny comparable only to that created by the National Socialists in Germany. In the incendiary lines of the *Manifesto,* one can decipher the whole tragedy that was to follow: Lenin's forcing of the pace of history, the genesis of Bolshevism as a matrix for generalized terror, the Stalinist horrors, and the universe of the concentration camp. Nations were murdered in order to carry out Marx's utopian desiderata. Social classes were victimized in the name of his abstract speculations and moral outrage.

It is equally true that one can discover in the *Manifesto* a flaming appeal to social harmony, a call for the reconciliation of individual and society, but it seems to me that these pleas are overshadowed by the vindictive spirit of Marx's oracular monism. The hyper-deterministic approach, the scientism, the positivism all take their revenge on the ethical-libertarian dimension and lay the foundation for intolerance and repression. To elaborate on a dichotomy proposed by Popper, it can be said that the *moral* radicalism of Marxism survived in contemporary varieties of democratic socialism. The *political* radicalism, with its mixture of historicism and positivism, ended up in Leninist conspiracy and dictatorship.[2]

The *Manifesto* does not claim to be a detached text, an analysis of what Marx diagnosed as the incurable ailments of the capitalist formation. Marx's démarche is not a romantic, anti-modern writing that deplores the appalling side effects of urbanization and industrialization. The *Manifesto* does not stigmatize the bourgeois order for its break with the communitarian values of blood and soil. On the contrary, its universalistic, transnational spirit is a battle cry on behalf of modernity. It states that the proletariat is the chosen class of history, the long-expected redeemer that will restore the lost unity of the human species (*Gattungswesen*).

The subtext of the *Manifesto* is an attack on the ambiguity of the bourgeois experience of modernity. Marx wants to correct this experience, to rectify it. For Marx, the bourgeois experience is a broken promise, a realm of duplicity; and the proletariat, like the Messiah-class Marx thinks it to be, is to punish those guilty of this duplicity. Written under the impulse of revolt, it is a text im-

[1]See Leszek Kołakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism,* Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1978, Vol. 3, *The Breakdown,* p. 530.

[2]See Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1966, Vol. 2, *The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath,* p. 211.

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bued with the sentiment of ethical outrage. To the extent that it subsists at all, the scientific element is buried in this avalanche of propaganda invectives. Irritating for some, contagious for others, the *Manifesto* is perhaps the most elaborate example of the rhetoric of modern destructiveness. In its fulminations and insults, in the grandiose hatred it pours on the powers that be and the philistinism of the bourgeois experience, it can be compared only to Nietzsche's outcries in *Ecce Homo* and *The Will to Power.*

A child of his time, but to be sure a frustrated and highly difficult child, full of secret vanities and offended ambitions, Marx projects his malaise to a cosmic level. His abhorrence of the bourgeoisie (combined with a certain envy, one might argue) leads him to an ultimate apocalyptic verdict: since the bourgeoisie is guilty of the barbarous distortion of human life, it deserves its fate. The proletariat is historically and morally bound to be its gravedigger. Moreover, the unreconstructed scientism, a disease of the positivistic age (let us not forget that Marx was a contemporary of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer), makes Marx view the social universe in terms of a frozen determinism. All human reality is thus subordinated to the dialectical laws of development, and history is projected into a sovereign entity, whose diktat is beyond any human questioning.

Here I see a fatal methodological error in Marxism: its rendering of history as a *gesetzmässig* (law-governed) succession of historical formations, and in the corollary of this rendering—the dogma of the class struggle as the engine of historical progress. In this theory, individuals are nothing more than hostages of forces that transcend their will and whose workings they can scarcely understand. This combination of philosophy and myth, so persuasively explored by Robert C. Tucker,[3] prevented the young German radical philosopher and his disciples throughout the decades from grasping the subjective dimension of history and politics. As Fehér says, the main difficulty with the Marxian project is its lack of sensitivity to the psychological makeup of mankind. The obsession with social classes, what French sociologist Lucien Goldmann once referred to as the viewpoint of the transindividual historical subject (a Lukácsian formulation, to be sure),[4] the failure to take into account the infinite diversity of human nature, the eagerness to reduce history to the conflict between polar social categories, this is indeed the substratum of an ideology that, wedded to sectarian and fanatic political movements, has generated many illusions and much grief in our century.

With its cult of totality, this social theory, which purported to be the ultimate explanatory archetype, set the stage for its degeneration into dogma and the persecution of the heretics that were to punctuate Marxism once it was transfigured into Leninism. An example of this dogma is the *Manifesto*'s thesis about the alleged inherent internationalism of the proletarian class, that famous assertion according to which proletarians have no fatherland. In this thesis, metaphysically deduced from the proclamation of the proletariat as the social embodiment of Hegelian reason, Marx bestows on the working class a universalist mandate that has little empirical validity (as it was borne out in the outbursts of nationalism during World War I, to the dismay of the Zimmerwald Left and other Marxian zealots).

Marx imagined an ideal proletariat, ready to renounce all social, communitarian, and cultural bonds. What really happened was precisely the opposite of Marx's prophecy: the proletariat failed to negotiate the apocalyptical breach, the cataclysmic and chiliastic cleavage so powerfully announced in the *Manifesto*. The Bolshevik revolution was anything but the total movement bound to overthrow the existing order and usher in the realm of freedom. Rather, the Bolsheviks inaugurated a pattern of dictatorial conduct that carried to an extreme both the Jacobin terrorist logic and the fanaticism of Russia's radical movements of the 19th century. Claiming to be Marx's most faithful disciple, Lenin despaired over the "*embourgeoisement*" of the Western proletariat. According to him, in the stage of imperialism, industrial workers cannot reach by themselves, spontaneously, revolutionary consciousness. They are a class "in itself." To become a class "for itself," i.e., to act in accordance with the Marxian script, consciousness should be injected from without by the self-appointed avant garde of professional revolutionaries. Bolshevism presupposed this chasm between the ignorant proletariat and the "enlightened," pedagogical elite.

Despite the Bolsheviks' best efforts, the collapse of capitalism did not take place on a global scale, and, to the dismay of radical thinkers like Herbert Marcuse or Jean-Paul Sartre, philosophy missed the hour of its historical realization. Once again, it turned out, there was a huge gap between theory and praxis, between the spiritual and material weapons of liberation.

Marxism's Failure

Contrary to the Marxian scenario, the 20th century was dominated not by the conflict between bourgeoisie and proletariat, but rather by the rivalry between the

[3]See *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1972.

[4]See *Marxisme et sciences humaines* (Marxism and the Human Sciences), Paris, Gallimard, 1970.

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The killing fields of Cambodia.

—UPI/Bettmann.

totalitarian blueprints inspired by absolutist and utopian ideologies (communism and fascism, in their various incarnations) on the one hand, and the liberal democratic experiments on the other. As such distinguished social thinkers as Popper, Hannah Arendt, and Raymond Aron showed, the struggle takes place between the partisans of the open society and those who seek to redesign society on the basis of a social or racial theory. In the case of Marxism, I tend to agree with those Soviet thinkers (Aleksandr Tsipko, for example) who found the original error in the founding father's hostility to the principle of private property and in his exaltation of egalitarian collectivism as a solution to all forms of social and economic injustice.[5] I think that it is precisely in this demonization of property, exacerbated during Stalin's rule, when whole social classes were physically exterminated in the name of a uniquely simplistic and single-minded reading of the original theses, that we can identify the fundamental source of the breakdown of the Marxian paradigm. Yes, Isaac Deutscher was right to describe Stalinism as a tribalization of Marxism, a combination of degraded historical materialism and primitive magic.[6] But for this Western conception to lend itself to such a bastardization, seeds of the monstrous distortion must have existed in the initial construct.

In addition, the decline of Marxism cannot be understood without reference to its vehement attack on democratic institutions, its inherent anti-parliamentarism, its arrogant rejection of the key propositions of liberalism, and its uncompromising hostility to nation and religion. Marxism failed because it misread human psychology, underestimating deep spiritual zones and deriding ultimate metaphysical searches and the human right to privacy. It aimed to create a perfect society whose materialization in the communist experiments, from Moscow to Phnom Penh, came closer to Kafka's *Penal Colony* than to the paradisiac visions of traditional utopians. Rereading the *Manifesto* today, we are overwhelmed by a sense of immense melancholy for all those lives sacrificed on the altar of a cynical teleology that managed to represent itself as revolutionary chiliasm.

Writing shortly before his death in 1983, Raymond Aron concluded his lifelong endeavor to analyze Marxism by pointing to its colossal theoretical and practical failure:

The prophecy, contradicted both by the evolution of capitalism and by the experience of so-called socialist regimes, remains as empty as it was at the beginning: How would the proletariat become the ruling class? Why would the proletariat become the ruling

[5]See Alexander S. Tsipko, *Is Stalinism Really Dead?* New York, Harper Collins, 1990.

[6]See Isaac Deutscher, "Marxism and Primitive Magic," in Tariq Ali, Ed., *The Stalinist Legacy: Its Impact on 20th Century World Politics*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, Penguin, 1984, pp. 106–17.

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class? Why would collective ownership suddenly produce unprecedented efficiency? What magic wand would accommodate authoritarianism and centralized planning to personal freedom and democracy? What was to replace the market economy other than bureaucratic planning? The mystification began with Marx himself when he called his prophecy scientific.[7]

This is indeed the way Marxism appears at the end of this convulsive century: a hidebound and often abstruse millennialism, having little to do with the reality and the challenges of industrial civilization and unable to offer as remedies for human suffering anything other than empty slogans and ossified dogmas. As science, Marxism is irretrievably compromised. As the "opium for the intellectuals," it is almost extinct. This twilight is, at least in its implications, a grandiose *fin de partie*: we see the final agony of a hopeless attempt to overcome the limits of human nature by imagining a total break in the chain of those often strange and inexplicable occurrences that for want of a better term we have come to call "history."

[7]See Raymond Aron, *Memoirs: Fifty Years of Political Reflection*, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1990, p. 414.

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The National State as an Agent of Modernity

Christopher Chase-Dunn

This essay attempts to explain the implications of the world-systems perspective for the national state as an agent of modernity. The world-systems perspective is a theoretical approach that analyzes the development of capitalism and socialism on a global scale with special attention to relations between core "developed" and peripheral "underdeveloped" countries. National states, rather than being the focal unit of analysis, are understood as parts of a larger systemic whole. The world-systems perspective analyzes long-run social change at the level of this systemic whole and within its subunits. It is the study not only of international relations but of all the economic, political, cultural, and social interactions that comprise the whole system of human linkages.[1]

The modern capitalist world-system emerged in Europe and Latin America in the "long" 16th century and expanded throughout the whole globe by the end of the 19th century, when the core powers finished peripheralizing and incorporating China, Africa, and Southeast Asia. In the world-systems perspective, the relations between rich and poor countries are understood as constituting a politically and economically created hierarchy that is sustained by processes of exploitation, domination, and underdevelopment. What others have called "national development" is understood as movement up (or down) in this global core/periphery hierarchy. Both core and peripheral societies industrialize, urbanize, etc., but the relative gaps between them with regard to wealth and power are reproduced rather than eliminated.

The recent demise of communist party power in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has encouraged the rethinking of development and modernization. One of the main challenges to the program of capitalist development and international liberalism has disappeared. The Soviet model of development has been discredited and dismembered. Many believe that the Chinese version of communist party–led socialism will soon follow suit. The Leninist challenge seems to have been blown away.

Many theories of modernization and political development have long claimed that the "socialist" states were simply aberrant cases of the general model of industrialization, political development, and modernization. For its part, convergence theory took many forms, but two basic assumptions are held by all of them: (1) industrialization creates a form of economic production that in turn leads to a certain kind of social structure and a certain kind of state; and (2) because the socialist states were late industrializers, they took a path of development that emphasized state mobilization of resources in order to catch up with early industrializers. Eventually, according to several versions of conver-

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[1]The theoretical approach I am employing has been developed primarily by Immanuel Wallerstein in *The Capitalist World-Economy*, Cambridge University Press, 1979, and in *The Modern World-System*, Vols. 1–3, San Diego, CA, Academic Press, 1974–80. I have formulated this perspective into a theory utilizing Marx's accumulation model of capitalist development in my *Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy*, Cambridge, MA, Blackwell, 1989.

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gence theory, the over-centralized socialist states would move in the direction of less-centralized, market-regulated economies. All this accords, to some extent, with the recent events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

I wish to challenge the modernization and convergence perspectives just described. The first and most basic problem of traditional modernization theory was its overemphasis on the national state and society as the unit of analysis.[2] In the traditional modernization approach, it is national societies that develop, and hence they are "advanced" or "underdeveloped." Social change is deemed to take place within the national state as such. Sometimes crossnational comparisons are brought to bear to explain national development, but national societies are never (or rarely) seen as parts of a larger whole. Since the intersocietal system within which national societies interact is not explicitly analyzed, those structural features, cycles, and trends that are characteristic of the larger system are never examined, nor are they employed to explain changes that occur in national societies.

Now that every businessman has discovered the "global economy," the problems created by focusing exclusively on national societies as so many independent units of analysis are obvious. But I would argue that this is not only a recent problem. The larger intersocietal system and its dynamics and structural processes have played an important role in shaping national societies for centuries. Indeed, I will argue that in order to understand the significance of the demise of Leninist parties, we must examine long-term trends in the expansion of international capitalism.

Of course, it is reasonable to expect that the revival of modernization theory stimulated by the worldwide shift toward deregulation, marketization, and the demise of Leninist parties will embrace and incorporate an enthusiasm for "globalism." This may produce a new wave of what may be called "world-system modernization theory." Such a theoretical perspective can even now be seen emerging among analysts of global culture.[3] And the master modernization theorist of them all, Talcott Parsons, presented an early formulation of this sort of theory in his 1971 book *The System of Modern Societies*.

Parsons's model of social evolution, which is the conceptual core of functionalist modernization theory, defined parliamentary democracy, mass education, free markets, and individualism as the key elements of modernity. In Parsons's scheme, the United States represents the pinnacle of social evolution. This has all been replayed in the essays celebrating the end of history and the final victory of freedom that have been inspired by the demise of the Leninist challenge. This was popular medicine when Parsons first concocted it, and the updated versions of it are even more in demand, especially in a United States that is in the grip of a hegemonic demise caused, not by the Soviet challenge, but by the success of other competing capitalist core powers. Perhaps international liberalism and parliamentary democracy are indeed the realization of Hegelian reason. And maybe the vision of the United States as the best of all possible worlds, the role model for the rest of the world to follow, will at last reign unchallenged—a lyrical upsurge for the last decade of the American century.

But the end of the cold war creates problems as well. The major justification for "military Keynesianism"—the version of "organized capitalism" in which the US has specialized—has disappeared. The rush to find new bogeymen to justify the maintenance of the US military goliath has been both amusing and tragic. If Saddam Hussein had not come along, he would have been invented.

In order to discuss the future of the national state, and its potential for contributing to the resolution of problems created by modernity, we must define modernity and delineate its problems. This term has been used as a catchall for numerous disparate phenomena. For purposes of this essay, I will use it to denote the expansion of commodity production, the technological revolutions, and the integration of market relations that characterize the development of the capitalist world-economy. A world-economy is a division of labor (a network of interdependent producers and consumers) that is politically structured as an "interstate system." In turn, an interstate system is one of competing states that are inherently unequal in power. It is understood that historically, intersocietal economic exchange networks have alternated back and forth between political structures that were multicentric (like the modern interstate system) and those that were much more centralized—so-called universal empires or, in Immanuel Wallerstein's terminology, "world-empires."

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[2] I use the term "national state" following Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1990*, Cambridge, MA, Blackwell, 1990. Tilly points out that very few modern states—territorial organizations with a monopoly of legitimate violence—include only a single "nation." The term nation refers to a community of people who share the same language and cultural mores, and who identify with one another. The process of nation-building and the revival of regional nations within states are phenomena that the recent changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union strongly bring to our attention.

[3] I am thinking primarily of the "new institutionalism" of John W. Meyer. See "The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State," in George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco Ramirez, and John Boli, *Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society and the Individual*, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1987, pp. 41–70.

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States and Capitalism

Interstate systems differ from one another in terms of the size and kind of states that comprise them. In ancient Sumer, there was an interstate system made up of a number of relatively small city-states. By contrast, the modern interstate system was, until the decolonization of the periphery, made up of powerful core national states (each of which controlled a colonial empire) and less powerful states.

But what distinguishes the European interstate system from earlier interstate systems is the relative importance of the capitalist mode of production. In most earlier states, the accumulation of wealth was based primarily and directly on the exercise of state-organized coercion—the gathering of taxes, tribute, or booty. In the Europe-centered world-system that emerged in the 16th century, the capitalist mode of production—the production of commodities for sale in a price-setting market—became a central and important alternative to state coercion as a means for accumulating wealth. Previously, there had been capitalist states (states in which successful commodity production and trade played a major role in state policy), but these were primarily city-states operating in the interstices between empires (e.g., the Phoenician city-states, Malacca, Venice, Genoa, etc.). In Europe, the capitalist city-states were more numerous and closer to one another than had been the case in earlier world-systems. And for the first time, larger capitalist national states came into being.[4]

This development was both cause and consequence of the expansion of commodity production out of the fertile soil of European feudalism, and it led to further consequences that kept the "European miracle" alive. Once the most powerful and successful players in the interstate system became capitalist states pursuing a policy of profitable commodity production, the whole logic of the rise and fall of empires changed. Earlier, empires were formed, usually, by conquests in which a single semiperipheral state embarked on military expansion that eventually led to its controlling the whole core region. The list is long, from the Akkadian Empire to Rome. But in the Europe-centered world-system, the hegemonic powers were no longer pursuing a strategy of conquest, and those second-tier core powers that did pursue such a strategy (Napoleonic France, Germany) were successfully defeated by coalitions led by capitalist core states.

Hegemonic Core States

The sequence of political centralization/decentralization took on a new form in the modern world-system. Instead of an interstate system being converted into a universal empire and then collapsing back into an interstate system,[5] we have had, since the 16th century, a continuous interstate system that has experienced waves of centralization and decentralization in the form of the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers. A hegemonic core power is simply the most powerful state in a multicentric interstate system. In the modern world-system, there have been three hegemonies: the Netherlands in the 17th century, Great Britain in the 18th century, and the United States in the 20th century.

What is different about this system is that the hegemon does not itself try to take over the core by military conquest and it acts successfully to prevent other states from doing so. The logic of competition among states does not entail the abandonment of military power, but rather military power is used by the most powerful states to support profitable commodity production.

The contenders for future hegemony will be German-led Europe, the United States, and Japan. The current reorganization of trading and military blocs will likely result in either two or three major international blocs. Europe and the ex-Soviet republics, and probably Africa, will form one. The US and Latin America will form another, possibly separate from, or possibly together with, Japan, East Asia, and the Pacific. South Asia will likely be a region of contention.

I agree with those observers who argue that Japan cannot perform the role of hegemon by itself.[6] Japan suffers from shortages of strategic raw materials.[7] Joint

[4]Christopher Chase-Dunn, "The Role of Cities in the Transformation of World-Systems," in Volker Bornschier and Peter Lengyel, Eds., *World Society Studies*, Frankfurt and New York, Campus Verlag, 1992, Vol. 2.

[5]See David Wilkinson, "Central Civilization," *Comparative Civilizations Review* (Carlisle, PA), Fall 1987, on the cycle of state systems and universal states. The literature on the rise and fall of hegemonic core states is reviewed and critiqued in Chase-Dunn, op. cit., Ch. 9.

[6]However, I do not agree with those scholars who contend that one reason Japan cannot perform this role is that Japanese culture is too insular to provide a new basis for universalism. The incredible malleability of cultural phenomena leads me to conclude that cultural shortcomings are not a major obstacle to Japanese hegemony.

[7]Stephen Bunker and Denis O'Hearn compare the strategies employed by Japan and the United States in seeking to invade the peripheral domains of other core powers. Though the forms are different in many respects, both rising powers sought to outbid other contenders by offering better deals. See "Strategies of Rising Hegemons for Securing Access to Raw Materials: A Comparison of Japan and the United States," paper presented at the Annual Spring Conference on the Political Economy of the World-System, University of Hawaii, Mar. 30, 1991. (This paper is available through the Department of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.)

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ventures and foreign investment work fairly well as long as the world remains peaceful, but in a period when core conflicts become exacerbated, Japanese holdings within the blocs of the other hegemonic contenders will likely be abrogated. Are the businesses and properties being bought by Japanese investors in Eastern Europe likely to survive the nationalistic upheavals that will accompany increased economic disorganization and rivalry? The picture of an economically integrated global economy, in which all property rights are equally enforced, is wishful thinking in the absence of considerable political integration at the global level.

Japan could participate in a serious bid for hegemony by politically integrating with either China or the United States. But most observers believe that neither of these mergers is likely. If these arguments prove to be correct, the Japanese do not have a reasonable shot at hegemony and they may have the most to lose in a world in which rivalry for hegemony becomes violent. This should eventually make them ardent advocates of a world-state.

World-State Formation

The preservation and reproduction of the national state is, in the long run, due to the preservation and operation of the interstate system. The main organizational alternative to the national state is a universal state, or in contemporary terms, a world government. It has been the rising importance of capitalism as an alternative to direct state-based accumulation that has altered the dynamics of competition among states in a way that has prevented the formation of a universal empire and prolonged the life of the interstate system for 500 years.[8]

But another important factor prevents empire-formation through conquest. The destructiveness of weaponry has increased geometrically with industrialization and the growth of resources controlled by the wealthiest states.[9] After World War II, this trend created an arsenal that would surely prevent the conquest of the whole core because all-out war among core states would now lead to destruction of the world-system as we know it, and possibly also of all life on Earth. Thus, both capitalism and the destructiveness of modern weaponry now block the possibility of global empire-formation through conquest.

Those who predict the imminent demise of the "nation-state" are undoubtedly jumping the gun. Certainly, the growth of firms, increasing economic returns to scale, and the growing importance of competition in global markets all create pressures that favor *larger* states. Thus the European Community may well turn out to be a grand economic success if the merger can be brought off, and other states are already trying to create larger regional economic blocs that can compete with a united Europe. But this is not the death of the national state. It is rather the recomposition and unification of particular states. The crucial dynamic of competition among sovereign states will continue in an interstate system in which the players are fewer and larger. Only the formation of a global state could fundamentally change these dynamics. There are signs indicating that a process of global state-formation is under way, but such signs have long been visible in such institutions as the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, and the United Nations.

The rise and fall of hegemonies has been accompanied, at least since the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, by a trend toward increasing international political regulation by international organizations. This process has operated unevenly through time, with big spurts occurring primarily after major wars among core states. But the trend has continued since World War II, and some have even argued that the era of the national state has passed and the world-system has entered a new period in which the bourgeoisies of the separate core states have formed a single political alliance to prevent further violent competition among core states. I think this latter conclusion is a considerable overstatement, but I do not deny the existence of the long-term trend. Neither do I claim that the trend has had no significant consequences for the operation of the system. All earlier international debt crises led to massive defaults and world financial collapse as lenders scrambled to grab remaining pieces of the pie.[10] But the ability of the International Monetary Fund to negotiate a coordinated approach among core banks to the most recent Third World debt crisis seems to have successfully averted (or at least postponed) a global financial collapse. In the long run, barring catastrophe, the trends of world-system development will lead to the for-

[8]The ways in which the interstate system and the processes of capitalist accumulation support one another are described in Christopher Chase-Dunn, *Global Accumulation*, Cambridge, MA, Blackwell, 1989, Ch. 7.

[9]The way in which military destructiveness has escalated as a result of the industrialization of competitive states is analyzed brilliantly by William McNeill in *The Pursuit of Power*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982.

[10]See Ulrich Pfister and Christian Suter, "International Financial Relations as Part of the World-System," *International Studies Quarterly* (Guildford, Surrey), September 1987.

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mation of a world-state. The question is when the process of international political centralization will result in a global polity strong enough to prevent warfare among core states.[11]

Nation-Building and Class Conflict

In modernization theory, nation-building is understood as integrating potentially conflictive interest groups within each country into a competitive, but peaceful, union based on common interests. Class struggles are seen as temporary problems of adjustment to urbanization and proletarianization. These are regarded as transitional strains that will be overcome in the normal course of development through nation-building and the integration of emergent interest groups into the democratic process.

The world-system perspective has a somewhat different approach to the understanding of nation-building. The democratic welfare states of the core are seen as having paid off certain important sectors of the working class by using the returns that come from occupying profitable positions in the larger world-system. The availability of greater resources has made the incorporation of a relatively larger proportion of the population into the "growth machine" possible. But the liberal national state has also served, even in core states, as a smoke screen in which nationalism has been used to motivate working people to go to war to protect the interests of "their own" national capitalists. A state's position in the world-system and changes in that position (upward or downward mobility) affect the composition of social classes within states, the degree and nature of class struggle within national states, and the processes by which states develop their political structures.

Peripheral and semiperipheral states, which make up the majority of states, are rarely liberal politically. In the periphery, we generally find authoritarian states, because scarcity of resources hinders effective cooptation of challengers to the state. Since the state is the main organizational vehicle through which people acquire and protect wealth, there is fierce competition for state power, and democratic processes of regime transition are rarely found.

Peripheral states are weak both externally and internally. Externally available resources from core powers are extremely powerful determinants of regime formation and change in these states. After decolonization, the peripheral states tried to construct integrated national communities, but this effort has been frustrated by many of the same forces that have blocked the institutionalization of democratic regimes. Since the sources of authoritarian regimes in the periphery and semiperiphery remain in place, it is unlikely that the recent trend in many of these states toward democratic regimes will result in permanent democracies.

Ironically, internal authoritarianism and external liberalism are often found together in the peripheral states. Many peripheral states support free international trade rather than protectionism. When the national economy is geared to the export of raw materials to the core, statesmen in the periphery are likely to support free trade. The tariff history of the United States in the 19th and 20th centuries is instructive in this regard.[12] The biggest supporters of free trade and international liberalism are core powers with a comparative advantage in the most profitable products on the world market. The Dutch invented the ideology of international liberalism during their hegemony in the 17th century. The British hegemony in the 19th century refined and extended international liberalism, and the US adopted and elaborated it in the American golden age after World War II.

In the semiperiphery, we find an oscillation between populist and authoritarian regimes.[13] Resources are greater and there are more degrees of freedom for state policy and developmental strategies than in the periphery, but competition to move into core status is fierce and only a few can succeed.[14] During periods of world economic expansion, there are a lot of developmental "miracles" in the semiperiphery, but in subsequent periods of contraction, only a few continue on the path toward core status.

The processes of world capitalist expansion have reproduced the core/periphery hierarchy. Although there have been a few spectacular cases of upward mobility in the system (e.g. the United States, which went from periphery to hegemon), most countries are not able to effect a major change in their position. The processes of economic and political development within the core tend to cumulate and to create institutional structures

[11]This problem is addressed in Christopher Chase-Dunn, "World-State Formation: Historical Processes and Emergent Necessity," *Political Geography Quarterly* (Guildford, Surrey), April 1990.

[12]See Christopher Chase-Dunn, "The Development of Core Capitalism in the Antebellum United States: Tariff Politics and Class Struggle in an Upwardly Mobile Semiperiphery," in Albert Bergesen, Ed., *Studies of the Modern World-System*, New York, Academic Press, 1980, pp. 189–200.

[13]The term semiperiphery refers to countries that contain a mix of core and peripheral economic processes. These roughly correspond to the upper third of the category that the World Bank calls "middle-income developing countries," e.g. Brazil, Mexico, India, South Korea, Taiwan, etc.

[14]The nature of core, peripheral, and semiperipheral states and the processes that create different patterns of regime formation are discussed in Chase-Dunn, *Global Formation*, Ch. 6.

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that systemically undercut attempts to equalize international economic and political/military power. Decolonization of the periphery has created the formal apparatus of core modernity, but not the economic or political substance. Thus, the national state has been unable to serve as the institutional basis of democracy or development outside of the core region of the world-system.

Socialist Movements and Communist States

The most radical attempts to overcome the systemic constraints on national development have been made by socialist revolutionaries who assumed power in semiperipheral and peripheral states—primarily Russia and China.[15] Movements with the intent of creating a self-sustaining socialist mode of production that could protect workers and peasants from market forces and accomplish capital accumulation collectively took state power through revolutionary action. Marx predicted that socialism would first come to power in the most developed capitalist states, but this was not to be. Within core states, socialist movements were either defeated or coopted by capitalist regimes. In most peripheral areas, socialist movements were either crushed by core power or were forced to give up most of their socialist programs in the face of overwhelming constraints.

The most far-reaching efforts to construct socialism were undertaken in two very large semiperipheral societies—Russia and China. And even these societies were constrained by the larger global economic, political, and military context. Efforts by capitalist core states to intervene militarily in the Russian Revolution made military defense of the Bolshevik regime the first order of the day, hardly a propitious start for the effort to build socialism. Of course, the external situation did not completely determine the nature of the regimes that emerged from the socialist revolutions. Many scholars point to the authoritarian nature of the Leninist party structures. But we may ask why Leninist parties succeeded ahead of more democratic alternatives that were contenders in both the Russian and Chinese revolutions. The nature of revolution, the threatening international situation, and the small size of the industrial proletariat relative to the peasantry in these countries made democratic outcomes unlikely. The authoritarian nature of both the Soviet and the Chinese revolutionary regimes was also strongly encouraged by the existence of external threats. The most important task was to prevent foreign intervention and to regularize the position of the revolutionary state within the interstate system. The success of both regimes in these efforts constituted the first level of political reintegration into the capitalist world-economy.

The economic reintegration of these states first began when policies were implemented to "catch up with capitalist industrialization" rather than build socialist political and economic structures. Rather than developing democratically run socialist firms and governments, these states mobilized their populations to work hard in the name of socialism while the economic plan and most other aspects of life were tightly controlled by a centralized communist party. Undemocratic socialism is an oxymoron. Necessity may justify temporarily centralized leadership, but this kind of permanent necessity prevented the institutionalization of socialism. This is what happened in both the Soviet Union and China, albeit with some important differences between the two.

This does not mean that all institutional aspects of socialism were abandoned in favor of older forms of state coercion. Collective accumulation, economic planning, job rights of workers, guaranteed health care, relatively equal income distributions, and other features of Soviet and Chinese society are definitely worthwhile features of socialism even though they may not be "efficient" or "competitive" by the standards of the world market for labor. But these aspects of communist-led socialism were drowned in the overwhelming debacle produced by the fundamentally undemocratic nature of these states.

The Chinese and Soviet trajectories of development were similar in many ways to the strategies and policies pursued by other semiperipheral states trying to move upward in the world-system. All semiperipheral states use state power to intervene in markets to try to create an industrialized and modernized domestic economy —so-called import substitution industrialization. They regulate their borders in order to protect this internal industrial sector from competition from existing core states.

In this regard, the Russian and Chinese states are merely extreme cases, not different types. The Chinese and Russian states are not unique with respect to the degree of authoritarianism, but only with respect to the ideological justification for this authoritarianism. Collectivist ideology was a powerful support for state-mobilized industrialization. Though the political conse-

[15]The following summarizes and extends work which was first published in Christopher Chase-Dunn, Ed., *Socialist States in the World-System*, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1982; and Christopher Chase-Dunn, "The Spiral of Capitalism and Socialism," in Louis F. Kriesberg, Ed., *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, Greenwich, CT, JAI Press, 1992, Vol. 14.

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quences were bad, probably worse than in other semiperipheral states trying to catch up with the core, the economic successes counterbalanced this to some extent. The tragedy is that socialist words and ideas were badly injured as a result of their employment as justifications of domination. The contemporary reform movements in China, the former Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe are unfortunately bereft of socialist ideas because these ideas have been so strongly associated with the communist regimes.

The national states that made the greatest efforts to create socialism ended up successfully industrializing, urbanizing, and creating many modern institutions, as well as significantly improving their standing in the world military order. But they did not successfully institute self-sustaining socialist societies. All the talk about the "economic crisis" in the Soviet Union proving that state-led economic development is a flop is completely wrong. The current economic crisis has political, not economic causes. The state-led model of development was a great success by most of the standard measures of "development" both within the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Stalinism rapidly industrialized, urbanized, and educated these societies. Their rates of growth in the 1950's and 1960's were among the highest in the world (even taking into account the fact that in most cases these rates were falsified), and the levels they achieved were high, especially if we compare them with other semiperipheral countries.[16]

In the 1970's, the Soviets and the Chinese began the process of re-entering the world market for capital and commodities. This has been portrayed as the result of having reached the limits of their models of development, but a major factor was the desire on the part of a large number of communist party cadres and state bureaucrats and technocrats to obtain goods only available through trade with core countries. The command economy would have been quite capable of producing more food, cars, and housing—the goods desired by the majority—but party cadres no longer believed that catching up with the West in high-technology sectors was possible. This was the essence of the political crisis that led to further economic reintegration and subsequently to the current crisis.

Socialist movements that took power in national states were ultimately unsuccessful in creating socialist societies. Though the societies they developed challenged capitalist core states, their defeat now strengthens the ideology of capitalism and delays further socialist challenges. The strategy of building socialism one state at a time has thus failed. This strategy will undoubtedly be tried again by other semiperipheral socialist movements, but it will be unlikely to succeed in the absence of transnational ties with socialist organizations within the core. However, the world-system perspective predicts that semiperipheral countries will continue to be fruitful locations for socialist movements. Semiperipheral positions have always been favorable terrain for both upward mobility and challenges to the rules of the game. The growing industrialization and proletarianization of semiperipheral states will create new possibilities for socialist labor movements and parties (e.g., in Brazil, Mexico, and India). These may be able to do a better job of institutionalizing socialism because they now have larger and more developed industrial work forces than the ex-communist societies did at the time of their revolutions. These new experiments with socialism probably will also benefit from the renewal and strengthening of transnational socialist networks and organizations working on global problems. The notion of autarkic national development has become increasingly anachronistic, but capitulation to the power of the capitalist core states and corporations is not the only alternative.

National States and Modernity

In this context, what of the future of the national state and its potential for contributing to the solution of the problems of modernity? In my view, the liberal national state has long been part of the problem, not the solution. The major "problems of modernity" in the current period are:

- the increasing inequality between "North" and "South," which condemns billions of people to suffering and starvation and exacerbates conflicts over scarce resources;
- the likely prospect of future nuclear holocaust through renewed war among core states;
- the likelihood of global environmental disaster resulting from the continuing "anarchy of investment decisions."

The liberal national state is not a solution to any of these problems. With regard to the first—the growing gap between core and periphery—the national state has not provided help in the past and cannot be expected to in the future. Liberal welfare states have been and will continue to be important mechanisms for resolving problems of maldistribution *within* core states. This, however, is dependent on the degree of econom-

[16]See Tables 1 and 2 in Chase-Dunn, "The Spiral of Capitalism and Socialism," loc. cit.

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ic development that core states have been able to achieve. If it were possible for the majority of peripheral states to "catch up" with the level of development achieved by core states, then they too might develop liberal welfare states. But my theory of the modern world-system argues that this is impossible as long as capitalism is the dominant mode of production, because capitalism needs the core/periphery hierarchy in order to reproduce itself, and thus capitalist firms and core states will act to reproduce core/periphery inequalities. The national class alliances within core states *require* the ability of the most powerful core states to exploit peripheral regions because it is this exploitation that provides the resources for coopting important sectors of the working classes in core states. If all countries were equally developed and equally powerful, workers would no longer have real incentives for supporting their states in wars against other states, the ideologies of nationalism would be much harder to sell, and, especially in the context of the increasingly integrated global production and transnationalization of firms, workers would tend to organize along global industrial lines rather than in national units.

In addition, without the possibility of exploitation of peripheral regions, the average rate of profit would drop so low that large private investors would no longer have a strong motive to engage in capitalist production. Necessity would require that large-scale production be carried out by public institutions much the way certain unprofitable but necessary functions are provided by state firms within liberal national states today.

Comparative evidence indicates that the global distribution of energy consumption became less unequal in the 1970's and 1980's, while global income inequality did not change.[17] Although some countries have experienced true upward mobility (Taiwan and South Korea), semiperipheral industrialization has not reduced the overall degree of inequality between the core and the semiperiphery, because the core has shifted to specialization in new, more profitable industries. The kinds of energy-intensive, heavy industries that the semiperipheral countries tried so hard to develop with their programs of import substitution and "socialist mobilization" have become less profitable, while "new lead industries" such as computers, robotics, and biotechnology have emerged.

Regarding the second problem—the probability of future nuclear holocaust—the national state is also part of the problem rather than the solution. The interstate system is the institutional basis that legitimizes warfare. The division of sovereignty among separate independent states is a major obstacle to the peaceful resolution of international disputes because the final arbiter among these states is force. Warfare is not a vestigial remnant of precapitalist societies. The capitalist system produces warfare because it prevents the formation of a world-state. Capitalist states, in their struggle to use state power to facilitate profitable commodity production, regularly engage in warfare with one another. The research of Joshua Goldstein shows that there is a 50-year cycle in the intensity of warfare among core states in the international system that has operated for centuries.[18] This cycle is correlated with the Kondratieff wave, a 40- to 60-year business cycle of alternating periods of economic expansion and contraction. Late in the Kondratieff A-phase (upswing), core states have lots of resources and major wars tend to break out. The likelihood of core war is diminished when there is a strong hegemonic core state that can mediate conflicts, but war is much more likely when a number of "great powers" of approximately equal strength compete for supremacy. Goldstein predicts the likelihood of a new core war in the 2020's, late in the next Kondratieff upswing.

The only solution to this problem is the creation of a global federation that would outlaw warfare among states. As I have mentioned above, there has been a long-standing trend toward greater political and economic coordination among core states. The question is whether or not it is possible to create a core-wide federation that is strong enough to peacefully mediate the conflicts that will emerge among those core powers competing to be the next hegemon. All earlier hegemonic successions were characterized by major wars among core states. The issue is to modify the cycle of political and economic centralization/decentralization in a way that allows succession to occur peacefully.

The creation of such a world-federation would directly challenge the sovereignty of the national states—real collective security requires that the world government be able to outlaw interstate warfare and to enforce peaceful solutions to disputes if necessary. The world peace-keeping force would have to have sufficient power to overcome resistance on the part of individual states *and* coalitions of states. A general disarmament and reduction in the funding of new military technology would reduce the necessary minimum size and cost of the federal force.

[17]See Chase-Dunn, *Global Formation*, Table 12.3, p. 266.

[18]Joshua Goldstein, *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1988. See also Christopher Chase-Dunn and Kenneth O'Reilly, "Core Wars of the Future," in Robert K. Schaeffer, Ed., *War in the World-System*, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1989, pp. 47–64.

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Obviously such a world-state could itself be a potential new source of domination and exploitation. But I suggest that one of the main constraints on democracy and socialism is the multicentric nature of the interstate system, where popular political controls over capital can easily be escaped. In a future world government, popular movements will tend to be oriented toward the world-state, not the local state. This will make it more difficult for firms to play off groups of workers against one another. In any case, nuclear holocaust is the greatest risk. The problem of civil liberties within a world state can be dealt with in time.

The third problem—global ecological catastrophe—is one that is not likely to be solved within the current interstate system. Core states may manage to institute effective environment protection measures, but this prospect becomes less likely the greater the degree of competition and conflict among core states during a period characterized by US hegemonic decline. Peripheral states are very unlikely to make the kinds of environmental investments that will be required to save their forests. And the industrialization of the semiperiphery places the dirtiest heavy industrial sectors in these states. The extreme competition among them for shares of the world market undermines efforts to protect the environment. In this realm, global regulation and enforcement are also needed. The national state, liberal or otherwise, is not likely to be of much help.

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Islam in the Postcommunist World

A. Kamal Aboulmagd

In the wake of the collapse of communism in Europe, historical prejudices and misunderstandings seem to have given way to a genuine belief in pluralism as both an historically inevitable and a desirable state of affairs. The purpose of this article is not merely to provide some information on the attitudes of Muslim thinkers or masses toward modernity or the modern state, which now seems to stand triumphant. To so limit the focus would detach us from reality and make the presentation irrelevant to this larger concern. Rather, I offer a position paper whose point of departure is that in the present world situation of historic political-economic and civilizational changes, dialogue among representatives of different cultures is absolutely essential. My main objective is to pave the way for such dialogue by re-introducing a more objective and unprejudiced understanding of Islam as a religion, a culture, and a way of life.

There has been some talk during the last few years about the end of history and the reaching of a final stage in historical evolution, in which one civilization, that of the West, has become irreversibly dominant and transformed into the civilization of all mankind. This, I believe, is a terrible oversimplification reflecting some historians' complete absorption in the present moment and their blindness to new and important changes that are beginning to take place elsewhere. The true universalization of culture cannot legitimately be reduced to a simple internationalization of one particular culture and the imposition of that culture on the rest of the world. Such a pseudo-universalization would simply be a new form of monopoly of power and would only serve as a prelude to new forms of conflict.

In this context, I would draw attention to the apparent operation in the affairs of mankind of a "law of social balance," no less cogent than the law of natural and ecological equilibrium that promotes the continuation of life on our planet and the survival of innumerable species. (We often place too much stress on laws of nature as laws in the narrow sense—characterized by stability, absolute efficacy, and universal validity—and dismiss the laws governing social change as mere intellectual constructs of historians and social analysts aimed at describing certain patterns that often characterize the course of social change.) One example of the operation of the law of social balance is that in the very same period in which East European communist regimes collapsed virtually overnight and the Soviet Union lumbered to the verge of disintegration, the imbalance created by the disappearance of one of the two superpowers seems to be immediately redressed by the unification of Europe and the astronomical economic growth of Japan and a number of other Asian countries.

Thus, it would appear that pluralism rather than monopoly will be the name of the game in international politics for generations to come. However, as a result of the end both of the cold war and of the threat that weapons of mass destruction might be used, this pluralism seems likely to operate within a new order based on some common principles and values that are becoming more and more recognized and accepted. Foremost among these are the sanctity and dignity of the individual, the safeguarding of personal and civil rights, popular participation in government, and the rule of law.

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Islam, too, subscribes to these values, although for many decades, if not many centuries, its true teachings and basic principles have been badly misrepresented to the world by both its detractors and followers. The mass media in the West have played a most damaging role in this by portraying Islam as a primitive, rigid, and inhumane culture that is alien to the basic principles of Western civilization and serves as an impediment to progress and improvement of world political conditions. Repeated references to a Judeo-Christian heritage—which implicitly excludes Islam—have led millions of well-intentioned people in the West to believe Islam has no role to play in striking a universal consensus on some fundamental values that would underlie the new world order.

On a societal level, Muslims do not seem to be invited to join the new world club that is emerging from the collapse of the old. Such a negative attitude needs to be reconsidered, particularly by those intellectuals and leaders who are genuinely interested in promoting intercultural entente and a new world order free from old prejudices. Such reconsideration of the negative attitude toward Islam and its followers is essential inasmuch as one out of every six and one-half human beings living on this planet is a Muslim, conducting his or her life, or at least aspiring to do so, on the basis of the teachings of Islam.

If Islam and the 1 billion men and women who follow its teachings and way of life are to be accepted into the new world order, there need to be some clear answers to the following five basic questions:

- What is Islam's concept of man and of the rights of the individual?
- What is Islam's position vis-à-vis non-Muslims and the rest of the world?
- What kind of political system does Islam legitimate?
- How can Muslims reconcile their strict observance of principles and laws dating back 1,400 years with the basic need to adjust to the ever-changing conditions of our world?
- What is the impact of modern Islamic fundamentalism on the future role of Muslims within the new world order?

In order to address these questions, we must first resolve a problem of methodology. In Islam, as in all other religions and philosophies, there will always be room for different interpretations. How is one to judge the "Islamicity," the representativeness, of these different interpretations? The answer to this question lies in the fact that at the heart of the Islamic religion and culture there are two unanimously accepted sources of Islamic principles, values, and laws: first, the Qur'an, which —according to the firm belief of all Muslims—was revealed to the Prophet of Islam; and second, the sayings and deeds of the Prophet (the Hadith), which confirm, explain, and implement the various verses of the Qur'an. Islamic culture throughout the centuries has been centered on these two sources.

Needless to say, this applies most vigorously to the conceptual aspect of Islam. Actual conditions in Muslim societies were bound to reflect the impact of other factors, i.e., the religious nature of the sources of Islam does not preclude the operation of the general rules of social change. With this caveat in mind, let us turn now to considering the five specific questions listed above.

Concepts of Man and of the Rights of the Individual

Islam has always been a monotheistic religion. Monotheism is not only central in the theology of Islam; it also has certain social and political implications that are relevant to our main concern. The principle of the equality of all humans and of the emancipation of the individual from the authority of other individuals is directly derived from the principle of accepting only one form of submission—namely, submission to the one God. According to the Qur'an, man is the vicegerent of the Almighty. The human race is, so to speak, the chosen vehicle of God. According to the Qur'an, Adam was a prophet, and his original sin was forgiven before he and his spouse left the Garden of Eden. He and his descendants are elevated above all other creatures, and respect for their dignity is a cornerstone of Islamic morality and social organization.

From this concept of man stems the whole theory of human rights. These include the sanctity and protection of human life, absolute freedom of thought, and basic freedom of expression. The Qur'an unequivocally stipulates the protection of these rights in the most categorical and uncompromising manner. Here are some examples:

On the sanctity of human life:

O, you people, be aware that your blood, your moneys, and your honor [reputation] are protected [from aggression] amongst you. They are as sacred as the culmination day of pilgrimage in the sacred city of Mecca. (from the Prophet's speech at the end of his last pilgrimage)

In Islam, capital punishment is reserved for only three

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crimes, one of which is the killing of another human.

On freedom of religion:

There is no compulsion in Religion; truth stands clear from error. (Surat 2 - 256)

Or do you force people to become believers? (Surat Younes - 99, the import being one should not force people to become believers)

The protection of freedom of thought is sometimes carried to extremes, as manifested by the Qur'anic verse requiring believers to give refuge to those who associate a different God than Allah with the Almighty, if they seek such refuge. A Muslim is required, moreover, to guide such a refugee until he reaches a safe place.

It is very frequently argued that freedom of religion under Islam is seriously abridged by the sayings of the Prophet stipulating capital punishment for a Muslim who deserts Islam and converts to another faith. A careful examination of those sayings would reveal that what they view as criminal behavior is not the conversion per se or the change of mind and belief, but rather the act of deserting the Muslim community and collaborating with its enemies. Many Muslim scholars have reached the conclusion that within the historical context of these sayings, capital punishment is directed against some sort of treason, and that it is not a prescribed punishment (*Hadd*); rather, it is based on the exercise of judicial and political discretion in selecting a punishment proportionate to the offense, given the surrounding circumstances (*tazeer*).

On freedom of expression:

According to the Qur'an and the Sunna (the body of Islamic custom), speech or the use of "the word" is not simply a freedom but also an obligation on every believer. The duty of "inviting to the good and warning against the evil" is a religious and moral duty of first priority in Islam. According to the Qur'an, witnesses are enjoined to give testimony and are warned against refraining therefrom:

. . . the witnesses should not refuse when they are called on. (Surat 2 - 282)

Conceal not evidence, for whoever conceals it, his heart is tainted with sin. (Surat 2 - 282)

A witness is—by an explicit Qur'anic verse—protected against any harm he may suffer because of his testimony. The writer of his own opinion or of someone else's testimony receives equal guarantees.

. . . and let neither scribe nor witness suffer harm. (Ibid.)

On equal protection under the law:

Equality of all people regardless of their race, color, or language is in fact the foundation of Islam's concept of human relations, on both the individual and the collective levels. A leading and most unequivocal verse of the Qur'an reads:

O, you people, we have created you from a male and a female, and made you in peoples and tribes, so that you may know each other. The noblest of you in the eye of God is the most righteous. (Surat Al Hogorat - 12)

Contrary to the claims of an older generation of orientalists, slavery is not an Islamic social institution. It is conceded by the great majority of students of Islam that slavery was a social institution in the Arabian peninsula (as well as many other places) prior to the advent of Islam. Islam—gradually, but in a most effective way—liquidated that inhuman institution.

The status of women in Islam has equally been the subject of long debate. It is necessary in this respect to differentiate Islamic principles from the state of affairs prevailing in many Muslim countries. The Qur'an is most categorical in pronouncing the equality of men and women:

Women have rights equal to their obligations which must be fulfilled in good faith.

A leading saying of the Prophet underscores this basic equality by stating explicitly that "women are equals of men." The right of men to divorce their wives is not an absolute right—women are not deprived of the right to stipulate a similar right at the time the marriage contract is executed.

Of course, no particular principle of a legal system, including those principles of the Shari'ah system, can be properly understood or judged in complete detachment from the other principles of the system. Rather, one must examine the principle within the context of the organic unity of the whole legal system. It is noteworthy in this respect that under Islam, a wife retains her complete financial independence from her husband, and that her wealth and property remain hers after her marriage. I find it most unfortunate that this liberal and

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egalitarian spirit of Islam has been at times completely overshadowed by pre-Islamic practices and attitudes that continued to prevail in some Muslim countries.

Islam's Position vis-à-vis Non-Muslims

The question of Islam's position toward non-Muslims is twofold, relating both to non-Muslims living beyond the borders of a Muslim state and to non-Muslim minorities living within such a state. The first is a matter of the Islamic concept of the world order and the nature of the relations between nations, which is beyond the scope of the present discussion. I, therefore, will limit my reflections here to the question of the status of non-Muslims within a Muslim state.

A Muslim state is basically democratic in nature—it respects individual rights and freedoms, and governs according to a legal system based on or derived from Islamic principles of law. Yet, the concern of historians and political scientists regarding the status of non-Muslim minorities living under any political regime that claims to be "Islamic" deserve serious attention, for two reasons. First, non-Muslims are usually categorized by Muslim majorities as "*Dhimmis*," which may very possibly be a mere sugarcoating of the words "second-class citizens," dependent for their social and political rights on the good will of the Muslim majority. Second, there are some instances in the history of Islamic societies in which non-Muslim minorities have not enjoyed complete equality with the Muslim majority or have suffered from persecution and mistreatment.

However, the words "*Dhimmi*" and "*Dhimmis*" need to be more accurately defined and understood. In my view, they do not refer to any particular set of rights and obligations relating to non-Muslims. In the Arabic language, "*Dhimma*" means "pledge," "undertaking," "promise," or "compact." Its usage in designating non-Muslims is merely a reference to the historical event and to the legal instrument by which non-Muslims have acquired their legal rights within a certain Muslim state. It does not refer to the content of that instrument.

It is noteworthy that in most authentic documents of Islamic history, the word "*Dhimmat*" is described as the *Dhimmat* of God and his Prophet, or the "*Dhimmat*" of the believers, which may clearly refer to pledges and undertakings made by the majority to protect and respect the rights of non-Muslims. One could safely claim, therefore, that historically, the status of non-Muslim minorities has been determined through some "agreement" or "compact" between the Muslim majority and the non-Muslim minority. The content of such agreements remains to be investigated.

The Qur'an itself does not use the term "*Dhimmi*." It refers to Jews and Christians as "people of the Book," which means "the followers of a revealed religion." They are referred to with great respect and in a spirit of equality and brotherhood. On the practical level, Muslim jurists and historians have described the contract of the "*Dhimmi*" as the agreement between Muslims and non-Muslims on the principle that the latter enjoy equal rights with the former, and carry the same obligations the former carry (*lahum ma lana waalayhim ma alayna*). This literally means that there must be complete equality in the enjoyment of civil rights.

It must be conceded, however, that in the practice of daily life, problems do arise, and that certain denials of equal rights do occur from time to time. In most cases, however, non-Muslims are not singled out for such denials. Under a nondemocratic regime, where the rule of law is not adequately observed, all citizens are subjected to various violations of their rights.

In this respect, however, one issue remains to be addressed, namely, the right of a Muslim majority to base its legal system on the principles of Islamic law. I do not find that this right in and of itself violates any basic legal or political principle. The issue, as with every pluralistic society, is to guarantee that the rule by the majority (in this case, an Islamic majority) recognizes minority rights.

I am, however, very far from underestimating the danger of religious and sectarian conflicts in the countries of Islam—the example of Lebanon leaps to mind. The last 20 years have also witnessed some alarming though sporadic incidents of sectarian strife in my native Egypt. Much, however, is being done at the present in Egypt, both at the governmental and nongovernmental levels, to contain these incidents and to restore the traditional positive brotherly relationships between Muslims and Christians that had long characterized our national life.

Islam and the Political System

Liberal thinkers and proponents of the protection of human rights have always been skeptical of any political regime claiming a religious basis for its political authority. Since the teachings of Islam insist on the unity of men's life and reject secularism and the high wall of separation between God and Caesar, most students of political Islam would tend to classify an "Islamic government" as necessarily a theocratic government.

This is a grave misunderstanding. Islam does not call for a government whose authority is based on a divine will. Nor does it call for a government of clerics. According to the consensus of Muslim Sunni jurists, the legiti-

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macy of any government derives exclusively from the consent of the people. Rulers have no divine rights of any kind and are bound by the rule of law. The confusion in this respect results from another principle of Islamic government—namely, that the laws of a Muslim land should always be derived from or at least conform to the principles of Islamic law (the Shari'ah).

Political scientists and constitutional lawyers would distinguish two separate issues: the basis of political power and authority on the one hand, and the sources of the legal system on the other. In this respect, I would, without hesitation, state that the political system envisaged by Islam is a democratic system that has nothing to do with theocratic government. Islam does not establish a clergy, and scholars of theology and Islamic law are ordinary people. The whole question is more complex when we move to the Shi'ite concept of government, in which the "Ulamas" acquire a special religious and political status and become particularly eligible to run the government as representatives of the legitimate "Imam," who must be a descendant of the Prophet.

It is noteworthy, however, that even within the framework of Shi'ite doctrine, the particular role of "Ulamas" or religious leaders does not preclude the principle that government must be based on the consent of the people. The rulers, according to Shi'ite doctrine are still elected by the people. The highest authority, however, rests in the hands of a collective body of "Ulamas," who are themselves elected by their peers or by the people at large.

Adapting Islamic Principles to the Requirements of Modern Life

The fact that the source of Islamic law is divine inspiration, with its two principal texts, the Qur'an and the sayings of the Prophet, revealed or issued some 1,400 years ago, raises certain problems regarding its ability to adjust to the needs of modern societies. To a jurist or a political scientist, it is simply inconceivable that a contemporary society could operate on the basis of a legal system whose norms were fixed that long ago and are held to be immutable.

However, this contradiction is overstated. First, neither the Qur'an nor the sayings of the Prophet contain all the legal norms necessary for the organization of society. In certain areas of law, they only enunciate broad principles and basic values, which need to be concretized and implemented through man-made laws and regulations. Muslims are free to adapt the general principles laid down in the Qur'an and the Sunna to the ever-changing conditions of their societies.

Second, since the early days of Islamic jurisprudence, Muslim scholars have recognized the need for additional sources to complement the Qur'an and the sayings of the Prophet. They have recognized the important role of consensus of opinion (*Ijmaa*), reasoning by analogy (*Qiyas*), and reliance on the general interest or welfare of the community (*Maslaha*). They have also made considerable room for "custom" as a complementary source of law. The net result of the interaction of all these sources is a highly developed legal system with highly sophisticated legal techniques, reaching solutions very similar to those reached by the two great legal systems prevailing in the West, namely, Roman law and the common law.

Islamic Fundamentalism

How does Islamic fundamentalism relate to the emerging new world order? To begin with, the term "fundamentalism" is a most unfortunate choice to designate the phenomenon of Islamic extremism, radicalism, or fanaticism. For purposes of this article, I will, nevertheless, employ the term to refer to that stream of thought and to those Islamic movements and parties that are characterized by the following:

- A narrow, literal understanding of the religious texts as contrasted to the functional approach advocated by the scholars of sociological jurisprudence.
- A static approach to society and a pathological blindness to the basic laws of social change.
- An antisocial temperament based on a hostile attitude toward all others, be they non-Muslims or Muslims belonging to a different stream of thought.
- An activist attitude with respect to social and political change, at times coupled with readiness to resort to violence.
- Fanatical attachment to the past and rejection of anything novel or without precedent in the history of Muslims.

Relations between any Muslim state dominated by these principles and attitudes and the rest of the world are bound to be troubled. Moreover, the prevalence of such reactionary and unhealthy attitudes would be a serious impediment to the development and progress of the Muslim state involved.

There is a regrettable tendency in the West to overestimate the influence of the so-called fundamentalist groups in Muslim countries and an even more unfortunate tendency to generalize and to assume that any movement raising the banner of Islam must necessarily be a "fundamentalist" group. These two tendencies

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have left Muslims out of the contemporary efforts to identify universal common values and principles that might serve as the basis for the conduct of nations under a new world order.

To some extent, such misperceptions reflected the cold war and the way it played out vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict—the fact that the Soviet Union for decades gave support to the Arab cause whereas the United States gave almost unconditional support to the state of Israel. In the resulting polarization, there emerged a false image that the Arabs and the Muslims were the friends of the principal enemy of the West. With the end of the cold war, this perception is bound to change. The prevailing moderation of most Arab states and the inflexibility of the present Israeli government should foster less biased, more objective attempts to mend fences between Arabs and Muslims, on the one hand, and the West, on the other.[1]

The Promise of Mainstream Islam

In contrast to the negative, isolationist, and antisocial attitudes of the fundamentalist groups, mainstream thought among most intellectuals and politicians in the Muslim world is characterized by the following positive ideals:

- A strong belief in the oneness of the fate of mankind and in the dire need for full cooperation of all nations to promote the causes of peace and the preservation of healthy life on our planet.
- A strong belief in pluralism as a fact of life, and a psychological readiness to accept "others" as partners and friends.
- A functional approach to Islam, and a sharpened sense of commitment in implementing its principles and teachings.
- A genuine belief in democracy as a fair and workable mechanism to settle differences and to work out a system of decision-making. The mainstream holds democracy to be a workable mechanism implementing the Islamic principle of consultation.
- A strong commitment to the preservation and protection of human rights without discrimination or prejudice.
- A belief that Muslims have a role to play and a commitment to participate in the building of the new world order.

This is obviously contingent on a reciprocal readiness by non-Muslims to accept such a role for Islam and to accommodate such participation. It is my conviction that we have a long way to go before achieving this goal. The present attempt to present a more positive image of Islam and of the Muslim peoples is but a first step on the road toward meaningful cooperation in pursuing the noble objectives of peace, progress, and an improvement in the quality of human relations.

[1]Regarding Muslim radicalism, too, it should be noted that no Muslim country has ever embraced Marxism in any form. Afghanistan is no exception, since it was—in fact—a case of a regime imposed with the direct backing of a foreign superpower. Moreover, the resistance of the Afghani Muslim population that eventually resulted in the collapse of the communist occupation of the country is—in itself—a witness to Muslims' immunity to the materialist philosophy of Marxism.

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International Institutions and Modern Security Strategies

Celeste A. Wallander

This article has two purposes: to offer an institutional approach to understanding national and international security, and to argue that such an approach offers considerable advantages for understanding Soviet security policy in the post–cold war international system. Although my primary concerns are theoretical and empirical, the analysis has clear implications for future policy-making as well. The changes in Soviet behavior and in conditions in Europe since 1989, but especially since the failed coup attempt in August 1991, have demonstrated in stark terms that many of the assumptions and underlying conditions upon which the United States has based its security calculations may no longer hold and, at minimum, should be critically reassessed. I will attempt to show how a nontraditional reading of the issue of national security strategies may help us more sensibly understand such strategies under future conditions. The argument I present is a highly conditional one, so I will take care to explain the circumstances under which I believe the analysis holds.

Anarchy and Security in the International System

Although a commonly accepted definition of security is elusive, one important analyst of the concept has concluded that "security is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity,"[1] because these conditions must be satisfied before a state or its citizens can pursue any other goals. Conflicts that threaten national survival remain the core concern of national security. Another important review defines the field of security studies as "the study of the threat, use, and control of military force."[2] In this view, identification of the source of armed conflict and war is fundamental to understanding international security.

In the simplest sense, the source of conflict is disagreements between states or the individuals who lead them. Such conflicts result in war because of the absence in the international realm of a legitimate sovereign authority to which disputes can be submitted and by which outcomes can be legitimately arbitrated. Since states operate in an anarchic environment, rational leaders respond to their environment by relying upon "self-help" security policies that decide conflicts of interest through contests of power rather than the application of justice or law. We do not need Thucydides to remind us that "the strong do what they have the power to do, and the weak accept what they have to accept."[3] Power and self-help strategies are the basic tools for coping with external threats.

In focusing upon power and anarchy in the international system to explain security issues and national security policies,[4] traditional security studies have gener-

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ally either neglected the issue of what national interests are and how they are formed, or assumed them to be (for all intents and purposes) identical to the pursuit of power. Traditional realism took as one of its six basic principles "the concept of interest defined in terms of power."[5] The basic theoretical proposition of realism is that states construct security strategies to maximize national power, and that the pursuit of these strategies by multiple states in the anarchical international system is the unchanging source of war. The power and skill of a country's leadership can play a role in determining which states benefit from this conflict-ridden system, but no country can escape it—to renounce the pursuit of power would only make one the target of other states' aspirations.

There are two fundamental problems with this understanding of security and the international system. First, although anarchy may be the ultimate source of war, it is a constant condition. Therefore, anarchy itself cannot explain why wars occur when they do, nor can it explain why certain states participate in war while others do not. Anarchy is the reason for war in the international system, but this observation gives us no deeper insight than the fact that human nature is the ultimate source of war as well.[6]

Traditional analysts have (at least implicitly) recognized this problem for some time and have offered more elaborate theories, but they remain based on the constraints of anarchy and power. Their basic assertion is that states respond to changes in the balance of power in the international system when assessing threats and opportunities. Variation in conflict and the changing roster of participants result from changes in national power and the resulting shifting alignments that self-reliant rational states utilize to balance against rising or predominant powers.

In the postwar era, the prevailing view was that a bipolar balance of power—one based on the enormous advantage in national power held by the United States and the Soviet Union—was the primary determinant of national security policies and was the source of the virtually unprecedented 45-year "long peace."[7] Virtually all international phenomena—military alliance blocs, cooperation within alliances, competition in the Third World, indeed even the cold war itself—could be explained in terms of this bipolar structure of power in the anarchic international system. In this analysis, considerations of power supplemented anarchy as the principle source of war.

In thus stressing power, traditional analysts created another problem for understanding security. For them, since power is relative, states are overwhelmingly concerned with "relative gains."[8] Power is zero-sum: any increase in the power of one state is by definition a decrease in the power of other states. Thus, cooperation is impossible for two reasons: anarchy means enforcement is impossible, and the relative nature of power means it is never rational to agree to a policy that will provide another state with more benefits than you gain yourself. Even if you gain more than you had without the agreement, if the other state gains more than you gain, in *relative* terms you are worse off than before.

The problem is that although power may be zero-sum, security is not. Traditional realist theory tells us how states will behave if their fundamental goal is power, not if their goal is security. If power and security are identical, then the theory is coherent. But they are not identical; there is good reason to believe that security —far from being zero-sum—is variable-sum. For example, nuclear deterrence theory (and policy) was predicated on the assumption that nuclear war would be a worse outcome for both the US and the Soviet Union than maintenance of a basically unsatisfactory status quo. That is not a zero-sum calculation of security. Joint loss or gain is not consistent with the zero-sum nature of power. Realist theory has generally not dealt with the non–zero-sum nature of security in a fundamental way, although this aspect permeates at least one important study in the field.[9]

I do not claim that states have an intrinsic common interest in peace, nor that states' interests are basically harmonious. Rather, I claim that security is intrinsically variable-sum—precisely to what degree, is determined by context. The security relationship between states

[1]Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post–Cold War Era*, Boulder, CO, Lynne Riener Publishers, 1991, pp. 18–19.

[2]Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* (Guildford, England), June 1991, p. 212.

[3]Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, rev. ed., trans. by Rex Warner, New York, Penguin Books, 1972, Book V, p. 402.

[4]Walt, loc. cit., provides a good summary.

[5]Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 4th ed., New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948, p. 5.

[6]For the original distinction between different "levels" of explanation for war, see Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959. Waltz points out that human nature is invariable and therefore cannot explain war, but does not extend this conclusion to his analysis of anarchy.

[7]Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 1979, Ch. 8; John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Vol. 10, No. 4, reprinted in Sean Lynn-Jones, Ed., *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace*, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1991.

[8]Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization* (Cambridge, MA), No. 3, 1988, pp. 485–508.

[9]Robert Jervis, "Cooperation and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), No. 2, 1978, pp. 167–214.

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may be highly competitive and approach a zero-sum character, but it need not be. Therefore, we cannot understand security policies solely by studying power. I attempt to shift the traditional approach as follows. Power cannot be used as a shortcut to national interests, and it is only one of the means (if, perhaps, the most important one) by which states pursue security. This means a theory of security policy must (1) take seriously the study of national interests, and (2) study state *strategies* as policies balancing the costs and benefits of alternative actions and policies. I will turn to this second issue to establish a framework for thinking about national security strategies.

Security as a Bargaining Process

An everyday example demonstrates the analytical power of thinking in terms of what happens when there is a mix of mutual and competing interests in security calculations. Let S be someone seeking to sell a house and B be someone who wants to buy S's house. S would like to get as high a price as possible for her house—there is no upper limit on what she would take if she could get it—but she does have a minimum price in mind below which it would not be worth it to her to sell the house. This minimum selling price is S's "reservation price." At her reservation price or above it, she would (in her own evaluation) be better off selling the house than holding on to it. Similarly, B would like to pay as little as possible for the house, but she too has a "reservation price"—in the buyer's case, it is the absolute maximum she is willing to pay for this house. For B, she is better off paying this maximum price for the house than not managing to conclude a deal.

What will happen? First, it depends on what both parties' reservation prices are. If S's reservation price is $100,000 and B's is $90,000, no deal will be made. S has no interest in selling her house for any less than $100,000, and B has no interest in paying any more than $90,000. There is no overlap in their interests, so there is no mutually beneficial deal. If S's reservation price is $100,000 and B's is $120,000, there is plenty of room for a mutually beneficial agreement. S and B now have a common interest in concluding a deal: they each would prefer a house sale in the range of $100,000 to $120,000 over no sale.

If S and B knew one another's reservation prices, it might be easy to come to an agreement when a mutually beneficial one existed. Most logically, they might split the difference between their prices. But, of course, they almost certainly do not know one another's reservation price. This condition of uncertainty (not knowing the other person's preferences) creates a different dynamic to their relationship. Athough S and B have a *common interest* in concluding a deal, they also have a *competing interest* in the matter of how the $20,000 surplus between their respective reservation prices is to be distributed. While each would be happy with an agreement at her reservation price and would rather conclude such a deal than walk away, each would prefer to gain as much of the surplus as possible. S will demand more than $100,000, while B will offer less than $120,000. Their interests are part positive sum (the mutual preference for an agreement) and part zero-sum (distribution of the bargaining surplus). Neither has an interest in revealing her true reservation price, for in doing so, she gives the other person an informational advantage. If B knows that S's reservation price is $100,000, but S does not know B's reservation price, B can offer $100,000 and refuse to budge, secure in the knowledge that S would prefer to sell the house for $100,000 than not sell at all. B gets all of the surplus, so S is not as well off as she could have been, although she is better off than with no deal at all.[10]

Superpower bargaining during crises has been remarkably like this house-selling example in terms of the incentives to cooperate and compete. The Korean War was a clear example of a case where neither the US nor the USSR had an interest in escalation to direct conflict, but both continued to compete in the war for years over precisely where the ceasefire line—and thus the de facto north-south Korean border—would be drawn. Avoidance of direct conflict was the common interest, but a competing interest over whose ally would end up with more territory existed as well. Similarly, in the October 1973 war in the Middle East, both superpowers had an interest in stopping the conflict short of direct war, and they cooperated on this basis. But they also had a competing interest in precisely where the ceasefire line would be drawn, and each permitted their clients to seek competitive advantage in that regard. On the American side in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, there was a general sense that neither side wanted nuclear war, but also a clear understanding that the specific terms of crisis resolution were negotiable and competitive. There is clear evidence that Nikita Khrushchev sought to gain more than the mere avoidance of nuclear war when he demanded that US Jupiter missiles in Turkey be removed in addition to obtain-

[10]For a conceptual analysis of the bargaining problem, see Howard Raiffa, *The Art and Science of Negotiation*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1982. For a more formal analysis, see Steven J. Brams, *Negotiation Games: Applying Game Theory to Bargaining and Negotiation*, New York, Routledge, 1990.

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The outcome of a non–zero-sum game: Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev and US President Ronald Reagan sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at the White House on December 8, 1987.

—Bettmann.

ing the American promise not to invade Cuba.[11]

Arms control agreements provide another example of a mix of shared and competing security interests. Both the US and the USSR perceived an advantage in mutual restraint in the arms race, yet both have sought to preserve specific advantages (in types of deployment or modernization, definition of forces covered, or verification procedures) within the broad outlines of restraint. The nuclear nonproliferation agreement and verification system is a striking example of competing and common security interests entwined in the same issue. The major nuclear powers identified an overall common interest in the prevention of nuclear proliferation, but substantial competing economic and political interests led them to provide potential proliferators with nuclear capabilities.

A major problem for state strategies in this type of crisis bargaining or arms control negotiation is whether there is any overlap and therefore any possible mutually acceptable outcome. A second major problem is that although there may be such an overlap, in the process of competitive bargaining over the surplus, the states involved risk convincing others that their requirements are so severe that there is no overlap, and war may be the outcome. This approach makes it clear how armed conflict or arms races can occur even when states may have a common interest in peace and policy coordination. The persistence of competing as well as common interests creates an incentive to challenge other states. It is not necessary that national security interests be purely conflictual in order for conflict to occur.

Thus, two core realist positions are shown to be incorrect. First, one cannot simply treat the problem of security as a problem of power. A theory of security cannot use power as a measurable and tractable substitute for national security interests without creating the potential for basic contradictions in analysis. Second, a theory that is not centered on relative power is neither utopian nor exclusively (and naïvely) dependent on the assumption that states have harmonious interests. A sophisticated theory of security assumes that the character of security interests between states varies along a range between pure conflict and pure harmony, with the most typical and most interesting security issues falling in the middle realm of common and competing interests.

Some 40 years ago at the height of the cold war, John Herz provided the definitive explanation of the fundamentally interdependent nature of the "security dilemma."[12] Thomas Schelling made a similar point in a book a decade later that formulated basic American deterrence policy.[13] Schelling's analysis is mainstream security theory, but the fundamental implication for power-based theories of his focus on "games"—on the position *between* pure harmony and pure conflict—has been almost entirely overlooked. Similarly, Robert Jervis's more recent analysis of the security dilemma is most often cited to confirm the competitive nature of security (the actions a state takes to increase its security may reduce the security of others), and his fundamental analytical point—that security is not inherently zero-sum—is neglected.

To be sure, other scholars in the realist tradition do not completely ignore the non–zero-sum nature of security. Kenneth Waltz wrote that a state that desires peace must become neither too powerful nor too weak. He also

[11]The American side ignored that public demand, having already learned through Khrushchev's private demands that those terms were not his true reservation price. See Raymond Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1989. For evidence of the effect of common and competing interests during crisis bargaining on Soviet use of military force, see Celeste A. Wallander, "Use of Force and the Uncertainty of Power: Soviet Behavior During International Crises," Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1990.

[12]John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, No. 2, 1950, pp. 157–80.

[13]Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1960.

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does not believe that states necessarily seek to maximize their power.[14] This is consistent with the inherent potential of security to be non–zero-sum. But he has not reconciled the different characters of security and power in his theory. Security theorists tend to focus on the fact that state actions *may* reduce others' security and forget to incorporate into their analyses—explicitly or systematically—that this also means they *may not*.

Security is like the real estate bargaining analogy offered above insofar as states define their interests in a way that creates overlap in their minimal security requirements. To be sure, it may be the case that states do have zero-sum security requirements: this was likely the case with respect to Germany and most countries before World War II. It is also clear that there was little overlap in US and Soviet security requirements in the postwar era, especially during Stalin's rule (more on this later). But security can be variable-sum, because the minimum requirement of national security is protection from direct attack. This basic interest has most often been difficult to obtain, and therefore security interests have not been defined by states in such a way as to leave much room for common interests, such as the safety of allies and partners, the development of global trade networks, the prevention of arms races, maintenance of limits on external intervention, and (most recently) avoidance of nuclear war. Nonetheless, under certain reasonable conditions, states may define their interests in such a way that areas of common interest emerge despite the persistence of competitive interests that play a central role in state strategies.

The bargaining analogy is a more realistic way to think about security than is an exclusive focus on either pure conflict or pure harmony of interests. It frames the problem of security as one in which there may be a substantial mutual interest in avoiding certain outcomes, yet it acknowledges that strong competitive interests are intrinsic to security relations as well. It poses the problem of security as one both of coordination and of competition over the distribution of advantage in states' relations. This approach deals with the realist point that rational states cannot pay much attention to common elements of security because if they are too desirous of peace, they set themselves up for war. It does so by making both common and competing interests intrinsic to security relations. With these assumptions, one would predict that states will rarely be entirely focused upon their mutual interests. In the very act of seeking to secure a common good, states will maneuver to advance their competitive interests.

In sum, anarchy does not mean that power is every state's first consideration. Power is important because anarchy means that ultimately states must rely upon themselves to guarantee their security. But security interests exist prior to power-as-means. If security interests are zero-sum, *then* under anarchy, power is the first consideration. If interests are variable-sum, power plays a less deterministic role in strategy.

Obstacles to Cooperation

This analysis refutes the assumption that it is *impossible* to cooperate for national security (relative gains), but it does not deal with the problem (anarchy) that such cooperation is *difficult*. Traditional analysis concludes that because states can never be certain they will not be exploited, they must assume the worst. Cooperation is never rational as a stable national security strategy because the stakes are so high that noncooperation is a safer or risk-averse strategy. But that is not necessarily the case. Schelling points out that security situations are characterized by the constraints of interdependent decisions—the outcome depends on the intersection of state choices. The problem for states is not only that agreements cannot be enforced, but that states do not know one another's preference with certainty. In a situation of strategic choice, how you choose should depend on how the other party will choose, because you will jointly determine the outcome. When you do not have that information, one reasonable strategy is to assume the worst and make uncooperative choices that can not be exploited. But another reasonable strategy, consistent with rational choice and the condition of anarchy, is to try to obtain information about the other party's preferences. That is in large measure what national intelligence services are meant to do: make rational, self-interested strategies possible by reducing uncertainty regarding other states' self-defined interests and likely choices. It may be the case that even with such information, purely noncooperative strategies will best serve one's security interests. But if information shows that there are some areas of overlap in security interests, it is possible that conditionally cooperative strategies can better meet a state's self-defined security interests.

In short, there are two important sources of competitive security strategies besides anarchy: national interests themselves and uncertainty regarding the interests and preferences of other states. A purely noncooperative strategy might be best for states if anarchy

[14]Waltz, op. cit., p. 222; and Waltz's response to his critics in Robert O. Keohane, Ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, Ch. 11.

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alone forced states to calculate only on the basis of power and to rely on noncooperative risk-avoidant means in order to avoid being exploited. But two other factors are at least as important: the degree to which security interests are variable-sum and the degree of uncertainty regarding other states' interests and preferences. These can vary.

Variation in National Security Interests and Strategies

Although I have argued that in the main, the traditional perspective that equates national power with national security is not correct, under some conditions, this perception is close to reality.[15] For example, national security interests are most likely to approach a zero-sum character when territory is the key to national power and when physical defense of one's country is extremely difficult. Under these circumstances, national (and especially military) power resources are virtually the functional equivalent of security: a state's security is measured in terms of its capacity to defeat attack. Since power and security become synonymous, security becomes zero-sum.

Territory has been a key to power in two respects: territory can afford strategic advantages for the conduct of conflict or for trade, and territory can be the source of economic resources necessary for well-being or for growth. In Barry Buzan's terms, national defense is the equivalent of national security. Physical defense of one's country is always important, because it is the minimum requirement for national survival. If all states were content to hold and protect clearly divided territories, they would not need to come into conflict. But when control over territory is a source of power, states will have strictly competing interests over the control of territory and are likely to become engaged in armed conflict, and physical defense of territory is the source of zero-sum competition. The colonial empires were driven by strategic and resource advantages that translated into power resources, sparking competition and conflict because of the relative nature of resultant national power. Iraq's attempts to gain control over the Shatt-al-Arab (from Iran) and oilfields or islands (from Kuwait) are recent examples in the Middle East. Similarly, nationalist separatism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is based at least in some part on the attempt of communities to gain political and physical control over economic resources appropriated by outsiders. However, while these conditions persist, in some instances they do not hold. For the advanced industrialized countries, increasing control over territory is not necessary for economic growth.[16] If states do not need to control territory for national prosperity, they do not need to threaten the territorial integrity of other states.

The second proposition—that security becomes more zero-sum the more difficult the physical defense of the state is—has been effectively demonstrated in Robert Jervis's work on the "security dilemma."[17] When technology and geography favor defensive military capabilities and strategies, national decision-makers can distinguish between military power and effective threats to national security. When offensive military capabilities and strategies have an advantage, the balance of military power itself does measure the threat to national security, power and security are effectively equivalent, and security becomes zero-sum. Jervis's argument that the security dilemma can be mitigated rests on the fact that security is not inherently zero-sum.

For much of world history and for most modern states, conditions have been such that security relations have been substantially zero-sum. However, historically and regionally there have been instances which favored loosening the link between security and national military power. Switzerland is a prime example of a country whose geographic situation affords defensive advantages that permit at least a partial mitigation of the power-security linkage. The United States prior to the 20th century is another case of the security advantages of geography.

Mutual nuclear deterrence between the US and the Soviet Union is generally assessed to have operated through an indirect calculation. The strategic nuclear weapons upon which deterrence policy is based are offensive, but their effect is not to give an advantage to offensive strategies. Instead, the inability to defend (perfectly) against nuclear attack means there is no advantage to taking the offensive. All that can be achieved with offensive nuclear weapons is to threaten retaliation for attack—in effect, a defensive strategy.

Whether conditions for variable-sum security pertain in this situation is the subject of empirical and analytical study. They do not derive from theoretical assumptions. The flaw in traditional theory is that it takes the conditions as unchanging—a result of the condition of anarchy.

Another flaw in traditional theory—the neglect of na-

[15]Buzan, op. cit., Ch. 7.

[16]James Rosenau observes that before the modern international economy, economic growth depended largely on acquisition of territory. James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1990, Ch. 10.

[17]Jervis, loc. cit.

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tional interests as a variable—directs our attention to a further source of variation in the character of security. A simple example demonstrates that states' self-defined national interests play a major role in the potential for common security interests. Probably the most stable and effective institution in the cold-war system—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—was made possible by the common interest of certain Western countries in coordinating policies and joining capabilities to deter a Soviet military attack on the West. Consistent with my security framework, the identification of this strong common interest did not preclude competing interests among the allies. The calculation of threat based upon Soviet power is consistent with the traditionalist focus on power. But the theory is indeterminate with respect to specific responses. The North Atlantic countries were acting not only upon the distribution of power, but upon differing perceptions of security interests.

This is the point upon which I would like to focus my discussion of Soviet security policies. The Soviet-US security relationship after World War II was substantially zero-sum, primarily because the Soviet leadership defined its national security interests in zero-sum terms. As long as the Soviet leadership promulgated a security doctrine that identified the existence of the capitalist system as a threat to Soviet interests, Soviet security was zero-sum. As the cold war progressed, successive Soviet leaderships came to view specific areas of relations in terms of some common interests (making cooperation in those areas possible but limited), but the overall and ultimate relationship remained zero-sum. Below, I will explain why, demonstrate how this is changing, and discuss the role of international institutions in Soviet strategies and in the definition of Soviet security interests. But first, it is necessary to consider how international institutions play a role in altering uncertainty regarding other states' preferences and likely strategies, since uncertainty is the other major constraint on cooperation.

International Institutions vs. Anarchy

Anarchy is a constraint on international cooperation because states cannot be certain they will not be exploited. One way to cope with the problem would be to create enforcement mechanisms: this is what national and subnational governments do. But states are not subject to a higher authority and are not likely to permit other states to be judges of enforcement, precisely because of the self-help nature of anarchy. Thus, realists conclude that anything other than short-term and very narrow cooperation is impossible in the international system. In particular, states will not agree to the creation of institutions with enforcement powers that will force them to act contrary to their interests.

Forcing states to act against their interests for the common good is one way to think about cooperation, but it is not the only way. Neoliberal institutionalist theory assumes that states will always rationally act in their self-interest. However, rather than turning to enforcement mechanisms, institutionalist theory analyzes how the constraints of uncertainty—the other source of noncooperation—may vary. In particular, theorists have demonstrated that as long as states have (and perceive) common interests, institutions may reduce uncertainty in specific ways that make international cooperation possible, though not certain.

The work on institutions is well known, so I will simply summarize some important points. Institutions are defined as persistent and connected sets of *rules*, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.[18] They can take informal or formal form, including unwritten conventions, regimes, and formal organizations. The conclusion that it is virtually certain that states will act noncooperatively is based on the game of Prisoners' Dilemma. In this highly stylized game, two people suspected of being involved in the same crime are given the option of either confessing to the crime or remaining silent. If both remain silent (i.e., "cooperate"), they each get a light prison sentence. If both confess (i.e., "defect"), they get a longer sentence. If one suspect confesses and her accomplice remains silent, the first goes free, while the suspect who attempted to cooperate with her partner goes to prison for the longest term possible. In a single play of Prisoners' Dilemma, it is always rational for both players to choose the strategy "defect" over "cooperate," even though the outcome for both players is worse than if they both cooperated. The reason is that each player always does better—regardless of what the other player chooses—by choosing to defect. In game-theory terminology, each has a "dominant strategy" of defect, which is intrinsic to the structure of the game, and which dooms the players to a worse outcome than they might otherwise achieve.

Institutional theory has shown, however, that it is not only the structure of the game but also the rules that lead to mutual defection.[19] If the players can make

[18]Keohane, op. cit., p. 3; Douglas C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Cambridge, MA, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 46–47.

[19]Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, New York, Basic Books, 1984; Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1984.

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promises (or threats), or if they are engaged in a repeated series of Prisoners' Dilemma interactions, they can rationally choose to cooperate.[20] The potential for cooperation depends on whether the players can somehow make conditional strategies—that is, cooperative strategies contingent on the other player choosing to cooperate. If the rules or conditions of the interaction allow conditional cooperative strategies, cooperation based on rational choice is possible (though not certain).

Repeated interaction makes conditional strategies possible simply by allowing a state to cease cooperating if its adversaries do. This assumes, of course, that the costs of being exploited once are not severe enough to risk national survival. Institutionalist theory would explain the varying success in US-USSR arms control efforts in these terms.[21] Early in the nuclear era, when the number of weapons each side possessed was small, slight advantages were perceived to have a large effect. Cheating could convey enormous advantages. With parity, strategic arms agreements were possible because it was possible to define acceptable margins for cheating that would not immediately threaten survival. If cheating occurred, the participants could react and repair their military-security status.

This points to the central role of information in institutionalist theory. In order for conditionally cooperative strategies to work, states have to be confident of detecting exploitation. "National technical means" played this role in the early arms control agreements. When such means are limited or are not considered adequate, institutional procedures can provide this information.[22] The procedures for verification of the treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) are a recent example. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards also are designed to maintain confidence that participants have not defected and developed nuclear weapons. The IAEA's varying success demonstrates both the weaknesses of international institutions and the reasons why institutions are important. Evidence that the IAEA procedures did not prevent Iraq from coming close to developing a nuclear weapon capability has led not to disintegration of monitoring, but to the adoption of methods to improve information-gathering, including the participation by representatives of the United Nations Security Council backed by American military force. Presumably, in the future, Iraq will not find that it can exploit the cooperative international nuclear regime, because other participants will be unlikely to cooperate.

There is some preliminary evidence that Soviet decision-makers not only take into account the effects of institutions on Soviet security interests and strategies and expect existing institutions to persist (to different degrees), but that they consciously and deliberately rely upon certain institutional arrangements in developing security policies. I will present some evidence to support this proposition in the following section. But first, we need to discuss three underdeveloped areas of institutionalist theory that are important for understanding future Soviet security policy.

First, neoliberal institutionalist theory acknowledges that states have a mix of common and competing interests in most issue areas, and that the competing elements are a primary constraint on cooperation. The theory focuses on the procedural obstacles to cooperation and demonstrates that these can be mitigated by institutions (through communication, repeated interaction, etc.).[23] But the theory has not developed a similar set of propositions based upon rational-choice assumptions about how distributional or competitive issues will be settled, nor about how the persistence of those issues affects the prospects for stable cooperation within institutions. Presumably, certain institutional arrangements will favor one set of distributional outcomes over others, and we know that the prospect of those differences affects how states approach international negotiations. Lack of work in this area can be attributed to the non-security focus of most work on institutions; similarly, lack of interest in institutional approaches to security can be attributed to neglect of the competitive aspects of institutional cooperation.[24] This issue figures strongly, however, in Soviet attitudes toward joining a whole range of Western institutions.

Second, institutionalist theory holds that institutions

[20]George Tsebelis, *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1990, p. 9.

[21]On institutions and nuclear weapons generally, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization*, No. 3, 1987, pp. 371–402.

[22]See Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1989, p. 2.

[23]James Sebenius, *Negotiating the Law of the Sea*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1984, documents the role that distributional effects played on negotiations for one institution.

[24]An important exception is John Gerard Ruggie's explanation for the development of postwar economic regimes as a compromise based on "embedded liberalism." The compromise was based on demands (largely outside the United States) that economic regimes protect against multilateral procedures that would implement economic liberalism, and liberal internationalist sentiment (largely in the US) favoring fundamental principles of free trade and multilateral procedures to prevent economic nationalism. His analysis of how economic regimes were created in the context of embedded liberalism takes conflicts of interests among states and domestic groups as central to the explanation of the specific form of the compromise. See Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Stephen D. Krasner, Ed., *International Regimes*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1983.

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form largely as a response to cooperative incentives among a set of states. The theory has yet to study how institutions are used against non-members, and what effect this practice has on the roles of institutions in the post–cold war system. For example, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) arose both out of common security interests within each alliance and out of very competitive security interests with respect to at least some non-members. The WTO disintegrated as quickly as it did because the postcommunist governments in Eastern Europe found that it did not meet their common security interests. NATO's future remains unclear, not only because of the shift in the European distribution of power (a realist perspective) but also because the security conditions it was designed to address have changed. In that respect, NATO could become more of an obstacle to European security arrangements than a forum for cooperative strategies. Institutionalist theory would generally predict that NATO will persist, but some available evidence on Soviet perspectives suggests that the theory is underdeveloped in this area.

Third, some work on institutions has argued that they affect not only national strategies, but also the definition of national interests. With few exceptions,[25] however, theorists have not explained how this would occur. Soviet security policy and the role of institutions in evolving definitions of Soviet security interests suggest that theorists who had begun to develop a domestic politics explanation for this process provided the best answer.[26] In the past, theorists have tended to adopt the prevailing assumption in international relations that an explanation of international behavior is best accomplished by taking the nation-state as a single unit. As a result, the theory has not looked at how different institutions may affect the domestic political processes that define national security interests. However, we cannot simply take interests as a given. We must understand interests, strategies, and institutions as parts of a potentially interactive process.

Clearly, an institutional approach to security is highly conditional. It depends first on the nature of nationally defined security interests. If leaderships do not frame national security interests in a way that allows for common as well as competing interests, self-help strategies based on national power are the most consistent with rational choice. Whether there are substantial common security interests depends in part on objective historical conditions, and in part on subjective national definitions of security interests. The existence of common security interests also depends on the pre-existence of institutional structures or on the efforts of (usually the most powerful) states to create new institutions. Just because an institutional arrangement would be useful does not mean it will be created or developed.

Some proponents of realist theory argue that institutions (particularly international regimes) can be created only by the most powerful states, and these institutions will disappear as the power that supports them weakens.[27] Institutionalists differ on the role of state power in institutional formation, although they agree that institutions can persist independent of the distribution of power.[28] At issue for the future international system is whether institutions created under conditions of US-USSR bipolarity will survive the post–cold war structural changes, and what role those institutions may play in future security strategies.

In the following section, I will attempt to show how evolving Soviet security strategies and even interests may contribute to an inductive theoretical effort to meet the deficiencies in institutionalist theories that I have identified.

Soviet Security Policy

The standard approach to studying Soviet foreign policy is very much in the realist tradition: identify Soviet interests (on a global scale or with respect to geographic regions) and assess Soviet means and strategies with respect to the possibilities and constraints of the international environment (especially the policies

[25]Especially Ernst B. Haas, *When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1990, who develops a learning-based explanation for international organizations and changes in national interests. James March and John Olsen also focus on how institutions affect interests as well as strategies; see their volume, *Rediscovering Institutions*, New York, The Free Press, 1989. Jack Snyder, in "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," *International Security*, No. 4, 1990, pp. 5–41, suggests four ways in which institutions can reduce the chances for praetorian politics in the Soviet Union and East Europe: (1) increased openness to trading on the world market would help break the power of cartels; (2) a negotiated security environment would undercut plausibility of threat exaggeration and nationalistic appeals; (3) a democratic institutional requirement for EC membership might favor such an outcome; (4) successful integration into EC would expand the economic pie. See also Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, "Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980's," in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, Eds., *The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1991, p. 23.

[26]Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1990.

[27]Stephen Krasner, Ed., *International Regimes*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1983, Ch. 1, Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981.

[28]Contrast Keohane's position in Keohane, *After Hegemony*, op. cit., with Haas, op. cit.

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and capabilities of the United States). This made sense for much of the postwar history of Soviet behavior because Soviet national security interests were defined in relatively constant zero-sum terms, so the primary measure of Soviet security, as the country's leaders saw it, was Soviet power relative to that of the United States.

Prior to 1987, Soviet foreign policy was premised on a Leninist world view, which saw no room for the coexistence of capitalist and socialist systems. Capitalism had to be an international system to survive; it could not tolerate the existence of socialism. Therefore, all international interactions were zero-sum. The threat to Soviet national security was consequently the presence of capitalist states, and the solution to Soviet security problems was in the long term the disappearance of such states, and in the short term the development of an alternative socialist international system.[29] Cooperation, if it was useful at all, helped only in tactical terms in narrow policy areas. Stalin's foreign policy view did not allow for even the most minor common interests; it even viewed the prosecution of World War II partly in terms of postwar advantages and weaknesses. Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev came to argue that security relations in specific areas could be non–zero-sum, but the overall relationship remained strictly competitive.[30]

Soviet military efforts were directed toward matching or exceeding Western power. Political efforts were directed toward preventing the spread or maintenance of American influence in Europe and the Third World. Since security was zero-sum, any area of increased Western influence by definition represented a diminution in Soviet security. In economic terms, Soviet relations with other countries were meant to be isolated from the processes and institutions of the capitalist international economy. Trade was not conducted via market mechanisms, but through barter or credit arrangements via non-convertible rubles.

Although Soviet policy relied to some extent on international institutions, there are two important qualifications to keep in mind. First, the most important of these institutions (the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Economic Mutual Exchange) for the Soviet Union included only states the Soviets considered socialist. Since these countries were considered to have mutual (indeed, harmonious) interests, the institutional bent of Soviet security policy confirmed the perspective on the potential for security cooperation suggested above. Second, use of the term "cooperation" to describe relations in these institutions must be taken with a grain of salt. In particular, the Warsaw Pact was a constraint on the sovereignty and policies of the non-Soviet members, and was maintained by the threat or use of force.

The few instances of Soviet participation in East-West international institutions before 1987 also claim our attention. They confirm that a necessary condition for limited cooperative participation was Soviet perception of areas of common security interests. Soviet participation in United Nations agencies was most often based not on policy coordination, but on political competition for influence and was not intended by the Soviet leadership to develop, pursue, or establish fundamental cooperative relations with the West.[31] The United Nations Security Council has often been paralyzed by conflicts of superpower interests. The Council became a more useful mechanism for crisis management with the onset of détente. In recent instances —most often competitive militarized crises in the Middle East—Soviet leaders decided that the national security interests of the USSR were best served by averting direct military confrontation. Overall security interests might remain strictly competitive, but Soviet and American interests might be complementary in narrow, localized instances, particularly under the threat of escalation to nuclear conflict. As an institution, the Security Council provided information and stabilized expectations about the maintenance of cooperative policies (curtailing arms supplies and restraining allies) effectively enough to establish and implement ceasefires.

These attempts were extremely limited and short-term, however. Once the urgent need to avert escalation was met, competitive security interests in defending and advancing allies' interests became more important. Without a definition of regional or global security interests that allowed for common interests beyond crisis escalation, the United Nations' institutional role in Soviet security policy remained very narrow.

The nuclear nonproliferation system is another case where the Soviet leadership was willing to utilize institutional mechanisms in an area where their definition of security provided for common interests with Western

[29]Whether the Soviet leadership was concerned with capitalist or merely powerful states is an issue that brings up the intractable problem of ideology vs. interests as primary causal sources of Soviet foreign policy. For my purposes, we should note that Soviet attitudes toward the Western countries are consistent with either view, and the two factors are complementary. However, Sino-Soviet relations suggest that the ultimate problem in Soviet security policy is other powerful countries. If it is the case that power relations were more important than ideological considerations, it suggests another reason why traditional Soviet security interests were cast in zero-sum terms.

[30]Alexander Dallin, "Soviet Approaches to Superpower Security Relations," in Alexander George, Philip J. Farely, and Alexander Dallin, Eds., *US-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 605.

[31]Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policy Toward Developing Countries, 1953–1963*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1964, Ch. 1.

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states. The goal of preventing West German acquisition of nuclear weapons, interests in supporting nuclear energy development in developing countries, and a relatively strong position against nuclear proliferation (with the partial exception of Chinese programs in the 1950's) made unilateral measures inadequate. The history of the nuclear nonproliferation system is an uneven one, and there are certain to be future problems with leaks and with coping with those states determined to acquire or develop a nuclear weapons capability.[32] Even with the return to confrontation in the late 1970's, however, the Soviet leadership did not undermine the nonproliferation control regimes. Indeed, Soviet allies intent on developing nuclear capabilities—for example, Iraq—had to turn to Western suppliers.

In sum, the history of post-Stalinist foreign policy reveals hints of non–zero-sum definitions of security, but these definitions were initially narrow in scope and range. Once they developed, we find some evidence of the Soviet use of institutional mechanisms to pursue certain security interests more reliably. However, their use was tightly constrained by an overall competitive world view and a consequent definition of Soviet security that left no room for common interests outside the socialist bloc.

The Impact of "New Thinking"

"New thinking" altered most of the traditional basic principles of Soviet foreign policy. The leadership declared that Soviet foreign policy would no longer hold as its basic assumption that the fundamental condition of the international system was class conflict. Instead, "common human values"—such as the avoidance of global nuclear war and the achievement of peaceful economic development—were declared to be more significant than any socialist-capitalist cleavages that might still exist. Soviet priorities in foreign affairs were to turn toward policies consistent with these common interests. The change disengaged the focus of Soviet national security from the precise nature of internal developments in other states and shifted it to more tractable issues of geographical security stemming from external threats and the potentially wide variety of relations with other states.[33]

Although policies and strategies were often not clear during the tumultuous period from October 1989 to August 1991, the reasoning underlying official Soviet policy usually was quite clear. For example, a foreign ministry review for 1989–1990 explained that changes in the understanding of "national security" were brought about by the advent of political, economic, social, and informational interdependence (*vzaimozavisimost'*). As a result, according to the new Soviet view, it was insufficient to see national security simply as being able to defend oneself from external military threat. Interdependence created new opportunities and potential for strengthening security, and this meant that security required "common efforts."[34] While acknowledging that a well-armed military is still necessary, the review argued that a country's place in the world is no longer determined by military power alone. It concluded that "the overexaggerated attention given to the buildup of military might in the last decades gave birth to a series of phenomena which brought society to the brink of catastrophe and brought into question its ability to develop in modern terms, to remain a part of world civilization."[35] In other words, at some point, additional military power does not contribute to national security, but subtracts from it. According to the review, the Soviet Union had to return to "the society of civilized states" and participate in the creation of a principled system of security, based on cooperation, in order to concentrate on development. "To act otherwise may mean to miss a historical chance for the rebirth of our own country."[36]

To function in the world economy, many Soviet analysts argued, a state must participate in international economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Soviet Union "remains outside of interdependence" as long as it cannot participate in the international monetary and financial system, and cannot even provide data on Soviet reserves and credit.[37] To participate would require costly adjustments in Soviet policies (such as establishing nondiscrimination against foreign trade and investment and, most costly of all, a shift to convertibility of the ruble), but it would offer valuable benefits. Par-

[32]See Leonard S. Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb*, Cambridge, MA, Ballinger Books, 1988; and Stephen M. Meyer, *The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984.

[33]The argument and evidence in this section is based on joint research reported in Celeste A. Wallander and Jane Prokop, "Soviet State Strategies and the Post–Cold War Settlement," paper prepared for the meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, Aug. 28–Sept. 1 1991, and in Celeste A. Wallander, "Soviet Policy Toward the Third World in the 1990's," in Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler, Eds., *Third World Security in the Post–Cold War Era*, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1991.

[34]"Chapter 1: National Security and National Interests of the USSR in the Present Period," in "The Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Work of the USSR—Review of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1989–1990," published by *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), March 1991, pp. 12–14. This source will be cited hereafter as *Foreign Ministry Review*.

[35]Ibid., p. 12.

[36]"Chapter 3: Changes in Europe and the New Path to Safeguarding Security. Construction of a Common European Home," in ibid., p. 54.

[37]A. Kortunov and A. Izyumov, "The Meaning of State Interests in Foreign Policy," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), July 11. 1990.

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US Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze condemn Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in a press conference at Moscow's Vnukovo airport on August 3, 1990.

—AP/Wide World.

ticipation in the GATT would yield the Soviet government and enterprises access to information on product standards, foreign certification requirements, and real market values of enterprises and products. At a basic level, it would afford the Soviet Union the right to negotiate terms of international economic relations, and would require that other participants confer most-favored-nation status on the Soviet Union.[38]

Conservative officials (indeed, the August coup leaders) did not accept this radical view of security. Soviet Minister of Defense Dmitriy Yazov argued that "the fact remains that the attainment of military-strategic parity between West and East was the most important condition allowing the prevention of a new world war, the preservation of peace."[39] Security is maintained through "reasonable sufficiency"—the "correspondence between armed forces and the degree of real military danger . . . the minimum demands of defense." Yazov supported a new order, but his was an order in which the military balance still mattered, because the threat of war still exists. "Under these conditions, our state needs sufficiently powerful mobile armed forces . . . that meet the demands of reasonable and reliable sufficiency for defense, and that are capable of repelling aggression from any direction under the most unfavorable conditions."[40]

From this perspective, talk of economic conditions for security and integration was premature. A CPSU Central Committee memorandum published in a German newspaper in June 1991 criticized Soviet policy

[38]Igor' Ye. Artemov and Sergey S. Stankovskiy, "The GATT and the Interests of the Soviet Union," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow), No. 8, 1989, pp. 34–44, at pp. 36–37.

[39]Marshal Dmitry Yazov, "The High Frontier of History," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Nov. 29, 1990.

[40]Marshal Dmitry Yazov, "USSR Ministry of Defense Draft: The Concept of Military Reform," *Pravitel'stvennyy Vestnik* (Moscow), No. 48, November 1990, pp. 5–10.

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toward Eastern Europe, and insisted that Western advances in the region were a loss for Soviet interests. A key concern was to ensure that the former Soviet allies not join Western military alliances, nor allow their territories to be used for any Western military deployments.[41] Echoing criticisms that KGB head Vladimir Kryuchkov reportedly directed at Gorbachev in June 1991, a *Krasnaya Zvezda* article asked rhetorically whether "a country can be conquered by aid."[42]

Despite conservative opposition, the Soviet domestic economic crisis and the transformation of European international conditions inspired further change in Soviet self-defined national security and interests. Basically, Gorbachev came to claim that the central issue for Soviet security was integration into the world economy, because integration is essential for the success of Soviet domestic economic reform, the Soviet national priority. The focus of Soviet efforts became clear in early June 1991, when the USSR suggested that Gorbachev be invited to the G-7 meeting in London. The place this invitation played in Gorbachev's internal reform and foreign policy strategies was clearly reflected in the speech he delivered when accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo on June 5, 1991:

We are now approaching what might be the decisive point when the world community and, above all, the states with the greatest potential to influence world development have to decide on their attitude toward the Soviet Union. . . . I am convinced that the world needs perestroyka *no less than the Soviet Union itself does. Fortunately, the present generation of politicians for the most part is becoming ever more deeply aware of this interrelationship, and also of the fact that now, when* perestroyka *has entered its critical phase, the Soviet Union is entitled to expect large-scale support to insure its success. Recently, we have been seriously rethinking the substance and role of our economic cooperation with other countries, above all the major Western nations. We realize, of course, that we have to carry out measures which would enable us genuinely to open up to the world economy, to become an organic part of it. But we have come to the conclusion that we need a kind of synchronization of our actions in that plan with the Group of Seven and the European communities.*[43]

For Gorbachev, by 1991, domestic economic interests required more reliance on market mechanisms in a mixed economy. What type of foreign policy serves these priorities? Gorbachev repeatedly emphasized Soviet integration—rather than mere participation—in the international economy. "We don't consider ourselves an organic part of the world economy . . . . to a considerable extent we are on the margins. We are an autarky, if you like. . . . we prefer a concept for the way in which the Soviet Union might move toward being integrated in the world economy."[44] Gorbachev's chief complaint was that structures and institutions created during the cold war under conditions of confrontation continued to block this integration, even though the confrontation was over. He appealed for changes in the rules and restrictions of the GATT, the IMF, and the World Bank, pointing out that the Soviet Union had already demonstrated its commitment to ending confrontation by its arms reductions and cooperative policies regarding change in Europe and the unification of Germany.

These central concerns suggest that institutions affect Soviet strategies in ways not directly predicted by institutionalist theory. Successful and powerful Western institutions serve as a resource for Soviet policy at a time of severe national weakness and disorder. They do not contribute to power per se; rather, they make Soviet integration into the international economy possible by providing information about requirements and basic economic conditions. Accession to the rules and requirements of international economic institutions reduces uncertainty, as predicted by theory. However, it was not uncertainty about other states' intentions that was the problem for the union and republics—instead, it was their own intentions, capabilities, and strategies that had to be clarified for other states.

Information regarding other states' intentions and capabilities does figure in concerns about potentially risky security strategies, as does the need for reciprocity to monitor and maintain cooperative approaches. For example, a Soviet foreign ministry official admitted that conflict resolution policies in the Third World were diffi-

[41] *Frankfurter Allgemaine* (Frankfurt am Main), June 7, 1991, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), June 25, 1991, pp. 18–20.

[42] M. Ponomarev, "Could It Be Possible to Conquer the Soviet Union?" *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 14, 1991.

[43] "M. S. Gorbachev's Nobel Prize Lecture," *Pravda* (Moscow), June 6, 1991.

[44] *The New York Times*, July 18, 1991. The *Foreign Ministry Review* reports: "It is beyond doubt that unless the country's economy is inserted into global economic ties, unless access to foreign experience, technology, markets, capital is obtained and cooperation is established, economic transformation of the USSR is unthinkable in the short periods allotted by history. The USSR's position in the future world also depends on overcoming the present economic problems, because [in the future] the power (*moshch'*) and influence of states will be determined increasingly by economic factors, by the level of technology and science." See "Chapter 9: External Economic Ties of the USSR. Problems of Integration of the Soviet Economy Into the World Economy," *Foreign Ministry Review*, p. 92.

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cult to implement because one party could always take advantage of the others and behave competitively. But, he concluded, implementation of such policies could be rational if carried out within institutional structures, the key being reciprocity. He stated, "Our consistency in these spheres will give us grounds for demanding the same consistency of the West and for establishing extensive rather than selective cooperation."[45] Eduard Shevardnadze has also accepted this reasoning; for example, he made a proposal to the UN Secretary General that there be created a UN register that would provide information on the amounts of arms sales and supplies as well as member-states' national legal procedures governing sales. The information thus provided would enable members to assess more reliably the military potential of other states, would contribute to the solution of competitive arms-transfer cycles, and would reduce uncertainty regarding other states' intentions and likely behaviors, as a condition for cooperative strategies. This, even more than Gorbachev's integration-oriented concerns, is what institutionalist theorists would expect.[46]

Soviet policies in the negotiations on Afghanistan and Namibia relied heavily on UN procedures. For example, UN talks can create incentives for all parties to demonstrate that they have ended military operations, as well as focus attention on actions that contradict such claims.[47] The reasoning advanced by officials is not simply that the Soviet Union must participate in international institutions because problems are global or because of moral commitments to universal principles, but because these institutions are resources necessary for the realization of Soviet objectives. Since the Soviet Union does not often have sufficient military and economic power to secure important Soviet national interests, its leaders concluded that reliance upon international mechanisms can play a role in security strategy even though they require compromise and limit Soviet aid to failing allies. This institutional function is closer to realist conceptions of security policy, because the leadership is concerned less directly with uncertainty than with capacity to influence outcomes.

Institutions affected not only Soviet strategies in this period, but also evolving definitions of Soviet interests by supporting certain domestic political and economic outcomes. Gorbachev's shift back toward reform in the spring and summer of 1991 clearly was partly a response to international requirements. Progress on domestic reform required international technical and financial assistance. To have access to substantial, long-term aid, the Soviet government had to participate in institutions, which, in turn, required certain internal political and economic reforms. This linkage between institutions and security strategy, which must have become clear to even cautious moderate leaders by June, is not explained well by theory. In this case, institutions affect not only strategies after interests are articulated, but affect the very definition of interests by constraining domestic political and economic options as they are formulated. Soviet (or republic) leaderships are not obliged to formulate interests in accord with international constraints, so sovereignty is not at issue. But the rules and procedures of existing institutions can favor certain economic reforms and serve as political resources in domestic political debates on the nature of national interests. They are not decisive—the August coup could have reversed Gorbachev's shift back toward reform. But that very shift is evidence that institutions may be important for reasons other than the reduction of international uncertainty.

How German unification was negotiated is another important example of how institutions play a role in shaping cooperative and competitive Soviet security objectives. Official Soviet policy changed completely from November 1989 to July 1990. At first, Soviet officials and policy-makers firmly declared German unification to be impossible. By February 1990, Shevardnadze explained that the Soviet Union had no problem with the right of German self-determination, but that "all peoples, particularly the peoples of the Soviet Union, should have the right to a guarantee that German territory should never again be the source of a threat of war." He proposed that this be accomplished by a gradual process in which both Germanies would become neutral; "reliable political, juridical, and material guarantees" were to ensure that the new German state would have to have a clear place in a new, peaceful European order.[48]

At the center of Soviet concern with a unified Germany in NATO was the nature of the military balance. A leading policy-maker on Germany in the foreign ministry stated very clearly that "the nucleus of the German problem was and remains the military component."[49]

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[45]Vladimir F. Petrovskiy, "Post-Confrontation Prospects for the UN," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya*, No. 4, 1990, pp. 16–23, at p. 22.

[46]Shevardnadze's letter was printed in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Aug. 16, 1990.

[47]For an extremely critical analysis of Soviet policy—past and present—for the self-defeating effects of unilateral and aggressive political-military policy, see Andrei Kolosov, "Reappraisal of USSR Third World Policy," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 5, 1990, pp. 34–42.

[48]From an interview with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, reported by TASS International Service, Feb. 2, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 5, 1990, pp. 33–35.

[49]"But the Fact Is," *Trud* (Moscow), Feb. 18, 1990. The policy-maker is A. P. Bondarenko.

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East and West Berliners wave a flag declaring "Germany, One Fatherland" as they celebrate the opening of the Brandenburg Gate on December 23, 1989.

—Frank Johnston, The Washington Post.

Although Soviet analysts spoke in terms of the need for "stability," and spoke with alarm about the instability arising from a powerful Germany, their objections to Germany in NATO were clearly based on the potential not for general instability in Europe, but for the reconstitution and growth of the military threat directed against the Soviet Union by a more powerful NATO. This probably would have been a concern under any circumstances, but it was magnified by the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. The Pact had been the Soviet response to the creation of NATO, and now the "balance" between the blocs was being not simply adjusted, but fundamentally altered.

However, the Soviet leadership sought to cope with this military threat and the competitive security aspects of Moscow's policy toward Germany in terms of existing international institutions. They argued that German unification should be accomplished in synchronization with the various processes of European integration, both actual and potential. Shevardnadze warned that unification "is outdistancing the formation of common European structures that could become a guarantee of stability."[50] Gorbachev argued that NATO and the Warsaw Pact "will be transformed from military-political organizations into political organizations . . . . Then there will be no need for this haggling about where a united Germany will be located."[51] The creation of the "two-plus-four" structure addressed some of these concerns. In exchange for formal recognition that unification itself was solely an internal matter for the two Germanies, the Soviets achieved several objectives. First, their argument that German unification had its "external" aspects and that the rights and responsibilities of the four wartime powers must be preserved was accepted and institutionalized. Second, the two-plus-four structure assured a legitimate role for Soviet participation in the disposition of the postwar European system and in creating the form of the new system.

The two-plus-four talks became a way for the Soviet Union to bargain for alternative institutions in Europe that would serve its security needs without either enhancing NATO's power or shutting out Soviet participation. The focus shifted to reduction of NATO's predominantly military character. In meetings with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in Moscow in June 1990,

[50]From Shevardnadze's interview, TASS International Service, Feb. 22, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 23, 1990, p. 5 .

[51]"Answers of M. S. Gorbachev to Questions of a *Pravda* Correspondent," *Pravda*, Mar. 6, 1990.

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Gorbachev stressed that the WTO was becoming a political rather than military organization, and observed that if at its July meeting NATO "undergoes similar changes in its doctrine, structure, contents, and functions, with an accent on the political aspect of its activities, then appropriate institutions may emerge which will somehow reflect these changes."[52] In the course of the third round of the two-plus-four talks in Paris, July 17–19, Shevardnadze said that NATO's doctrinal change "enabled us to look differently at the role and place of a reformed NATO in Europe" and the resultant "qualitatively new military-political situation."[53]

The primary Soviet military and defense concerns with respect to Germany had to do with limiting that country's defense capabilities and deployments, as well as those of NATO in the former GDR. There was, however, also a less traditional element in Soviet thinking and policy on the nature of a German threat that was somewhat counterintuitive and decidedly "institutional." The Soviet foreign ministry review concluded that "important components of the system of guarantees lie in the complex of agreements, in the organization of German arms, in the exclusion of the possible renewal by Germany of political and territorial expansion, and in its integration in a *double ring* of all-European and West European institutions."[54] A deputy minister hinted that Soviet-German security treaties (with their nonaggression pledges) would somehow be binding on NATO by virtue of Germany 's membership in that organization.[55]

The evolution of Soviet policy on German unification shows that it was not so much a powerful Germany or multipolarity in Europe that the Soviet leadership saw as threatening, but the increase of NATO military power directed against the Soviet Union. Furthermore, a major issue in Soviet concerns was NATO not just as a military threat, but as an institution that excluded Soviet participation. When Moscow still believed that both military alliances would survive the cold war, Gorbachev even endorsed NATO and the WTO as institutions that could be used in the future because they had contributed to stability and security.[56] That is, he was happy to countenance a continued, if transformed, role for NATO in future European stability and security, when the WTO was thought to have some future form of existence as well. However, Yevgeniy Primakov told *Literaturnaya Gazeta:* "Today we do not have that 'symmetry' that even a few years ago had been created in the strategic field by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. . . . In order to insure stability under these conditions it seems to me that it is necessary for both the Warsaw Pact and NATO to gradually move away from their military function."[57] A particular concern was that the former WTO countries might join NATO. However, measures by NATO to include the Soviet Union in formal institutionalized consultations at NATO headquarters in November 1991 met these concerns.

Strongest and most consistent Soviet support is found for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Soviet support is based on three features of the CSCE: its basis in the Helsinki Final Act, which recognized postwar European borders; its comprehensive membership (which, by 1991, included even Albania); and the fact that it is not a product of the cold war bipolar structure. The CSCE was so important to the Soviets because it is the only major existing European institution (other than the talks on Conventional Forces in Europe—CFE) of which it is a member. Although the Soviet government endorsed the principle of comprehensive participation,[58] it is clearly Moscow's own participation it wishes to ensure.

The CSCE also had the advantage (from the Soviet perspective) of being comprehensive in scope. Through the CSCE, the Soviet Union (and perhaps the republics) believed it could play a role in economic, technological, and ecological negotiations. Based solely on its capabilities, it is difficult to see how the Soviet Union could have been a major player in defining the future of European relations on such issues. With the CSCE, it was at least possible for them to play a larger role. Shevardnadze consistently pushed the value of CSCE as the only all-European institution with the scope to address the entire range of European security —as opposed to purely military—policy.[59] Thus, the Soviet government favored CSCE not because it was a weak institution (although it is), but because it was the only institution in which the Soviets could possibly play a role in defining rules and procedures.

The developments and evidence I have analyzed predate the August 1991 coup attempt and subsequent developments in Soviet economics and politics. It is difficult to predict with any certainty to what degree there will be a unified post-Soviet foreign policy in military or economic affairs, or what the foreign policies of

[52]"Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Member States," *Vestnik* (Moscow), July 1990, p. 44; "What Are the Options?" ibid., July 1990, pp. 36–38, at p. 38.

[53]Moscow TASS, July 17, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, July 18, 1990, p. 3.

[54]"Chapter 3 . . . ," *Foreign Ministry Review*, p. 54 (emphasis added).

[55]*Vestnik MID* (Moscow), Mar. 15, 1991, pp. 20–23.

[56]"Interview of M. S. Gorbachev for Soviet and French Television," *Izvestiya*, Nov. 22, 1990.

[57]"The USSR and the USA in the New World," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Oct. 3, 1990.

[58]"Chapter 3 . . . ," *Foreign Ministry Review*, p. 43.

[59]E. A. Shevardnadze, "On Foreign Policy," *Pravda*, June 26, 1990.

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

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev addresses the CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension on September 10, 1991.

—TASS/Sovfoto.

the republics will be. I do feel confident in concluding that to the extent central or various republic leaderships pursue market-based reform as a goal, their definitions of security interests will be very close to those developed in the months preceding the coup attempt, as discussed above. Consequently, I would expect institutions to play similar roles in security strategies, although the particular institutions or priorities would likely differ among republics. However, should political leaders define republic security interest in more zero-sum competitive terms, as is quite possible, I would expect institutions to play a less important and more problematic role in strategies.

Conclusion

If we need evidence that purely self-reliant, autarkic strategies based on a zero-sum understanding of security are self-defeating in the contemporary international system, we need look no further than the Soviet Union. Before the reform process began in 1987, Soviet foreign policy was mired in costly and self-defeating global commitments, had cut the country off from the most developed and most successful industrialized countries, and (with the exception of nuclear arms control treaties) managed to intensify hostility through actions meant to increase Soviet security. I do not mean to imply that the Soviet Union was solely responsible for the problems in East-West relations. But in terms of its own security, Soviet policy was costly and inefficient.

All was not solved by the new thinking, nor has everything changed. Traditional definitions of military security and traditional calculations continue to play a fundamental role in post-Soviet strategy. To the extent that institutions play a role in this aspect of security policy, they are meant to maintain and make transparent the military balance. The distinction Soviet officials made between offensive and defensive capabilities was a significant development, because it seemed to create the possibility of a relatively minimal military security requirement. However, the importance of verification increases when policies depend on technologies, deployments, and operational planning as well as simple numbers of military forces. In this respect, institutional procedures are a more important requirement for cooperation than they were in the arms control relations of the 1970's. The redefinition of military security in terms

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of defensive balances not only makes substantial cooperation possible, it gives institutions a more significant role in security.

While recognizing this strong traditional element in security, we cannot understand Soviet thinking about the country's (or republics') interests without acknowledging how desperate the internal economic situation is and how that has affected understanding of national survival. A more likely threat to security than external attack is internal collapse—a version of this situation is seen by at least a significant number of leaders to require international economic measures. I see this as a core security concern because that is how the post-Soviet leaderships themselves frame it. Soviet compromises on the terms of German unification are evidence that these concerns increasingly override cautious views on the persistence of military threats in general. This is not to say that the present leaders would sacrifice military security for economic security. Rather, it is to argue that the economic aspect of national survival has been elevated to a level where security policy involves constant calculations of the relative value and connection between the two.

In both aspects of security, post-Soviet leaders are primarily concerned that they will be excluded from participation in the successful, Western-developed institutions. Exclusion from these institutions in and of itself is seen as a threat, both because it would deny the country certain benefits and advantages, and because the institutions themselves may be used in a competitive manner against the republics' interests. Development of the CSCE would prevent this, but so far such efforts have not been very successful. As a result, officials are calculating increasingly in terms of the IMF, the World Bank, the GATT, and even the European Community (EC) for their integrationist strategies. A main feature of the CSCE—that it is elastic—constrains its effectiveness at a time when decision-makers increasingly need effective institutions.

A major failing of institutionalist theory is that we really do not understand the role institutions play in resolving competitive interests. The Soviet case suggests that a major element of this role is the implicit linkage of quid pro quos among institutions—Soviet concessions on German membership in NATO in return for German support in EC aid, for example, or Soviet support of political conflict resolution in the Third World in return for expedited admission to membership in economic institutions. This is related to another neglected aspect of institutionalist theory: how institutions are used against non-members. The Soviet case is a striking example of how institutions or particular procedures can affect the security strategies of non-members. In the case of NATO, the issue of the potential future role and form of this institution encouraged Soviet efforts to favor "political security" and, in more concrete terms, to not appear threatening or intransigent toward the ex-WTO members for fear that they and/or NATO members may move toward an expanded alliance. Similarly, Western states have not been reluctant to explicitly withhold the benefits of institutional aid or membership in order to encourage a particular form of economic reform. The term "cooperation" does not quite seem to fit the implicitly threatening way in which institutions are being used to achieve the coordination of policies and pursuit of common interests.

I have suggested that some interesting issues in Soviet security strategies and interests can be best understood in terms of an institutional approach. These include the changed (and changing) definition of security interests, the mixture of traditional and nontraditional elements in Soviet strategies, and variation in Soviet attitudes toward specific institutions. I have not addressed the central theoretical proposition of institutionalist theory: do institutions make cooperative strategies more likely by reducing uncertainty? In large part, the answer is yes. To mention just a few instances: the CFE talks make defensive balances a reasonable strategy; negotiation over the terms of German membership in NATO via the two-plus-four talks enabled the Gorbachev leadership to secure specific agreements that met certain military security requirements; and the Soviets seek participation in the IMF in order to approach ruble convertibility more cautiously.

But in some respects, two other aspects of institutions are more important for post-Soviet security in the near future. One is that institutions are simply resources without which reform will be extremely chaotic, painful, and potentially destabilizing, if not impossible. The second is the extent to which existing institutions play a role in defining interests themselves by supporting the policy positions of individuals or groups within governments. I have analyzed Soviet security strategies in terms of a change in interests that permitted a change in strategies. Although this analysis seems valid for the first period of new thinking, it is difficult to tell whether it is now not more the case that interests are being defined to conform to promising strategies. Gorbachev's speeches in June and July 1991 present a nice justification for Soviet reliance upon integration in order to meet security interests, but a simpler explanation may run from domestic reform requirements, to international institutions, to strategies, to security interests.

Finally, how representative is the Soviet case for understanding the future of institutions in national and international security? In one respect, it is unlike any

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other because of the extreme nature of the internal and external changes facing the country. Few states experience as radical a change in perceived security requirements and national capabilities as the Soviet Union did from 1989 to 1991.

However, two aspects of the situation facing the former Soviet Union are clearly generalizable to many states in the international system. Increasingly, modern security is defined by states themselves in non–zero-sum terms. The Iraqi invasion was itself a strange mixture of traditional sources of war (territorial expansion) and nontraditional responses to war (international cooperation). Other cases are less extreme. Although the EC has been generally ineffective in responding to the Serbian-Croatian conflict, neither have the EC members broken apart to competitively support favored sides in the conflict, a fact which arises from a sense of the existence of stable, more important common security interests. Second, like the Soviet Union, many states in the system are presented with a large number of various institutions that can perform overlapping functions. If efforts to coordinate policies in any given forum fail (as happened with the Soviets in Eastern Europe and with Germany), states may turn to alternative institutions (as the Soviets did) rather than immediately rely upon purely competitive strategies. These conditions are not enough to make us certain that the problem of modern security may be more tractable, if complex, but they offer sufficient reason to take seriously such a possibility.

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Drafting Constitutions for the New Democracies

A. E. Dick Howard

In January 1991, the Czechs and Slovaks adopted a new bill of rights, their fundamental Charter of Freedoms. In December 1991, Americans marked the 200th anniversary of the US Bill of Rights. These two events make a nice pair of bookends for a very remarkable traffic in ideas. They are a felicitous reminder of the power of ideas to transform nations. I would like to discuss this traffic in ideas and relate it to the developments taking place in Central and Eastern Europe that lie at the base of the building of constitutional democracies in the region, where an age of authoritarianism is giving way, at least in part, to an age of democracy.

There is a striking resemblance between what is happening today in Central and Eastern Europe and what went on 200 years ago in America. When the framers of the federal constitution went to work in Philadelphia in 1787, they were drawing upon the experience of constitution-drafting in the states. After 1776, each of the American states adopted a bill of rights and instituted a system of government. It was a period of great experimentation. The writing of constitutions was a new art, and, although there were some precedents, one could not be sure precisely what a constitution was supposed to do. The result was the adoption of charters that although flawed in many ways, furnished empirical case studies upon which James Madison and his colleagues in Philadelphia were able to draw for instruction.

The early American state constitutions were objects of intense scrutiny and keen debate across the Atlantic. When in 1789 the drafters of the first French constitution set to work in the National Assembly, they drew very heavily upon American precedents. One faction in the French assembly was influenced by John Adams and the Massachusetts constitution of 1780. Another faction was influenced by the Pennsylvania constitution of 1776. The latter faction was the one that prevailed. This era of experimentation in the late 18th century has its contemporary counterpart in Prague, Budapest, Warsaw, and the other capitals of Eastern Europe, where there are ongoing debates about the purpose of a constitution.

I speak here principally about constitution-making, drawing upon the opportunity I have had to sit at the elbow of those who are doing the drafting. Moreover, in most societies, the making of constitutions, the drafting of a fundamental charter, is a window on society. It is a way of looking at the culture and the aspirations of a people.

To what sources do drafters of constitutions in Central and Eastern Europe look? There is, to begin with, an indigenous component; the drafters in this region appreciate the fact that a constitution must be rooted in the soil of the country from which it comes. To draft a constitution in Poland, one wishes to know something about the legacy of the great May 3, 1791, constitution, the second national constitution after that of the United States. But the good drafter is also a comparativist. He or she looks to what is happening in other countries, especially those that have had similar experiences or aspirations. Constitutional drafters therefore take a keen

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interest in the experience of West European countries—in particular, France, Spain, Germany, and Italy—because they are close at hand. Finally, there is a universal quality to constitutions. Skeptics may ask whether, given differences of ethnicity, nationality, and other factors of social and political life, it is possible to draw upon universal ideas of constitutionalism, democracy, and the rule of law. I think it is possible.

Here, one hears an echo of the 18th century. The drafters of American and European constitutions were children of the Enlightenment. They read John Locke and Montesquieu; they searched for what in the Age of Reason was called the common core of human happiness. Enlightenment ideals tended to fade in the 19th century, but I believe that since World War II, they have taken on new life in the contemporary guise of international charters and regional arrangements. I am thinking of the United Nations Charter, the UN Declaration on Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and other documents of that kind. Such charters reflect widely held principles. In my travels I have found that constitution-makers in Central and Eastern Europe commonly look to these documents to inject into their domestic law those principles and aspirations widely shared in other states—especially in Western Europe.

What is the relative influence of the American constitutional experience and that of Western Europe on constitution-drafting in Eastern Europe? As Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick has pointed out, we Americans have won a victory. Democracy is now spreading; it is beginning to appear in places where it has not been known for decades or where it has not been known at all. That moment of victory may encourage Americans to assume that what they have come to experience for 200 years is being exported to other places. To some extent, this is true. But one should consider that the influence of American ideas is qualified by their being examined in a European setting. My experience in such countries as Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary is that there is, especially among authentic democrats, a keen admiration for the American experience. Professors, judges, and lawyers in that region know something about separation of powers, checks and balances, and federalism. They have read *The Federalist Papers*. They know something about American history. We are an example of what they would like to accomplish.

At the same time, American experience cannot be transplanted wholesale to other countries. Indeed, as drafters go to work on new constitutions, they typically produce documents whose specifics are more likely to resemble those of West European constitutions. One example is judicial review. In the US, Chief Justice John Marshall established the principle that the Supreme Court has the power to strike down legislation it finds unconstitutional. But in the new democratic constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe, constitutional courts—on the model of those in Germany and Spain—undertake the task of judicial review; they do not have general jurisdiction like the Supreme Court in the US.

How constitutional drafters articulate rights provides another illustration of how democracy can come to reflect the culture or the manners of a particular place and time. In the bills of rights being adopted in Central and Eastern Europe, one finds more than one kind of "right." There are, on the one hand, the traditional negative rights, the prohibitions on government action, what my one-time boss, Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, used to call the great "Thou Shalt Not's" of the Bill of Rights. These include protection for free speech, free press, and free exercise of religion.

Alongside these negative rights, one will find in all the Central and East European constitutions enumerations of positive or affirmative rights—especially, social and economic rights. By these, I mean such things as the right to an education, the right to a job, and the right to old-age benefits—in effect, entitlements. These are ideas associated with the welfare state or the positive state. Such rights do not appear in the text of our own Bill of Rights, although some judicial decisions, especially from the federal courts, reflect this kind of thinking about rights.

Central and East European constitutions provide for both traditional negative rights and more modern social rights. There is an interplay between increasing personal freedoms and initiatives and, at the same time, having government undertake certain tasks that have come to be customary in most industrialized countries.

There is also an interesting interplay between individual rights and so-called collective or group rights. The American view is that rights belong to the individual, although at times Americans may exercise them collectively (for example, when we join together in an association). There is rising concern in Europe about whether constitutions ought to protect collective rights. If one were to go to Bucharest and speak to a Romanian lawyer or parliamentarian, the chances are that he or she would conceive of rights as individual rights; that, yes, we will give our national minorities rights, but they will be the same rights that ethnic Romanians enjoy. However, if one were to go to Transylvania and talk to a member of the Hungarian minority there, that person would be much more likely to say that Hungarians in Romania need collective rights to protect their culture, traditions, and religion in a state that they otherwise find

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hostile. This kind of sharp debate reflects the kinds of national tensions that now characterize much of Europe.

Ultimately, these principles will have to take institutional shape. I mention this point because it reminds one that powerful feuds and quarrels finally do have to be dealt with in the political and institutional process. Otherwise, they will destabilize democracy.

Finally, rights will have to be interpreted. One of the great unknowns now in Central and Eastern Europe is what kinds of judges will hand down what kinds of decisions. It is unclear to what extent judges in the region will be able to distance themselves from the socialist era, when law was not an independent force, when law was simply a function of the will of the communist party or of what the state desired.

In constitutional democracies, there are inevitable tensions between two conflicting principles. One is that policy is made by democratically elected officials who are accountable for their decisions. The other principle is that even elected majorities are bound by certain constitutional limitations. In the US, the Supreme Court is the fulcrum of a great deal of that controversy. In Central and Eastern Europe, it is unclear whether the new or yet-to-be-appointed judges can move away from the European tradition—strong even today in Western Europe—of parliamentary supremacy. In France, this tradition—the notion that parliament's will is something like the expression of a general will à la Rousseau—is particularly strong. Thus, when a judge steps in and abrogates the will of parliament, it is deemed antidemocratic. These issues will bedevil and engage the minds of Central and East Europeans for some time to come.

Moreover, I predict that in Central and Eastern Europe, constitutions will not play the same central role that they do in American mythology. After the federalists and anti-federalists fought the ratification debates in the 1780's, they moved on to the world of party politics. But the constitution became common ground. It became as near as anything Americans have to an arc of the covenant, and thus assumed a certain mystical quality. This will not happen in Central and Eastern Europe. A constitution there will be an act of parliament. From the American standpoint, it is a paradox that a body, namely parliament, that is meant to live under the constitution, will, in most of these countries, be the body that adopts the constitution, typically without a popular referendum. There will then be a cluster of laws—also acts of parliament—dealing with things such as the electoral system, the press, the constitutional courts, and other bodies. The result, from the standpoint of constitutional theory, will be a mixed arrangement that to the academic eye, may appear to be somewhat disorganized.

One hopes above all that it will work. Consider, if you will, the case of Czechoslovakia. Czechs and Slovaks, laboring mightily to create a constitution, have produced thus far a bill of rights, a division of competency statute, and a constitutional court act, but they have yet to agree on a constitution. The Slovaks' desire for sovereignty and the Czechs' desire for a unified state may prove to be so at odds with one another as to make the adoption of a new constitution impossible. If so, the Czechs and Slovaks, if they stay together in one state, will continue to live under the current, somewhat untidy arrangement.

Drafting a constitution is but a first step in achieving constitutionalism. Other fundamental institutions must be developed—a multiparty system with free and fair elections, an independent judiciary, an independent bar, etc. Nurturing these institutions is not a finite act. Creating the institutions of democracy is not a weekend's work. It is not the work of six months. In many cases, it will be the work of a generation.

Establishing a lasting democracy will require something our founders understood very well—civic virtue, civic education of a kind that brings people to understand both the rights and the obligations of citizenship. It is an aspiration that is well summed up in a phrase contained in Virginia's Declaration of Rights, written in May 1776 by George Mason. Mason concluded his bill of rights with the thought that all free government depends upon "a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles." This is a very apt phrase. Although it was penned in this country more than 200 years ago, it is a thesis that sums up the challenges that confront Central and Eastern Europe today.

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Commentary

Dilemmas of the Transition Period

Ognian Pishev

BECAUSE I am an economist by training, I will deal with the more practical side of the transition—the dismantling of the statist system in Central and Eastern Europe—and will try to avoid the more academic questions of constitutional reform and change in our societies. I agree with A. E. Dick Howard's outline of the principal issues involved in drafting new constitutions in Eastern Europe, and I think that he skillfully pointed out some of the most critical elements of political transition in our societies—for example, the relationship between individual and collective rights. And in a very subtle way, he addressed a fundamental question: Do constitutions really matter during this transition? I think we in Eastern Europe fell into the trap of trying to outline all the essential elements of a future democratic society in our countries before the transition really began in earnest. This is why all these countries, including Bulgaria, which adopted a new constitution on July 12, 1991, have been encountering serious difficulties in drafting and ratifying their democratic constitutions.

There are two approaches to reform. The first is to create a blueprint of the kind of society one is trying to achieve, codifying well in advance the changes one is trying to provoke. The second is to define a minimum set of rules and principles of transition without detailing the many aspects of social change and market reform.

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The first, or normative, approach to democratic transition is less likely to succeed than a flexible institutional and legal reform that releases the creative forces of post-totalitarian societies in Central and Eastern Europe. The basic law—the constitution—provides a useful but very general framework for this approach. To illustrate this thought I would point out that private property rights, no matter how fundamental they are, are of little practical importance if emerging economies do not have such important pieces of legislation as a commercial code, contract law, or privatization and banking reform laws. The energy devoted to writing constitutions must also be applied to speed up political and economic changes in all these areas.

Once adopted, imperfect provisions of the constitution, which in reality reflects society's level of maturity, can jeopardize the reform in such vital areas as reprivatization and agriculture. For example, the ban on nonagricultural use of land contained in the Bulgarian constitution reflects 18th-century physiocratic prejudices that consider land to be the only source for the creation of wealth. The exclusion of foreigners from the restricted land and real estate market seriously constrains structural reform. Constitutions must be viewed not as a supplement of five-year plans, but rather must be viewed as the corollary of successful democratic revolutions whose principles have to be codified in law.

I will now try to address some of the problems of the transition period in our societies, and refer to the essential elements of the communist society and system in our region. I will address two sets of issues. The first is the distinction between nominal and real institutions and nominal and real processes under communism. The second is whether the West will be willing to live up to its own ideals and open the doors of its institutions and economies to the countries of the East.

Under communism, all East European countries had a sophisticated system of nominally democratic institu-

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tions. Each had a parliament that held two sessions a year, usually to rubber-stamp decisions already taken by the government or by the communist party. It was obvious to everyone that these political and legal institutions did not reflect the reality of decision-making in our societies.

And herein lies a problem. We now want to make real the nominal institutions that have long existed in our societies. I recall an episode that will shed some light on this problem. On June 7, 1991, US Vice President Dan Quayle, during a visit to Sophia, made a passionate speech in defense of democracy at the Central Square, the site of opposition rallies. The Vice President tried to be very guarded in his expression of support for democratic institutions. Knowing that there was public discontent with the National Assembly, he said that the parliament building symbolized democracy, but he was booed because people were not interested in the nominal importance of the parliament building as a symbol. They were interested in the real content of its work.

We now see that everything *is* moving in the direction of real reform—establishing separation of powers, introducing an independent judiciary, and the like. We have come to better understand the political principles that establish a balance among the executive, legislative, and judicial powers in the country.

Yet, this understanding is not always reflected in the actions of our societies. One example is party-building. Political party-building began two years ago in most of Eastern Europe. But democratic forces are typically not well organized; we have too many political leaders, and links to the rank and file are tenuous.

One of the reasons for this state of affairs, as Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick stressed in her address, is that political organization and force were the foundation on which communist society was built. And what can market democracies juxtapose to the organization, coercion, and force imposed by communist parties? We can juxtapose competition to organization and interest to force. Only now are we entering a phase of political competition, and only now are we witnessing the emergence of vested economic and social and political interests. And only subsequently will these be incorporated into the programs of various political parties.

At present, political competition remains personalized, which has encouraged the emergence of thousands of political organizations and groupings. Most of them will be short-lived. In Bulgaria, 44 political parties and coalitions took part in the general elections of October 13, 1991. Gradually, most of these political parties will pass from the scene. (Only three parties gained the required 4 percent minimum threshold of the vote to ensure their representation in the National Assembly.) Some will merge, and perhaps some will rejoin the Union of Democratic Forces.

Under communism, regimes imposed one-dimensional structures of life on their people. Economic, social, cultural, and other interests and behavioral patterns were to be guided by political criteria, by political decisions. Thus, in Eastern Europe, it is easy to proclaim a belief in democratic ideals and democratic values, but the inertia of previous communist practices remains very strong. It is easier to proclaim individual rights and freedoms than to enforce those rights and freedoms in a society that is only now beginning to comprehend new political structures, the principle of individual autonomy, and the freedom to choose. Our revolutions have yet to introduce the *multi*-dimensionality we need to restructure our societies.

The only dimension that really determined individual behavior was the political organization of the socialist society. Political power represented by the Communist party (its leading role was the cornerstone of "socialist democracy") was the final arbiter of every economic decision; it issued the aesthetic verdict on every piece of art. Personal loyalty to the party leadership was the ultimate criterion for promotion not only in public administration but even in science. Our revolutions have yet to put an end to these politicized patron-client relationships. Equally important, they must do what they can to promote an independent civil society. The emergence of this new dimension of human activity will inevitably come at the expense of politics, which still captivates the imagination of the new democrats of Eastern Europe.

When we speak about changing the statist economy, we should bear in mind that it involves not only a change in the constitutional system. Our constitution proclaims the inviolability of private property rights. It proclaims the principle that the economy is to be guided by individual entrepreneurial interests. Yet, our economy is far from being market driven—state-owned enterprises dominate the economy. The economy remains governed by the principle of central planning. It has yet to discover the advantages of market mechanisms.

When we speak about changing and introducing new market institutions, I think it is important to think of the market not as an institution in itself, but as a process during which a society introduces new essential elements.

Thomas Sowell made this point in a very convincing manner:

The market is no particular set of institutions. Its advantages and disadvantages are due precisely to this fact. Any comparison of market processes and gov-

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ernmental processes for making a particular set of decisions is a comparison between given institutions, prescribed in advance, and an option to select or create institutions ad hoc.[1]

There is constant interaction and conflict between existing "islands of stability"—corporations or essential government entities and the need to reform the entire system, between present and future needs of economies in transition. That is why utopian attempts at starting ab novo that do not reflect the present-day reality are likely to fail miserably while the self-reinforcing process of competition—which holds nothing sacred, neither century-old companies, nor government institutions—is more likely to produce a market economy.

The whole process of learning by doing is no less important than the goal itself. It matters not only that we get to a market economy, but how we get there.

The pressure to implement political reform in our countries was based on the perception of the primacy of politics, and I believe this has narrowed the scope of the thinking of our leading politicians. In too many cases, it was very simple for the democrats, after having become members of parliament or ministers, to forget about the primacy of individual entrepreneurship, the primacy of market over planning. Too many of them resorted to the traditional practice of centralized control over the economy.

This is a very difficult transition, because high on the agenda is the fight against all the traditional habits and psychological barriers of our former lives under socialism, and perhaps this one is the fight that will be the hardest to win. In this moment of truth, we must be able to count on the support of the international community.

We look to the West, but not only to enrich our ideals and our understanding of political change and constitutional reform. What is more important, it is obvious that such small countries as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary will be unable to reform their economies by adopting a radical market economic model, unless they receive outside help.

There should be an opening. There should be a more rapid integration of Eastern Europe into the world economy. This also means that the West should be more forthcoming in absorbing the exports of our economies. Thus far, our governments, which have been persuaded of the virtues of free trade, encounter protectionism in Western Europe. For example, we instituted a radical change in our agricultural practices, only to discover the West European governments' long-standing support for agriculture—the subsidies paid to farmers in many countries.

The willingness of the West to open its markets is the real issue, and it is a litmus test of the will of the West to accept the newcomers from the East. If markets remain closed to East European competitors there are bound to be political repercussions, including the closing of eastern markets, which will benefit no one in the long run.

In international politics, too, sometimes we find a Western approach that reflects a double standard. We have, as newcomers to democracy, become firm believers in human rights, and all of a sudden, we see that in addition to supporting human rights, there is, shall we say, a concern that Eastern Europe remain "stable."

Finally, to conclude my remarks, it is necessary to emphasize that the histories of our countries are quite different from those of Western countries. Thus, without proper understanding of these histories, it will be virtually impossible to understand present conditions in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The West's support for artificially created societies and states, whose continued existence runs counter to democratization, is an example of a policy that lacks the perspective of history. In fact, the West's policy toward the Soviet Union and, until recently, Yugoslavia, recalled Lenin's condemnation of "the idiocy of small nations" in his study of imperialism. This support for big states, which are deemed to be more convenient partners for the West, and which are valued because their existence is seen to ensure a greater degree of control over international politics, places limits on the democratic forces in these societies.

The richness of our experiences testifies to the need to allow multiple forces to work simultaneously and spontaneously, and to allow for the development of some uneven forms of political, social, and economic transition. Bulgaria, being a late-comer to the democratic revolution, has greatly benefited from the experience of other countries. In many cases, we succeeded in avoiding some of the early mistakes made by other new democracies. In other cases, the Bulgarian example of a gradual, but resolute, transition to a multiparty political system and of the gradual dismantling of the communist system could serve as a model for our neighbors—Albania, Romania, and even some of the Yugoslav republics. The tradition of ethnic tolerance in Bulgaria, which communist policies failed to destroy, is the best model to be followed in a region that is wrought by ethnic and national conflict.

[1]Thomas Sowell, *Knowledge and Decisions*, New York, Basic Books, 1980, p. 41.

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Commentary

Democratic Institution-Building in Eastern Europe

Aleksander Smolar

THIS discussion will deal with the course of democratic institution-building in a broad sense, considering not only macro-political institution-building—the problem of the constitutional state—but also the problems of transforming a command economy into a market economy, and transforming a monolithic society into a pluralistic one.

When we reconstruct how the problem of democratic institution-building in communist societies was perceived both in the West and among opposition intellectuals in the East in the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's, we see that their scenarios were quite simplistic. According to a model prevalent in the 1950's and 1960's, change was to come first in the domain of the economy. State socialism would be transformed into market socialism, which presumably would be acceptable to the communist regime. Market socialism would lead to the re-emergence of an autonomous civil society, and, in turn, this would facilitate political transformation sometime in the undetermined future.

In the 1970's, two other models appeared. According to the official one—popular among communist reformers and also among Western politicians who favored giving massive economic help to certain communist countries—imports of Western technology would lead to economic development. In turn, economic development would promote social civility, and subsequently political transformation. Another model was formulated by the opposition in Central Europe. The key concept in this scenario was the building of a civil society outside of and in spite of the communist state to overcome the atomization of society, which is the essence of life in a totalitarian country, and to promote a certain degree of social consensus. In Poland, where it was believed that the creation of an independent civil society would place certain limits on the authorities and promote economic transformation, the opposition made conscious efforts to create elements of a civil society.

Of course, as we have seen since 1988, the outcome was very different from the three scenarios outlined above. What actually occurred bears much more similarity to the scenario of Sir Ralf Dahrendorf, who wrote recently that a country could create a political democracy in six months and a market economy in six years, but that 60 years would be necessary for a true civil society to emerge in Eastern Europe.[1]

Dahrendorf understands the magnitude of the problems facing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. But even he may be too optimistic—it is doubtful, for example, that a true political democracy can be created in six months. Of course, elections can be organized, but is it possible to have a really democratic system in a country where the chasm between atomized individuals and the political system remains so large? In Poland, as well as in some other East European countries, sociological research conducted at the end of the 1970's showed that people identified themselves

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[1] *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe*, New York, Times Books, 1990.

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with family and close friends on the one hand and the nation on the other, but with nothing in between. There are no attachments to any kind of intermediate institutions, and it is these intermediate institutions that constitute civil society.

There are numerous explanations for people's unwillingness or inability to act collectively, but perhaps the most important has to do with the habits people developed in order to survive under communism. Over the past 50 years, people were forced to rely on themselves for survival, and they resorted to whatever means they could, legal or illegal. What they did not learn at all was how to engage in collective action, and this is one of the reasons why it is difficult to organize political parties in Eastern Europe. For example, in Poland, the Democratic Union Party, which gained the most votes in the October 27, 1991, parliamentary elections (about 13 percent of the total), has only 15–20,000 members in a country of almost 40 million people.

These characteristics of postcommunist societies have several implications for the role of the state. Postcommunist political elites are frequently proponents of the liberal doctrine of a limited state, according to which the state is to withdraw from all social and economic activities. Yet, the reality is much more complex, because the state is forced to do many things liberal states do not ordinarily do—to privatize the economy, to organize banking systems, and even to promote an independent civil society. There is a contradiction between the limited role that states will have and should have in the future and the kinds of tasks and obligations states are forced to take on now.

Moreover, these demands are being placed on states in the region—especially those in Poland and Hungary—at a time when they are weak. Originally, in 1988–89, the communists were forced to come to terms with the opposition in these countries because they could not solve economic problems. (Of course, they did not believe that the destruction of the system would follow from their efforts to come to terms with the opposition.)

In both Hungary and Poland, the communists left the opposition with a weak state. Nevertheless, there was hope when the opposition took power that a new, stronger state with significant popular support would take its place. Unfortunately, this did not happen.

First, there was a certain continuity between the communist state and its successor. There were no revolutionary ruptures in Eastern Europe, not even in Romania. Many people, especially in the countryside and small towns, could see no real difference between the communist and postcommunist regimes, especially in the sphere of economic policy. This continuity has been underscored by the postcommunist elites themselves, who argued against purging communists from their positions in the state and government administration.

Postcommunist states are weak for another reason. People continue to hold the state responsible for all economic and social affairs, even though market mechanisms are operating in the economy, and social organizations have taken on some of the tasks of the state in other spheres. Instead of seeking redress for their concerns through parties and legislatures, people tend to address their demands for wage increases or the cessation of price increases directly to the leadership of the state and government. There is no understanding that political institutions can be effectively used to voice grievances or seek justice.

Another impediment to democratic institution-building in Eastern Europe has to do with what I would call "the individualization of concern" and its relation to A. E. Dick Howard's remarks on the need for civic virtue. I have already spoken about how people resorted to individual survival tactics to adapt to life under communism. Such habits tend to retard the development of civic virtue, and civic virtue is critical to the building of a democratic polity. This problem is compounded by the fact that the entrepreneurial virtues that are now being promoted, including the core of the entrepreneurial spirit—individualism—also retard the development of civic virtue. There is thus a contradiction between two contemporary necessities—building a democratic polity through promoting civic virtue and building a modern market-type economy.

Yet a third problem in building democratic institutions concerns the issue of "negative rights" and "positive rights." Under the communist regimes, the guarantee of certain social and economic rights was considered a major achievement. Although Howard mentioned that in writing constitutions in Eastern Europe, the drafters are including guarantees for both kinds of rights, I do not agree with how he presented this issue. Social and economic rights do exist on paper, but in reality the problem in Eastern Europe is that the state is withdrawing certain social and economic rights because it cannot afford to pay for them. In return, the people are to acquire the so-called negative rights—political and civil liberties. But what does this tradeoff mean in social terms? Unfortunately, the people who will lose the security that comes from the state's guarantee of certain social and economic rights (for example, workers in state-owned heavy industrial enterprises) are not the same people who will benefit most from civic and political rights (white-collar professionals and intellectuals).

As I see it, these are the major problems linked to building democracy, creating an open society, and de-

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veloping a market economy. We will face, I believe, a long process of transformation in Eastern Europe. It will be much more complex than simply creating democratic institutions, because we have to transform whole economies, societies, habits, and mentalities, and all this is an extremely complex task.

Commentary

Observations on the Transition Period

Joshua Muravchik

THE first subject I want to address is the problem of guaranteeing economic and social rights in the new constitutions of Eastern Europe.

I am not sure that the concept of economic and social rights is pernicious or always outside of American experience, even though such rights are not enshrined in the US constitution. One could say, for example, that Americans "have a right to an education." Universal, compulsory education has been in practice throughout the United States for most of this century.

But there are two dangers in the proliferation of "positive" rights, as they have been proclaimed in communist and certain other socialist countries and in the way they are addressed in United Nations treaties and other international documents. First, although the state may guarantee people positive rights—rights to a job, vacation, medical care, and housing, for example—few if any societies have the wealth to provide such things for all members. As a result, the whole concept of rights is diminished by labeling as rights certain things that cannot be guaranteed, and, therefore, are not sacrosanct. Part of the importance of declaring certain things rights is to make them sacrosanct.

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Moreover, every time something is called a right, it is removed from the realm of democratic decision-making and control. When "rights" are enshrined in perpetuity, the majority no longer has the right to make decisions on such questions. The social resources used to give substance to these rights are disposed of by fiat, regardless of popular will.

Second, I want to comment on the American response to the process of transition. Recently, a growing number of people—some on the Left, some on the Right; some Democrats, some Republicans—have been saying that because there are urgent needs at home, the US cannot afford to spend much money to assist the transitions to a free market and democracy in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. This is extremely shortsighted.

The US is in a recession and people are hurting, but America has always had and always will have unmet domestic needs. And if tomorrow all presently unmet domestic needs were met, new domestic needs would appear, because that is the nature of progress and that is the nature of the American system. It is worth noting that America's overseas generosity was greatest in the immediate postwar period, when America was a much poorer country than it is today. The Marshall Plan provided aid to Europe, and substantial aid was given to Japan and some other countries at that time as well.

If America has unmet domestic needs now, just think about its situation in the late 1940's. The standard of living of the average American was about 40 percent of what it is today. In education, the average American today completes 13 years of schooling; then, the average American completed nine years of school. Medical care

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was not as widely available, and life expectancy was shorter. There is talk about the disrepair of America's infrastructure today, but back then the interstate highway system had not yet been built. Yet, for a half-dozen years, the US spent from 2 to 3 percent of its Gross National Product on foreign aid. This is 10, 20, 30 times as much as even the most generous programs today are proposing to spend to assist democratic transitions.

The Marshall Plan and the related programs of that period were wonderful investments, both in narrow economic terms (helping those countries get back on their feet as trading partners and contributors to common purposes), and, in political terms, because their recovery undergirded the peace and security that the West and Japan enjoyed in the postwar era. There is a lesson here. Helping the countries that are trying to make transitions to democracy and free-market economies is an investment that the US very much needs to make, notwithstanding the importance of addressing a whole variety of domestic ills.

Of course, I know that there is much uncertainty and debate about what to do and about how best to help, but I want to point to one area that seems very important: sharing some of Americans' political know-how with the new democracies in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This also happens to be a sphere of action in which the costs should not be overwhelming.

Americans have many skills that are essential to the functioning of a democratic system. These skills exist on the governmental level and, equally important, on the nongovernmental level in advocacy groups, the media, labor unions, and civic action groups of different kinds. These skills involve working with others, developing political strategies, articulating programs, building a popular base for a given program, and so on.

At different times in their past, Americans have gone abroad to share some of this know-how with people in other countries. We did it during the occupation of Japan and, to a lesser extent, during the occupation of Germany. Over the years, American labor groups trained labor union organizers in numerous countries. In addition, although the record on this remains classified, the CIA gave political training to certain groups abroad, although it is certainly less well equipped to do this than other American groups. In recent years, the National Endowment for Democracy and some of its cognate institutes have sponsored some work of this kind.

What could be done today, and I hear some talk along these lines both within and without the government, is to try to send Americans who have some experience in politics to the newly democratizing countries. There, they could be assigned to independent groups, or even to governmental institutions, where they could work as observers and advisers and share some of their political knowledge. It is also very important to have reciprocal programs in which we can bring many people from those countries to the US, particularly younger people who are aspiring to positions in government, the media, business, civic organizations, and so on. There are already some very good, but small, internship programs, such as that of the National Forum Foundation, that bring people from the new democracies to the US. These programs warrant expansion.

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Transition—An Insider's View

Václav Klaus

The transition from, or—as I call it—the dismantling of, socialism is definitely not easy. The first thing we have to ask is precisely what it is that we are dismantling. It is very easy to dismantle "explicit" socialism—the one-party system, institutions like the State Planning Commission—and to change some of the basic rules. But it is very difficult to dismantle the "implicit" socialism in us—the habits, prejudices, and traditions built over the past decades in our political, social, and economic system.

The task, as we understand it in my country, Czechoslovakia, is to create a normally functioning market economy and a normally functioning political system based on standard political parties. We have no wish to undertake new social experiments. We have had enough of such experiments in the past.

We want to play by the traditional rules; we want to accept traditional values. We are not interested in "third ways"—I have been frequently quoted in the past as saying that the third way is the fastest way toward the Third World. This, it seems to me, is still a compelling point. In Czechoslovakia, we are not interested in third ways.

Leftist intellectuals in the United States, having lost their economic case and suffered declining demand for their products, are looking for markets in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. But we are not interested in the market socialist dreams of leftist liberal economists on this side of the ocean, in various universities here. We have to fight such ideas in Czechoslovakia. Indeed, I would say that one of the main obstacles to our development now is ideological infiltration from the West. This is an endless fight we must wage in our part of the world.

We need neither third ways nor market socialist dreams, no *perestroyka* kind of thinking. If we want to introduce real change, we must forget *perestroyka.* I would recommend the same to our friends in the Soviet Union.

Some of you may be familiar with a well-known theorem in welfare economics called the turnpike theory. We want to apply this theorem in Czechoslovakia: we want to construct an ideological turnpike, not travel the winding roads from one system to another. We want to enter an ideological turnpike and proceed as fast as possible toward a market economy.

What is to be done? This is the central question in Czechoslovakia. We know that there are four preconditions for a change of economic system. First, we must have a clear vision of where we want to go. Second, we must have a pragmatic, viable reform strategy. Third, and very difficult, we must create a political and social consensus in favor of reform. Fourth, we have to start.

Those are four very, very simple points, and I would argue that my country—unlike some other countries of Eastern Europe—has already succeeded in fulfilling all of them. Let me say a few words about the crucial, hard-core measures of radical economic transformation that have been introduced in Czechoslovakia since the beginning of 1990.

Privatization measures. We know that massive, rapid, large-scale privatization is absolutely necessary. We know that it is not possible to do everything neces-

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Václav Klaus, minister of finance of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the architect of the Czechoslovak economic reform program, addresses the 40th anniversary conference of Problems of Communism, *"Toward a Postcommunist World," in Washington, DC, on October 22, 1991.*

—Dwight Somers, USIA.

sary to create a full-fledged market economy without privatization. Therefore, we have begun with what, I would argue, is the most ambitious privatization program ever developed.

You have probably heard about our standard, textbook privatization steps—for example, using auctions to privatize small businesses in Czechoslovakia. But I hope that you have also heard about our nonstandard, unique, inventive method called "voucher privatization." We want to augment the insufficient savings of the Czechoslovak public artificially by distributing to them, for a nominal price, vouchers that will be used for trading and exchanging shares in privatized firms.

The idea is very simple, and what is even more important is that it is not just an idea, it is not just a project, it is not a plan, it is a reality in Czechoslovakia. In October 1991, we started the process. As of November 1, 1991, everybody in Czechoslovakia over 18 years of age will be able to register to buy vouchers, which cost the equivalent of an average weekly salary, and use them as artificial investment money, in exchange for shares of newly privatized firms.

We have engaged in this unique process because we cannot afford to undertake social experiments at the brave pace of my favorite politician, Margaret Thatcher. We cannot privatize a mere two, three, four firms a year. We must privatize 2,000, 3,000, 4,000 firms a year, and, therefore, we cannot simply apply the standard methods described in Western textbooks. We have to apply an artificial method that will begin to take effect in the next days, weeks.

So we consider privatization to be a crucial precondition for the normal functioning of a market economy, and we are in the middle of a very ambitious privatization process. This is the first basic pillar, the cornerstone of our reform strategy.

Market liberalization. The second point I would like to make is that it is essential to liberalize markets, to lift all price controls, to deregulate. And we discovered that this is easy to achieve. It is not necessary to spend several years taking preliminary steps. It is easy to introduce price liberalization. The government need only announce it.

This we did, effective January 1, 1991, and after 40 years of distorted, outrageous, administered prices, the initial result was traumatic inflation. That month, the rate of inflation on a monthly basis was 26 percent. It was a tremendous shock for Czechoslovak citizens.

But thanks to our very restrictive macroeconomic policies, we succeeded in slowing down the inflation rate. In July, August, and September, the rate of inflation in Czechoslovakia was zero. It is considered a record for any country, at any time. So we can recommend to everybody that price liberalization is simply something that can and must be done, and it is necessary to accompany it with rational monetary and fiscal policies to reestablish price stability.

So price deregulation, the liberation of markets, is the second crucial step in creating a normally functioning economy. It is very interesting to observe that by doing that, you transform the economic regime practically overnight from one characterized by excess demand into one characterized by excess supply. We lived for decades with shortages, excess demand, and repressed inflation. We discovered that by liberalizing prices, we jumped into an unknown world of excess supply, a world of excess inventories, with problems of sales, unemployment, output decline, and so

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on. It is a total change, but very interesting to watch.

Opening to the world economy. The third crucial pillar of our economic strategy is opening to the rest of the world, opening the frontiers of Czechoslovakia, liberalizing foreign trade, introducing currency convertibility. On January 1, 1991, we introduced limited currency convertibility. It was a crucial step in our reform strategy, and the results have been very, very positive.

We hope that the rest of the world will open its markets to Czechoslovak goods in return. We want reciprocity, and I am a little bit amused to hear talk in the White House and State Department about import quotas in the United States. It is a very pleasing message for Czechoslovaks to hear that the United States is afraid of Czechoslovak cheese flooding the market here. This is a challenge for Czechoslovak farmers. I like to see that. But I must say that the problem of opening the markets in the European Community countries is more important.

Restrictive macroeconomic policies. Finally, having done our homework, we know that we need a rational, cautious, restrictive macroeconomic policy as well. So, very restrictive monetary and fiscal policies make up part of the reform process in Czechoslovakia. We are very often accused of being the monetarists of Eastern Europe, and I may be the only minister of finance in the region who has problems in his parliament defending a budget surplus. (Usually, the minister of finance is accused of having too large a deficit; I am accused of having too big a surplus. It is a very unusual situation.) But we know that such rational macroeconomic policy is a precondition for all other changes.

Sequencing? or playing chess? I hope that our reform process is rational, pragmatic. We do not believe in sophisticated sequencing of economic, or reform, measures. We know that just as an economy cannot be centrally planned, so an economic transition cannot be centrally planned and administered.

The economic transition is a process with many forces, many constraints, many policies. We have to react, and react rationally. There is no computerized program saying that at the beginning, one must introduce measure number one or measures number two, three, four, or five. I prefer to compare reform, traumatic radical reform, with chess. One simply has to know how to play. One cannot know in advance the position on the chessboard after White's 26th move.

So the sequencing issue very often discussed in economic literature is partly artificial, a rationalistic illusion of the intellectuals. We know in reality that transition is a complicated process with many, many constraints. We are sometimes blocked in effecting one measure or another, but we must and will go ahead and try.

I mentioned the crucial issue of creating a political and social consensus supporting the reform measures in our country. There is necessarily a J-curve in the economic performance of a reforming country. Economic indicators fall during the initial period. In this period, you have to explain, defend, create, and ask for a supportive consensus. This is the issue that I consider to be of the utmost importance for any Central or Eastern European country pursuing the formidable, unprecedented task of transition.

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Assessing the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1990's

Richard G. Lugar

Introduction by General William E. Odom

BEFORE I introduce the evening's speaker, I would like to take the opportunity to express my own personal congratulations to *Problems of Communism* on its 40th anniversary. I think its record of providing scholarly analyses of communist countries and communist parties all over the world has had no rival. And I doubt that any other of this country's scholarly journals has been read as widely abroad. Its staff and its editors, both past and present, deserve to be very proud of these achievements, and I am personally glad that over the years they published one or two of my theses on communism.

Now let me turn to the important task that I have tonight. Our speaker is well known to us all. We remember his outstanding leadership of the Foreign Relations Committee, and his handling of the INF Treaty ratification, one of the many highlights in a distinguished career. He was also a very articulate and compelling spokesman during President Bush's effort to mobilize support for the Gulf war and US policies in that region.

Senator Lugar, however, has not limited his activities in foreign affairs to the hearing rooms and the Senate floor. He has taken the opportunity when it presented itself to participate firsthand. And I think most of you recall his conspicuous presence in the Philippines during the 1986 elections, which contributed to assuring that justice was upheld in validating the election of Corazon Aquino over Ferdinand Marcos. Senator, we are very honored to have you here tonight, speaking to us on the future prospects for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Address by Senator Lugar

I applaud the 40th anniversary of the journal *Problems of Communism* and the efforts of Paula Dobriansky and others at the US Information Agency in bringing together this conference of scholars, statesmen, people in the field of journalism, and persons who are deeply concerned about the lessons of the past and the prospects for the future.

I have had the privilege this evening of sitting with Ognian Pishev, the distinguished ambassador to our country from Bulgaria, and that has been a continuation of the education that he brings to us about the vitality and the experiences of his country.

Also, I have been reunited with Ben Wattenberg, one of my fellow compatriots in observing the 1986 Philippine elections, which was a seminal experience for all of us who participated. That event may well have been the genesis of a democratic revolution and people-power revolution in many parts of the globe. It does not

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Richard G. Lugar is senior United States Senator from Indiana. He is presently the ranking Republican on the Agriculture Committee and a member and former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He managed the ratification proceedings for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty in 1988 and was chairman of President Ronald Reagan's election observer delegation that recognized Corazon Aquino as the legitimate winner in the Philippine elections of 1986. General William E. Odom, former Director of the National Security Agency, is currently Director of National Security Studies for the Hudson Institute (Washington, DC) and Adjunct Professor at Yale University (New Haven, CT).

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stretch the imagination to say that the television and print journalists who were in the Philippines returned to countries all over the world carrying a new message about American foreign policy, and some pragmatic conclusions about how political change can occur. I certainly did, and perhaps Ben did as well, as we visited other countries in subsequent years.

My story tonight begins in 1989, the year the Berlin Wall fell. In September of that year, two months before the wall came down, Polish Minister of Finance Leszek Balcerowicz came to the United States on a very difficult mission. Those of you who are scholars of the Polish experience will recall that Solidarity had taken up the toughest jobs in that country, including reforming the economy, and it was the Polish finance minister's lot to bring over an eight-page typewritten plan outlining how the transition to a market economy would occur. He came to see the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, officials of the US Department of the Treasury. And late one afternoon, he came to the Capitol, where Senator Robert Dole and I were privileged to receive him and listen to his explanation of what he proposed to do.

It was a remarkable hour because the Minister of Finance said, "Beginning January 1, 1990, and into the year of 1990, we will, in fact, move to market-planning mechanisms of supply and demand for wages and prices; move into privatization, not only of small businesses but eventually of large enterprises in the country. We will have a free convertibility of the złoty with all currencies in the world as rapidly as possible. We will promulgate a commercial code that recognizes private property and tries to incorporate many of the elements that we find recorded in the commercial code of the United States. And we require from you in the United States and the rest of the Western world and Japan a billion dollars for a stabilization fund that will get us through this experience, because we have no idea where the złoty may finally land vis-à-vis other currencies or where wages and prices will take us."

He continued, "We know that a lot of people will become unemployed rather promptly, and to the extent that redundant industries are wound up swiftly, unemployment will become extremely severe, probably by the middle of the winter; and we will need food and sustenance." All this was laid out.

In the midst of this, as I recall, on about page five, there was a very poignant paragraph which said, "There is no recorded history of a country moving from socialism to a market economy, and, if we make it, we will be the first."

The essence of the first part of my story tonight is that the jury is still out as to whether Poland will be the first socialist country to make a successful transition to a market economy or, indeed, even whether there will be a first. One of the things that is exciting for a visitor to Poland to see is how much has occurred, how much courage has been displayed, and what a massive amount of work there is still to do. Almost everybody writing about this in our national press points out how tough the going is, and how many obstacles—political, economic, social, and historical—there are. It is no news that the transition to a market economy is a difficult process.

As all of you know, the Poles will hold an election this Sunday, October 27, and it is not at all clear how the parties will sort themselves out and what coalition of forces may emerge from that experience. Nor is it clear how any coalition will react to the tremendous changes that have occurred or to the massive outcries of the people over these changes.

And yet, the Polish plan stands for me as a benchmark for assessing what is going to occur not only in Eastern Europe in the three countries making the most headway—Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland itself—but also in countries such as Bulgaria (which has achieved a good bit), Romania (for which we have hopes), and, finally, the republics of the Soviet Union. I would simply make the point at this stage that if, in fact, the Polish plan does not work, if the transition is not made, then the prospects for success elsewhere, for example, in the Soviet republics, are much dimmer and, as a matter of fact, may disappear.

This bleak forecast is not meant to discourage what has been an exciting quest. I simply wish to focus on something that I am very concerned about, and that is the lack of a sense of urgency in our own government with regard to success in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. As a matter of fact, we are going to have to concentrate a great deal more of our attention to make certain that transition is successful in those countries, because failure will be intolerable, not only for the countries that are involved, but for our foreign policy and for the whole ethos that guides our hopes in this transition. The success or failure of this transition will determine how nations with systems that are compatible with our own are perceived.

I have focused on Europe 1989 also in part because that was the year when President George Bush met on those ships that were fated to have a rocky time off Malta. I remember in the weeks just prior to the Malta conference, the President conferred with a good number of people, as is his habit prior to these affairs. In the Oval Office one day, I told him what I would do if I were in his shoes—that was to advise Gorbachev to adopt the Polish plan. And, in fact, the President thought that was a good idea. Many of you, as scholars, might well

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say, "Well, after all, the Soviet Union is not Poland. Their histories are different. You do not understand how complex it all is." And I probably do not. I think each one of us who is not a specialist in the field is going to school all the time, trying to understand the complexities.

In any event, the point I was trying to make was that Gorbachev, at that particular point, had no hope of dramatically improving the Soviet economy without currency convertibility, without a commercial code, without a sense of private property, in short, without any basis upon which American investment might reasonably be made. There have been a few sophisticated corporate individuals, starting, I suppose, with the Pepsi Cola people, who have set up successful barter arrangements and in that way traded on a modest scale with the Soviet Union. But by and large, as things stand, there really is no good reason for an American business or any other business to invest money in the Soviet Union. Until there is a sense of private property and a commercial code, there are enormous obstacles to doing business. Any Midwestern businessman would like to know whether if he bought a factory he indeed owned it, and to have some proof besides. Furthermore, he would like to be able to get his money out if he wanted to. Without these basics, there is not going to be much foreign investment in the Soviet Union or anywhere else. The broad view that somehow or other the United States has failed to see the opportunities in the Soviet Union is simply bogus in terms of economic analysis; it is out of touch with reality.

But, in any event, the President actually discussed the Polish plan or some reasonable facsimile thereof with Gorbachev, and found that Gorbachev was aghast at the whole prospect. "First, he said that it would be 'politically impossible'." He said, "I would lose it with regard to control of my country in proposing any such thing." To him, it sounded very radical; it was off the wall.

The second thing the President discovered was that Gorbachev himself still did not like the idea of private property—he was a communist. This is not meant in a pejorative sense; it is just simply descriptive. He really did not like the idea of private property.

The third problem was that Gorbachev did not understand the economic terms used by the President. He was not an economic illiterate, but he was close to that in terms of the complexity of the program that Bush was describing. When the President came back, he said, "You know, we have got a real challenge. We have not only got to be advocates, but educators besides. We have to bring the whole thing up to speed before there is any understanding of what all these terms are about." And he said, "I hope that we have a long enough period of time to do that."

Nonetheless, Gorbachev was persuaded to try on for size some of the ideas presented by the United States and other countries. He also invited old friends like Stanislav Shatalin to discuss the latter's 500-day plan that had been featured on the cover of *Business Week*. However, while Shatalin was here in Washington visiting James Billington and other friends at the Library of Congress, Gorbachev was in Moscow suggesting that the 500-day plan was interesting, but would, of course, have to be diluted to fit the reality of the system that was. A similar fate befell Grigoriy Yavlinsky, who came here with Yevgeniy Primakov in the summer of 1991. While Yavlinsky was working at Harvard with Graham Allison and others to devise a workable economic program for the Soviet Union, people back in Moscow were working at cross-purposes.

I make these points because the Polish plan is obviously a difficult proposition politically. The fact that "shock therapy" has lasted for two years in Poland is remarkable, and it is, in part, due to the successful leadership of Lech Wałęsa.

I was in Poland this spring to attend the May 3rd celebration and went to the Sejm. I forgot, to be truthful, as I witnessed that beautiful ceremony, that 65 percent of the members of the Sejm were communists, that they had retained their power simply because they were communists.

But in any event, they were there, and, strangely enough, Lech Wałęsa did not appear, did not take part in that ceremony. Almost everybody commented on his absence. His wife said the reason he did not appear was that he felt that the members, two-thirds of them anyway, were illegitimate. He wanted them out of the Sejm; he wanted to ensure that those who were communists were labeled communists. But the communists did not want to be labeled communists; they wanted to be considered differently—as part of a movement dedicated to a "third road," a middle path, social democracy, or whatever.

The 1990 presidential election in Poland was characterized by a huge plethora of parties, of every imaginable origin. It was not a simple election situation like the Philippine election of 1986, with Ferdinand Marcos on the one hand and Corazon Aquino on the other. (In such a head-to-head situation, it is easier to decide who is a good guy and who is a bad guy.) In Poland, the diversity of parties created a very confusing situation. Wałęsa wanted to clarify matters through electoral reform, but he was defeated in that effort.

The rhetoric of Wałęsa is worth examining. From time to time, he becomes impatient with the whole democratic process, with all the obstructions that are intrinsic to the system. I pick upon him for the moment because

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some of his intemperate remarks about the difficulties of democracy have suggested to some observers that for countries to make the kind of transition that Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia are trying to make, a regime much like that of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile is needed.

Some of you may recall that a good number of economists from the University of Chicago school of economists reportedly had an inordinate influence on policy in Chile for a period of time. They were market economists, and the Chileans adopted a good number of the structures they advocated. A great deal of progress occurred in the economy of Chile as a result, beginning from the days of Allende on to the present. However, orchestrating the economic reforms was General Pinochet, a very repressive, authoritarian person. One could make judgments on the scale of one to 100 as to where Pinochet was, as opposed to other autocrats, but he was a pretty tough old bird who rode herd on everything without taking much nonsense.

There are many persons who are inclined to say, I fear, that the transition from socialism to capitalism or to a market economy is so important that you may have to make some compromises, that you cannot build democratic institutions or promote a full flowering of public expression at the same time as you expect to make the necessary market transitions. In short, if you have democracy, people will yell and scream, complain and tell about their pain, and criticize public officials, saying, "What we have today is even worse than what we had under communism," even if it is not true. And if people do that too much and if they have elections like the one the Poles are going to have on Sunday, there may be reverses—there might be a disintegration of democracy as people lose faith in the political process.

It is predicted that maybe only 40 percent of the Poles will vote on October 27. There is not the great excitement that there was the first or second time they went to vote. A lot of people are quoted in the Polish media as expressing indifference about the outcome of the election. And, I suppose that as a result, we are going to have an increasing number of people who will rationalize that, as a matter of fact, a good dose of authoritarianism is probably required, given that they have not had the tradition of democracy that we take for granted.

Now I would pose a difficult question: if you accept that point of view, what should be the reaction of the United States? I can imagine the hue and cry of my colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee, to say nothing of the Senate as a whole, if a good number of East European countries or republics in the Soviet Union were to say, "We do want to make the transition to market economics, but you are going to have to understand that we are going to be rather heavy-handed about it. As a matter of fact, we are going to have a dictatorship, and not a very benign one on occasion, if this is what is really required."

How much support do you anticipate is going to come from the United States Senate or the United States House of Representatives for such regimes, ones that routinely violate human rights, do not provide much freedom of the press? Theoretically, one can argue: "Well, you have to have an authoritarian structure to create a viable economy and stability." But, I submit that as a practical matter, in this world and particularly in this country, that argument will not wash.

It is not so simple to say, as we said in Guatemala a few years ago, "You are violators of human rights; we abhor what you are doing, and we simply write you out of our interests for a time." This is what happened in Guatemala. Tens of thousands of people were apparently captured, tortured, killed, or disposed of in various ways. In due course, however, came the elections of 1985 in that country. Vinicio Cerezo was elected, and it was a miraculous event. But the years that preceded it were brutal, and they did not involve much of the presence or influence of the United States. We simply had said, "This is beyond the influence of the United States. This is beyond the pale of our consideration, our aid, or our care at this point."

In the United States, we do care as a people about the transition to democracy and to market economics in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. And we hope that we are going to be able to care a lot about what happens in the republics of the Soviet Union. And the stream of visitors that the Congress gets from those democracies leads us to believe that there is a great deal of hope and opportunity for a relationship, although there will be days when, in fact, we are disappointed in the progress on both fronts.

Let me suggest another question that arises from this experience. Today in the Senate, we debated whether we should proceed with the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement, the CFE Treaty, and whether we should proceed with the START II Treaty. I think both are very important treaties. Have they been overtaken by events? How controversial will they be, and are 25 legislative days enough to make these decisions? I think the answer will be that we will take up the CFE Treaty and attempt to finalize our ratification during the remainder of this session. We can probably take up START in February 1992.

But we are looking at a situation of enormous flux. President Bush made a dramatic speech Friday night [October 18] saying that unilaterally we are going to destroy a great number of nuclear weapons, and inviting

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our European friends to do the same. This is completely contrary to classic arms control negotiations, where we tediously look at each weapon (as in the INF Treaty) ad seriatim, destroying each one, inspecting each one. Suddenly, the President has leaped over all of this, and just said, "We are going after a large number. We are going to destroy a lot, and we trust the Soviets will want to do the same." We are standing down the Strategic Air Command after years on alert.

We have calculated that this is in our best interest, and we trust that President Gorbachev and the Soviet Union will reciprocate because, we think, it is in their best interest. We believe that they believe so, too, for a variety of reasons. These weapons are very powerful, and they are dangerous if you do not know how to go about maintaining, transporting, and servicing them. Ukraine, for example, prior to tilting a little bit with Boris Yel'tsin and the Russian republic, said it would like to be a nuclear-free zone. Then the subject of the old border disputes was raised, and they said, "Well, we have some second thoughts. There may be some reasons why, for the moment, we would not want to throw in our common lot with Russia or anyone else."

These are interesting questions for the United States and for other countries. Do we want all of the missiles, all of the nuclear weapons and devices to go to one republic of the Soviet Union or to a central part of one republic? Is that in our best interest? Some would say, in a housekeeping way, it is. After all, then it is more likely someone will have central control and will be accountable for all of this mass potential for destruction.

So, I applaud all of you who are participating in this conference. The transition to and institutionalization of democracy around the world is no easy task. It was not easy for the United States or for those other societies that today enjoy democracy. It takes time, trial and error, sacrifice, leadership, and patience.

In the end, there will be successes and failures. I pray that the successes will outnumber the failures. If so, the world will be a safer and healthier place in which to live.

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Transition and Political Morality

Arnost Lustig

It is very hard to comment in only a few minutes on a process that is better described in books of history, sociology, philosophy, and psychology, and that will continue on into the next century. I will speak personally because it is impossible to do otherwise. My point of view is that of a Czech writer who, though living in exile for 23 years, has followed very closely everything that has been going on in his native country.

I would like to say that Czechs are, for me, a most talented, pleasant, romantic people—and they are very clever, too. As we heard from Václáv Klaus, they need little from the rest of the world. They never ask for money. After World War I, when they outlived the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, they fared better than others. They have always done well. Even now, they are doing better than many other peoples. Their problem is that they try to do well under all circumstances. But rather than speak about the character of a nation, it is perhaps better to speak about the nature of the times.

IN the spring of 1945, I escaped with a friend from a transport enroute from Buchenwald to certain death in Dachau, and I made it to Prague. I could not believe what I saw. After three years in the camps, where you lived in dirt and you were a slave without dignity, without any rights, I saw people living relatively decently. This was because the Germans needed the Czechs, who had one of the best industrial plants and produced ammunition and weapons for the Nazis.

By accident, I found a hiding place with a former Czech Nazi and collaborator who wanted an alibi. I was able to observe life at the end of the war. It was unbelievable. In Prague, there was a soccer club called "Slavia." Half of their uniform was white with a red star, like the communist star. People wore the uniform in public—I could not believe that it was possible. There was no hunger. You could buy potatoes without ration cards. There were almost no bombed-out ruins. People were well-dressed and not really frightened.

And then came the revolution—the uprising in the last five days of the war. What I saw shocked me even though I was accustomed to seeing killing (in Auschwitz, they killed 10,000 people by day and 10,000 people by night). I saw unbelievable cruelty in Prague: against the Gestapo, against Germans, against Czech traitors. There were no trials—only the angry mobs. It was not justice, merely revenge. And not just honorable people sat in judgment. It was a sort of flood. The people who were tortured and killed did not deserve mercy, but the cruelty visited upon them was unbelievable, a Nazi sort of cruelty. I saw that people had been poisoned by Nazism. In that sense, everybody was a victim. I am sure that did not honor the best people of the land—many thousands of them—who had sacrificed their lives in the underground fight against the Nazis.

Then came the end of the war, and all sorts of people reappeared—those who had fought bravely in foreign armies (in the British Army, in the American Army, in the Red Army) and those who had been in the camps.

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There were also some exiles who returned. The atmosphere was beautiful; the cruelty had finally ceased. There was hope, and the reason for it was that before the war, Czechoslovakia had enjoyed 20 years of democracy. It had been a prosperous country. It was a democratic country. It hosted the best Germans on their way to exile—people like Heinrich Mann, Berthold Brecht, Kurt Weill, and others. The Czech people were proud of this legacy. And they expected that, as quickly as possible, the old order would return.

In this brief, if intense, intermission after the war, people were very optimistic. But everybody knows what happened next: after three years, the democratic dream was over, and 40 years of communism followed. The scourge of totalitarianism reappeared. This country, which had once been culturally and economically aligned with the West, was violently turned toward the East. Two generations were born under communist rule. Of all the features of the national character, it was opportunism that blossomed most. In people's effort to survive, morality became amorality, if not immorality. Life resembled more and more the surreal world of Franz Kafka; it lacked beauty, meaning, and stability. It became merely "existence." The soul of the nation was badly damaged. Poisoned. Deformed. Diminished.

TEN days after the revolution in 1989, I was sent on assignment by *Life* magazine to Prague. Everything in my being expected to find in the wake of the "velvet revolution" the optimism I had seen in 1945–48. But I soon discovered things were different. No experience can disappear as if it had never existed. And the wounds of 40-plus years of communism had left their scars.

Unlike people born into the democratic Czechoslovakia of the interwar period, who were really democratic and knew democracy from daily life, people in 1989 saw democracy as a dream, but many had never actually experienced it. And as for those, of more advanced years, who had, many had forgotten democracy. But everybody had learned opportunism. Everybody had learned how to negotiate the narrow path between morality and immorality. And because everybody had wanted to live, everybody was touched, just as nobody emerged unscathed from the Nazi era,.

The problem, as Minister Klaus has said, is psychological. One sensed an enormous deformation of morality. I have been dealing with psychological deformation all my life, because if you are "educated" in concentration camps, you do not know very much about human rights, about human dignity. When everything is forbidden, you do not know what is permitted. Heroism is different than in a normal life. Even honesty is different.

You learned quickly that there is no single morality. You knew that there was one morality for the Nazis and a second morality, from their point of view, for everyone else. This sort of distinction in morality was present in communism as well. There was a class morality. It meant that what was good for the "vanguard" of the working class (as decided by the Central Committee of the party) was right, but as for the rest (including the workers), you could lie to them, you could cheat them, you could even kill them, and it was not a crime. Under this dual morality, what was against the best interests of the party was wrong and was necessarily punished. Courage, honor, and honesty became absurdities, and absurdity became normal. Everything was upside down. There was no God except the party. The party was always right—and that was that.

In my view, the view of an exiled writer, this deformation of morality—this double morality—is the greatest problem with which Czechoslovakia must now deal. The country had six years of opportunism during the Nazi era and more than 40 years of opportunism under communism. People learned how to get along, how to succeed, and they adopted "situation morality," which blurs the boundary between what is moral and what is immoral. It excuses all immoralities, all deformations, in the struggle for survival. How to be just for everybody? How to right old wrongs? How to re-establish all the rights to all people? These questions must still be answered.

In Czechoslovakia, the proverb "Whoever does not steal cheats his family" is still very much alive. And there was also the joke under communism that "the government pretends to pay us, and we pretend to work." How does a people rid itself of such attitudes? Moral deformation is an enormous problem, but it must be solved, because, after all, economic (and not just economic) success depends on morality.

As I said at the outset, this is really the stuff for future novels and for future histories. It is an enormous drama awaiting its Shakespeare, Balzac, Kafka, or Jaroslav Hašek. But it has to be solved now, with the people of Czechoslovakia. I would only like to say in ending that I know beautiful people in Czechoslovakia, and with all my heart, I am optimistic, because I believe that in two, five, ten years, these problems will be problems of the past.

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The Changing *Problems of Communism*

Abraham Brumberg

My remarks will be, at least to some extent, personal, for what I hope are obvious reasons. My account begins in 1952, when I was a young man, just conscripted into what was soon to become the United States Information Agency. I remember sitting in a room at 18th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue in downtown Washington (where the headquarters of the agency was then located), having written some brochures and articles about communism, but otherwise not knowing what the Agency had in mind for me. I recall somebody coming into the room, looking at me, and saying, "Abe Brumberg, you're an expert on communism, aren't you?" My natural modesty prevented me from agreeing with alacrity, but I allowed that I was "a student of communism." "OK, we're starting a new magazine," said the man, "and you will be working on it." This is how my career began—an illustration, if you will, of the role of accident in history.

In retrospect, 1952 was a fateful year for the birth of *Problems of Communism*. In the Soviet Union, the year saw the demented campaign against "cosmopolitanism," and all the signs pointed to a revival of a reign of terror perhaps no less vast and harrowing than that which had swept the USSR in 1937–38. In Eastern Europe, it was yet another year of rigged trials, mass arrests, and executions. In the international arena, the Soviet Union, having swallowed a good chunk of Eastern Europe, seemed prepared to extend its influence and power to other parts of the world.

Indeed, never did Soviet communism seem to pose such a threat to international stability as it did at that time. Some even wondered whether Stalin, in his lunatic hatred of the West, would go so far as to risk another conflagration.

Stalinism left its malignant imprint on the West, too, and primarily on the United States. I am not referring here to the strength of international communism, at that time unremittingly faithful to Moscow and commanding the loyalties of millions of people throughout the world. In the United States, the Communist party and its various affiliates were never really a large or influential force in academe, among organized labor, or even within the ranks of the intellectuals. Rather, I refer to Stalinism's role in fostering, however indirectly, a climate of fear and suspicion, an image of a danger to freedom and democracy that hindered any rational discourse about the meaning of communism, and about the meaning of democracy and freedom in America.

The United States, I fear, has not covered itself with distinction in dealing with communism and with the threat to free institutions—a threat that was always, in my opinion, far more political than military. I am speaking, of course, about the history of anticommunist hysteria—the fear that the Mexican Revolution would encourage the spread of "bolshevism" in the United States, the Palmer raids of the 1920's, the Dies and the Un-American Activities Committees' obsession with communist influence in Hollywood. In the late 1940's and 1950's came the spy scare that facilitated the rise of McCarthyism, with its proclivity for equating any form of political dissent from the Left with sedition and treason.

You might question the relevance of this issue to the

Abraham Brumberg was the Editor of Problems of Communism *for its first two decades. From 1952 to 1970, he played a critical role in shaping the journal and establishing it as one of the preeminent publications in the field of communist studies. He has continued to track developments in the communist world, from Moscow to Managua, editing such volumes as* Poland: Genesis of a Revolution *(1983) and* A Chronicle of a Revolution: A Western-Soviet Inquiry into Perestroika *(1991).*

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journal that my colleagues and I edited for nearly 20 years, and my answer is simply that the climate in the United States at that time was far from congenial to an objective inquiry into the nature of communist countries, movements, and ideology. This, however, was to be the purpose of the journal that was suddenly thrust upon me and my only colleague at that time, Marie Thompson House. Our challenge was to distinguish myth from reality; to explore the relationship between Moscow and non-Soviet communist parties, both ruling and non-ruling; and to determine under which circumstances political challenge to basic democratic values might translate into a military threat to the security of this country and its allies in the West.

In order to illustrate the impact this baleful climate did or could have had on our work, let me relate two incidents (I have written about them before). One occurred toward the end of 1952, at the time when two young men helped Senator Joseph McCarthy wreck the USIA in Europe. In the midst of the sordid scandal provoked by the late, unlamented Roy Cohn and his well-heeled partner, David Schine, the USIA issued one of the most curious instructions ever put out by a government agency, to the effect that no one in the agency must mention, quote from, or refer to Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin in any way, shape, or form. The peculiar rationale of this directive was that to mention these repugnant figures was in effect to provide them with publicity. How to publish our journal under these conditions–how to discuss Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism without mentioning the names preceding the "isms" was difficult to fathom—which is why, of course, my colleagues and I simply disregarded the instruction. Eventually common sense prevailed. But this was a mark of the times—lunatic, but not all that unusual.

The other matter was the policy pursued by the Agency of obtaining "security checks" on all of its private-sector contractors. This applied, though in a limited form, to all of the journal's contributors, too. I would often argue with the Agency's guardians of what would now be called "political correctness" (much, I am afraid, to the amusement of my interlocutors) that what mattered was not political affiliation, past or present, but the *content* of the article. Happily, with the passage of time, the instruction was relaxed and then withdrawn altogether.

The problems faced by the journal did not abate after the death of Stalin in March 1953. The demise was, of course, a pivotal event, and the immediate events that followed it in the Soviet Union, in the East European countries, and in East-West relations, all testified to it. Yet, if it was obvious to some of us that Stalin's death would affect the future of communism, if not the whole course of history, it was not so obvious to others.

Two equally outlandish theories were bruited about at that time. One was the theory propounded by Isaac Deutscher that the death of Stalin would pave the way for democracy, freedom, and, given Deutscher's ideological framework, democratic socialism. To this day, this notion finds favor in the eyes of those who see Soviet communism as a "social experiment," rather than as a flawed and primitive idea finally gone to seed. The opposite theory was what can be summarized in the French expression, *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*. This view maintained that the death of Stalin did not, would not, could not change the totalitarian essence of the Soviet system, and that anybody who believed otherwise was naïve, deluded, or worse.

The first notion appealed (and still appeals) to some academics and left-wing intellectuals. The second seemed to become the conventional wisdom among American politicians. The latter made it rather difficult to publish the journal without stepping on some prominent toes. But we did.

I stress the word "we," for I am speaking not only of myself, but of three other people without whom the magazine would not be what it is. One was Marie Thompson House, who did an extraordinary job for *Problems of Communism* as the major copy and managing editor for many years. The journal is much in debt to her. The second was the late Clarke Kawakami —gentleman, meticulous editor, and loyal friend—who was with us from 1956 on. The third was Cary Fisher, who joined the editorial staff later and who with his sound political sense contributed greatly to the growth and reputation of the journal.

I emphasize our refusal to yield to conventional or official wisdom. This is a matter of considerable importance today, given the recent attacks leveled at the whole profession of American Sovietology for its putative "sin" of having abandoned the totalitarian model, which such critics view as the best and, indeed, only tool for understanding Soviet-type regimes and societies. Such criticisms caricature the whole Sovietological experience as one that sacrificed the "totalitarian model" on the altar of something called "social studies" that is, at worst, a form of pro-Soviet apologetics, and at best, just "trash," in the words of one well-known commentator.

The history of the journal during my editorial tenure and thereafter refutes such accusations. The totalitarian model was, in my view, a useful—indeed, an absolutely essential—tool for understanding Stalinist Soviet Russia, but it gradually became less relevant, and ultimately lost its validity. The evolutionary school, as I would call it, which believed that Soviet-type regimes and societies were bound to alter or to become at least

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more traditionally authoritarian, and perhaps ultimately, more liberal, has, in my opinion, stood the test of time up to and including the final collapse of communist rule.

In assessing the trends of policies, both domestic and foreign, it was necessary—if I may quote what I wrote in 1959, "to distinguish between the elements of continuity and those of change, to understand which aspects of the Soviet system are here to stay and which elements may be expected to evolve, and, if so, in what direction."

That, in fact, expressed the guiding principle of the journal: to abjure ideological preconceptions in selecting authors, to encourage contributors to describe history as they perceived it, rather than as might be dictated by our assumptions or beliefs. And to be mindful of distinctions: distinctions between the Soviet Union now and in the past, between Third World revolutionary movements and Soviet policies, between different East European countries, between Stalinist genocide and, say, the Sandinistas' brutal treatment of the Miskito Indians, between the French and the Italian communist parties, between one and another species of Marxism and Leninism—I could go on ad infinitum.

It is comfortable to believe, as sundry politicians and op-ed page savants urge us to do, that the downfall of communism had been brought about by Western "toughness." This is nothing but triumphalist euphoria. Soviet communism disintegrated above all as a result of its own internal contradictions, its inability to keep pace with contemporary history.

Here again is where the experience of *Problems of Communism* comes in. An emphasis on internal factors (though certainly not to the total exclusion of external influences) was characteristic of the journal, and reflected the thinking of the vast majority of its contributors as well as of its editors.

This approach remains valid for the future as well. The end of communism is hardly the end of history, as some Western commentators would have it. Problems remain, many of them daunting. We do not know how and in what direction some of the ex-communist countries will evolve. But I would caution against the smug assumption that they all must necessarily conform to American political and economic values, and that any departure from these values would mark a slide into statism or authoritarianism. The options are many, some of them disturbing (e.g., nationalism or a species of clericalism), some conceivably superior to our system. At any rate, the task of scholars is to understand —and only subsequently worry about the ideological or political implications of their findings.

I do not know what the future of communism will be. I do not know about postcommunism. I do not even know about the future of *Problems of Communism*—that is something the editors and others will have to struggle with. But I submit to you that whatever the future, those of us in the Sovietological profession—if not all, certainly most—have no reason to apologize for the past. Rather we should take pride in our achievements and continue to apply the notions and tools that have served us so well as we plunge into new and uncharted waters.

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On Keeping a Government Journal Honest

Paul A. Smith, Jr.

Let it be said at the outset that no journal can be kept honest that did not start honest. Abe Brumberg and those who worked with him established a tradition of intellectual honesty at *Problems of Communism*. We were fortunate to have two skilled editors who stayed with the journal for a number of years —Marie Thompson House and Clarke Kawakami. I want to join Abe Brumberg in acknowledging their contribution to the journal.

When asked to sum up several decades of watching the cold war as Editor of *Problems of Communism*, I thought first of Marx's dictum that when history repeats itself it does so first as tragedy and then as farce. Actually, it did not happen that way. There was plenty of tragedy and farce, but it was usually mixed together. Marx had stimulating insights. But they lacked predictive power.

There are better guides. Francis Bacon had good reason to reflect on the meaning of history. As Lord Chancellor, he was tried and convicted by a special prosecutor for lying to Parliament about his finances. James I eventually pardoned him. Bacon went into retirement, where, among other things, he established empiricism as the basis of modern science and wrote a history of his country. He also pondered the ways knowledge can speak to power.

"It is a pleasure," Bacon said, "to stand upon the shore, and to see ships tossed upon the sea: a pleasure to stand in the window of a castle, and to see a battle and the adventures thereof below: but no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of truth (a hill not to be commanded, and where the air is always clear and serene), and to see the errors, and wanderings, and mists, and tempests, in the vale below: so always that this prospect be [observed] with pity, and not with swelling or pride. It is heaven on earth," he concludes, "to have a man's mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth."[1]

What perspective did we have from our castle window at *Problems of Communism*? Were we watching from the hill of truth? Or were we wandering in the mists and tempests of the vale below? Could we be objective editing a journal paid for from public funds, staffed by government employees, and addressed to—among others—the senior policy-makers who employed us? Or was *Problems of Communism* merely another voice of official advocacy, however well-meaning and however elegantly disguised? Did we act on our own judgment in selecting, editing, and publishing the scholarship we received from people around the world? Or when push came to shove, did we bow to the dictates of policy guidance and political expediency?

The truth is quite simple: we used our own judgment, and in the final decision, only our own judgment, to decide what we would and would not publish. The journal's mandate was clear. It is openly stated on the cover: to provide analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Period! There were no limits—national, ideological, or

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Paul A. Smith, Jr., edited Problems of Communism *from 1972 to 1986, a period that witnessed wide swings in Western perceptions of the Soviet Union and the world communist movement. A former Foreign Service Officer with experience in Eastern and Western Europe, he recently published* On Political War *(1989).*

[1]Francis Bacon, "Of Truth,", *Essays [1625]*, 5th ed., London, Everyman, 1947, p. 4.

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political—on who could contribute to the journal. We did not reflect the policies of any government or any agency of government. There were occasions when we were told to publish an article we thought dishonest. We did not publish it. There were occasions when we were told not to publish an excellent article because some official thought it "would not be helpful." We published it.

I say this with some caution. Civil servants must be accountable. They must respond to authority. Public funds are to be spent only for programs set by Congress. Our courts are required to punish civil servants who defy the law. We knew this. We also knew, after we got the issue clarified in debate on the floor of the Senate in 1972, that we were expected to exercise professional judgment in editing the magazine.

Our mandate from Congress was clear, our Agency directors by and large respected it, and we who actually did the work had a lively conviction that we should stick to the truth as defined by our professional judgment. Lack of clarity or conviction on any of these counted could have created difficulties. Honest people could differ. But given our mandate, we did not intend to bend our professional judgment to fit the passing expedience of personalities and power.

To pass, in Bacon's words, from "theological and philosophical truth to the truth of civil business" requires a look at another dimension of truth—namely "bureaucratic truth." The politics of survival in any large organization is not easy. There are stories to tell, but that is for another time. Suffice it to say that in many cases, policy conflicts were not what really concerned us. It was power and personalities. But we survived, with the determined help of a few senior officials, not least among them Eugene Kopp, William Hyland, and Zbigniew Brzezinski. They respected and protected our compulsion to tell the truth as we saw it.

That said, it should be added that we drew on honest analysis and interpretations wherever we could find them. Official policy statements and assessments are not necessarily untruthful. They can make a great deal of sense, even in a chaotic democracy like ours. The real problem was often one of *no* guidance even if we had wanted it. On the really tough issues, the dilemmas for which no one had an answer, the official position papers could mean anything or nothing. At times, they were self-contradictory or bureaucratically self-serving. We simply took the position, I hope with due respect, that they did not apply to us. I found it helpful on this point to make it clear to our publisher (USIA) and our contributors that we did not receive and did not want to receive classified documents.

It must also be admitted that our judgment, however clear it might seem at the moment, could occasionally prove in retrospect to have been less lucid than that of our superiors in the official hierarchy. A scholar in government faces two temptations: one is bending the truth as he sees it to political expediency; the other is in asserting his personal vision of truth, simply because it is his vision, against authority, simply because it is authority. Let him who is without sin cast the first stone.

Last, and by no means least, we had the dilemma of "author's truth" versus "editor's truth." The conventional solution lies in a peer review panel. We never used one at *Problems of Communism*. Occasionally, we asked an outside expert to read a manuscript if we felt lost in the technicalities. Otherwise, we used our own judgment. This approach saved a lot of time and money. We offered our contributors fast publication, well ahead of most scholarly journals; we also avoided some ferocious academic feuds.

The best review panel is the full readership of the journal. If they do not like it, you hear about it. If they do like a piece, the author will hear about it, which would not have happened if the article had been strangled at birth by a biased panel. Conventional "peer review" in my opinion does less service to truth than the judgment of editors whose names are on the masthead, who personally read each manuscript submitted, who make their own decisions and stand behind them.

The editorial "we" is not an affectation. All manuscripts, solicited or volunteered, were seen by all the editors on the masthead. We made our decisions at weekly editorial conferences. It took time, but it was worth it. If I had to pick one point to explain whatever success the journal has had, I would say it was this ongoing debate among the editors. The more we argued, the better the resulting issue of the journal. Between conflicting schools we tried for balance, if not in each issue, then in successive issues. We fought, we voted, and we tried for consensus. We did a lot of back-and-forth with authors. In the end, as Chief Editor, I made the decision, but in retrospect, I am surprised at how often we did reach a consensus.

Let me add a note for the future. There is a lot of talk today that communism has collapsed. Perhaps it has. Perhaps not. It certainly has in the Soviet Union. In any event, when we contemplate Moscow's problems, we should be mindful of Bacon's advice to observe "with pity and not with swelling or pride." Several nations that share our roots in classical antiquity followed views of the world and of their place in it that destroyed millions of people and made miserable and wretched the lives of many more. That evil came not from without but from within our common cultural heritage. Germany and Russia suffered most, indeed to the point of national collapse. But we were all touched by it.

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The English-speaking peoples, whatever their sins, avoided total collapse and even helped to end the evil. An astonishing number of scholars used the vantage point provided by journals like *Problems of Communism* to contribute to that outcome. They can remember their work with pride. It should be pride tempered with charity. There, but for the grace of God, however defined, might we have gone. Without charity, some of us may fall into tragic error in the future.

Providence is a force, call it what you will, that promises a better future, better at least than the dreary prospect of repeating in endless and meaningless circles the follies and miseries of the past. Most scholars who wrote for *Problems of Communism* remembered that we and our communist opponents held in common this providential view of history. We tried to keep it in mind, even when events tempted one to lose sight of the truth in the mists of rage and resentment.

A providential view of history has been part of the way Western man has viewed his place in the universe since the days of Abraham and Isaac. Its modern form is rooted in the three great sources of our culture: Hebrew theology, Greek philosophy, and Roman literature and law. Providence was as much a part of Russian communism as it is of our own civic culture. We should not deny this link. We can build upon it in reaching out to the peoples emerging from the rubble of communist rule.

Scholarship exchanged in journals like *Problems of Communism* keeps us mindful of past mistakes. It can help us communicate from the vantage point of truth in the future. I wish the editors of all such journals good luck for the next 20 years. May their minds move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth. And may the spirit of Sir Francis Bacon watch over them.

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From Under the Rubble, What?

Martin Malia

We have met the enemy and he is us.

—**Pogo**.

The appropriation of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's famous title for the present essay refers to two fields of rubble. The first is that which extends, in the empirical world, over the former Soviet Union's 11 time zones, from Brest-Litovsk to the Bering Straits. The second is that which extends, in the conceptual world, over the four time zones of the continental United States, and through all the universities and think-tanks from Massachusetts Bay to the Pacific Rim. And this conceptual world embraces four social science disciplines: economics, political science, sociology, and their common ancestor, history.

After 74 years of Sovietism, and 45 years of institutionalized Sovietology, the time has come to say openly: Comrades, there is a crisis in our party—both the one we study, and the one to which by professional vocation we all belong. Clearly, something quite unanticipated by the Kremlin went wrong with Sovietism, and just as clearly as well, all of us failed to anticipate it.

But perhaps anticipation in history is precluded, for everyone, by the unfathomable ways of what Hegel called the "Cunning of Reason" in human affairs. Perhaps the most we can ever hope for is to devise analytic or conceptual schemes that will make full sense of events only after they have occurred. On this score, how does our Sovietological science measure up? And how well are our post-Soviet colleagues, both in Russia and in Eastern Europe, doing in their own efforts to comprehend the communist catastrophe? For to them, this matter is no academic exercise, since they must urgently cope with the crushing problems that communism has left in its wake.

Yet, in order to evaluate matters in the conceptual world of Sovietology and in the four social science disciplines, it is first necessary to survey the problems left behind in the empirical world by the recent collapse of communism. And before we can survey these problems adequately, it is necessary to dispel some of the false perceptions that have surrounded them since August 1991. The present essay, therefore, will begin with a discussion of these recent perceptions, will then proceed to post-Soviet problems, and, finally, will turn to those grander and more systematic perceptions that constitute Sovietology.

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The Russian Revolution of 1991

During the four months between the August events of 1991 and the end of the Soviet Union in December, Western public opinion, as well as governmental opinion, was clearly suffering from cognitive lag in registering events in Moscow. And this opinion was struggling with an even more acute case of cognitive dissonance in attempting to organize these events into a mode of discourse appropriate to post-*perestroyka* conditions.

What we heard in our academic colloquia and read on our op-ed and editorial pages is that a "failed coup," which was carried out by an adventitious group

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of individuals tautologically known as "coup-plotters," took place in Moscow last August. Their evil designs were fortunately thwarted, however, and "President" Mikhail Gorbachev, with the heroic help of Boris Yel'tsin, was restored to his rightful place. Thus, the "reform process" begun by *perestroyka* was put back on track, although under more difficult circumstances than before, because of the untoward interruption by the coup of the Soviet Union's "transition to democracy." True, the media also spoke prominently of the "collapse of communism," yet usually managed to combine this with a focus on Gorbachev that conveyed a message of continuity.

Moreover, we were often told that the post-coup situation in the Soviet Union had brought with it new dangers that apparently had not been so threatening during *perestroyka,* dangers of a chauvinistic authoritarianism, quite possibly promoted by "tsar" Boris, as some called Yel'tsin. Such sentiments were not confined to Western liberal opinion; they could also be heard in Moscow, although less in liberal quarters than in former communist ones. A frequent conclusion of this line of reasoning was that Gorbachev, not Yel'tsin and those in Russia who presumed to call themselves "democrats," represented both state legitimacy and the real potential for democracy in Russia.

This perspective, predominant in America in the months after the August events, represents an inversion of reality as it is perceived among Russian democrats. And not just as it is perceived, but an inversion of reality *tout court.* For the August "coup" was no coup at all, but an act of the Soviet government. This "coup" was led by the vice president, the prime minister, the head of the KGB, the ministers of defense and interior, the chief of staff of Gorbachev's personal cabinet, and the president of the Supreme Soviet, among others. Together, they represented the whole communist establishment—the party, the military-industrial complex, the army command, and the secret police. Gorbachev, moreover, had appointed them all.

As their actions before August demonstrate, these "plotters" no doubt expected to implement their program of repression openly and constitutionally. They rather clearly supposed that faced with the growing anarchy in the country, and the rising strength of the Yel'tsinian democrats, their President would ultimately agree to declare a state of emergency, a measure that had, in fact, been under active consideration since Gorbachev had appointed Boris Pugo to be his interior minister and Valentin Pavlov to be his prime minister in December 1990.

Indeed, these "coup-plotters" had already acted with armed force in the Baltic republics in January, and politically in the Russian parliament in March, when they attempted to impeach Yel'tsin, only to be thwarted by several hundred thousand democrats demonstrating in the streets of Moscow. And their final effort was Pavlov's public attempt, in June, to usurp Gorbachev's decree powers. If the President during all these months did not know or understand what was going on, then he was incompetent, which is almost as bad as active complicity. The Russian word for such conduct in responsible positions is *khalatnost',* or criminal negligence.

When leading government officials sought to pressure Gorbachev into decreeing a state of emergency and, to their surprise, he refused, they clumsily declared him deposed, thus leaving his vice president, Gennadiy Yanayev, "legally" able to issue the required decree. In the West, this type of attempted palace revolution is called a "coup." It was to have been followed by what in Moscow is known as the "putsch," that is, a military operation to put down the democrats.

The plotters' effort failed grotesquely. Yel'tsin and the democrats then turned the situation into a genuine revolution. They suspended—and later dissolved—the Communist party. This was tantamount to dismantling the Soviet system itself, together with all its works and pomps—the Union, the Congress of People's Deputies, the five-year plan, the police, the politicized army command, and the administrative apparatus of the military-industrial complex.[1]

This is the basic, indeed self-evident, outline of Russian history in August and September. One can even read about it in *The New York Times.* Yet almost no one publicly uses the self-evident name, "revolution," to designate what is so obviously one of the most revolutionary events of 20th-century history. For what occurred in August was the end of communism, not just in its East European periphery, but in its heartland and place of origin, the Soviet Union. What more does it take to qualify as a revolution? It is this mysterious refusal to face reality that must first be explained before we can talk realistically about the staggering problems of post-Sovietism.

On closer examination, the mystery really is not so mysterious after all. What is really involved in this matter may be shown by adapting a distinction made in the historiography of the French Revolution, in which the debate was once between proponents of *la thèse du complot* and *la thèse des circonstances. La thèse du complot* held that the revolution was the work of a minority of conspirators, and hence was both avoidable and illegitimate, while *la thèse des circonstances* as-

[1]See my article, "The August Revolution," *The New York Review of Books,* Sept. 26, 1991, for a more complete account of the collapse.

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serted that the revolution proceeded from objective conditions and hence was both necessary and legitimate. In the present Soviet case, what might be called *la thèse du coup* (*complot*) minimizes the importance of the August events, and thus implies that the passage from *perestroyka* to the new democracy in Russia was an evolutionary one, with a continuity of legitimacy from Sovietism to a liberal order. As such, this passage realized the reform potential of communism, and by the same token demonstrated that the Soviet system had not in fact been totalitarian. *La thèse de la revolution* (*circonstances*), on the other hand, asserts that there was a fundamental rupture, a radical break between communism of whatever stripe and Russia's present attempt to build a market economy and democracy. In this perspective, legitimacy stems from entirely different, indeed anticommunist, roots, and thus demonstrates that the Soviet system was totalitarian, incapable of reform without abandoning its fundamental structures.

But frank recognition of a sharp break with the comfortable illusions of *perestroyka* is unsettling to too many Western political, as well as Sovietological, interests to be readily accepted—hence the urge to believe in continuity. Hence also, a part of the post-August concern about the authoritarian and chauvinistic dangers inherent in the new democratic polity. Although some of this concern was inspired by Eastern Europe's turbulent past, much of it constituted an effort of dubious intellectual authenticity to invert reality so as to make a democrat out of the communist Gorbachev and an autocrat out of the anticommunist Yel'tsin. As Louis Jouvet said in *Drôle de Drame,* "bizarre, bizarre."

Droll though our misperception of postcommunist reality may be, that reality itself, if not yet tragic, is clearly calamitous. For communism left in its wake, as a poisoned legacy to the democratic August Revolution, nothing but rubble—in the most literal sense of that word. We are all aware that Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union face numerous, if not quite innumerable, problems: constitutional, economic, ethnic, nuclear, ecological, and even the most basic of problems—lack of food and shelter.

Yet, once again, our understanding fails us; too often we treat these problems as discrete and separate, as if they could be taken up and solved one at a time. To cite only one example, the US Secretary of Agriculture together with the National Security Council's resident Soviet specialist, economist Ed Hewett, were dispatched to Moscow in mid-1991 to help the Soviets fix "their food distribution system," as if that system could somehow be treated apart from the kolkhoz network and its agrarian *nomenklatura,* three or four ministries, and the inveterate distrust of all state authority on the part of what remains of the Russian peasantry—all of which Dr. Hewett, of course, knew quite well. Or we find the International Monetary Fund, some professors from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, and Monsieur Jacques Attali of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development giving the ex-Soviets advice on how to brake inflation and absorb the "monetary overhang," as if all we are talking about are essentially technical measures to be applied to yet another sick, Third World economy.

To be sure, all of these discrete problems are quite real; and all of them will require technical solutions of the sort just mentioned. Nevertheless, none of them will work unless it is first realized that the post-Soviet crisis is a *total* crisis, embracing every aspect of life at once. For all basic institutions in the former Soviet Union collapsed together and at once; and thus all of them must be rebuilt together and, if not at once, then in rapid succession.

This is the meaning of an oft-quoted witticism, so universally applicable to Sovietism that it has been variously attributed to Lech Wałęsa and to the Russian humorist Mikhail Zhvanetskiy: It is easy to make fish soup out of an aquarium, but no one has yet found a way to make an aquarium out of fish soup. Such a situation, and such a conundrum, is without precedent in world history. And it will no doubt take a generation and a decade or two to improvise, while still in the soup, Russia's return to a "normal society."

A 20th-Century *Smuta*?

Russia has already taken the first step out of the soup by abolishing the party. Historical events since 1989 have now demonstrated that political transformation is the indispensable prerequisite to economic transformation, or to any other kind of basic change, in the communist world. For in a total system, where everything is political but politics, the first step on the way back to normality is to end the total hegemony of the political. But this step only permits a postcommunist country to address, at last, all its discrete substantive problems; it does not itself offer solutions. And this is the point at which Russia now finds itself in the era of its post-August, Yel'tsinian democracy.

It is as easy to enumerate the steps that remain to be taken as it is difficult to foresee how they might be made. First, a post-Soviet political and constitutional order must be completely re-invented. Between August and December 1991, in a process without precedent in history, a great state, and one of the world's two superpowers, simply disappeared from the map of the world.

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And all its basic institutions dissolved as well: its Congress of Peoples' Deputies, its Supreme Soviet, its ministries, the pseudo-federal structure of the Union, and finally its 4-million-member armed forces. And from the ruins there emerged 15 independent states.

Eleven of these were tenuously linked in a Commonwealth that was no more than a first draft of a new form of association. It now acts as a permanent diplomatic conference for dividing the assets of the late Union and negotiating the numerous conflicts of interest among its members. Still, this fragile Commonwealth can be too easily disparaged. In a situation where the process of decomposition has not yet hit bottom, its very looseness offers the advantage of flexibility. And it thus far has made it possible for the former Soviet Union to avoid the conflicts that have rent Yugoslavia.

Within each republic, the situation is also transitional and fluid. None of the new states has a real constitution. In each state there is a parliament that was elected on a semi-rigged suffrage in March 1990 that yielded either a communist majority, as in Ukraine, or a communist plurality, as in Russia. In most states, there is a president elected by universal suffrage in 1991, who therefore enjoys greater democratic legitimacy than the parliament—a situation obviously fraught with the possibility of major constitutional conflict. In addition, except for Yel'tsin, most of these new presidents—such as Ukraine's Leonid Kravchuk—were communists until the August events. Their commitment to democracy and the market is tenuous and opportunistic.

Moreover, nowhere are there mature political parties with genuine constituencies in society; rather, there are only numerous coteries of intellectual or ex-*apparatchik* politicians, and a society whose population, amidst the deepening economic crisis, is increasingly indifferent to the political process. Finally, among the members of the Commonwealth, only Russia has made its anticommunist revolution, effectively destroying the national organization of the party. In most of the other republics, the old *nomenklatura* with its first secretary, now elected president, is still in power, as in Nursultan Nazarbaev's Kazakhstan. And everywhere, even in Russia, at the local level, outside the largest cities, the party *apparat* is still in power. Given this situation, the task of decommunization and the construction of a working, stable constitutional order in the 11 new states of the Commonwealth still lies largely in the future. Only the Baltic states, now independent, have a more or less clear internal and international constitutional status.

Second, the economy is in a similar state of prostration and decomposition. The usual way to describe the Russian economic catastrophe is to compare it with the Great Depression in America, but with double intensity. The drop in the former USSR's GNP for 1991 has been variously estimated at between 13 and 15 percent (it is impossible to obtain an accurate figure), while in the worst years of the American Depression, the GNP dropped 9 percent. Yet even these stark statistics do not do justice to reality. The country's transportation and communications network, and all other infrastructure, together with its capital stock of housing, factories, machinery, oil fields, and nuclear power plants, are literally crumbling into rubble and ruin. This is a condition closer to that of post–World War II Germany or Japan than to the US Depression of bank failures, unemployment, bread lines, and the WPA, where a sharp drop in real output nonetheless left the nation's productive capacity intact. In the former Soviet Union, moreover, there is now a severance of all normal ties among enterprises, for the plan has collapsed, the currency is following suit, and the country is reverting to a "natural" economy of barter. In addition, the former Soviet republics are stricken with ecological problems that make their situation worse in important respects than that of Germany and Japan after World War II.

It would be futile to pursue this enumeration of collapses and crises through every former Soviet institution from the Academy of Sciences, to the KGB, to the armed forces, but there is one area that merits particular attention. That is the danger presented by the disintegration of the USSR's pseudo-federal structure. The former Union was in fact a unitary state ruled from the center by the Communist party and held together by force or the fear of force. But this reality was camouflaged by a fictitious sovereignty for each "constituent" or national republic; and within most republics, there were "autonomous" regions for still other nationalities. In only rare cases, however, did political boundaries coincide with ethnic-linguistic frontiers, in part because this would have been almost impossible to achieve, and in part because Stalin drew the boundaries in a spirit of "divide and rule," the better to bolster central power.

Now, however, the dominant nationality in the various republics has broken away from the old Union "center." It would be unworthy to disparage this development as "suicidal nationalism": the revolts of national liberation, beginning with Lithuania and culminating with Russia itself, were essential to destroying the hold of the party over all its subjects. Still, the inherited crazy-quilt frontiers automatically created a whole series of nationality problems. It will require great ingenuity to resolve them while avoiding open conflict.

The most important of these problems arises where the minority nationality within a given republic is the same as the majority nationality in the largest republic, Russia. Here, two cases stand out. One is Kazakhstan,

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a wholly artificial entity, 40 percent of whose population (9 million people) are Russians, and who inhabit a zone contiguous with Russia. The second is Ukraine, where Russians number approximately 12 million out of that country's 52 million people. The majority of Ukraine's Russians also live close to the border of the Russian republic.

In this potentially perilous situation, the breakup of the Union has been eased by the basic moderation of present-day Russian nationalism, though this fact has hardly received adequate notice in the Western media. The fall of communism, of course, was accompanied by a public return to traditional Russian values and themes, as well as by the re-emergence of the Orthodox Church as a social force. Yet, in the psychological and spiritual void created by the collapse of Marxism-Leninism, this was only to be expected. Indeed, it should be welcomed as a sign of healing, for no society can live without some form of higher national values. Nor is this return to traditional roots politically dangerous. Yel'tsin, far from being the "Great Russian chauvinist" that some allege, clearly has no intention of trying to dismember Kazakhstan; and even in the far more vital case of Ukraine, his policy has been essentially one of accommodation to the irresistible reality of independence. Yet, eventually, some adjustment of the former Union's crazy-quilt borders will probably become necessary; but negotiation and plebiscite are, in the present Russian mood, a much more likely means of attempting this than the resort to arms. Still, once again the resolution of a major post-Soviet problem lies essentially in the future.

Thus, on all fronts simultaneously—political, economic, and ethnic—between August and December, the old Union of Soviet Socialist Republics came crashing down in one all-embracing revolution. Yet, it was a strange sort of revolution. Although the word revolution has no single, fixed meaning, it usually implies the breakthrough of already formed, vital forces—Parliament in 17th-century England or the Third Estate in 18th-century France—against an outworn shell of power. But in the communist case, although the shell was indeed hollow, there were no preexisting structural forces, whether political, economic, or ethnic, ready to take over. More than anything else, there was an overwhelming aspiration to be done with communism. Thus, the August Revolution was a revolution not by breakthrough, but by implosion. And the force that took over from the communist regime was a relatively unstructured "civil society" of former dissidents and democrats, moral leaders who lacked a power base in property of their own.

One word for such an implosion is that used to designate the brusque demise of the Second German Reich in 1918—*Zusammenbruch*. But in the German case only the regime collapsed, not society as a whole. A more appropriate term would be the Russian word *smuta,* usually translated as "Time of Troubles" and first used to designate the collapse and near disappearance of the Tsardom of Muscovy between 1604 and 1613. Between those two dates the autocratic monarchy collapsed; the social structure, composed of hereditary boyars, the service gentry, and the enserfed peasantry, came near to dissolution; and an anarchic Cossackry, as well as foreign powers, intervened to appropriate what was left of the country.

The process of general dissolution now under way in the former Soviet Union may be seen as the beginning of a *smuta,* though with one major difference: it is a *smuta,* not in a traditional autocracy and universal service society of gentry and peasants, but in a new kind of order for which we have no adequate and generally accepted term. Yet, two recent Russian neologisms may suffice to stake out the terrain in preliminary fashion at this point in the argument. The late Soviet system was, according to Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, a "partocracy," since all of life was subordinated to the political imperatives of the party.[2] And, this novel arrangement originated after 1917 in an equally novel governmental form—an "ideocracy," to use Nicholas Berdyayev's term for a secular theocracy. In a traditional theocracy, God rules not directly but through His priests; and in a secular ideocracy, the Idea of Socialism also rules indirectly, through its "vanguard party," in a dictatorship of the proletariat that is in fact a dictatorship of the *apparat.*[3]

And this unique new arrangement, an ideocratic partocracy, came into existence through an earlier 20th-century *smuta,* that extended from 1917 to 1921, an event more commonly referred to as the Russian Revolution. For it was only the total collapse and dissolution of the old Russian order that made it possible for a small, militarized band of Bolsheviks to take over the wreckage of the tsarist empire. And it was only the mesmerizing power of the Socialist Idea that made it possible for them to fasten their ideocratic partocracy onto the wreckage. Thus, as a preliminary generalization, Sovietism must be understood as the product of the conjunction of the recurrent Russian phenomenon of absolute collapse, or *smuta,* with the promise of the universal and absolute utopia of Socialism. Since the utopia, once in absolute power, turned out to be unsustainable, Russia collapsed again under its

[2]See, for example, his two-volume work *Proiskhozhdeniye partokratii* (The Origins of the Partocracy), Frankfurt am Main, Posev, 1973.

[3]See *The Origin of Russian Communism,* translated by R. M. French, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 1960.

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weight, into the present *smuta* of post-*perestroyka*.

Yet, it would be a mistake to consider the *smuta* to be a peculiarly or uniquely Russian phenomenon. Similar general implosions have marked the history of other European nations. The Polish *Potop* (Deluge) between 1648 and 1660 was obviously a similar phenomenon. The 30-Years' War in Germany between 1618 and 1648 was another major example. The 100-Years' War in France between 1380 and 1453, which was also part of what is now sometimes called the "Great Depression" of the later Middle Ages, was perhaps the greatest European *smuta* of all, replete with peasant jacquerie, demographic catastrophe, and economic regression. Finally, the Wars of the Roses in England between 1455 and 1485 were a less drastic form of the same pattern, due in large part to the defeat of England's imperial adventure in France. Peripheral Russia, with its more meager resources and cruder social system, has simply been under greater strain throughout its history than other powers in the ferociously competitive European world, and hence more prone to implosion.

It is against the background of this comparative historical perspective that the present attempt to account for the collapse of Soviet communism will be conducted. But as a preliminary to this attempt, it is necessary to assess the vast body of interpretive literature on communism that has been created over the past 45 years. To examine this literature in detail would be impossible. It is also unnecessary, for the general structure of this body of writing is quite clear, indeed repetitively simple, as we move from one of the four social science disciplines to the next.

The remarks that follow, therefore, will aim only at the general structure of the Western Sovietological argument, leaving aside the empirical variety and the nuances with which it was set forth. This means that the ensuing discussion will be a tentative exercise in the intellectual history of Western speculation about Sovietism, or an attempt at a *Begriffsgeschichte* (conceptual history) of the field. As in any essay, it will often be possible merely to give a provocative "Ems Despatch" of complex positions. Yet, in the present collapsed state of Sovietology, a bit of "shock therapy" is probably as necessary as in the postcommunist world itself to start things up again; and in our rubble-strewn field, perhaps the best way to shed light is by first generating polemical heat.

Sovietology and Social Science

The great first step taken by the August Revolution in the Soviet Union was to put an end to the communist ideocratic partocracy. Western Sovietology must now take an answering step by coming to terms intellectually with post-partocratic reality. And this will have to be a rather big step indeed; for long ago mainstream Sovietology threw away the key to understanding Sovietism by discarding the "totalitarian model" in favor of such concepts as "modernization," "institutional pluralism," and "developmental authoritarianism." So, the way out of our Western conceptual soup might well be one that leads us back to a state of pre–social science innocence.

The present inability of our Sovietological "models" to explain the way Sovietism ended concerns not only Sovietology but the four social science disciplines as they have developed in the West since World War II. Until that time, our academic institutions had only two basic faculties—Letters and Sciences. It is only after the war that a third great area of learning was staked out and institutionalized in a separate faculty as the Social Sciences. At the same time, the spirit in which the study of man and society was conducted changed. What the French used to call *les sciences humaines* and the Germans the *Geisteswissenschaften* had been largely informed by the spirit of the humanities, and they were considered to be distinct from the exact or natural sciences. But what the Americans now labeled the social sciences had the ambition of becoming as similar to the natural sciences as possible. Until this "behavioral revolution," the fledgling social disciplines were lodged in the traditional faculties or, in Europe, outside the established university, as in the London School of Economics or France's Institut d'Etudes Politiques. Now all the social disciplines were gathered together under one great positivistic roof of their own.

Sovietology came of age entirely in the behavioral era, and within the institutional confines of the third, new domain of learning, the social sciences. And Sovietology developed as the application of general social scientific methodologies to the communist world. It was considered as a form of "area studies" alongside Latin American area studies and those dealing with other regions of the world. This occurred first in American universities, and was subsequently copied in Western Europe; the results are now being imported into the postcommunist countries. We have a professional obligation to inform their scholars of what it is they are getting.

The idea of an empirical, inductive science of society is as old as Aristotle's *Politics*; and in a very basic way this work has never been superseded, because certain aspects of the knowledge we have of ourselves are not cumulative. But it was only after the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century that social science in the mod-

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ern and putatively cumulative sense became possible, because for the first time, mankind developed a form of knowledge that was wholly empirical and yet conceptualized in universal, and often mathematical, laws. And, as such, this new knowledge was regarded as incontrovertible, not to say infallible. It was a kind of knowledge that had hitherto been attributable only to God. In the 18th-century Enlightenment, the first systematic effort was made to transfer this model of knowledge to human affairs so as to create a science of man and society. The great prototype of this was the *Encyclopédie* of D'Alembert and Diderot. Its 19th-century culmination was the positivism of Auguste Comte, who indeed first gave us the word "sociology" to designate the ultimate science.

In the sphere of practical, empirical application of this aspiration, the first new discipline to emerge was "political economy" in the half century following Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* in 1776. By the turn of the century, it had acquired organized academic status. The second discipline to emerge in an institutional fashion was what we now call political science, which gained a separate identity beginning in the 1880's. Sociology was the last to appear, emerging as a discipline in the 1920's and 1930's out of an amalgam of the work of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim (as in the structural functionalism of Talcott Parsons); and after the late 1930's, a great deal of Marx was blended in, while a dash of de Tocqueville was added after World War II. Then, in the wake of that conflict, these social sciences permeated the great parent discipline, history, which was in fact older than Aristotle.

During the 40-odd years after World War II, all four disciplines in this new world of social science lived through the same great "paradigm shift" in communist studies: from the "totalitarian model" to "modernization theory." The former sought to explain communist systems essentially from above, as the product of ideology and political will. In this perspective, Sovietism was akin to Nazism and fascism, and hence radically different from the Western democracies. The second model, which emerged in the 1960's, sought to explain the Soviet system essentially from below, as the product of universal social and economic forces, and hence different only in degree, not in kind, from other "modern" or "modernizing" societies. But how did this overarching paradigm shift unfold in each of the four social sciences?

Economics. Let us begin with the basics, or what Aristotle called the management of the household (*ta oikonomia*), which Marx later termed the base (as opposed to the superstructure), and which is generally known in modern languages as the economy. In the matter of the Soviet economy, from the 1920's to the mid-1940's, there was a long history of pre–social-scientific, semi-ideological commentary on whether or not the "socialist experiment" was working out properly in the new workers' state.

On the one hand, as early as 1922, Ludwig von Mises of the Austrian school of economics argued that replacing the market by a so-called "Plan" was intrinsically impossible because it was founded on the erroneous belief that prices were nothing but an artifact of capitalism and thus something which the planner could abolish without impairing the efficient allocation of resources. Von Mises contended that in any situation, the variables of quantity and price were too interlinked, and the number of decisions to be made too huge, to permit advance calculation. Thus, only the market could cope with the complexity of the problem of the allocation of resources and investment in the process of production.[4] To be sure, von Mises was not commenting directly on Soviet developments. Rather, he was answering the antimarket theories of such Austro-Marxists as Rudolf Hilferding, as well as criticizing the German war economy of Erich von Ludendorff and Walter Rathenau. But both of these targets were quite appropriate stand-ins for Leninism, as we will see more fully in a moment.

On the other hand, and somewhat later, adherents of socialism, such as Maurice Dobb, argued that the experiment was on the way to success. Although the War Communism of 1918–21 was an over-hasty start, and the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1921–29 was too much of a retreat, Stalin's five-year plans of the 1930's at last made the Soviet Union a modern industrial country of a new socialist type.[5]

And in the middle of this debate, there were the market socialists, such as the Polish economist Oskar Lange, who held that Soviet planning as practiced was indeed a blunderbuss operation. Nonetheless, if nationalized property were combined with a market, he argued, genuine socialism would result.[6]

In addition to all these Western positions, there was that of the émigré Soviet economist, Naum Jasny, who in the late 1940's and early 1950's severely criticized both the Soviet economy itself and all its foreign ana-

[4]See *Die Gemeinwirtschaft* (Socialism), Jena, Fischer, 1922, which builds on his "Economic Accounting in the Socialist Commonwealth," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften* (Tübingen), Vol. 47, 1920.

[5]See his *Soviet Economic Development Since the 1917 Revolution*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948.

[6]See, for example, the book he co-authored with Fred M. Taylor, *On the Economic Theory of Socialism*, Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press, 1938.

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lysts. Although he may have lacked the methodological sophistication of economists trained in either Cambridge, he knew of what real country he spoke, for he "had been there, and drunk its bitter honey" (to paraphrase a Russian proverb). Jasny argued that both the Soviet Union's collectivized agriculture and its planned industrial plant were very costly failures, and that Western economists were presenting to the public a thoroughly make-believe world of Soviet socialism. And in this precocious pessimism, Jasny was at one with the earlier, more theoretical evaluation of von Mises.[7]

It was at this point, around 1960, that analysis of Soviet economic performance at last became grounded in hard social science. It did so with the aid of what might be called the "GNP model," which in the Soviet case depended on a "cost factor adjustment model." Contrary to widespread opinion, GNP is not a fact but a concept; or, more precisely, it is a measurement, and there can be no measurement without theoretical premises. The size of the Soviet GNP, therefore, depends on what theory one uses to devise it. And here a major problem arises, because all our theories regarding real economic output were derived from Western experience and data.

But Soviet experience and data did not fit Western models of measurement at all. In particular, Soviet prices have no economic logic. Their logic, if that is the proper term, is a political, or an administrative, or a "command" logic. Hence, a "cost factor adjustment" was required to convert Soviet "prices" into data that could be fed into measurement models employed in the two Cambridges. This feat was the accomplishment of Abram Bergson in his pivotal *The Real National Income of Soviet Russia since 1928*, published in 1961. His conclusion was that the Soviet GNP, between 1928 and 1940, grew more than 60 percent. If we bear in mind that during the same years, the total drop in the American GNP was about 33 percent, the Soviet performance appears as one of the most imposing in the 20th century.

In the 25 years after the publication of Bergson's seminal book, on the whole a similarly optimistic evaluation of Soviet success prevailed in Western scholarship; it was echoed and amplified by such an illustrious figure as Wassily Leontiev, and it was popularized and bowdlerized by John Kenneth Galbraith. And so a high opinion of the Soviet achievement found its way into the evaluations of the US Central Intelligence Agency, where of course it was interpreted as a measure of the Soviet threat. Thus, on all sides, by the 1970's, the conventional wisdom came to be that the Soviet GNP was some 60 percent of the American.

Yet, as in earlier years, there were dissenting voices. These came predominantly from the ranks of former Soviets, who, though perhaps lacking in methodological polish, had direct experience of Sovietism in the period of Brezhnev's "developed" or "really existing socialism." The most prominent among them is Igor Birman. One of his main arguments was that American academia, and the CIA, failed to take into account, not only the unreliability of Soviet statistics, but, even more important, the low quality of the whole Soviet national product.[8]

Then, in the late 1980's, when *glasnost'* at last permitted Soviet economists and journalists to speak out, Birman's pessimistic, or, more accurately, realistic, verdict was amply confirmed. Through the voices of Nikolay Shmelev, Gavriil Popov, Vasiliy Selyunin, Grigory Khanin, Larissa Pyasheva, Mikhail Berger, and subsequently Grigoriy Yavlinskiy and Yegor Gaydar, they offered us a portrait of the Soviet economy that was in full accord with the evaluations of Birman, Jasny, and, indeed, Ludwig von Mises, whose book contains hardly a single figure and not a word about GNP. This methodological *smuta,* finally, received international recognition at a conference on Soviet "non-statistics" held at Airlie House, under the sponsorship of the American Enterprise Institute in April 1990 and attended by both Soviet and Western specialists. As a result of this "demystification," it became clear that we simply do not know the size of the Soviet economy or its GNP for any period. And with the collapse of *perestroyka* in 1991, it also became evident that socialism was one of the greatest economic disasters of the 20th century.

What, then, was the true nature of the Soviet productive system, or *narodnoye khozvaystvo,* as the Russians call it? An appropriate term would be a militarized economy, since the prototypical political-command economy first emerged during World War I. Indeed, in Germany, General Erich von Ludendorff, utilizing the organizational talents of Walter Rathenau, built a system he called *Kriegssozialismus* (War Socialism), which, in his view, was only the economic component of *der totale Krieg* (total war). But for Lenin, this war was an "imperialist" war, the product of the "highest stage of capitalism." The war thus would end in socialist revolution, and Ludendorff's militarized economy then would logically become the matrix of the new "socialist" economy.

[7]See *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1949, and *Soviet Industrialization, 1928–1952*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1960.

[8]See, for example, his *Personal Consumption in the USSR and the USA*, London, MacMillan, 1989.

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So, at the end of the Soviet Civil War, in 1920, Trotsky also logically argued that the "militarization of labor" was the means for building peacetime socialism. Indeed, in the partial retreat to the market during the NEP, the state or socialist sector of heavy industry and credit was still appropriately known as the "commanding heights." Finally, when Stalin called off this retreat in 1929 and lunged toward "building socialism" in what turned out to be a four-year Five-Year Plan, he did so on a series of "fronts"—industrial, agricultural, and cultural—and under the slogan that "there are no fortresses that Bolsheviks cannot storm."

Then, when Hitler returned to Stalin Lenin's old compliment to Ludendorff by socializing the German economy in a Four-Year Plan, German émigrés from National Socialism's Leviathan state called Hitler's policy a *Befehlswirtschaft* (command economy). For the past 20-odd years or so, this apt term has been juxtaposed in Western usage to the misleading and pseudo-rationalistic official term "plan." Under *glasnost'*, the German term returned to the land of Lenin as "the command-administrative system," a terminological refinement of the democrats who are now in power in Moscow, and who are setting about abolishing that system in favor of such genuinely economic institutions as the market and private property, both of which require the rule of law.

Without the West's overestimation of the Soviets' economic achievement, the overestimation of their performance in the other three disciplines would have been impossible. Or, more exactly, it was the intersection of this economic misjudgment with the great historical trauma of the Depression and World War II that made the Soviet Union's political and social fortune. For, just when Stalin was building socialism in the Soviet Union, the Depression helped to generate Nazism in the West. Subsequently, World War II was fought as a "Popular Front" alliance of democrats and communists against fascism. Thus, after the 1930's, a rough correlation between, on the one hand, capitalism, economic crisis, and war, and, on the other hand, planning, growth, and peace was engrained in the Western liberal consciousness. And not all the de-Stalinizations of the last 40 years were sufficient to eradicate these associations. To do that, the great economic collapse of *perestroyka* was required . . . or so it seems.

Political science. In political science studies of communism, the great issue turned around the "totalitarian model" and its critics. And this struggle touched just as directly the other "soft" social sciences as well—sociology and history. The basic facts are so well known as to make superfluous anything but the briefest recapitulation. The totalitarian model was launched in 1951, while Stalin was still in power, by Hannah Arendt in her *Origins of Totalitarianism.* Her thesis was that the mid-20th century experienced a qualitatively new and unique form of despotism, founded on the mass, demotic mobilization of society by ideological political power; and that the supreme expressions of this were Nazism and communism. In 1956, Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski turned Arendt's thesis into a model, according to which totalitarianism is characterized by an official ideology, a mass party with a leader, institutional terror, a monopoly on information, a monopoly of high-technology weaponry, and a centrally controlled economy.[9]

Beginning in the 1960's, the totalitarian model came increasingly under attack. There were many reasons for this, but here it is possible to mention only the most important. First, times were in fact changing in the Soviet Union, and the system was becoming more mellow. Second, times were changing in the West as well, and the Left, after a long eclipse, was making a comeback. The conjunction of these two factors diminished concern about the Soviet menace, and so the totalitarian model came to be denounced as the academic rationale for the cold war. Moreover, with the "balance of terror" between the two superpowers producing a stalemate, it seemed clear that the Soviet Union would be a permanent factor in world affairs, and that the time had therefore come to settle down and analyze it soberly, without the emotion of the late Stalin years. And this meant processing Soviet data through the "value-free" categories of the new social sciences. Thus, academic investigation of the USSR, which had begun as a form of mere "area studies," was constantly upgraded by its practitioners through the assimilation of ever more sophisticated social science models. The result was that the Soviet Union's historical specificity as a communist party-state was increasingly blurred under a vocabulary that spoke in universal political and social terms. And this process was furthered by a good dose of ignorant innocence in the West about actual Soviet conditions.

By the 1970's, this "revisionist" perspective had produced a vast literature that sought to ground the Soviet regime in the dynamics of Soviet society, and which subordinated politics and ideology to social and economic factors in explaining the system's operation. This revisionism produced no single dominant model; rather, new models came on the scene as thick and perishable as autumn leaves, from the leadership conflicts approach (Kremlinology), to Sovietism as neo-traditionalism (in Weber's sense of the traditional), to

[9]This model can be found in their classic *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1956.

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corporatism, to the view of Brezhnevism as welfare-state authoritarianism. But there were three approaches, characterized by three key words—development, authoritarianism, pluralism—that proved more durable than all the rest.

The first of these was in fact the political equivalent of the GNP model. Its classic statement was given by Richard Löwenthal in "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy" published in 1970.[10] Löwenthal began with the totalitarian model, which he combined with the newer perspective of modernization theory, which in turn drew both on Max Weber and on structural functionalism as applied to backward or traditional societies. Thus, for him, communism was a particular form of modernization, or "a special type of politically forced development" founded on Marxist-Leninist ideology. Yet, totalitarian policies inevitably led to unintended consequences. Thus, under Khrushchev, Sovietism's "last utopian," the ideological goal of "building socialism" gave way to the mundane pursuit of economic development as an end in itself. One conclusion drawn by others from this mode of argument was that Soviet development, as measured by an allegedly expanding GNP, could serve as a model for more backward Third World countries, from Cuba, to India, to Vietnam—an opinion with which the rulers of those countries concurred. Another conclusion was that since economic development was the royal road to modernity everywhere, the Soviet Union itself was well on its way to "converging" with the fully developed First World. And so Sovietism was fitted into a universal pattern of progress.

The second of the political science insights need not be associated with any one name or book, because it was diffused throughout the field: this was the contention that although Sovietism may have been totalitarian under Stalin, it had mellowed into ordinary "authoritarianism" under his successors. Thus, communism was at the same time reformable and intrinsically different from fascism. Again, there is factual basis for a distinction between Stalinism and the more decayed regime of his successors, as everyone who lived under Sovietism knew well. But this is not the same as holding that the quantitative decline in terror equaled a qualitative transformation of the system; or that reform communism could eventuate in genuine democracy without a radical break.

And the reform communism of *perestroyka* did, in fact, end last August in a rupture. There was no evolutionary "transition to democracy" of the sort that Juan Linz and others have so effectively analyzed in Latin America and Spain. Indeed, the intrinsic irreformability of communism is the point of Jeane Kirkpatrick's famous—and for some, infamous—distinction of the late 1970's between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Her contention was not that totalitarian regimes could never change at all—this is a caricature of her position—but that they could not transform themselves into democracies, whereas merely authoritarian regimes could, as in fact occurred in Spain.

The final conceptual innovation of post-Stalin political science was that if Sovietism was to be understood as "developmental authoritarianism," then its political mode of operation must be "institutional pluralism," a derivative of "interest group" theory. The most notable proponent of this approach was Jerry Hough. Its effect was to present the Soviet Union as just another multipolar polity, in much the same way that the GNP model made Sovietism out to be simply another species of a universal, modern economy. This view received its culminating expression in Hough's *How the Soviet Union Is Governed,* published in 1979, which symbolically annulled the *summa* of the totalitarian approach, Merle Fainsod's *How Russia Is Ruled,* which was first published in 1953. And so with the political system, as with the economy, we were promised a pot of convergence at the end of the Soviet rainbow. But, again, in historical fact things did not work out this way. A true pluralism of institutions—from the factories, to the Academy of Sciences, to the local soviets—did not emerge until the super-institution of the party-state, or the "center" as it came to be called, was abolished.

Sociology. Is it necessary to argue in detail that a similar paradigm shift, achieved through the projection of Western models onto Soviet reality, is to be found in sociological studies of communism? Suffice it to say the following: as with the economy and the polity, the notion that Sovietism was about the unique process of building socialism was not taken seriously. This was regarded as ideological window-dressing. The Soviet experience was seen as basically a variation on universal social processes.

Briefly, then, what happened first was the application of the canons of structural functionalism to Soviet society. The classic work in this regard appeared in 1956 and was called *How the Soviet System Works.* A collective enterprise of psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists, it was the product of the pilot institution of academic Sovietology, Harvard's Russian Research Center. This study accepted the uniqueness of the Soviet system and the basic premises of the totalitarian model, but fleshed out the model with concrete ana-

[10]In Chalmers Johnson, Ed., *Change in Communist Systems,* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1970, pp. 33–116.

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lyses of its multiple structures and their "operating characteristics." The conclusion of this investigation was that Soviet structures did indeed function successfully—that the system, in short, worked, because it was in fact a genuine social system and not simply a political regime.

But this effort to introduce nuances into the totalitarian perspective gave way, like everything else in Sovietology during the radical 1960's, to an approach that finally reduced communism to a variant of a universal social process. This approach was a combination of modernization theory with a revisionist form of Marxist class analysis, and its main exemplar was Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* of 1966. For Moore, the central thread of all modern history was the transition from traditional to industrial, or developed, society, but this transition worked out in quite different ways depending on which social class dominated the revolution against the old order. In England, France, and the United States, the "bourgeoisie" emerged on top, and the result was capitalism and a (very flawed) democracy. In Germany and Japan, the aristocracy introduced capitalism through a "revolution from above," and the ultimate result was fascism. Russia was treated indirectly through the Chinese case, but in both of these "great agrarian bureaucracies" the old regimes were overthrown by the peasants and the result was communism, which then proceeded to industrialize through despotic bureaucratic means. But nowhere in this class analysis of China and Russia did Moore find any room for the party or Marxist ideology as the indispensable agents of the communist outcome. Nor did he find that political forces acted as independent variables in any of the revolutionary cases he studied. Indeed, they played no real role whatever; all that existed in his world was raw social process.

Moore's disciple, Theda Skocpol, thus felt moved to make a great conceptual leap forward by "bringing the state back in" for a discussion of "agrarian revolution" against bureaucracy in France, Russia, and China.[11] In all three cases, the result of the alleged peasant revolution was the triumph of a new despotic "developmental bureaucracy." What Skocpol did not notice, however, was that in Russia and China, this bureaucracy was communist and total, whereas in France, the bureaucracy was an instrument in the service of a constitutional democratic order based on universal suffrage. Even more, she did not notice that a sociology so far gone in social reductionism that it was a matter of great methodological moment "to bring the state back in" had become a sociology irrelevant to understanding communist party-states.

History. And what, finally, of the mother discipline of the social sciences—history? Well, history offers us more of the same, for the oldest social discipline had been thoroughly modernized in the behavioral era by the new social sciences. Yet, historical writing was still ordered in a temporal sequence, as research advanced after World War II from 1917 to the Stalin era; at the same time, this progression fused with the familiar methodological progression from the totalitarian to the revisionist perspective. So history came to sum up the whole "normalization" of Sovietism in Western scholarship.

In the years after World War II, the Western approach to Soviet history was overwhelmingly political and ideological. The paradigmatic work of the day was Leonard Schapiro's *The Origins of the Communist Autocracy,* published in 1955, which portrayed a Soviet regime already under Lenin as aiming at the elimination of all rival loci of power and the total concentration of this power in the hands of the party, themes later extended in time by his *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* in 1959. And this view of the Soviet Union as a totalitarian monolith paralleled that of its classical formulation in Fainsod's *How Russia Is Ruled.*

But even Schapiro's great adversary, E. H. Carr, who was favorably inclined to the Soviet experiment, gave an essentially political explanation of Bolshevism. Nor did he make any bones about its being a tough autocracy, on the grounds that toughness was necessary to socialism's survival.[12] And Carr's ally in Sovietophilia, the Trotskyite Isaac Deutscher, also gave a political interpretation of his subject, though placing a significantly greater emphasis on ideology than did Carr.[13] It should by pointed out that both these authors had their greatest impact at the height of the cold war, when the totalitarian model supposedly ruled the field.

The revolution in Soviet historical studies came in 1964 in an article in the *Slavic Review* by Leopold Haimson, an article whose mention ever since has invariably, and justifiably, been preceded by the adjective "seminal." At the time it appeared, the prevailing view of 1917 was that the Revolution was a cataclysm pro-

[11]The title of this book is *States and Social Revolutions,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979.

[12]See his monumental series, *History of Soviet Russia,* published in the 1950's.

[13]Deutscher's main work was, of course, his outstanding biographies of Trotsky—*The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879–1921,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1954; *The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky, 1921–1929,* London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1959; and *The Prophet Outcast, Trotsky, 1929–1940,* London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1963—and of Stalin—*Stalin: A Political Biography,* New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1949.

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duced by the impact of World War I on the fragile political and economic structures of Imperial Russia, which until then, had been evolving toward a Western-style constitutional order. Haimson, however, argued that the Revolution had to be understood as the product of a dual "polarization" in Russian life—the one between the state and society, and the other between the workers and the bourgeoisie. He argued further that this process had already reached a decisive phase by the summer of 1914. By implication, therefore, October was no "accident" due to war but the logical working out of Russia's social processes, or of what the Russians call *zakonomernost'* and what German Hegelo-Marxists call *Gesetzmässigkeit.*[14]

In the same way that the classic Russian novel (in Dostoevsky's famous phrase) emerged from Gogol's *The Overcoat,* so subsequent American social history writing on Sovietism emerged from Haimson's hardly less seminal endeavor. This tradition of social history may be characterized, in its basic thrust if not necessarily in its empirical elaborations, as neo-Menshevik. Or, more precisely, it is in the intellectual lineage of Left, or internationalist, Menshevism as represented by Yuliy Martov, who indeed was the originator of the polarization thesis. In the neo-Menshevik view, Bolshevism, for all its excesses, was a genuine workers' movement, and therefore the Soviet state was authentically socialist, though deformed by the later excesses of Stalinism. Sovietism, in consequence, possessed the capacity for self-reform, so as to yield what the Czechs and Slovaks in 1968 called "socialism with a human face." Given this usually unstated yet constantly lurking postulate, most Western historiography about Soviet Russia, through all its empirical permutations, has in fact lent support to the idea of communism's eventual transformation into some kind of social democracy.

This enterprise of the historical rehabilitation of Sovietism unfolded in four basic phases. The first was characterized by a wave of studies on 1917 designed to show that October was not a coup d'état, as the totalitarian school held, but a genuine workers' revolution, and that the Bolshevik party was no monolith commanded from above, but an open, "democratic" entity driven by radical impulses from below.[15] Although there is much in this view that is true with respect to 1917 itself, and with respect to workers only, it totally neglects the rest of society, the extraordinary political conditions created by the war, and the long-term ideocratic purposes of the party, which were quite incompatible with any democratic sharing of, or alternation in, power with other groups. Yet, these factors were largely ignored, and research concentrated on establishing the proletarian legitimacy of October, since this was necessary to give legitimacy to Soviet history as a whole.

The second phase of the neo-Menshevik enterprise was characterized by the argument that the true harvest of October was not War Communism, but the NEP of Lenin's last two years as this was developed by Nikolay Bukharin until 1929. And, indeed, an economic policy along the lines of the NEP had been the Menshevik program to save the socialist fruits of the Revolution in the 1920's. The argument went that if only the NEP had not been brutally interrupted by Stalin, Russia would have "grown into" socialism, conceived of as a semi-market, quasi-mixed economy. Again, there is minimal empirical plausibility to this characterization of the 1920's, but this is achieved only at the cost of ignoring, not only the persisting hegemony of the party over the economy, but the communists' ambition to socialize, in more or less short order, all aspects of life. Nevertheless, the mode for some 20 years has been to idealize the NEP—economic, political, and cultural—as the golden age of Sovietism, with the implication that some future reform was destined to return successfully to this source.[16]

The third phase of social-history revisionism of the totalitarian model went beyond neo-Menshevism to what can only be called a soft Stalinism. This approach argued that the First Five-Year Plan took its impetus from below in the form of a "cultural revolution" of working-class and party activists. It resulted in a great upward social mobility, or *vydvizheniye,* of these worker-activists into managerial and party posts, a development that eventually furnished the cadres of the "Brezhnev generation." Such a process of upward mobility would obviously be recognized by any Westerner as democratic social promotion. And, in fact, this *vydvizheniye* did occur on a massive scale. But this is hardly all that occurred in Stalin's revolution, which, moreover, clearly came from above. Almost completely neglected in this perspective are collectivization and the purges; indeed, the latter are minimized with the remark that their victims were in the "low hundreds of thousands." This partial rehabilitation of the Stalinist record is most

[14]Leopold Haimson, "The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905–1917," *Slavic Review* (Columbus, OH), Part I, December 1964, pp. 619–42; Part II, March 1965, pp. 1–22.

[15]The list of books that make up this wave is too long to include here. A good "short course" can, however, be found in the collection of articles in Daniel Kaiser, Ed., *The Worker's Revolution in Russia, 1917: The View from Below,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987.

[16]The two classic examples of this trend are Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution,* Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1973; and Moshe Lewin, *Lenin's Last Struggle,* New York, Pantheon, 1968.

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prominently associated with the name of Sheila Fitzpatrick, and it obviously corresponds to the positive evaluation of mature Sovietism given in political science by Jerry Hough.[17]

But matters did not stop with this, and there occurred a fourth phase of revisionism that did not hesitate to rehabilitate the rest of Stalin's record. His collectivization has been portrayed as being, in significant measure, the product of worker enthusiasm for the building of socialism. And his purges have been presented as the result of a struggle by the "center" to bring the quasi-anarchic "periphery" under control, a process in which Stalin allegedly played a moderating role. It has also been argued that the number of victims is not a subject for proper scientific investigation since contemporary, that is official, sources are silent on the matter.[18] Proper social science method could hardly obfuscate Soviet reality more thoroughly.

With this oblique sanitization of high Stalinism, the process of revisionism reaches a kind of culmination: each phase of Soviet development from October through the final building of socialism in the 1930's has been given a purposeful cast; the overall process, if not every detail, adds up to achievement and success. To be sure, those who hold to Bukharin's NEP vehemently reject the efforts of the defenders of cultural revolution as excessive, and as aberrant to the truth as Stalinism itself was to true Leninism. Nonetheless, both are working in the same social reductionist mode, and the result in both cases is to judge the Soviet experiment to be, on the whole, reformable. Both are linked, moreover, by the fact that the 25 years of Stalinism are too central a piece of Soviet history to be written off as an "aberration" lacking a proper "social base." Thus, that bolder revisionism oriented to the 1930's really develops logically out of the more cautious neo-Menshevism, and brings out more clearly the failings of the whole revisionist enterprise. And these failings are that neither Leninism nor Stalinism can plausibly be derived from any class or social base. The Soviet regime determines, and is not determined by, the social process.

And so, by the mid-1980's and the onset of *perestroyka,* revisionist historical writing had spelled out period by period, and in concrete terms, the basically positive evaluation of Sovietism given in different ways by economics, political science, and sociology. And the implied conclusion of this whole interdisciplinary joint venture was that a mature communism, since it had grown into an advanced industrial urbanized superpower, was ready for a liberalizing "reform" that would make of Russia a wholly "modern" society. So, Gorbachev's *perestroyka* was received by most Sovietologists with enthusiasm, and was happily processed through a panoply of predictive models for portents of success. But as has already been noted, *perestroyka* did not rejuvenate communism; it killed it. So perhaps we should look to the East for insights and intuitions, if not for outright models, to help us restructure our ailing discipline.

The Eastern Perspective

In the East, we observe the exact opposite of the Western development. Until well into *perestroyka,* the official Eastern evaluation of Sovietism was the Marxist-Leninist assertion that the system represented "really existing," or "developed," socialism. But in the 1970's, as the system began to decay in Eastern Europe, dissident thinkers took up the term totalitarianism. To be sure, these thinkers also adopted some Western social science perspectives; but they almost always subordinated these concepts to the overarching totalitarian concept. By 1988, with *glasnost',* this term came out in the open in the Soviet Union; by 1990, even Gorbachev himself was using it; and by 1991, Yel'tsin's government made anticommunism and the "exit from totalitarianism" its declared policy. Faced with this overwhelming consensus of Eastern opinion about the nature of the system, Western Sovietology will in time have to adapt.

Under early *perestroyka,* down to 1989, Western neo-Menshevik revisionism was an acceptable Sovietological position in both East and West. Indeed, Gorbachev's policy represented a kind of neo-NEP; selections from Bukharin were republished, and Stephen Cohen's work on Bukharin was translated. Even the bolder Western eulogists of the Soviet 1930's could be useful in this context, and the whole spectrum of American revisionists gave lectures at Yuriy Afanas'yev's Archival Historical Institute. But this period has passed. Václav Klaus, the Czechoslovak minister of finance, has taken to declaring that now "the greatest danger in the East is ideological infiltration from the West." So, to continue to do business with the East, and perhaps even to make a contribution to its "exit from totalitarianism," Western Sovietology will have to enter into an

[17]See, for example, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Ed., *Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931,* Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1978; and Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921–1934,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979; and her *The Russian Revolution,* Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1982; see also Jerry Hough, *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decisionmaking,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979.

[18]I am referring to Lynne Viola's *The Best Sons of the Fatherland,* Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987; and J. Arch Getty's *The Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985.

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intellectual joint venture with post-Soviet democrats, preferably as their junior partners. Indeed, the Institute for East-West Security Studies has already done this for Eastern Europe at Štiřin Castle in Bohemia—a similar venture will no doubt soon follow for Russia and other former Soviet republics.

What is the view of totalitarianism that has developed in the former communist countries over the past 15 years? First of all, it is not a model in the social scientific sense. Rather, it is a concept, general and flexible, yet also reasonably precise in its essential points. This concept is viewed simply as the reflection of a fact of life, indeed of the basic fact of life since October 1917. Moreover, this concept is not a recapitulation or simple endorsement of Arendt, or Friedrich and Brzezinski, or Fainsod, though it does build on their work. The model of totalitarianism of Friedrich and Brzezinski tended to be static and abstract, and it is this version that seems to have become fixed as the totalitarian model per se. But the approaches of Arendt and Fainsod were quite historical, and thus were closer to the current East European one, which is both historical and dynamic, deriving as it does from the changing experience of totalitarianism in its decline and decay. This model is not set forth or systematized in any classic treatise or formal work of social science. Rather, it is to be found in the imaginative, polemical, and scholarly writings of such East Europeans as Leszek Kołakowski, Adam Michnik, and Tadeusz Konwicki, in Poland; Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia; János Kis and János Kornai in Hungary; and in the writings of such Russians as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Andrey Sakharov, Abram Tertz (Andrei Siniavsky), and Aleksandr Zinoviev. It also appears in the writings of such Russian social scientists as Andranik Migranyan, Aleksandr Tsipko, and Igor' Klyamkin, and of historians such as Sergey Kuleshov or Vyacheslav Shostakovskiy.

The main points of this concept need not be codified or hypostatized as a model, but they may be conveniently summarized as follows. First, communist totalitarianism is not a variation, even a deformed one, of some universal process of modernization. It is historically sui generis, a qualitatively new departure in human affairs. Outsiders have difficulty comprehending it precisely because of its radically new nature. As Alain Besançon put it in the 1970's, when his works were considered classics among dissident Soviet social scientists, the problem in understanding the Soviet Union is that one must "believe the unbelievable." This world is so radically different from the normal world that Besançon could only use the word "surreal" to characterize it.[19]

Second, the fundamental organizational trait of Sovietism is that everything is subordinated to politics, that this politics consists of the "building of socialism," and that this world-historical task is the monopoly of the self-appointed party. Concretely, this means that the state administration, the economy, culture, and even private life are subject to the direct control of the party. This is achieved through a hierarchical directorate of party cells from the top to the bottom of society, an interlocking network of party *nomenklatura* appointments in all key areas, and a constant flow of agitprop to orchestrate the whole. In short, Soviet society is a total, or totalitarian, society, with everything institutionally controlled by the omnipresent party-state, its plan, and its police. To be sure, at no time, even during the worst years of Stalin, was such total control ever in fact achieved. Nonetheless, such control has been the system's constant aspiration from the beginning of the party's dictatorship, and such a total order is the ideal type of communism everywhere. In other words, the system has an essence, a logic, or, if you will, a "genetic code," that is always present and acting, however much its empirical and historical accidents may vary from one time and place to another.[20]

But this essence or logic of communism is in no way static in its concrete manifestations. The system has a history, a life course, with a beginning, a middle, and as we now know, an end. Although its genetic code is a permanent given, this code reveals its potentialities only by stages over time. And the degree to which the system verges upon total control is a function of the historical stage in which it finds itself at any given moment.

Thus, Western critics of the totalitarian model do not have a point at all when they argue that although Sovietism might have been totalitarian under Stalin, it had evolved into a mere authoritarianism under Brezhnev, because the level of terror and the degree of party-state control had declined. It is of course true that this diminution occurred, and for people who had to live in communist countries, this change was of very great practical importance. Still, these Western critics had mistaken a quantitative change for a qualitative one.

Although its will and muscle had begun to atrophy, the essence or nature of the system remained the same. All functional institutions, from the factory to the schoolhouse, remained subordinated to the party-state, and "institutional pluralism" under such circumstances remained circumscribed to immediate, func-

[19]See his *The Soviet Syndrome*, trans. Patricia Ranum, New York, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1978, for a good concise summary of his thought.

[20]This position is forcefully and concisely argued by Leszek Kołakowski, "Marxist Roots of Stalinism," in Robert C. Tucker, Ed., *Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation*, New York, Norton, 1977.

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tional matters. By the last years of Brezhnev, we were dealing with "totalitarianism with its teeth kicked out," in Adam Michnik's phrase; we were not dealing with a "normal" society, as East European dissidents called their ultimate goal. This, indeed, was the meaning of the sharp rupture of 1989 in Eastern Europe, and its only somewhat less sharp sequel of 1991 in the Soviet Union. As *la thèse de la revolution* would have it, only after these breaks was it possible to move from reform communism, however far-reaching, to a genuine exit from the system.

It is necessary to insist on this point, for what ought to be self-evident about the end of communism is at times disputed in a kind of posthumous prolongation of the revisionist perspective. One of the consequences of *la thèse du complot* and of the minimization of the break of August 1991, is the belief that *perestroyka* was in fact Russia's transition to democracy. The point is made that Gorbachev introduced *glasnost'*, parliament, and elections, and that these reforms depended on the Soviet regime's earlier success in industrializing, urbanizing, and educating the country—a position that derives from the corpus of Moshe Lewin's writings, as these are summed up in his *The Gorbachev Phenomenon* of 1988 In short, despite all the acknowledged horrors of communist history, the system produced the resources for transforming itself. Thus, Russia's transition to democracy was an evolutionary, not a revolutionary, process.

Although the pre-August developments adduced in this argument are all quite real, the argument itself ignores the fact that the basic components of the system—the party, the plan, the police, and the Union—were not transformed; they were abolished, and in the short span of three months after August. All the things that made communism what it was, had to be destroyed before Russia could embark on the quest for democracy. To argue that this destruction was in reality an evolution is a bit like arguing that because Louis XVI had summoned the Estates General, the events of 1789 represented an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary transition from absolutism.

The Socialist Idea

But more was involved in the Russian Revolution of 1991 than a change of institutions, however basic; at the heart of the transformation was a change in the defining ethos of life: viz., the abandonment of the Idea of Socialism. To understand the significance of this, Aristotle is really more helpful than all the social science of the behavioral age. In the *Politics*, the economy and the polity are viewed as part of ethics. In other words, ethics gives purpose, the final cause, or what would now be called, in functional terms, the value system of a society, that which lends meaning to each of its institutions, and indeed makes it possible for them to function at all. And this ethical purpose must be transcendent to any one of its particular manifestations.

Thus, the essence of the communist system and the unity of the Soviet experience are defined by a single and supreme task—the "building of socialism." And it is because Western social science has by and large refused to take this ideological aim seriously that Sovietology has failed so woefully to understand its subject. But what is meant in the present instance by the slippery and protean term, socialism?

Basically, two elements are involved. First, there is an ethical goal—the supreme social good is democratic equality among all human beings. Second, there is an instrumental program—since inequalities of wealth inevitably create inequalities of human conditions, the abolition of private property is the great means for achieving democratic equality. This was indeed how Marx defined the essence of the communist program in his *Manifesto*. But if private property is abolished, its fruit—profit—and the means for realizing profit—the market—must also be abolished. Thus, the moral goal of human equality requires a program of total state control over the economy. At the same time, this coordinated control is deemed to be more rational, and hence more productive, than the selfish profit motive and the "anarchy of the market." And the combination of democratic morality with productive rationality in the socialist aspiration would, in time, provide an extraordinary ethical warrant for using coercion to achieve such unquestionably noble goals.

And coercion did, indeed, prove necessary when it came to realizing this program. In Marxist theory, the logic of history—expressed both in the modern momentum of social democratization and in the constant growth of productive forces—was supposed to produce the transition from capitalism to socialism. In practice, however, the logic of history did not work out this way. The intervention of a special political instrument, the Leninist party, was required to "build socialism." This ideological-cum-political set of circumstances, and not "development" or modernization, represents the key to understanding the communist system, and the reason why it became totalitarian.

Toward a New T-Model

The Soviet regime began with the October 1917 seizure of power, an act designed to force the hand of his-

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tory into producing a socialist revolution. When, in the turmoil of the civil war that inevitably ensued, a socialist order did not appear on its own, history had to be forced once again with the militarized economy of War Communism and the first attempts at "planning." But this effort proved more than a society devastated by war could sustain, and so the first attempt at building socialism had to be given up in 1921 for a temporary retreat into the semi-market, semi-private economy of the NEP. In this alternation between a "socialist offensive" and a partial retreat toward a more normal society we have the basic rhythm of the Soviet experience.

The rhythm, however, was hardly regular, for it culminated in one great climax, which was the actual "building of socialism" under Stalin in the 1930's. When, in the late 1920's, the minimal concessions to normality of the NEP began to threaten the party's monopolistic hold over the country, Stalin proceeded to the full implementation of the original program—abolishing private property and the market in both agriculture and industry, subordinating all economic life to the plan, and subjecting the whole of society and of culture to the party-state and its police. Indeed, by the 1930's, Soviet socialism had effectively annihilated all autonomous forces in the country and thoroughly atomized society. It is in this Stalinist revolution from above that communism came the closest it ever would to realizing in practice the ideal type of totalitarianism. This was quite close enough, however, to create maximum discomfort for all who lived under it, or for putting beyond cavil the appropriateness of the embattled "T-word." And Stalin's socialism clearly surpassed both Nazism and fascism in the totality of its control over society, as well as in its staying power.

To be sure, all of this did represent "development," urbanization, and everything else that modernization theory has claimed for Sovietism. But this "modernization" was wholly driven by the political purposes of communism. Hence, this modernization was rendered sterile. It was capable of imitating and multiplying, on party command, industrial models taken from the West, but as a command structure, it did not have the capacity to innovate and invent on its own. It was a kind of grandiose robot in the service of "building socialism."

It is because of this sterile, robotic quality that Sovietism, after the initial successes of building the system in the 1930's and winning World War II, stagnated and entered into decline under the leadership of Stalin's successors. After the great Stalinist peak, therefore, the basic rhythm of alternation between hard, militant communism and soft, reform communism resumed. It did so now, however, in a descending phase of the life-course of the system. In this phase, successive efforts at liberalization gradually eroded the system while seeming to improve it. At the same time, these efforts generated the illusions about the ability of the communist system to reform itself that for a time made plausible all the various revisionist critiques of the totalitarian model discussed above.

This pattern was first played out in the late 1950's and early 1960's under Khrushchev. It was also during his reign that Sovietology first turned to revisionism. His de-Stalinization seriously destabilized the system, however, and so he was deposed. Under Brezhnev and Mikhail Suslov, Sovietism returned to a soft or routinized Stalinism, that is, a command-administrative partocracy without mass terror and with a now cold ideology. And this stable and stagnant Sovietism was different enough from its grand and terrifying predecessor to pass in the West for an authoritarian, pluralistic system founded on what has quaintly been called an "asymmetrically advantageous social contract" between party and people. But this stagnant system increasingly made the Soviet superpower noncompetitive internationally, and so still another attempt at liberal, reform communism became necessary to bring forth new elites, to revive energies, and to stimulate innovation. This was the meaning of Gorbachev's *perestroyka, glasnost',* and democratization.

In consequence, the whole 25 years' accumulation of revisionist, American Sovietology was offered to him as a homage: he was seen as the Second Coming of Bukharin, the maturation of Soviet modernity, the architect of communism's transition to democracy. But this time, the effort at reform communism went beyond the point of no return. *Glasnost'* made it possible for people to say openly that the system was a failure and a fraud, while democratization made it possible for them to challenge the party's hegemony. So when the apparatus's inevitable attempt to roll back the reform was made in August 1991, it was defeated ignominiously, and the whole system collapsed in three days.

In this manner, the genetic code born of the October overturn of 1917 at last worked itself out fully, that is, to the extinction of the organism. This would not have been the case had the Soviet adventure been simply about development or modernization. But it was about "building socialism." By this is meant integral, full socialism, in the sense of non-capitalism, or suppression of private property and the market. And this is not at all the same as the halfway-house Scandinavian variety of socialism, which preserves the market and private property yet taxes them maximally to finance a super welfare state.

But integral socialism is ultimately an impossible and self-destructive venture. For the moral goal of demo-

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cratic equality does not result from the instrumental program of the "statization" of all property; quite the contrary, the result is total state tyranny. Nor do greater economic rationality and material abundance result from the suppression of the market in favor of the command-administrative plan. Again, quite to the contrary, the result, after an initial phase of crash growth, is stagnation, obsolescence, and ultimately widespread penury. In the face of such fatal internal contradictions the system can be held together, in its ascending phase, only so long as the socialist Myth is credible, that is, while its realization still lies in the future. Once socialism has been built, however, the Myth is transformed by the results it has produced into the Lie. This transformation occurred at the peak of socialist development under Stalin in the 1930's, and from that time until his death, institutionalized terror became necessary to preserve the "conquests of socialism." But this regimen undermined the system's performance, and so his successors attenuated it in an alternation of reform and retrenchment that sent the system into its long descending phase. Thus, after Stalin, it was only a question of time before the internal contradictions of the impossible enterprise of "building socialism" worked themselves out in the total discrediting, and hence the brusque abandonment, of the system.

In short, there is no such thing as socialism, and the Soviet Union has built it. When a disastrously noncompetitive performance at last made this paradox apparent, the whole institutionalized fantasy of "really existing socialism" vanished into thin air. The "surreality" of Soviet life suddenly ceased, and Russia became a "normal" country once again. But it was a country now existing amid the rubble of its abortive "development." It is under these catastrophic conditions that it must begin its transition to true "modernity," that it must transform the fish soup of spent socialism back into a pluralistic market aquarium.

A Positive Note

And what of the fish soup of American Sovietology? First of all, a serious stock-taking is clearly in order. Now that we know how the dynamics of Sovietism worked out, we will have to go back and do our economic, social, and historical calculations all over again, re-evaluating each period of the Soviet performance from October and the NEP to *perestroyka* itself. And a similar stock-taking of the social sciences in general is also in order, for the failure of Sovietology, perhaps the greatest case study of the behavioral age, is also a failure of the social sciences per se.

Nor is this effort at correction just an academic matter; the misjudgments of Sovietology have had major practical consequences. For example, the overestimation of the Soviet economy has obviously affected Western defense policy and hence also our budget and domestic policies. There is even reason to believe that the Soviets took the CIA's estimates so seriously that they concluded they had greater resources to devote to the military than was in fact within the possibilities of their economy. Indeed, this misjudgment could be a contributory reason for their collapse. Another Western input into Soviet policy is, as we now know, that Aleksandr Yakovlev, the theoretician of *perestroyka,* when he was director of the social science think-tank IMEMO, assigned to his researchers the work of John K. Galbraith on post-industrial societies, that of Wassily Leontiev on growth, and that of Daniel Bell on the end of ideology as arguments that a mature Soviet society was ready for "*konvergentsiya.*" Still another example is the fate of Löwenthal's thesis that communism meant, in fact, development: this led West German Social Democrats to court and coddle the East German communists in the hope of producing gradual reform, but the result was simply to prop up the East German order. The governing West German Christian Democrats largely concurred in the Socialists' illusion, with the result that both were totally unprepared when East Germany collapsed. Along similar lines, in the spring of 1991, a number professors at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, with the benediction of *The New York Times* editorial page, proposed to give a Marshall Plan of some US$30 billion a year for five years, to be called a "Grand Bargain," to the Soviet government of Valentin Pavlov that was then preparing its August coup to save the system.

Nonetheless, the task of Sovietology's reform should be far easier than that of the Soviet Union itself. We now have full access to Russian society, and we will soon have comparable access to all its vital data. We no longer have to submit to the pretext, or to the fantasy, that special Soviet forms and institutions have a value and a future that we must respect. We are now dealing with something that is "just another society," a country that, if not wholly comparable to the West, is of a kindred genus with other urban industrial societies. A number of our models or conceptual schemes based on the experience of the West or the Third World—development, modernization, transition to democracy, etc.—are more or less relevant to present former Soviet circumstances. But they are relevant only on the condition that we recognize that these circumstances are still haunted by their Soviet past, by an experience that is radically and surreally different from our own world. And for this unique experience, a historical

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and dynamic totalitarian model is the only one that is appropriate. With this perspective as a base and a background, our social science techniques, whether in economics, political science, sociology, or history, can at last bear fruit in a manner proportionate to the effort invested in developing them. They can no doubt also aid our Eastern colleagues in effecting the "return to Europe" to which they have aspired since the onset of *perestroyka*.

Sovietology and communist studies need not go the way of the Soviet Union and communism into oblivion. For some decades to come, there will be a vast and valid field of post-Soviet, postcommunist studies, applicable from the Caribbean to the China seas, in lands where a third of the human species has for various periods in time been subjected to the Marxist-Leninist fantasy. And this shared calamitous experience will continue to mold their relations with the rest of the world for as long as it will take them to become integrated, at last, into a genuine modernity.

Commentary

Toward a Postcommunist Economy

Yuri Maltsev

THE presentation by Martin Malia demonstrates that he is one of the few members of the Sovietological profession who realizes the true significance of the August Revolution of 1991 in Moscow. That revolution marked the final stage of the century's most dramatic event —the rise and fall of socialism. The failure of the desperate and incompetent Kremlin bureaucrats to revive the ancien régime represents the complete collapse of Marxist-Leninist ideology and all its philosophical underpinnings.

Malia's paper is the cruiser "Aurora's" shot of today's revolution at the *nomenklatura* of Western Sovietology. Sovietology discredited itself through its politicization and normative approach. However, the "real life" behavior of the subjects of Sovietology proved it to be absolutely out of touch with reality. Even today, some of our colleagues are still trying to convince us that the problem is not with their understanding of the events but with the events themselves. To follow their logic, the peoples of the postcommunist countries did not follow our enlightened advice and behaved differently from what Sovietology predicted.

Arrogance, illiterate imperialism, the intention to impose the policies that were rejected by an absolute majority of people in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are characteristics of those Sovietologists who call themselves "pragmatists." They are visible and vocal. They created "Gorbachev's personality cult" in the United States, and they are very close to the political process irrespective of who is in the White House. The pragmatists labeled everyone who disagreed with the arguments of "reformed communists" from Nikolay Bukharin to Mikhail Gorbachev as "conservatives," "reactionaries," or "blind in their anti-communism."[1] The "pragmatists" were actively trying to save the Soviet

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[1]One probably does not have to be a great economist or statistician to understand that the Soviet economy was going to hell in a hand basket, but I know of no single piece of mainstream Sovietological research except Marshal L. Goldman's *USSR in Crisis. The Failure of an Economic System* (New York, Norton, 1983) that in the early 1980's or before had predicted the present Soviet economic crisis. All of the epithets mentioned above were immediately applied to him.

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empire in an attempt to prolong the life of structures that were voted out by 86–97 percent of the populations in question. As Padma Desai, for one, puts it:

The Bush Administration, caught between pragmatists inside and outside the White House who favor a closer Soviet union with some central control, and conservatives, who believe the republics should be allowed to go altogether their own way, is sitting on the fence. But it needs to be more active, using aid to pressure republics to take the pragmatic route.[2]

Following this strange logic, we can assume that the "conservatives" took over the White House during the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations and "allowed" the peoples of the British, French, and Portuguese empires "to go altogether their own way." These evil people then infiltrated the United Nations, which in 1960 adopted the Declaration of Independence of Colonial Nations, while the "pragmatists" later attempted to stop these disastrous developments in Southeast Asia.

The Miscalculation of Sovietologists

Malia, unlike most Sovietologists, seriously deals with the problem of economic calculation under socialism, which is the most important clue for understanding the collapse of the socialist system. Failure to understand the importance of this problem was precisely the reason for the failure of Western Sovietology to realistically assess the nature and viability of command economies.

Even though some Western academics believe that the USSR "has an advanced system of collecting and evaluating economic statistics,"[3] Soviet economic data were probably the least reliable in the world. These statistics gauged the performance of a non-economic system and, correspondingly, were based on a non-economic methodology. Moreover, until recently, statistics were also treated as a form of economic propaganda and widely used as an illustration of the "success" of the regime's economic and social policies. Propaganda, however, played a much less significant role than flawed methodology.

One of the main shortcomings of mainstream quantitative estimates of Soviet economic performance, as Malia points out, is a methodological one. A good example is the uncritical application of neoclassical theory to the Soviet economy, as in the case of the concept of producer-cost minimization used by the pioneer of Soviet economic analysis, Abram Bergson. The principle states that a producer always strives to minimize costs and, consequently, any cost increase (other things being equal) is associated with a rise in quality. In the Soviet Union, however, the situation was exactly the opposite—producers want to maximize costs (inputs) and minimize outputs. The reason is well known. Soviet planning was based on the so-called "ratchet principle," according to which an enterprise's plan for one year is determined by its success in fulfilling the plan for the previous year. For example, if the enterprise exceeds its planned output by 20 percent, the next year's plan will include the attained level of output as a new base. Under these circumstances, Soviet data on housing construction, or any other capital investment, are quite misleading because enterprise managers inflate the number of inputs necessary to make a given product in order to ensure that they have sufficient resources to meet their plan targets. But this means that the costs of inputs do not reflect the quality of the product.

Without a market mechanism, there really is no way to determine when and how cost increases relate to improvements in quality. Thus, one is strongly tempted to agree with Malia's conclusion that the only valid theoretical evaluation of the socialist model was that of the Austrian school of economics, which concluded that it is impossible to measure what is going on in the Soviet economy.

The Marxist labor theory was also a major source of methodological distortions of Soviet statistics—land and other natural resources (water, timber, air, etc.) were not regarded as having value because no labor was expended on their production. A related Marxist dogma applied to statistical methodology was the concept of "productive" and "nonproductive" labor. Production, according to this view, is the result of social labor in material form. The "social" character of labor is manifested in the cooperation of labor in society, and in the unity of production, distribution, and consumption. The product is "material" if it satisfies "material" needs. However, in reality, this term also embraces energy, communications, transportation, and other activities that increase the costs of material goods created elsewhere. In the Soviet Union, services and other "nonmaterial" costs were not included in determining value. Moreover, national accounts in the USSR were calculated by simply adding up the value of all material in-

[2]Padma Desai, "Keeping the Soviet Economy Under Control," *The New York Times*, Oct. 5, 1991.

[3]D. Steinberg, "The Real Size and Structure of the Soviet Economy: Alternative Estimates of Soviet GNP and Military Expenditures for 1987," prepared for the American Enterprise Institute conference Comparing the Soviet and American Economies: Overall Output, Levels of Consumption, Military Expenditures, Warrenton, VA, Apr. 19–22, 1990, p. 3.

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puts and labor at their state prices. The artificial exclusion of services is by far the most drastic difference between the national accounting system of the USSR and that of the West. Indeed, it leads to some real paradoxes. A dentist, for example, is a "nonproductive" individual while a dental technician is a "productive" one.

There were still other problems with Soviet statistics. Labeling the concept of interest as "bourgeois" resulted in skewed estimates of investment costs. Thus, in choosing between two industrial projects in which to invest, only their current costs were taken into account and not alternative uses for investment funds, where the rate of return would have been calculated on the basis of the rate of interest. The labor theory of value distorts economic statistics because it neglects the independent variable of the time factor in economics. Nor were outputs of some industries that became inputs for other industries eliminated to avoid double counting of value added. The value of inventories in all industries concerned was fixed arbitrarily by government bureaucrats without any regard for an accurate assessment of sales, profits, or production performance.

The bias in favor of hard numbers inevitably led Sovietologists to swallow Soviet lies irrespective of whether they were "pragmatists" or "conservatives." Contemporary mainstream Sovietology is based on the principles of positivism—a scholar dealing with quantitative data is expected to produce hard and exact numbers (and to be precise in his calculations). But the use of positivistic approaches may lead to an illusion of precision among economic researchers. In fact, Western Sovietologists were aware of the danger, but, at the same time, they maintained that it was better to "be exactly wrong than approximately right." Unfortunately, they could not attain even that standard, because there were different degrees of being wrong.

Another common flaw in Sovietology was its neglect of consumption. In treating the socialist economy as a real economic system, Sovietologists were trapped by official Soviet statistics on consumption, which, by definition, are supposed to be more or less in equilibrium with production. Kenneth Boulding's well-known Bathtub Theorem,[4] which holds that over the years the average rate of production and the average rate of consumption must be equal, cannot be applied to a society that lacks a market. At the beginning of the 1990's, personal consumption in the Soviet Union ranked 77th in the world, and its people were the poorest in the developed world.[5] Compared to the average American, for example, the Soviet citizen even before the January 1992 price hikes had to work 12–15 times longer for butter, 15–20 times longer for eggs, and 10 times longer for bread. Production was greater than consumption for 69 out of the 74 years the Soviet economy was in existence. This is an absurdity from the point of view of serious economics. Simply put, hundreds of thousands of factories did not produce goods ready for use; in the majority of cases, unfinished goods and producer goods were manufactured. Every good had to proceed through a whole series of stages before it was ready for use; yet, in each stage, there were no market signals to help managers design a method of production that would result in a product that was both profitable and fulfilled real consumer needs.

This is no small matter of concern. On an economic level, we have a prediction made in 1920 by Ludwig von Mises, who said that cost calculations under socialism are impossible owing to the absence of a rational accounting system:

One may anticipate the nature of the future socialist society. There will be hundreds and thousands of factories in operation. Very few of these will be producing wares ready for use; in the majority of cases what will be manufactured will be unfinished goods and production goods. . . . Every good will go through a whole series of stages before it is ready for use. In the ceaseless toil and moil of this process, however, the administration will be without any means of testing their bearings. It will never be able to determine whether a given good has not been kept for a superfluous length of time in the necessary processes of production, or whether work and material have not been wasted in its completion. How will it be able to decide whether this or that method of production is the more profitable? At best it will only be able to compare the quality and quantity of the consumable end-product produced, but will in the rarest cases be in a position to compare the expenses entailed in production.[6]

The Analysis of Soviet Military Potential

Another serious error in studies of the Soviet economy had to do with the defense budget. Before May 1989, the annual figures for defense expenditures published by the Soviet government were obviously too small to encompass the scope of the Soviet military buildup. The US and other Western governments thus

[4]Kenneth E. Boulding, *Economic Analysis*, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, Vol. 1, p. 170.

[5]V. Radayev and O. Shkaratan, "Return to Essentials," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Feb. 16, 1990.

[6]Ludwig von Mises, *Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth*, Auburn, AL, The Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn University, 1990, p. 9.

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allocated substantial resources to make estimates of their own. Alongside the intelligence community, substantial efforts to establish the real size of the Soviet military economy and military expenditures were also made by numerous academics both in the West and in the Soviet Union itself. Most of these studies sought to find some magic formula that, using official Soviet figures, would provide the "real" numbers. This approach is obviously absurd—if one multiplies nonsense by any figure, the result is nonsense.

The main problem here is the unresolvable one of comparisons between a market and nonmarket economy. Thus, the numerous estimates of the share of the Soviet GNP going to the military, which ranged from the low official Soviet figure of 9 percent, to the US Central Intelligence Agency's 17 percent, to the RAND Corporation's 21 percent, are all equally invalid. Moreover, there is absolutely no assurance that the truth lies somewhere in between these figures. The CIA did not deflate Soviet physical data and did not acknowledge the inferior quality of Soviet production. Its statistics are probably comparable only to those of Goskomstat in their irrelevance. The real figure probably is much higher than the most generous estimate cited above. Aron Katsenelinboigen wrote that "if we look structurally at Soviet military expenditures, they turn out to be all the country's expenditures minus the production costs of consumer goods and services, which would be cut back in the event of a war."[7]

The Roots of the Crisis

For many decades, economic activity in the Soviet Union was used for the fulfillment of communist political ideals "at any price." The peculiarities of the economic and political structure of the USSR, combined with its low level of economic development and social organization, made it a unique phenomenon in the world economy. The decades-long effort to eliminate free markets resulted in the almost total monopolization of the economy, the destruction of the work ethic, and the absence of incentives for capital accumulation. The suppression of individual initiative has led to widespread apathy and the inability of the public to make independent decisions, as well as to a complete lack of individual responsibility on behalf of all types of managers. The result—Chernobyl', catastrophes at nuclear power stations near Chelyabinsk, and numerous other man-made disasters, such as the drying up of the Aral Sea. The command economy distorted the means of economic calculation, and technology is now so obsolete that the capital stock of many industrial enterprises possesses zero or even negative value. Most Soviet heavy industries were built during Stalin's industrialization campaign in the 1930's and have not been seriously remodeled since. Moreover, the system of central planning would not permit the closing down of any enterprise built since 1917, irrespective of the enterprise's efficiency. It is clear that decisions concerning the economy were made on the basis of politics. The system discouraged risk-taking, punished efficiency, and led to unprecedented waste of resources, slowdown of technological progress, and chronic shortages of goods and services. The collapse of the Soviet Union is not the result of a military defeat but of the policies of the Soviet government.

The first sign of the coming Soviet economic collapse, which went unnoticed in the West, was the increase in state subsidies to unprofitable enterprises at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of 1980's. During this period, more than 30 billion rubles of the state budget were allocated annually to support unprofitable industrial enterprises. Huge losses were covered by currency obtained from overseas sales of oil, gas, and other natural resources. These hard-currency reserves were used by Kremlin bureaucrats to purchase goods on the world market in order to make up for domestic production failures.

By the mid-1980's, the deterioration of the Soviet economy reached a critical point. More than 50 percent of state business enterprises were permanently unprofitable but survived due to the provision of huge subsidies,[8] while the agricultural sector required an infusion of more than 100 billion rubles a year to support the feudal collective-farm system.[9]

The August Revolution seriously undermined the position of the forces opposed to radical economic reform. Nevertheless, the danger of the possible new attempts to re-install socialism is still there; the deeply entrenched positions of bureaucracy and military are based on the system of economic statism that is nothing else but the socialist economic system without communist ideology.

Today it is obvious that there will be no changes for the better without the radical overhauling of the obsolete economic system. The share of state property in Russia is the highest in the world (95.4 percent), while

[7] Aron J. Katsenelinboigen, *The Soviet Union: Empire, Nation, and System*, New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1990, pp. 121–22.

[8] *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 11, 1988; *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1988 godu* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1988), Moscow, Statistika, 1989, pp. 620, 621.

[9] *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1988 godu*, op. cit., p. 435.

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the private (personal) property of the people amounts to 2.8 percent and that of cooperatives, 1.8 percent.[10] Moreover, irrespective of the recent so-called "market reforms," the share of state property has increased 7 percent since 1980 (the absolute rate of increase of the value of state property was 165 percent; cooperatives, 19 percent; and private property, only 11 percent).[11]

Government and party functionaries have come to believe that state property belongs to them. Given that such people "plan" and manage state property and economic life in general in their own interest, it is not surprising that bureaucrats became the economic elite so thoroughly described by Milovan Djilas in his classic *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System.* According to my estimate, the number of these bureaucrats in Russia alone in early 1992 was around 13 million. These elites wish to maintain their economic and political power. Nobel laureate James Buchanan has observed that "rent seeking"—competition for government largesse and protected profits—emerges as a significant social phenomenon as institutions move away from ordered markets toward the near chaos of direct political allocation.[12]

The resistance generated by bureaucrats who have been responsible for directing the enterprises is one of the leading causes of the failure of privatization programs. Reluctant to relinquish their power and privileges, government and industrial officials have many opportunities to delay and obstruct any real privatization. They support only those programs that employ "expropriatory methods" in combination with price increases and the printing of additional billions of rubles. The January 2, 1992, "price reform" of Boris Yel'tsin's government in Russia is the best illustration of this. There was no "free market reform" in this economically absurd measure.[13] The essence of socialism is public ownership; fixed prices are only a consequence of public ownership. Even the well-intentioned manager has no guide to tell him what to charge for goods and services. As long as government monopolizes the processes of production and distribution, the laws of supply and demand cannot work.

Unfortunately, Yel'tsin's government has no coherent plan for structural reform. The Russian parliament adopted a law calling for the privatization of 60 percent of shops in 1992. This will not be enough. Without productive private industry, there will be nothing to sell in these shops.

All of the programs of economic reform that the Russian government is now trying to effect are directed toward the preservation of the Russian empire and the creation of certain illusions of reform. First, an illusion of change in the system of ownership in order to induce workers to work more productively for the same salary, and second, an illusion of radical market and other democratic reforms designed to elicit massive economic assistance from the West. Russia's democratic institutions are still unstable. Contract law and liability law do not exist. Property rights, such as they are, are not enforced.

Privatization

Russia and the newly independent states are now confronted with the urgent necessity of replacing the command system with one based on private ownership, competitive markets, entrepreneurship, and customer service. The transition from a command economy to economic freedom implies recognition of private property and private decision-making in the allocation of resources. This is now absolutely clear to everyone, except some colleagues who have yet to acknowledge the obvious source of the Soviet economic collapse. One example is Robert J. Samuelson, who writes in *Newsweek*: "What we can offer is a reform agenda and the money—not huge amounts—to make it practical." Specifically, he writes, the republics need to (1) preserve internal trade; (2) overhaul farm policies; (3) create usable money; and (4) revive oil production.[14]

Malia is absolutely correct when, referring to such recommendations, he writes: "To be sure, all of these discrete problems are quite real; and all of them will require technical solutions of the sort just mentioned. Nevertheless, none of them will work unless it is first realized that the post-Soviet crisis is a *total* crisis, embracing every aspect of life at once. For all basic institutions in the former Soviet Union collapsed together and at once; and thus all of them must be rebuilt together and, if not all at once, then in rapid succession."

Privatization, however, is the first step: state ownership was the main source of economic disaster, so if this problem is not addressed, any reform will inevitably fail. Privatization, however, is a rather complicated procedure. It involves much more than simply a series of administrative steps leading to the automatic transfor-

[10]Calculated from *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1989 godu* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1989), Moscow, Statistika, 1990, p. 279.

[11]Calculated from ibid.

[12]"Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking," in James Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, Eds., *Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society,* College Station, TX, Texas A & M University Press, 1980, pp. 3–15.

[13]Industry in Russia is run on the same basis as the US Postal Service. Let us assume that the US government gave permission to the Postal Service to charge whatever prices it wanted. Would this be a free-market reform?

[14]*Newsweek* (New York), Oct. 14, 1991, p. 37.

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mation of unprofitable enterprises into prosperous ones. World experience has demonstrated rather clearly that privatization is first and foremost a political rather than an economic process. Many privatization programs failed because this factor was overlooked.

Today, Russia and the other post-Soviet republics are confronted with a serious dilemma. The need for major reforms in the sphere of ownership is widely recognized, even among the more rigid representatives of the bureaucratic elite. At the same time, however, there are many formerly communist Russian politicians who are trying to persuade public opinion in Russia and in the West that the majority of the population is unprepared to accept the hardships and uncertainties that will be brought about by wholesale privatization. Russian bureaucrats as well as some Western economists would insist that the population of Russia and other republics is not psychologically prepared to support large-scale privatization programs, that they "cannot understand the market," and that they "carry around the collective-command mentality rather than the trade-exchange mentality."[15]

The economic reality is quite the opposite—the cooperative (i.e., private) sector is growing. By 1990, the number of cooperatives reached 300,000, and employment in cooperatives has increased 25 times since 1987 with an estimated annual increase in output of 30 percent.[16] By 1991, more than 5 million people were employed in cooperatives that produced goods and services worth 67 billion rubles. In Russia alone, cooperative business is booming—the number of construction companies doubled in 1990.[17] Other evidence that the Russians "can understand the market," and that they do not "carry around the collective-command mentality rather than the trade-exchange mentality," is the fate of Russians who have emigrated to the United States and are adjusting extremely well to American society. Economically, the Russians are a true "American success story"—the average Soviet immigrant's household earned US$5,000 more per year than did the average American household.[18] Admittedly, those who emigrated over the past 20 years were ambitious and well educated, and not "average" Soviet citizens by any standard. Nevertheless, their success proves that the motivation of *homo economicus* is still there for at least a certain segment of the population despite over three-quarters of a century of being brainwashed with the "socialist ideal" of equality.[19]

Private ownership of the means of production is not sufficient for economic success. Prices for all goods and services must be free to reflect supply and demand. Regulations, taxes, tariffs, and credit manipulation all distort the price system. They also allow bureaucrats to retain their control over the economy. Moreover, the functions the government performed in a centrally planned economy must be abandoned completely, while new functions and responsibilities for providing (but not necessarily producing) public goods and for trying to offset the distortions caused by externalities need to be introduced. A full theoretical discussion of government activities would take us too far afield. So, we will concentrate here on the immediate steps that must be taken to ensure a positive role for the government in the transition to the market economy.

Evidence from previous cases of reform does not, however, necessarily imply that future reforms must follow the same path. We will never know what kind of growth rates and increases in living standards South Korea, for example, might have achieved had it fully liberalized trade and not subsidized select industries. Nevertheless, there are certain lessons to be learned from the experience of the newly industrialized countries. The most important one concerns the value of stability, credibility, consistency, and coherence in economic reform policy.[20] In Russia and the other republics, instituting a legal framework is important for legitimizing business activities as well as for ensuring the credibility of prices.

Legal Reform

A market economy cannot function without a legal structure that is consistent with the underlying institutions of private property and freedom of contract. Any reform of the formerly socialist economy must be undertaken in concert with the institutionalization of the rule of law where the legal code is primarily directed toward defending person and property against threats from either the state or private parties. Governmental decisions must be rooted in the consent of the governed, acting through structures designed to prevent individual oppression or political tyranny. Procedures

[15]James M. Buchanan, "Why the Soviets Cannot Understand the Market (And Why We Cannot Understand Why They Cannot Understand)," *Journal of Private Enterprise* (Waco, TX), Fall 1991, pp. 12, 14.

[16]*Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1990 godu* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1990), Moscow, Statistika, 1991.

[17]*Ekonomika i Zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 20, May 1991, p. 12.

[18]Leon Aron, "Preparing America for the Wave of Russian Immigrants," *The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder* (Washington, DC), Mar. 6, 1991, p. 14.

[19]Paul Craig Roberts points out that the hardships involved in the transition to the market economy should not be overestimated: if the Soviets could endure communism for 70 years, they can endure privatization. See *Moscow News*, Oct. 7–14, 1990.

[20]In the cases of South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, this implied mild measures of coordinated trade and industrial and credit policies to promote so-called infant industries.

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must be subject to appraisal by an independent judiciary rendering judgments based on law.

Thus, government maintains a framework of security and order within which liberty can be enjoyed. Individual rights of person and property are treated as inalienable, as absolute standards. Governments are instituted among people so as to secure and protect those rights. Obviously, not only the Russian government but also the governments of many of the republics have a long way to go before they meet this standard. Only time will tell whether they will make it.

Inflation and the Price Level

One of the most important objectives of the economic transition is price stabilization. All former Soviet republics are already experiencing hyperinflation. On the one hand, stable prices and a convertible currency are the bases of any healthy economy. In addition, containing inflation is a crucial condition for both economic and political stability. On the other hand, the inflation of the money supply is a rather profitable endeavor for government officials—it provides them with economic rents and makes further regulation inevitable. Gorbachev, more so than all his predecessors, used this ancient technique to fund the state machinery. The growth of the money supply averaged 10–15 billion rubles annually in 1987–90, and reached over 50 billion in 1991. Inflation will probably reach 1,100 percent in the first quarter of 1992.[21] Yel'tsin's government is far from resolving the issue of money and banking as well. The Russian State Bank continues to print rubles without regard to the damage it is causing. This is the main source of inflation.

What needs to be done in these conditions is obvious—remove price and wage controls and abolish subsidies. In the long run, such a policy will counter the inflationary spiral and fill the shops with goods. In the short run, this policy is likely to increase prices and reduce the real standard of living. As Murray N. Rothbard puts it:

[S]evere price controls have disguised the price inflation, and have also created massive shortages of goods. . . . If the government went cold turkey and abolished all the controls, there would indeed be a large one-shot rise in most prices, particularly in consumer goods suffering most from the scarcity imposed by controls. . . . Total decontrol eliminates dislocations and restrictions at one fell swoop, and gives the free market the scope to release people's energies, increase production enormously, and direct resources away from misallocations and toward the satisfaction of consumers.[22]

Further anti-inflationary policies, especially involving a program of industrial restructuring, will generate high levels of unemployment. While necessary and beneficial in the long run, these policies will no doubt be extremely unpopular. Unless pursued with vigor and along with more radical political and economic reforms, they could in fact become unacceptable and result in social calamities. An excellent example of rapid economic recovery is West Germany after World War II, when Ludwig Erhard initiated the dismantlement of the entire structure of price and wage controls on July 7, 1949.

Even the financial policy of "reformist" local governments (such as that in Moscow, headed by reformer Gavriil Popov) is characterized by a confiscatory approach to profits and personal incomes using high tax rates and severe price controls. These reformers, as Malia notes, understand that von Mises and Friedrich Hayek were right about socialism, but they fail to understand that they were also right about extensive government regulation. It is not enough to have private ownership of the means of production. Regulations, taxes, tariffs, and credit manipulation all distort the price system.

The de-nationalization of state assets, and the increasing freedom of private enterprise, will no doubt help to alleviate much of the adverse effects of the transition. Private enterprises, especially in the neglected areas of service and consumer-goods production, can absorb much of the unemployment that will inevitably result from the restructuring of heavy industries. The private sector must serve as the social-welfare safety net for the democratic regime.

Another problem of critical importance is that of unemployment insurance, which in the complete absence of any accumulated funds, must, at least for the transitional period, be covered through public provisions. Premature dismantling of the existing social safety net could lead to a situation where the reforms would be considered unacceptable and a reversal could be anticipated. But all provisions should be measured, so as not to create disincentives for the participation of all people in the social division of labor that grows out of market economy.

The Pace of Reform

The conventional wisdom of Western Sovietology counsels going slowly, "phasing-in" freedom, rather

[21] *Moscow News*, Apr. 11, 1991; *Kommersant* (Moscow), Dec. 25, 1991; *The Washington Times*, Jan. 13, 1992.

[22] Murray N. Rothbard, "A Radical Prescription for the Socialist Bloc," *The Free Market* (Auburn, AL), March 1990, p. 3.

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than taking the generally reviled path of radical and comprehensive social and economic change. Gradualism and piecemeal change are held up as a sober, practical, responsible, and compassionate path of reform, avoiding the sudden shocks, painful distortions, and unemployment brought by radical change. As is obvious from the Soviet experience, however, gradual reform provides a convenient excuse for the vested interests in the state bureaucracy to change nothing at all. Combine these interests with the standard resistance to change that is endemic to socialism, and support for change will be reduced to mere rhetoric.

Due to the urgent need to create an effective market, it is important to enact reforms as soon as possible. Gradualism should be eschewed in favor of a radical and immediate overhaul. The implementation of the required elements of reform should be done simultaneously and as fast as possible. János Kornai put it bluntly: "[T]hese measures must be taken in one stroke. . . . Most of the measures beneficial as parts of the stabilization package would be dangerous and damaging if taken singly, without the other measures being implemented at the same time."[23]

There is little the West can do to alleviate the post-communist economic crisis. The Russian people know how to grow grain and bake bread, but the system provides them with incentives to do neither. Russia's problems, as Malia states, are neither technical, nor natural; rather, they are the product of the existing system. So any amount of "experts" dispatched to help the Russians fix "their food distribution system" will be of no help.

A comprehensive program of transition to the market economy should include the introduction of private property through a variety of means, the creation of stock exchanges and provisions for free trade in shares, the denationalization of land, the elimination of state price controls, the creation of labor markets through the elimination of restrictions on the freedom of labor to contract, the immediate sale of state-owned housing, the enforcement of drastic cuts in military and other government spending, the implementation of monetary reforms aimed at achieving currency convertibility in international money markets, and the liberalization of foreign trade.

The centrally planned economic system was linked to the Communist party's "leading" role in society, thus making all economic reforms impossible. As the post-communist governments of the former Soviet republics make the transition from centrally planned to market economies, they will confront strong political forces (including those in the West) that will seek to pull them in the opposite direction.

Today, one of the most important issues for Russia and other newly independent states is how can former socialist countries keep from repeating the mistakes made by the West when its own policy-makers borrowed from the utopian socialist model. Undoubtedly, Malia makes a significant contribution to our understanding of these problems.

[23]János Kornai, *The Road to a Free Economy*, New York, Norton, 1990, p. 159.

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Commentary

Political Scientists and Sovietology

Dale R. Herspring

THE thought-provoking essay by Martin Malia on the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union raises a number of issues of critical interest to Soviet analysts, whatever their methodological persuasion. He is correct in arguing that the events of August 1991 represent more than a minor shift in governmental power (i.e., overcoming an attempted coup by dissatisfied conservatives who saw their world slipping away). If anything, the failed coup, as Malia suggests, led to a systemic collapse of the Soviet political system. Those who opposed the movement toward a more open, pluralistic society have been swept away. The task now is to construct a *new* political system.

Malia expresses two concerns that I believe warrant a response. First, he states that since the collapse in the USSR is *total,* it requires a total policy response on the part of the West. Second, he argues that not only was Western social science unable to predict the end of the Soviet system, it did a poor job over the years of analyzing the evolution of developments in that country.

Western Policy

Malia is concerned that "too often" the West treats problems in the Soviet Union "as discrete and separate, as if they could be taken up and solved one at a time." As an example, he cites the often-mentioned problem of food distribution. From an analytical point of view, Malia is correct. There is a tendency to believe that if only the transportation system, or silo storage, or the medical system could be improved, then the political systems of the successor-states would become more viable.

Unfortunately, the fact is that the political process in the United States is not supportive of such an approach. Individual bureaucracies, whether they be the Congress, the Pentagon, the State Department, or private groups such as labor, industry, or charitable organizations, tend to favor specific programs. For example, there is talk of intensified military exchanges between the US and Russian militaries, of increased academic exchanges, of assistance to Russian agriculture, etc. The point is that while it would be desirable to have all of these programs coordinated and integrated into a holistic planning process, this is not likely to happen. Should we discourage a US medical group because it wants to assist a Ukrainian city in overcoming some of the effects of pollution on children? Likewise, should exchanges between small colleges in this country and colleges in Russia be discouraged because they are not part of a larger exchange program? My own judgment is that we must deal with the reality of American politics; this is a country of individualists, and my 25 years in the US government tell me that no matter how hard we try, we will never succeed in putting together a holistic approach to aiding foreign countries. In fact, I am not sure we want to go down this path. Individualism is the basis of American democracy, and if nothing else, a piecemeal approach, involving a wide variety of programs, may go a long way to help the Russians—who have been used to a collective political system—to understand the importance of individualism and diversity.

The Question of Theory

Malia's methodological concerns mirror those he expressed vis-à-vis the US policy approach toward the

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successor-states. Western social scientists erred, he suggests, when they dropped the totalitarian model. It provided us with a holistic view of events in that country, and in particular emphasized the importance of ideology and political will, both of which were controlled by a small elite (the *nomenklatura*). Dissatisfied with this approach (for many of the reasons Malia outlines in his article), American social scientists attempted to develop alternative explanatory paradigms. According to Malia, these efforts produced partial explanations and, even worse, teleological constructs that led the analyst to believe that he or she had a key to where the political system was heading.

In a certain sense, Malia's criticism of American social science is valid; some analysts did attempt to carry matters too far and make claims for their models that their data did not support. I fear, however, that in Malia's attempt to disprove the epistemological basis of social science models, he has overstated his case. Is he suggesting, for example, that every analyst who relied on a social science model distorted Soviet reality? Should we rely primarily on intuition? This is what most of the émigré commentators who have come to this country have done (and they have been no better than the rest of us in explaining Soviet reality or predicting the Soviet future). It is important to remember that the main reason why American scholars stopped relying on either the totalitarian model or the perspectives of Soviet émigrés was because these did a poor job of explaining change in the Soviet political system. Recognizing that the battle for power was just as characteristic of the USSR as of other political systems (even if it occurred within a different structural milieu), American social scientists had little choice but to try to develop alternative explanatory devices. Furthermore, it is not surprising that the vast majority of these models were drawn from Western experience, which meant that some of them turned out to be culturally bound.

Based as they were on a paucity of data (something that has changed with a suddenness that leaves all Sovietologists in a state of shock and confusion), some models utilized by political scientists oversimplified Soviet reality.[1] On the other hand, a number of them made important contributions to our understanding of Soviet reality. Take the three Malia singled out for special criticism. Developmental theory may carry with it the teleological implication that "some day the Soviet Union would be a developed First World country." Second, it is also true that some who saw the USSR moving away from totalitarianism toward an authoritarian model read too much into the nature of the systemic change under way. Finally, there is also some merit in suggesting that some advocates of institutional pluralist models went too far in seeing the USSR as "just another multipolar polity."[2] The key question in evaluating these approaches (as well as the others Malia mentions in his essay) is what are these theories supposed to do? Are they supposed to explain all Soviet reality?

From a conceptual point of view, the major problem with Malia's criticism of the models mentioned in his essay is that he sets up a methodological straw man by seeing them as grand theories. I would argue that this is not what they were intended to be. For example, developmental theorists were right in seeing Marxism-Leninism as a modernizing theory. While the human, ecological, and economic costs can be seen as prohibitive in retrospect, the fact is that Leninism did industrialize countries such as the USSR. Likewise, it was becoming clear by the 1980's that from a practical point of view, ideology was playing less and less of a role in the USSR. As one Soviet put it to me in the early 1980's, "No one has paid any attention to ideology since [Mikhail] Suslov died." The totality of control in this area was also diminishing and those who focused on the authoritarian nature of the Soviet Union pointed this out. Finally, a pluralistic model need not assume that the Soviet Union will eventually become just like a Western parliamentary system. The truth is that especially since 1985, it was becoming clear that pluralistic forces were emerging everywhere in the USSR. This was as true of the armed forces as it was of the party or governmental bureaucracies.

What then is the role of the conceptual frameworks mentioned by Malia? In my own opinion, comparative politics is a long way from being able to develop grand theories that will explain all the variables in a political system.[3] This is especially true with regard to the chaos that the Soviet Union left behind. Indeed, one could question whether we will ever develop such a grand theory, given the complexity of many of the idiosyncratic variables we must deal with. Despite such problems, however, these frameworks can make a useful contri-

[1]Since I am a political scientist, I will leave it to economists, sociologists, and historians to respond to Malia's criticism of those fields. Suffice it to say, I have found a number of sociological writings on the USSR to be very useful and illuminating.

[2]I fear Malia overstates Jerry Hough's arguments here. Malia may have concluded from reading Hough's works that the Soviet system "was just another multipolar polity," but this is not the impression I get from reading Hough's work. At a time when analysts such as Malia were emphasizing the uniqueness of the Soviet political system, Hough was reminding us of certain similarities between political systems, e.g., the struggle for power within and across institutions.

[3]For a discussion of the current state of comparative politics, see Howard J. Wiarda, Ed., *New Directions in Comparative Politics*, 2nd ed., Boulder, CO, Westview, 1991.

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bution to theory-building, and at the same time sensitize policy-makers to the commonalities and unique aspects of political systems. For example, from a theoretical standpoint, a concept such as political culture can be utilized in the construction of what Robert Merton called mid-range theory, e.g., testing hypotheses and, on the basis of empirically verifiable relationships, attempting to construct more and more comprehensive statements.[4] From a practical standpoint, such a concept can help policy-makers and their advisers zero in on some of the key problems facing Russian leaders as they attempt to encourage those attitudes most supportive of democratic institutions.

Malia's criticism of Western social scientists for not having predicted the collapse of the USSR is also unfair. In fact, no one predicted it, with the exception of a small group of ideological true believers who for some 70 years had claimed in one form or another that such an outcome was inevitable. While emotionally and ideologically reassuring, such an approach did nothing to expand our academic knowledge of the country, nor did it do much to guide policy-makers. The same can be said for the totalitarian model. On the other hand, many of the models criticized by Malia were far more useful in sensitizing us to the magnitude of the changes under way. Looking at the military, for example, it was clear by last August that "pluralistic" forces were at work within the armed forces. Indeed, it was a recognition of the existence of such splits that led some analysts to argue even before the "coup" that if the military were asked to use force in support of such an action, it would lead to civil war. As a result, we were able to predict with a fair degree of certainty that a coup that relied on military support would fail.

[4]For an example of the use of mid-range theory, see Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1974.

Conclusion

The events of August 1991 have taught all Sovietologists, including the former dean of the field—Mikhail Gorbachev—a lesson. We all suffered from a sense of overconfidence in our efforts to understand events in that country. We all—regardless of our methodological orientation—need *perestroyka*. Malia, for example, might find useful many of the conceptual models he criticizes if he regards them less as grand theory and more as attempts to develop mid-range theory or even as heuristic devices.

For political scientists, on the other hand, it is important to recognize that, as Malia argues, reality in what used to be the Soviet Union has changed significantly. The system collapsed. Accordingly, we need to rethink the utility of the models we have long utilized. Some of them may no longer be relevant, while others may now be more appropriate given the greater openness of post-Soviet reality. Finally, a good dose of humility is in order for everyone working in the field. In an effort to get him to do my work for me, I once asked my dissertation adviser what was the best theoretical approach for my chosen topic. His sage response was "Whichever one makes the most sense out of the reality you are investigating. Just recognize that it will not explain everything, and that as reality changes, so will your model." I find this advice just as relevant today as it was 25 years ago.

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Commentary

After the Rubble, What?

Alex Alexiev

RECENTLY, somebody mentioned that it is very difficult to comment on a paper that one agrees with. I am in that position now because not only do I agree with most of Martin Malia's paper, but I think it is an outstanding contribution; in fact, I wish that it had been published earlier and given to the State Department and assorted other officials who deal with the Soviet Union. I will, therefore, not discuss the paper, except to make a couple of points, rather I will try to offer some remarks about "After the rubble, what," which Malia's paper did not deal with.

The main point of Malia's paper is very well taken. What happened after the failed coup *was* a revolution, and not the restoration of a legitimate government. It was a revolution that overthrew the ancien régime, *perestroyka*, and reform communism. In fact, the revolution also overthrew Mikhail Gorbachev and what he stood for. And it was not long before Gorbachev joined the ranks of such illustrious predecessors as Imre Pozsgay and Wojciech Jaruzelski who tried to do the impossible, to reform communism.

But the failed coup and the revolution that followed it also marked the end of what I consider to have been a very misguided Western policy. If one looks at what happened after the coup, four things were readily apparent: the Communist party collapsed, Boris Yel'tsin emerged as the real authority in the country, Gorbachev began his slide into irrelevance, and the Soviet Union disintegrated. Most Western countries, including the United States, worked very hard to prevent the last three outcomes. In fact, it was a little more than a year ago that Gorbachev argued to the Soviet legislature that he had assurances from the highest authorities in the West that we were indeed committed to the preservation of the Soviet Union as a unitary state. Indeed, the West did place its eggs in Gorbachev's basket. I think this has proven to be a serious misreading of history, of the forces at work in Soviet society.

As it turned out, this misreading of Soviet reality has not been terribly costly, but a similar misreading could be very costly in other cases. What is happening in Yugoslavia is a case in point. It was only recently that the West finally started questioning its policy of unconditional support for a unitary state in Yugoslavia, something that had already become an illusion by autumn 1990. That support may have bolstered the confidence of the communist reactionaries and motivated them to commit further atrocities in the name of a unitary state.

The second part of Malia's paper is a devastating critique of Sovietology. To me personally, such a critique is very long overdue. At UCLA, where I had gone to study in 1970 after leaving Bulgaria, I was given a book entitled *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*. In that work, I read with amazement that the Communist party had ceased to be a ruling party, and had become merely an arbiter of competing interests in Soviet society. In my native country, people ended up in very dark and cold places for telling jokes about this "arbiter." I read a little more of that type of Sovietology, and then I finally decided that, as my grandfather used to say, there are some things that are so profoundly stupid that it takes an intellectual to believe them. (Later on, of course, I encountered scholars such as Robert Conquest, Hugh Seton-Watson, and others, and realized that there was some sanity in the West after all, even among Sovietologists.)

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Now, Sovietology is not particularly dangerous if it is limited to the ivory tower, which has always been the last refuge of people who were detached from reality. However, it is very dangerous if it comes to influence the analysis that supports policy decision-making. Sovietology had this kind of negative impact on the US government's assessment of the Soviet Union, and again, Malia discussed this issue very eloquently.

He did not give any concrete examples, but I have long read the US Central Intelligence Agency's *Handbook of Economic Statistics*, which has been published for at least the last ten years. If one looks at it, one comes up with some astonishing facts. For example, according to the handbook, at least for the past two decades, until two or three years ago, the Soviet Union's 4–5 percent growth rate was at least twice as great as that of Western countries, including the United States. The USSR had achieved a level of GNP of about two-thirds of that of the United States, of which 40 percent was consumption. About four or five years ago, I took a pencil and paper, and I estimated that the average Soviet lives a lot better than the average Italian. It is very difficult to convince a Soviet citizen of this. The CIA's *Handbook* also led policy-makers to believe that the Soviet Union was spending 11–14 percent of its GNP on the military, while the actual figure was closer to 25–30 percent.

And when one now considers what reputable Soviet economists tell you, that in fact there has been no growth in the Soviet Union since 1975, and that throughout this period Moscow was spending 25 percent of its income on the military, it is not very difficult to comprehend why the USSR was running into the ground. In fact, its decline was very predictable.

Now, while we are discussing Soviet economic performance, I have a minor bone to pick with Malia. He argues that GNP in the Soviet Union does not have the same meaning that it does in the West. But then he goes on to compare the expected 20-percent decline in Soviet GNP with the 9-percent decline that this country experienced in the Great Depression. I would argue that if GNP does not mean much, then its decline means nothing.

And the reason I mention GNP is that there are non-specialists, and they are the people I am appealing to here primarily, who will concoct doomsday scenarios about the effects of economic transition on post-communist countries. They cite examples such as Poland, Hungary, and others, where the GNP is expected to drop 15 percent in 1991 and the unemployment level is expected to reach 10 percent.

These figures not only mean absolutely nothing, they are very misleading. To give just one example, I read in *The Los Angeles Times* some time ago a story about a factory near Moscow producing brassieres. The factory's plan called for the production of some 12 million brassieres a year. Unfortunately, they were so uncomfortable that no one bought any. Well, some American businessmen went there and looked at the product, and said that if two more seams were added, the brassiere would be much more comfortable. This was done, and the factory produced 9 million brassieres that it was able to sell. Now, that is either 25-percent decline in production or a tremendous increase in sales. I would argue that if a postcommunist economy is not experiencing a severe production drop, it is not being transformed.

I believe that in Chile, after its economy was restructured, the production drop was something like 30 percent or more. There is no big tragedy in rapidly declining production rates if junk is what is being produced, and these command economies produced junk for the most part.

Another factor that should be mentioned is that the statistics of postcommunist societies are still not geared to measuring the productive contribution of the private sector. In Poland, there are at least 500,000 private companies now that are producing and paying real wages. Their production is not being taken into account in the mystical GNP figure, and the same holds true for the 300,000 cooperatives in Russia that Yuri Maltsev mentioned. Such considerations show that, again, certain caveats have to be added when discussing declines in production.

Similar considerations hold for unemployment figures. Communist countries have always had high unemployment, but this unemployment has been hidden. If a factory survives through subsidies, produces junk, and employs 3,000 or 5,000 workers, these workers are unemployed, for all practical purposes. Now, if they are put out on the street, and the government pays them out of its budget, it may be a good thing because they may come to realize that they really have to work.

Thus, in general, I would say at least in terms of production and unemployment figures, the worse they get, the better it is. It means that somebody, such as Václav Klaus, is serious about the transition to the market.

LET me now consider the prospects for the Soviet Union's successor-states after the rubble is cleared. Perhaps it is easier to start with my views on what is not going to happen in this vast region. First, there will be no lasting union of any kind. And I think that attempts to forge a political union are going to fail, although there may be some kind of an economic union. No country, least of all Russia, has any interest in being associated with countries that are in even worse shape than it is.

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Second, there will be no socialism of any kind in whatever takes the place of the Soviet Union. I think people there have become immunized against any sort of socialism, whether it be of a human or inhuman face, third way, or fourth way. There will be a collection of independent states that, to a greater or lesser extent, will subscribe to the market economy. Now, this is not to say that these states will be democratic. Some of them will be more democratic, others will be less, but I do not foresee any kind of move back toward socialism. What will emerge I think, is the inevitable and perhaps traditional north-south dichotomy, with a developed north—Russia, Ukraine, the Baltic states—and an underdeveloped or less developed south (although perhaps some parts of the south, i.e., Georgia and Armenia, have living standards more comparable to the north).

We are now hearing doomsday scenarios about Russia sliding into a kind of anarchy, because its people are deemed congenitally incapable of democracy. I heard a distinguished professor say the same thing about Spain in 1969.

The only thing that the Russians have not had until now is a workable political system and a workable economic system. If capitalism is instituted in Russia, which is twice the size of the United States and has the richest resource base in the world and a fairly well-educated population, it cannot fail to succeed in the long term, once it clears the rubble.

It is being said that Russians do not have entrepreneurial instincts. I think Maltsev answered that question. Already one can see a tremendous outburst of entrepreneurial activity there. In late summer and early fall of 1991, six commodity markets dealing in oil appeared in Russia alone. Recently, one of them sold 1.5 million tons of oil. At that rate, the Russian exchange may be bigger than the London exchange in a year or two. That takes entrepreneurial spirit. I think the Russians have it. They have simply not had the requisite political and economic conditions to succeed.

In the south, things are much tougher. Central Asia has been brutally exploited by the center in a purely colonial fashion. It has been raped by the cotton monoculture. The Soviets did not create much industry there. The region lacks skilled labor. The skilled labor that does exist is European. If this labor disappears, and it has been disappearing, a situation like the one in Pakistan may result, where there is no one to run the trolley cars. It also reminds me of Angola after the Portuguese left in 1975. Before that year, 300,000 Portuguese were, in effect, running the country, and not running it as a colonial government, but as taxi drivers. Their exit left a very serious problem. But this is not a problem that will doom these countries to a perpetually dismal existence. I think they also have the potential to succeed, and this potential, again, will be realized in the market.

The most immediate problem is pernicious nationalism. Some of this nationalism has arisen because it has been repressed for so long. For 70 years, one could not be a Russian patriot, or any kind of patriot for that matter. Such repressed nationalism is coming to the fore now, and much of it is legitimate. Unfortunately, many people are trying to use these nationalist, and potentially chauvinist, feelings for their own purposes. Most of these people are the old communists.

In virtually every postcommunist country, there have been efforts to create a kind of a neofascism on the basis of nationalist appeals. In Bulgaria, former communists are stirring up anti-Turkish feelings. Most prominently, in Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević is playing upon some very legitimate Serbian concerns in Kosovo and elsewhere to keep himself in power. Milošević's policies are painting Serbia into a historic corner from which it will be hard to escape. Similar things are happening in a variety of new states on the territory of the former USSR. In Russia, the KGB and others are talking about various Jewish-Masonic conspiracies that are about to destroy that country. In fact, there are now what Soviet jargon used to call "communist islands." It is said that the authorities in the Crimea want to make a communist island out of that area by using the potential dissatisfaction of the Russian population there against the Ukrainian government. The same thing is happening in Turkmenistan. I do not think that such policies will succeed in the long term, but we must take note of them.

Why are there grounds for optimism? I think that what is happening in the Soviet Union can be viewed as a process of decolonization. And if one compares the states that are now emerging from this decolonization process with the states that appeared on the political map after World War II, in terms of human potential and material resources, the former are in much better shape.

Once these decolonization processes have played themselves out, economic imperatives will lead the former Soviet peoples to cooperate. For example, the mayor of St. Petersburg has already begun talking about his city's place in a Baltic economic sphere, and he is right to do so. In the Black Sea area, a free economic zone is being discussed, and it probably will become a reality. Authorities in Sakhalin have proposed a free economic zone that will include the Far East, Korea, and Hokkaido. In Turkmenistan, there are people building railroads, opening roads, and building a pipeline down to Iran, down to the Persian Gulf. In Azerbaijan, cooperation with Turkey and Iran has become top

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priority. And even Armenia has now opened a railroad to Turkey that has many times the passenger traffic that it had the week it opened. So, although there are plenty of problems and conflicts, I think there is also hope and opportunity.

I will conclude by mentioning something I saw on television the other day. A prisoner who had been in jail for 20 years was interviewed, and the interviewer said, well, you know, you've been gone for so many years and you're facing a very uncertain future as a free man. There's terrible unemployment, there is crime in the streets, all kinds of social problems, etc. And the ex-prisoner said, well, that's all true, it really looks terrible, but it will not be prison.

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Nationalism in the Former Soviet Empire

John A. Armstrong

Observing the dissolution of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe during 1989–90, followed in 1991 by the shrinking of the USSR itself, one might regard the category "Eastern Europe" as a transitory artifact of Leninist power. Certainly Mikhail Gorbachev's loosening of economic, ideological, and police controls was the immediate cause of centrifugal tendencies. Nevertheless, as far as the Russian power base goes, one should recall the prophecy George F. Kennan made 44 years ago:

If, consequently, anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and efficiency of the party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies.[1]

In Eastern Europe as a whole, more enduring characteristics help to explain the forms of dissolution and provide some basis for projecting the future of the independent states that are emerging. One such characteristic is the line, resembling a geologic fault, from the Caspian to the Adriatic between cultures of Islamic origin and those of Christian ancestry. The latter can, in turn, be subdivided into cultures derived from Eastern Orthodox Christianity and those of Western (Catholic and Protestant) background. Here, as subsequently, reference to cultural heritages does not necessarily imply present religious devotion, but suggests the remote, formative force of the great world religions. As cultural influences, therefore, the great "fault lines" traversing Eastern Europe continue to influence politics, notably in Southeastern Europe and the Caucasus. A second ethno-religious characteristic is lingering antipathy of countryside to city, often manifested in anti-urban ideologies that denigrate both entrepreneurial values and the minorities who exemplify them.[2]

Both of these characteristics were confronted by the Marxist-Leninist regimes imposed throughout Eastern Europe between 1917 and 1948. These regimes asserted their intention to terminate ethno-religious conflicts and replace anti-urban ideologies with the values of urban industrialization via state socialism. From the beginning, however, subtle national biases were evident; by 1948, cynical antisemitism had become a governing principle.

As Andrew Arato points out, like most world populations outside the United States, East Europeans align along identity cleavages rather than economic interests.[3] When an ideology like Marxism-Leninism fails to achieve its proclaimed goals, the recollected virtues of ethno-religious identities—community solidarity, intimate individual participation, and cultural expression—outweigh, for most, the anti-urbanism and ethnic an-

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[1]George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 125.

[2]John A. Armstong, "Toward a Framework for Considering Nationalism in East Europe," *Eastern European Politics and Societies* (Berkeley, CA), No. 1, 1988, pp. 280–305.

[3]Andrew Arato, "Social Movements and Civil Society in the Soviet Union," in Judith B. Sedaitis and Jim Butterfield, Eds., *Perestroika from Below*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1991, p. 213, fn. 10.

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tagonisms in traditional East European culture noted above. When this occurs, the ethnic community regains its importance as the dominant organizing principle.

A Typology of Nations

The transformation of Eastern Europe after 1988 led many observers to speak of the "re-emergence of civil society."[4] Insofar as this concept applies to the states of East Central Europe that preserved memories of recent independence in homogeneous states, "civil society" is appropriate. What has appeared in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, however, is not a single civil society, but clusters of national civil societies. Most Yugoslav units (represented by the republics) were fully formed as nations before Tito's takeover, though it can be argued that Macedonian and Albanian national consciousness (within Yugoslavia) developed only after World War II. It has also become evident that the USSR never constituted a single society; the interrelation of its constituent national societies has been even more complicated than in Yugoslavia. To grasp these complexities, one must, for the sake of clarity as well as brevity, resort to a typology of nations.[5]

Soviet propaganda often emphasized that there were some 150 ethnic groups in the USSR; at times, indeed, official policy deliberately divided coherent ethnic units. In 1923, the Soviet Union began to impose a formal hierarchy of nationality divisions, headed by union republics. Gradually these categories shaped the consciousness of their inhabitants, until many people of diverse backgrounds identified with their republics of residence.

But implicit recognition of more subtle ethnic categories was also apparent.[6] Russia was always in a class by itself, as were the Slavic "younger brothers"—Ukraine and Belarus. "Colonials"—the six union republics of Muslim background—became critical for the Soviet future as their populations multiplied; yet, the cultural distance between these populations and the Slav core made the Muslim republics' position resemble French Algeria. In contrast to the rigid centralization of cadres appointments under Stalin, Leonid Brezhnev's status quo policies led to a tacit contract between cadres of Muslim origin and central Soviet authorities. In return for verbal affirmation of Leninism and Soviet policy directives, top Muslim cadres were assured of long tenure and permitted considerable patronage power in the appointment of subordinates.

No doubt it was apparent to Soviet security agencies, as well as to outside observers, that several union-republic nations were just as firm in their ultimate attachment to independence as were the captive nations of East Central Europe. Among these union republics are what the typology termed "state nations," including the Baltic peoples forcibly incorporated by Stalin. A conspicuous minority of Latvians were Bolsheviks; their descendants included former Soviet interior minister Boris Pugo, who committed suicide after the failure of the August 1991 coup; and Viktor Alksnis, a diehard centralizer despite his grandfather's execution by Stalin. The overwhelming majority of Latvians are, however, fervently attached to the independent state that their nations had enjoyed from 1918 to 1940. Refusal of Latvian teenagers to admit fluent knowledge of Russian during the 1960's; Latvian skill in organizing industry and consumer services; and a major naval mutiny 20 years ago all suggest that only dire threats kept Latvia in the USSR. Estonians were even more solidly anti-Soviet precisely because this nation of 1 million was threatened by massive Russian immigration. More homogeneous and stronger in religious solidarity, Lithuania has been equally opposed to the Union. Georgia, conquered by Soviet arms after only three years of independence, draws on a long history as an embattled feudal kingdom. Moldova had no experience with independence, but "Moldavians speak Romanian, and consider themselves part of the Romanian political nation," a United States official observer reports.[7]

The clearest evidence for the state-nation status of these five nations, prior to August 1991, was their firm refusal to accept restrictions on the formal right of secession contained in the Union Treaty submitted by Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1991. All refused, as a matter of principle, to conduct a referendum on the treaty. The Armenian republic also rejected the referendum. During the Brezhnev era, Armenians appeared to be more appropriately classified as a "mobilized diaspora" because, although united by their Gregorian Church and a tragic history longer even than Georgia's, Armenians lived scattered throughout the USSR, the Middle East, and the West as well as in their truncated homeland. As a nation, they appeared to regard Rus-

[4]Ibid., pp. 198, 202.

[5]John A. Armstrong, "The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union," reprinted in *Journal of Soviet Nationalities* (Durham, NC), No. 1, 1990, pp. 14–64.

[6]Early on, the regime *explicitly* recognized that policy formation could not proceed on the basis of its formal territorial divisions alone. Under Stalin, major industrial and mining operations in the Donbass (Ukrainian SSR) required distinctive economic and Communist party administrations. Conversely, Nikita Khrushchev's *sovnarkhoz* system required regroupings such as the unification of the four Central Asian union republics in a single economic administration—which produced a resurgence of identification with "Turkestan."

[7]Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Elections in the Baltic States and the Soviet Republics*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1990, p. 75.

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

Soviet Army troops patrol a section of the Muslim-Christian "fault line" on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border in Azerbaijan.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

sians as allies rather than occupiers. After the coup, Armenia declared independence; but in December, it adhered to the new association, the "Commonwealth of Independent States."

The Process of Dissolution

When Gorbachev became Communist party general secretary in 1985, there was little to suggest that he would preside over a loosening of central control. In contrast to most previous general secretaries, he had had little experience with ethnic minorities. As an oblast first secretary, he supervised a territory—Stavropol'—that although located on the Caucasus frontier, had just enough contact with *inorodtsy* (non-Russians) to arouse Russian ethnocentrism. Close by was the Krasnodar region—the retirement home of numerous KGB and military officers and thus a stronghold of centralizing opinion.[8]

Given his background, one should not have been surprised that Gorbachev's first major move in the nationality area was to abrogate the tacit contract between Muslim leaders in Kazakhstan and Moscow that had been established under Brezhnev, who for a time had headed the Communist party there. Finding local patronage an obvious impediment to *perestroyka*, Gorbachev replaced key Kazakh cadres by imports from Russia. His eventual retreat, although not atypical of his governing style, suggests that Gorbachev was unprepared to deal with complex ethnic issues.

Imperatives of *perestroyka* eventually produced genuine steps toward freedom of discussion (*glasnost'*), including toleration of "popular fronts" in the Baltic republics beginning in 1988. During the following year, such fronts spread rapidly, and escalated their demands. In Georgia, the stakes were raised in April 1989 through the violent repression (which Gorbachev disavowed) by KGB and military forces of mass demonstrations. Not long afterward, Armenian demands for alteration of the border with Azerbaijan to permit incorporation of the predominantly Armenian district of Nagorno-Karabakh aroused Azeri passions against their ancient enemy and caused a pogrom in a Baku suburb that led to the loss of many Armenian lives. More extensive riots at the end of 1988 produced a flight of Russians as well as Armenians. An Azerbaijan popular front

[8]Ibid., p. 108. As recently as July 1991, hard-line forces mobilized Kuban Cossacks to assault "foreigners" (particularly Armenians) endeavoring to introduce more real competition in the local kolkhoz markets. Cossack xenophobia was inflamed by calls for keeping "room for Russians in this fertile little piece of Russian soil." See *Izvestiya* (Moscow), July 5, 1991, condensed in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH—hereafter, *CDSP*), Aug. 7, 1991, p. 10.

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temporarily gained control of large areas, including Azerbaijan's border with Iran. After brutally suppressing this uprising, the Moscow regime utilized the interethnic strife as evidence of the imprudence of relaxed central controls. However, during 1989–91, KGB and military forces dispatched to the Transcaucasus increasingly sided with the Azeris.

From the international standpoint, complete liberation of East Central Europe by the winter of 1989–90 was by far the most important step in the dissolution of the Soviet sphere:

The threat of Soviet intervention [was] . . . a dam placed against pressing waters. When this dam cracked, it was the pent-up waters that overran its remains. The constraint was external, but the impetus was internal.[9]

Within months, the "northern-tier" countries (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) had eliminated their communist governments. Significantly, communist influence persisted in the Southeast European states (Romania, Albania, and Yugoslavia) whose national communists had maintained de facto independence from Moscow for decades. In Yugoslavia, Serbs made up a plurality but were far from a majority; however, the electoral victory by national communists in the Serbian federal republic brought increasing pressures on other nationalities. Dismayed by this trend, parliaments of the Croatian and Slovenian republics declared their independence in June 1991. After a brief military intervention involving aerial bombing of civil airports in Slovenia, the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army ceased operations there, while top politicians hinted Slovenian independence might be tolerated. However, nationalist Serbs were intent on crippling Croatia, whose population was 11 percent Serb. In July, the official Soviet news agency warned that West European intervention in Yugoslavia might lead to World War III.[10] Before and during the abortive Soviet coup, the Yugoslav army relentlessly drove into strategic areas having Croat majorities.

In March 1990, the Lithuanian parliament reasserted Lithuania's independence. Although somewhat more restrained in their independence declarations, Latvia and Estonia also asserted the illegality of their annexations by the Soviet Union in 1940. Gorbachev denounced these "unconstitutional secessions," but promised not to resort to violence. Nevertheless, although the Lithuanian government continued to function, public buildings were seized as state or Communist party property in January 1990. Troops from the interior ministry's Special-Purpose Police Detachment (OMON) carried out violent attacks on Lithuanian customs posts, culminating in the killing of six guards on July 31, 1991. Moscow's actions up to that point strikingly resembled Soviet and Communist tactics in postwar Czechoslovakia; Hubert Ripka's account of the March 1948 coup in Prague reads like a blueprint for the 1990–91 actions in the Baltic republics, just as their 1940 annexation had been a dress rehearsal for the subversion of East Central Europe.[11]

The next stage ended differently. During the August coup, massive columns of troops occupied all three Baltic republics, but left precipitously when the coup failed. Thereafter, Lithuania outlawed the party, while the other two Baltic states took less sweeping measures. In rapid succession, the major European powers, followed by the United States, recognized Baltic independence; on September 6, the Soviet government formally acknowledged this fait accompli. Later, independence was sealed by admission of the Baltic states to the United Nations. As discussed below, numerous practical issues remain, but return of Russia's control in the Baltic region seems as unlikely as restoration of Russia's power in East Central Europe. When, in December 1991, Boris Yel'tsin called for the formation of a "Commonwealth of Independent States" to replace the defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the three Baltic states did not join. Like the large majority of Soviet republics that did join, however, the Baltic states remained concerned about the large formations of former Soviet troops remaining on their territory.

The Goals

Events of the last three years demonstrate that all peoples of Eastern Europe advance three fundamental demands:

- For a standard of living comparable to Western Europe's. The crushing burden of scarce, shoddy consumer goods, poor or non-existent services, and time wasted in securing necessities have to be alleviated. But East Europeans are also determined to maintain an extensive welfare safety net, especially in health services and employment stability.
- For return to the numerous advantages of life in

[9]Adam Przeworski, "The 'East' Becomes the 'South'," *PS: Political Science and Politics* (Washington, DC), March 1991, pp. 20–24. This eminent political scientist is a Pole by origin.

[10]*The New York Times*, Aug. 8, 1991; also, *Izvestiya*, July 9, 1991, in *CSDP*, Aug. 7, 1991, p. 18.

[11]Hubert Ripka, *Czechoslovakia Enslaved*, London, Gollancz, 1950.

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stable ethno-religious communities, regarded not merely as vehicles for attaining other goals, but as intrinsically valuable. Determination to avoid the strife and economic obstacles that often accompanied earlier nationalisms is also evident, however.

• For responsive governments, based on popular participation through competitive elections, guaranteeing the rule of law and personal liberties. The most appropriate governmental forms may not resemble American features like separation of executive and legislative powers and the adversary legal system. Conceivably, some East European states may consider that expansion of civil liberties at the cost of maintaining 3,000 attorneys per million population would constitute an unconscionable burden. Consequently, recent missions by American lawyers and others unversed in either East or West European traditions are, in my judgment, of dubious value.

After the attainment of national independence in most of East Central Europe and the rejection of authoritarianism in the USSR, none of these popular demands is unrealistic. But a return to some type of authoritarianism arising from overemphasis on one set of demands is always possible.

The following sections briefly examine what is probably most difficult for all East European nations: the *simultaneous* satisfaction within a very few years of all these demands.

The State Nations

The best candidates for stable democracy are the East Central European states of the northern tier. Short of world upheaval, it is inconceivable that eastern Germany will leave the democratic framework of the Federal Republic of Germany. Yet, in early 1991, Bundesbank President Otto Pohl called the monetary phase of German reunion a "disaster."[12] Problems of reintegrating the eastern *Länder* into the market structure have produced widespread dissatisfaction there, while citizens of western Germany grumble at the cost. Attaining full employment will require substantial labor movement to the West. There seems to be no doubt, however, that social and financial costs will be borne by all Germans.

Czechoslovakia (officially the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) and Hungary pose different problems. Since its agriculture complements Czech industry, Slovak secession would aggravate economic problems (energy imports, industrial modernization) now afflicting the federal state. However, even in the event of Slovakia's secession, the Czech lands would be larger than several EC countries, and thus could eventually establish a place in the European market. To this observer, the Czechs, although possessing a stronger industrial and mining base than Hungary, appear to be making a slower transition to the market economy, while they rejoice in their recovery of cultural freedom. To the visitor, Hungarian economic activity, gradually liberated during the two decades preceding the fall of communism, appears less orderly, even frenetic. However, many types of consumer services are more readily available than in Czechoslovakia.[13]

Poland probably poses the most severe problem in the northern tier. "Incarnated," a recently published poem by Czesław Miłosz, grasps the ironic essence of the "equestrian" or "Sarmatian" lifestyle of the Polish gentry, which prior to the communist takeover penetrated all classes:

In that country he was an officer of cavalry. . . .
A horse dances under him at a review, bells ring.
The clergy strolls in a procession, children pour a powder of flowers.
Life there was as it should be. . . .[14]

Recent reports suggest that echoes of such anti-urban ideologies, combined with contempt for minorities, linger in isolated areas. On the other hand, the present Polish government firmly confronts the need for a sharp, short transition to the market economy. Undoubtedly, the Polish learning experience has been strongly reinforced by the direct observations of Pope John Paul II, reflected in his 1991 encyclical,[15] which portrays the advantages of the market in far greater detail than earlier papal encyclicals. At the same time, the Pope reiterates earlier exhortations calling for state curbs on excesses of individual accumulation and social liabilities incurred by the market. Attaining a proper balance through state initiatives depends on a stable, expert, yet responsive public administration, which Poland has not yet attained. Poles' ethno-religious enthusiasm and communitarian solidarity—demonstrated in their incredibly persistent but prudent resistance to both Nazis and Communists—constitutes a strong assurance of patience in the difficult transition ahead; but even restraint has limits.

Since recognition of their independence, the Baltic states appear to be no more worse off than the north-

[12] *Die Welt* (Hamburg), Mar. 21, 1991, translated in *The German Tribune* (Hamburg), Mar. 31, 1991.

[13] See especially *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt am Main), Sept. 13, 1990.

[14] ©1989 Czesław Miłosz, trans. by Robert Hass. Originally published in *The New Yorker*, Dec. 18, 1989, p. 40; subsequently in *Provinces*, New York, Ecco Press, 1991. Reprinted with special permission. All rights reserved.

[15] Text in *The New York Times*, May 3, 1991.

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ern-tier states. Each Baltic state does face constraints inherent in a small society and market along with the legacy of closer integration into the bankrupt Soviet economy. In the absence of significant friction among the three states, however, development of a mini-confederation should pose no insurmountable difficulties. The three economies are partially complementary, and joint foreign representation and commercial ventures would reduce expenses. The biggest problem is the Russian minority in Latvia and Estonia. After intransigent early steps, Baltic governments have wisely made concessions to Russian culture. Nevertheless, restrictions on immigration and enforcing of length-of-residence requirements for voting appear to be essential for preserving the cultural integrity of such small nations. Many Russians in Latvia (especially in the old settlement in Riga) and Estonia voted for the independence of these two states, probably because of their memories of the superiority of Baltic political and cultural institutions. Apprehensions aroused by the failed coup in Russia probably increased the proportion of Russian settlers prepared, under suitable guarantees, to remain Baltic citizens.

The situation in the second group of Soviet state nations and in the currently independent countries of Southeastern Europe is shakier—a clear indication that predicting the future requires comparisons across international borders as often as within them. All of the Southeast European countries face potentially disruptive border issues; at least two confront intensely difficult internal ethnic conflicts. The large Romanian ethnic majority has been able to dominate restive Magyar and German minorities in Romania, but such domination diminishes the country's economic capacity and encourages persistence of authoritarianism. In the mid-1980's, Bulgaria created a significant source of conflict with neighboring Turkey through extreme pressures on its Turkish-speaking minority. The position of the Greek minority in Albania has been rather similar.

Recently, the two problems just mentioned seem to have diminished, but both Bulgaria and Albania have irredentas in Yugoslavia. Throughout more than one-third of Croatia, Serb violence has led to the flight of Croat residents—a common prelude to permanent separation of conflicting ethnic elements. Vital transportation arteries, including a pipeline for importing crude oil, have been severed. Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a three-way Slavic division among Muslim Bosniaks, Catholic Croats, and Orthodox Serbs, found it increasingly difficult to keep out of the brawl. Ultimately, that republic and Macedonia, where many are inclined to prefer Bulgarian identity, declared their independence too. In Kosovo, Albanians, although lacking the legal framework of a republic, have pressured Serbs to leave, but so far have been severely repressed.

Just a few months ago, a "Spanish solution" might have worked for Yugoslavia. In Spain, after 1975, Catalonia and the Basque lands, economically the most developed parts of the country, were granted broad autonomy. For the Catalans, autonomy included the right to require immigrant minorities to educate their children in the local language. These concessions have reconciled the regional majorities to central expenditures for the impoverished south that will permit vigorous economic development within the EC. Parallel arrangements for the economically advanced Slovenes and Croats, together with a reduction of expenditures for armed forces that were used to advance Serb interests in Kosovo, might have been successful in Yugoslavia. After five months of ruthless, devastating warfare, the United Nations was able to begin deploying a peacekeeping force. All European Community members and most other European states recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. The ultimate territorial settlement remains uncertain, but re-integration of these two republics in a Yugoslav federal state appears highly unlikely. At present, unfortunately, it appears more likely that a rump Serb-dominated Yugoslavia will lack resources and know-how to attain European standards, and that Croatia will be too devastated to succeed.

The Ottoman invasions of Christian Europe in the 16th–18th centuries are the remote cause of population intermingling[16] and the heritage of ethnic strife in Southeastern Europe.[17] Across the Black Sea, this Muslim-Christian fault line continues in the Caucasus region, geographically compartmentalized by a mountain range grander than the Balkans. Effects in Georgia and the North Caucasus (presently within the Russian republic) may be equally deleterious. Direct clashes between Abkhazians (predominantly Muslim) and Georgians, who make up an overwhelming majority in the Abkhaz autonomous republic as well as in Georgia as a whole, are unlikely to end in secession, but they undermine the credibility of the strongly nationalist Georgian government.

Harder to understand is Georgian harassment of the small Ossetian autonomous oblast, which does contain

[16]Populations were uprooted as a result of these invasions, during which the Ottoman Empire swept as far as Vienna and then slowly retreated to the southern part of the Balkan peninsula. Some Slavs converted to Islam; others became refugees and border guards in regions with different cultures and religions.

[17]Much the best discussion is Emanuel Turczynski, *Konfession und Nation: Zur Frühgeschichte der serbischen und rumänischen Nationalbildung* (Religion and Nation: On the Early History of Serbian and Romanian Nation-Formation), Düsseldorf, Schwann, 1976.

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

A Yugoslav Federal Air Force jet flies low over Osijek airport, which is in Croatian hands.

—Reuters/Bettmann.

a solid majority of the eponymous nationality, separated from the larger Ossetian autonomous *republic* in the RSFSR by the main Caucasus range. Descended from the Alans of the *Völkerwanderung,* Ossetians by heritage are Christian like the Georgians; but the latter people's intransigent nationalism has turned them from a natural ally into an adversary.

More serous than these pathetic quarrels is the Georgians' incipient conflict with their urban minorities. As the administrative center of the Transcaucasus, Tbilisi long ago acquired a large Russian settlement. Under an independent Georgia, it would probably become vestigial. The position of the Armenian minority is quite different. In effect, Armenians constitute the indigenous core of modern Tbilisi. Having numerous talents in viniculture, arts, war, and politics, Georgians depended on Armenians for entrepreneurial and commercial skills. This situation made Georgians, like Serbs and Russians, susceptible to imported anti-urban ideologies. In addition, intermingling of peasants in southwest Georgia could lead to communal clashes between Georgians and Armenians.

Yet, in many respects, the two nations are suited to a mini-confederation like that which appears feasible for the Baltic region. Although now of different denominations, Armenians and Georgians descend from the same Christian heritage. In contrast to adamantly "Asian" Azeris, Armenians and Georgians insist they are "Europeans." Precisely because their history is so intertwined, however, rivalry over accomplishments and priorities has divided these nations. Georgian myths emphasize martial virtues and Armenian mercantile compliance. Rarely do they recognize the extraordinary military accomplishments (exemplified by Marshal Ivan Bagramian's career) of 20th-century Armenians. Without a seacoast and situated between hereditary Turkic foes, Armenia at the moment needs Georgia more than Georgia needs Armenia. As its attachment to the new Commonwealth shows, Armenia is more open to reconciliation to Russia than is Georgia, which favors complete independence. In a longer perspective, attainment of truly European levels of economic achievement and and the building of cosmopolitan associations in the western Transcaucasus probably depend on Armenian inputs.

The Muslim Nations

During the August coup, leaders in several republics of Muslim heritage voiced support for the effort. If—in a manner similar to Chinese Communist deployment of troops from remote provinces to crush the student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square—the inept Soviet plotters had introduced Muslim formations into Moscow, encounters with Boris Yel'tsin's resistance might have been bloodier. As in Kazakhstan, however, some prominent leaders supported Yel'tsin throughout, and

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eventually all six Muslim republics rallied to his plan for a new Commonwealth.

Generally, the renewed compact between cadres from the Muslim areas and the center is too attractive for the latter to be shaken by Russian internal conflicts. What are the parameters of this bargain? According to Armenian sources (hardly disinterested), "the center has supposedly entered into a political deal with Azerbaijan: After receiving assurances that Azerbaijan would sign the Union Treaty, it is closing its eyes to the outrages that are being committed."[18] Quite possibly the Soviet regime's insistence on maintaining existing union-republic borders by force—directed primarily against the Armenians—was a critical reassurance that it had opted to favor Muslim interests generally.

At almost the same time, the Kazakh SSR president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, observed:

Since the decision was adopted at the Congress—we in Kazakhstan never launched a war of laws—we agreed to hold the [Union Treaty] referendum, though it is true that we proposed our own wording. Although whether there should or should not be a Union ought to be decided by the republics, not the center! . . . I had to appear on television and say: "Dear Kazakhstaners! I consider the referendum a vote of confidence in myself as president."

Nazarbaev then went on to say that more than 94 percent supported continued membership in the Union.[19] Similar overwhelming majorities in favor of continued membership in the Union were recorded in the other Muslim union republics, including Azerbaijan. Nazarbaev himself was one of the first union-republic presidents to rally to Yel'tsin and Gorbachev against the coup, although some Central Asian presidents supported the revolt.

In Central Asia, Muslim cadres have been firmly quashing the turmoil and dissent that had been rife in their regions during 1988–90. Rumors of Azeri pressure for a state union with Iranian Azerbaijan have faded. Draft evasion in Central Asia has been reduced by enlisting official Muslim clergy to urge compliance, while acclaiming authorization of worship among the military. Overall, the six Muslim union republics met 80–90 percent of their draft quotas, which contrasts with most state nations, where compliance was less than 33 percent. In Tajikistan, efforts of the Sunni spiritual council to refuse religious funerals to Communists were opposed by the union-republic president. Nevertheless, a *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* report concludes:

Table 1: Comparative Income Levels, 1961 vs. 1991

Republic	Average industrial wage as percent of RSFSR wage (1961)	Percent of republic residents having incomes under 100 rubles a month (1991)
RSFSR	100	11
Ukraine	94	11
Belarus	86	7
Estonia	97	3
Kyrgystan	90	47
Azerbaijan	71	49
Turkmenistan	101	49
Tajikistan	93	69
Uzbekistan	57	80

Source: V. Zlatin and V. Rutgaizer, "Comparison of the Levels of Economic Development of Union Republics and Large Regions," *Nauchnyye Doklady Vysshey Shkoly: Ekonomicheskiye Nauki* (Moscow), No. 8, 1968, pp. 24–34, translated in *Problems of Economics* (Moscow), June 1969, pp. 3–24; and V. Romaniu, *Izvestiya* (Moscow), May 22, 1991, condensed in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), June 26, 1991, p. 25.

An absolute majority of Tajikistan's population professes Islam and is prepared to live by its laws—and is living by them now for that matter. . . . If there is no return to dictatorship and if the country continues along the path of democratization, then after the unification of all Muslim forces in the republic, the prospect of erecting an Islamic state on the territory of Tajikistan will become a reality.[20]

Probably many top officials of Muslim origin, now able to turn out the Muslim vote, fear the rise of an Islamic state on the model of some in the Middle East. Preservation of ties to Russia may seem the best means of avoiding such an outcome. Yet, even from the average Muslim's standpoint, for economic reasons, continued alliance with Moscow may also appear desirable in the short run. As early as the 1960's, *industrial* wages in Muslim republics were near the Soviet average, but today the per capita income is woefully below that of the European republics (see Table 1). Only heavy subsi-

[18] *Izvestiya*, May 5, 1991, condensed in *CDSP*, June 5, 1991, p. 9.

[19] *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 13, 1991, condensed in *CDSP*, May 22, 1991, p. 11.

[20] *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, Mar. 23, 1991, excerpted in *CDSP*, May 1, 1991, p. 17. It is not surprising that *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* was one of the first publications suspended by the coup-plotters. See *Izvestiya*, July 2, 1991 (condensed in *CDSP*, Aug. 21, 1991, p. 25) on conscription compliance; and Donald S. Carlisle, "Uzbekistan and the Uzkeks," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1991, for a detailed perspective on the future of Tajiks and Uzbeks.

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Mirzobek Mambetov, second from right, a chief shepherd on a state farm in Kyrgystan, shares tea with his family.

—V. Korotayev for TASS via Sovfoto.

dies from European portions of the USSR have made a minimal level of consumption possible in the Muslim republics.

Yet, a lifestyle derived from Islamic practices, if not beliefs, continues to appeal to much of the population. As Russian women, who staffed Central Asian textile mills for a century, join the Slavic exodus, this principal industrial activity requires *male* Muslim replacements —who disdain operating looms as "women's jobs," while adamantly rejecting Muslim women's employment in industry.

Another factor threatens perpetuation of this ethno-religious lifestyle: unwillingness of a popular Moscow regime, especially if it is reduced to Slavic or even just Russian components, to maintain subsidies. The alternative of massive transfer of Muslim workers to Russian urban centers has been strongly resisted by Central Asians; previous Soviet regimes have declined to use force or extreme economic deprivation to compel such migration. It is most unlikely that any popular regime will adopt harsher policies.

But Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has already urged another course: "We could stand straighter still by getting rid of this 'Central Asian underbelly,' the thoughtless conquest of Alexander II." Solzhenitsyn added: "If any of them [the non-Slavic union republics] have doubts about seceding, with the same indubitable right we will have to declare our separation from them."[21] Whether such republics would form a united state of "Turkestan" or other possible combinations cannot be predicted; in all probability, the region would resemble some Middle Eastern areas with strong community solidarity and religious life but a low resource base.

Ukraine

Soviet observers realized that without Ukraine the USSR or its successor would cease to be a superpower.[22] Moreover, as the days following the abortive coup

[21]Translated in *The New York Times*, Sept. 19, 1990.
[22]*Izvestiya*, July 31, 1990, condensed in *CDSP*, Sept. 4, 1990, p. 33.

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demonstrated, the much smaller Belarus is likely to follow Ukraine's lead. The internal situation of Ukraine is, however, more complicated than that of any other union republic. Although the Christian-Muslim fault line lightly touches the Ukrainian republic, the Orthodox-Catholic division is critical. This dividing line cuts across the West Ukrainian area of 10 million people, but some districts (notably Transcarpathia) are mixed. For West Ukraine, which is the bastion of the independence movement, ethno-religious factors have been fundamental. All nationally conscious Ukrainians (as well as liberal Russians) deplore Russian Orthodox Church collaboration, after 1944, with the communist regime in violently suppressing the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The Orthodox argument that it was merely redressing a wrong that is four centuries old—the transfer of numerous West Ukrainian Orthodox congregations to Roman allegiance—rings hollow when confronted by the reality of past KGB repression and manifest West Ukrainian fervor for Byzantine-rite Catholicism today.[23] A more serious problem for the future is friction between Greek Catholics, who have regained their ecclesiastical structure and many church buildings, and the restored Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (likewise opposed to the Moscow Patriarchate) that competes with it in some West Ukrainian regions.

During 1988–91, West Ukrainian enthusiasm for independence was partly offset by popular sentiments in the ethnically mixed southeastern region. This region was the power base from which many Communist party and KGB officials trained in Brezhnev's Dnepropetrovsk apparatus originated. In 1972, Petro Shelest, the Ukrainian republic first secretary, was removed for fostering a distinctive Ukrainian culture; his replacement was V. V. Shcherbyts'kyi, a hard-line member of the Dnepropetrovsk clique. He harshly repressed literary dissent, and remained a key factor in central control of Ukraine until 1989. Months later (in March 1990), the party leaders who succeeded Shcherbyts'kyi were able to obtain a large parliamentary majority in a fairly honest election; in March 1991, a 70-percent majority endorsed the Union Treaty.

The nuances of the referendum in Ukraine were significant, however. The Ukrainian parliament had added a second question to gauge the population's views on Ukrainian sovereignty. Sovereignty was affirmed in all but one province—the Crimea—by majorities often greater than those supporting the Union Treaty. In itself,



Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church celebrate their return to St. George's Cathedral in Lviv after nearly 45 years on August 19, 1990; in the center, Greek Catholic Metropolitan Volodymyr Sterniuk of Lviv.

—Photo courtesy of Bohdan Bociurkiw.

it is hard to grasp what acceptance of the elastic term "sovereignty" implied; but voting for it was a learning experience on the road to independence. West Ukrainian provinces *rejected* both the Union Treaty and sovereignty by overwhelming majorities, voting instead for a third option—outright independence.

More important, perhaps, than formal votes were the actions of Ukrainian miners. In the ethnically mixed Donbass, coal miners followed the lead of the Kuzbass (Western Siberia) miners by striking during the late summer of 1989. The Donbass miners sharply rejected calls by Ukrainian nationalist emissaries to turn the strike into a pro-independence movement. More recently, though, both Kuzbass and Donbass miners, disappointed by the results of strikes over purely economic questions, have moved toward advancing political programs. For some Ukrainian mine crews, these included an endorsement of sovereignty and insistence on withholding Ukrainian products from the center.

[23]The otherwise excellent review, "Religion, Nationalism, and Intolerance in Ukraine's Millennium of Strife," United States Institute of Peace, *In Brief* (Washington, DC), No. 32, June 1991, neglects the element of Counter-Reformation compulsion in the 17th-century church union.

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The miners' lukewarm reaction was a major factor pushing the Ukrainian popular front *Rukh* toward a moderate position. Its organizers, who stem disproportionately from West Ukraine, had earlier advanced programs for rapid cultural Ukrainization as well as church freedom and imminent independence. Events in the Donbass enabled the large contingent of literary dissidents from the "Dnieper" lands (central Ukraine) to assume the leading role in *Rukh*. To them, it was evident that a program for economic gains and gradual movement toward independence would attract the greatest support. They also endorsed equal rights for all cultural groups, including use of Russian in parliament. Numerous Russian deputies, including a major parliamentary spokesman from Dnepropetrovsk, as well as several Jews and Poles, were endorsed by *Rukh*.

During 1990–91, the KGB continued to harass *Rukh* parliamentary deputies. Remarkably, however, deputies and ministers elected with the help of Communist party endorsements began to advance measures for Ukrainian economic autonomy. Restrictions (based on ration coupons issued to republic residents) were placed on the export of the bountiful Ukrainian harvests. In April 1991, the republic's Council of Ministers decreed that "With the aim of carrying out the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Ukraine and relevant legislative acts of Ukraine, it is stipulated that conscripts shall be sent to perform their service in military units located on the republic's territory. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR may be sent beyond its borders for this purpose only with their voluntary written consents."[24]

Immediately after the failure of the August coup, the Ukrainian parliament declared independence. Strong cultural and religious ties connect a high proportion of residents of Ukraine to Russia; but disgust over failure of economic reform and fear of a new authoritarian centralism tipped the balance. A week later, however, Ukraine and the Russian republic signed a treaty pledging economic and military cooperation, while reserving the right to conduct separate foreign policies. If the present Ukrainian government under Leonid Kravchuk is sincere in its pursuit of independence, the status of Ukraine (and Belarus) as founding members of the United Nations could be crucial, for UN members are committed to support one another against overt aggression.

Ukraine's relatively compact territory and absence of climatic extremes makes transportation far easier than in the Russian republic. Although energy reserves are much smaller than Russia's, such minerals as manganese are plentiful. Above all, Ukraine has demonstrated that it can feed its population, not only because natural conditions are more favorable but because lengthy pre-Soviet experience prepared many of its rural people for individual farming by avoiding the common Russian practice of periodic redistribution of land among peasant families, which were thereby deprived of incentives for careful long-term land management. Traces of anti-urban ideology persist, but *Rukh* (drawing on the experience of its members in underground dissident cooperation) has made advances in overcoming antisemitism, which many Ukrainians now associate with extreme Russian nationalism.

A big problem—far greater than in most state nations—is recruitment and training of numerous competent, practical civil servants. Avoidance of ethnic discrimination and acceptance of capable, flexible holdovers from the Soviet economic and governmental administrations who had not been involved in acts of repression will be essential. Temporary employment of a small cadre of West European administrators to help introduce Western practices could provide a crucial balancing element. The biggest problem is development of a stable, orderly civil society to complement traditional Ukrainian love of liberty. In this respect, Ukraine's future is less secure than that of the East Central European northern tier. By far the strongest support for Ukrainian civil society would be membership in the European Community. Ukraine is, however, larger in population than any present member except Germany, Britain, Italy, and France. The EC, which apparently intends to delay membership for Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (all historical participants in the European international order) until the end of this decade, will be cautious about extending full membership to such a large, untried unit as Ukraine. However, informal West European counsel and cooperation can serve as a useful balance to economic cooperation with Russia.

Russia

It would be obtuse as well as ungenerous to exclude Russians from the prospect of eventual membership in a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals—or, indeed, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Cooperation as an equal with other former Soviet republics in a restricted association will notably enhance Russia's position in relation to Europe. The ultimate nature of the present Commonwealth is unclear. Even before its formation in December 1991, however, respected Russian voices questioned the wisdom of tight linkage between Russia and

[24]Quoted in *Izvestiya*, Apr. 30, 1991, trans. in *CSDP*, May 29, 1991, pp. 27-28.

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some other parts of the USSR. Solzhenitsyn, for one, contended that Russians must "get rid of grand imperial thinking inherited from the Communists, the inflated 'Soviet patriotism' that never really existed and takes such pride in 'the great Soviet power'." He added: "By the secession of 12 republics, Russia, with this seeming sacrifice, will liberate itself for precious inner development."[25] Solzhenitsyn hoped the two smaller Slavic republics would remain with Russia, but appears to recognize their inherent right to secede. With some justification, he suggests that the northern districts of Kazakhstan, which have large Slavic majorities, should remain with Russia.

On the basis of Solzhenitsyn's reasoning, small Muslim autonomous republics in the North Caucasus ought to have the right to leave the Russian republic, perhaps entering some form of union with Azerbaijan. It is practically impossible to grant independence to the larger Tartar and Bashkir autonomous republics, which are ethnically intermixed with Russians and separated from other Muslim regions by extensive Slavic areas; but they deserve guarantees of complete cultural autonomy. In very exceptional cases, the principle of border adjustment (broached by Yel'tsin but renounced in favor of maintaining existing union-republic borders) might be extended to some anomalous border districts, although certainly not to Russian migrants in the urban centers of other republics.

Were Russia to demonstrate a determination to separate from the Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics (except for alliance arrangements where mutually agreeable), it would demonstrate Moscow's resolve to renounce its ostensible geopolitical capacity for adventures in the Middle East or South Asia. All erstwhile imperial powers (Solzhenitsyn points to Japan) profited from such renunciations—and only additional renunciations by the great powers can restore a truly multilateral world balance.

Russia would still stretch from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok, but it would confront greater problems than most other East European nations. Although Russians did not invent them, anti-urban ideologies have repeatedly hindered employment of skilled foreigners and members of diasporas in Russia. Such thinking merges with remnants of communist populism, which "rises up like a wall, blocking the way. 'They'll make a fortune'—that is its chief objection to nonstate trade."[26] Russians possess a great, though flawed, administrative tradition. Like Ukrainians, although to a lesser extent, Russian civil administration can profit from a temporary injection of administrative experts from Western Europe (which originally inspired the Russian administrative practice).

Although the tradition of individual farming is weaker in Russia than in Ukraine, the North Caucasus steppe and the Volga-Kursk black-earth zone can eventually produce an abundant grain supply. The grey-earth region from Smolensk to Nizhniy Novgorod with adequate drainage and fertilization could produce large potato crops. Perhaps Russia and Belarus could follow the example set when Germany leased extensive eastern tracts with similar drainage and soil problems to an experienced Dutch firm. Industrial renovation depends, as elsewhere, on plant modernization and speedy introduction of the market economy. Fortunately, Russia's huge oil and gas reserves, if exploited with the aid of foreign technology, could provide much of the capital required.

Everything depends on whether the Russians, like the Poles and many others, can endure the long wait for significantly improved living standards. In August 1991, Russian urbanites put the world in their debt with a demonstration of civic courage rarely seen in the last half century. Historically, though, Russian civic enthusiasm is often followed by withdrawal from active political participation. Coupled with the dissatisfactions arising from several more years of economic stagnation, the cycle of public opinion could make way for another attempt at dictatorship.

Overall Prospects

Recent events in Eastern Europe demonstrate that aroused public opinion can advance democracy even among populations accustomed to authoritarian rule. These events also undermine Metternichian ideas of an inviolable status quo beloved by Western chancelleries and by much of the media and scholarly world. New states are arising, borders are being altered, and even certain population transfers may be forthcoming. Present leaders—especially in Europe—are right to be concerned about the constant danger of violence during such changes, as the example of Yugoslavia demonstrates so tragically. Much depends on whether firm but prudent multilateral intervention can facilitate change without violence.

Earlier in this essay, three kinds of popular demands were listed. Attainment of adequate living standards appears to be most likely in the northern-tier states of East Central Europe (with the possible exception of Poland), the Baltic states, and Ukraine. Prospects for

[25]Solzhenitsyn in *The New York Times*, Sept. 19, 1990.
[26]*Izvestiya*, Mar. 11, 1991, trans. in *CSDP*, Apr. 10, 1991, p. 3.

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Southeast European states, with the exception of Slovenia (if it is able to maintain independence) are jeopardized by ethnic strife; the same holds true for the Transcaucasus. Russia's prospects for sufficiently rapid economic growth are endangered by a combination of geographic limitations and the intensity and duration of communist rule. Muslim nations, while certainly not immune to consumer pressures, have considered adherence to ethno-religious lifestyles more important than the creation of modern economies.

The demand for stable ethno-religious communities and the spiritual values they foster that appears so strong among Muslims is somewhat less strong among Catholic nations headed by Poland, and among Orthodox groups like Georgians and Serbs. Predictably, the demand appears somewhat weaker overall in nations of mixed religious background—Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus.

Marginal tradeoffs may be feasible among demands for material improvement, ethno-religious community, and the third goal of responsive government, popular participation, and the rule of law. But abandonment of these prerequisites of democracy would mean a return to oppression, with no guarantee that the first two sets of demands would be met. For most East European nations, experience with democracy's complexities is too limited to make one confident that it will be retained in periods of economic stagnation or ethnic strife. Exceptions are Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the Baltic states, and possibly Poland, Armenia, and Slovenia. At the opposite pole are the formerly Soviet Muslim nations, which embody many democratic elements in their ethno-religious lifestyle, but consider significant aspects of Western democracy to be dispensable. Georgians and the antagonistic Southeast European nations also tend to treat democracy as secondary. If this analysis is correct, efforts to support recent democratic trends should be concentrated on the large Slavic nations—Poland, Ukraine, Russia—whose decisions for or against democracy are apt to determine the future of Eastern Europe.

I am cognizant of the temerity of an individual observer's attempt to specify alternative futures for such a vast, diverse region. We stand, however, at a rare moment of history when a large segment of the world map (one particularly significant for our own civilization) is being redrawn. The last time Western opinion had a chance to influence such a sweeping transformation was after World War I, when the Wilsonians' best intentions were thwarted in considerable measure by ignorance of the complexities of that same East European region. In preparing the preceding pages, I have been struck by the insights of such towering figures as Miłosz, Solzhenitsyn, and John Paul II. If poets and popes feel called upon to point to a better future for their region, can the pedestrian observer trained throughout a lifetime for this moment refrain from endeavoring to fill in details of the prognosis?

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Commentary

Are the Ukrainians a State Nation?

Yaroslav Bilinsky

THE paper presented by John Armstrong is very rich and comprehensive in that it dealt with the collapse of both the outer and the inner Soviet empire. For the sake of brevity, I would simply say that Armstrong's typology of Soviet policies toward the peoples of the former Soviet Union has justly become a classic; it deals with *old* Soviet reality in a realistic, useful way. Armstrong's paper also contains a bold vision for the future—that Western Europe will assist the reconstruction of the economies and societies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics and eventually allow them to join the European Community.

I have one small question concerning Armstrong's paper. Are the Ukrainians, who have voted to become independent, a state nation like the Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians, and Georgians? Or, are they the "little brothers" of the Russians?

I fully agree with Armstrong that the Ukrainian nation is plagued by certain weaknesses, such as the difference in the level of national consciousness between inhabitants of West and East Ukraine, and the religious differences between Greek Catholics and Orthodox.

There is also—and here I would agree with Martin Malia's warning—a large Russian minority that is nearly dominant in such regions as the Crimea, the northern littoral of the Black Sea, and the Donbass. To be blunt, is a "Yugoslav" scenario possible in Ukraine? Is it possible for a so-called federal army, backed by guerrillas from an ethnic minority, to keep an independence-minded nation from leaving a so-called federation? I would say that it is *possible,* but perhaps *not probable.* I trust that the leaders of the Ukrainian government have counted the number and gauged the ultimate loyalty of the Ukrainian officers in the Soviet Army. There are quite a few of them, indeed.

But if I may draw upon Nietzsche's famous dictum about the Germans to characterize the Ukrainians, and if I may be allowed to exaggerate a bit. I would say that "A Ukrainian does not *exist*: he is constantly growing and defining himself."[1] A Ukrainian literary scholar expressed the same sentiment when he declared that "Events in Ukraine are proceeding with miraculous speed."[2] Let me thus take this opportunity to mention some of the more promising developments in Ukraine.

First, a Deutsche Bank survey from 1990—and bankers are rather realistic, sober people—found that of the constituent elements of the former Soviet Union, it was Ukraine, and not the three Baltic states or Russia, that had the best prospects for market-type economic development.[3]

Second, I would submit that it takes a considerable amount of political maturity to hold a commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the massacre at Babi Yar, as was done in Kiev from September 22 to October 5, 1991. According to a Western observer:

In his talk at the main ceremony Saturday night [October 5, 1991], Ukrainian leader Leonid Kravchuk

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[1]Wrote Nietzsche: "The German himself does not *exist,* he *is becoming,* he is developing himself." *Beyond Good and Evil,* translated by Helen Zimmern, Modern Library edition, No. 244; *Werke* (Works), Musarion edition, Vol. VII, pp. 208–11, as cited in Koppel S. Pinson, *Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization,* New York, Macmillan, 1954, pp. 1–2.

[2]Dr. Vyacheslav Bryukhovets'kyi, head of the Secretariat of the Organizing Committee of the *Rukh* founding congress in September 1989, in several conversations with the author, New York, January–February 1990.

[3]Deutsche Bank, *The Soviet Union at the Crossroads: Facts and Figures on the Soviet Republics,* n. p., 1990, 54 pp. See especially the table, "Ranking of the Soviet Republics," p. 11. My copy was supplied by Dr. Victor V. Mashtabey, deputy director, International Management Institute, Kiev.

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seemed to resolve the issue [of Ukrainians, Russians, and other nationalities constituting a large part of the nearly 200,000 bodies that eventually filled Babi Yar], emphasizing that the Babi Yar massacres started as a plan to exterminate Jews, that some Ukrainians were accomplices in the killings, and that he apologized for the Ukrainian role. From the spontaneous applause from the mostly Jewish audience, it seemed the apology, by this group at least, was accepted.[4]

Third, I agree with Armstrong that some Ukrainians must become more tolerant of Russians and address legitimate Russian ethnic concerns in Ukraine. But to some degree this has already been done. The July 16, 1990, Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine was issued in the name of the people of Ukraine, *not* in the name of the Ukrainian people—a very significant difference.[5] I would also note that the mayor of *cosmopolitan* Odessa, Valentin K. Simonenko, declared himself a supporter of Ukrainian independence. In an interview with *Izvestiya*, he said:

For almost a year now since the referendum we have been making the rounds, explaining to everyone what a free-trade zone is, why we should have one, what its benefits are, ***but we only got the go-ahead after proclamation of the Independence Act.***[6]

As Czechoslovak finance minister Václáv Klaus put it so well in his presentation: In order to institute economic reforms, you simply have to start. Mayor Simonenko has emphasized that after Ukraine's August 24, 1991, declaration of independence, it was Kiev that promptly organized the Odessa Special Economic Zone, which included making Odessa a free port.

Significantly, Simonenko comes from a mixed Ukrainian-Russian family. He told the interviewer:

I am Ukrainian, but my brother is Russian. We registered my eldest son as a Ukrainian, but our youngest —in memory of his Kuban Cossack roots on his mother's side—as a Russian.[7]

Finally, Kravchuk, who received 62 percent of the vote in the December 1, 1991, presidential election in Ukraine,[8] strikes me as a prudent and responsible pragmatist. The leaders of *Rukh* are pragmatic as well.

So, to return to the question "Are Ukrainians a state nation as of 1991 or are they not?" I would suggest that perhaps they are becoming a state nation before our eyes. Only time will tell whether they have already attained that status or whether they will attain it in the near future. The very size of the vote for independence (also held on December 1, 1991) should have dispelled any lingering doubts: "little brothers" do not vote to become independent by an overwhelming majority of 90 percent to 8 percent of the votes cast.[9]

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[4]Jonathan Kwitny, "The Ukraine's Holocaust Reversal: Commemoration Honors Jewish Victims at Babi Yar," *The Washington Post*, Oct. 7, 1991.

[5]The preamble of the Declaration states: "The Supreme Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, *expressing the will of the people of Ukraine, . . . the national rights of all peoples* . . . (emphasis added). Translated by Roma Hadzewycz, of *The Ukrainian Weekly*, and published in 1990 by Smoloskyp Publishers, (Ellicott City, MD).

[6]L. Kapelyushnyy, "What Kind of Ukraine Can Be Seen From Odessa?" *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Sept. 25, 1991, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Soviet Union: Republic Affairs* (Washington, DC), Oct. 4, 1991, p. 96 (emphasis added).

[7]Ibid., p. 97.

[8]The exact figure was 19,643,481 out of 31,892,415 votes cast, which amounted to 61.59 percent (percentage figure calculated by the author). See *Vybory prezydenta Ukraïny 1 hrudnya 1991 roku: Protokol Tsentral'noï vyborchoï komisiï po vyborakh prezydenta Ukraïny ta z vseukraïns'koho referendumu pro rezul'taty vyboriv prezydenta Ukraïny: . . . Protokol skladeno 4 hrudnya 1991 roku* (Elections of the President of Ukraine of December 1, 1991: Protocol of the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of the President of Ukraine and for the All-Ukrainian [Popular] Referendum, on the Results of the Elections of the President of Ukraine: . . . Protocol Drawn Up and Signed on December 4, 1991.) Copy of signed protocol supplied by Mr. O. V. Lavrynovych, deputy chairman of the Central Electoral Commission.

[9]Out of 31,891,742 votes cast, 28,804,071 (90.32 percent) confirmed the Ukrainian parliament's Act of Independence of August 24, 1991; 2,417,554 votes (7.85 percent) opposed the act of independence; and 670,117 (2.1 percent) were declared invalid (percentages calculated by the author). Approximately 84.2 percent of the eligible electorate voted in the independence referendum.

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Security Dimensions of Imperial Collapse

Peter M.E. Volten

When the countries of Eastern and Central Europe liberated themselves from Soviet domination and threw off the yoke of communist rule in 1989, it marked the disintegration of the international security order that had prevailed in Europe for most of the postwar epoch. The Soviet Union, itself in increasing internal disarray, rapidly lost its ability to impose its will on its periphery or to support its clients in the world. As a matter of fact, the architect of the new Soviet foreign policy, Eduard Shevardnadze, basically declared the end of the politics of suppression in the East and of confrontation with the West. Much to the chagrin of the Soviet security establishment, he and President Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to drastic reductions of the conventional armed forces of the Soviet Union to numerical parity with those of the West, something nobody could have dreamt of only a few years earlier.

Shevardnadze and Gorbachev implemented their revolutionary foreign policy in a resolute and cogent manner, but Soviet domestic reform followed a more haphazard and incoherent course. It also encountered more formidable opposition. To be sure, critics of Shevardnadze lashed out at him, calling him a traitor who had relegated a proud superpower to the role of a third-class player, even a spectator, in the world, but they—at least some of them—understood that the USSR's military superpower status could not be maintained at the same level. However, when it came to domestic politics, these conservative party members realized there was no question of a gradual loss of power as in the case of foreign policy—what was at stake was an absolute loss of power. The dénouement came with the failed coup of August 1991. In a matter of days, communist rule was suspended and relegated to the realm of the past, followed in short order by collapse of the union. The USSR became history.

The revolution in international relations that began in 1989 was effected at an unbelievable pace, in less than two years. What was left of the bipolar world after the Berlin Wall came down has completely vanished. The threat that the Soviet Union—heavily armed, particularly with nuclear weapons—would one day confront its former allies and the West with renewed aggressive behavior is extremely remote and has probably disappeared altogether. The overwhelming conventional power once concentrated in the hands of one center is going to be divided in unknown quantities among an as yet unknown number of constituent parts of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The nearly 30,000 Soviet nuclear weapons are likely to be deployed in the Russian republic in the future, but they effectively have been decoupled from the erstwhile superior conventional forces that once faced the states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Meanwhile, the possible dispersal of control over nuclear weapons to successor states of the former Soviet Union could pose a serious risk, especially in restive areas that fail to establish democratic rule and that suffer further economic decline. There is no doubt that Russia will have a huge nuclear arsenal on its territory in any case. And the military preponderance of Russia vis-à-vis its neighbors is

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potentially disruptive. All these military risk factors must be taken into account in the new political landscape of the former Soviet Union and its periphery. But such a capability analysis gives an incomplete picture and reflects cold-war thinking. One simply cannot overlook the tremendous changes that have recently occurred in the strategic entity and in that entity's disposition of forces—both nuclear and conventional—that the West faced during the past half-century.

Most important, rather than worrying about emerging military balances, the West—and for that matter the East as well—should primarily be concerned with the uncertain processes that might or might not lead to democratic regimes in the former communist countries and republics. It is the outcome of these political changes that will ultimately determine whether military power is a threat or not.[1] The earlier "prudent" policy of President George Bush and others toward breakaway Soviet republics that was based on grounds that the maintenance of one center furthers predictability in East-West relations and international security was, in the words of Soviet analyst Andrey Kortunov, "a case of diplomatic double standards. . . . The dilemma of 'democracy vs. security' is a false one: any deviation from democracy is bound to affect security sooner or later."[2]

Unlike the Soviet Union, the West survived the demise of the rigid, albeit predictable, security system in Europe. Yet, the West changed too, and is under pressure to change still more rapidly. The United States is the only remaining superpower, even though its supremacy in nonmilitary power is increasingly challenged. The Western collective defense organization, NATO, is the only military alliance, although other, nonmilitary, considerations threaten its salient position. Organizations like the European Community (EC) and to a lesser extent, the West European Union (WEU) are the talk of the town, but currently lack political maturity and the military structure to assume responsibility for a European security system or a Western defense organization. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) proved to be a useful tool in the years of superpower confrontation, but suffers shortcomings in the changed world precisely because of its "cold war" genesis and structure. The international security order consists of many pieces—at best, related only partly.

The superstructure that determined to such a large extent how individual states formulated their foreign and security policies has disappeared. The rationale for a common security language, either superimposed on satellites or arrived at after endless debate, is gone in the East and contested in the West. At least two inferences can be drawn from this state of affairs.

The first is that the foreign and security policy of individual countries will be based to a far greater extent than in the past on perceived national interests. Immediate geostrategic considerations will play an ever greater role in the decisions of governments, and even more important, these governments will be under strong pressure to accede to domestic moods and preferences. The democratic principle that governments govern on the basis of the consent of the governed will likely be felt much more strongly in an environment where international security imperatives are less salient. Questions of defense, now less dramatic, are bound to become less prominent on the political scene in virtually all Western countries.

A second, related consequence is a change in the understanding of what constitutes security. Security has, of course, never been limited to the protection of territorial integrity by military means. It also entails the notion of political sovereignty, including economic, legal, and cultural freedom of action. The internationalization, if not globalization, of these aspects of politics has accentuated the nonmilitary dimensions of security in national decision-making. The fear of an economic war with Japan has dwarfed the fears in the United States of a real war with the Soviet Union for quite some time already. The looming danger of massive emigration from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union frightens the Germans considerably more than the remnants of the Soviet Army. The security of the fledgling democracies in Central Europe is first and foremost dependent on political, economic, and social developments, and in that respect, on access to the West.

The internationalization of domestic politics, rather than the imposition of international demands on it, leads to a colorful, almost surrealistic mosaic of many different foreign policy considerations. East and West are in need of a new structure. The challenge for governments is to master the very erratic political processes currently taking place in an ill-defined and volatile structure and to build a new order, offering new perspectives of progress on the road to freedom under the rule of law.[3]

Foreign and Security Policy Goals

In his monumental work *Paix et Guerre entre les Nations,* Raymond Aron enumerates three foreign policy

[1]Richard H. Ullman, *Securing Europe,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1991, p. 141.

[2]Andrei Kortunov, "Apocalypse Excluded," *Moscow News,* No. 21, May 21, 1991.

[3]See Michael Howard, "Structure and Process in History," in Howard, *The Lessons of History,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, pp. 188–200.

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goals that motivate states: power, ideas, and glory.[4] Each plays a role at any time, although one may be more characteristic than the others of the conduct of foreign policy during a particular period. All three are fundamental, but their meanings change over time and are essentially changing now in the wake of the cold war.

Power. Power politics hardly needs an explanation. Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, emerging nation-states have sought power vis-à-vis one another or have tried to balance power among themselves. After the nationalistic, ideologically based expansion of Napoleonic France, the Concert of Europe provided a balance of power that prevented the outbreak of a continental war for almost a century. After World War I, the Versailles Treaty omitted the inclusion of Germany in a new balanced order, and the ensuing 20-years' crisis showed devastating neglect by a number of countries of the role of (military) power in international relations.[5] The cold war brought a balance of terror, highlighting the role of military (nuclear) power in denying either side gains in influence.

Today, military power remains a factor of major significance in politics, but compared to the years of East-West confrontation, it now plays out in dramatically different ways. There appears, in fact, to be little that the military machines developed in the context of the cold war can do about such conflicts as that raging in Yugoslavia. Ethnic conflict and civil war have little in common with the balancing of military power in Europe as a whole, perhaps even in the embattled areas.

The role of military power as a means is inevitably affected by the relative decline in the importance of such power as an end in foreign policy. Notwithstanding the ongoing contribution of military strength to state power, the sense of security vis-à-vis others has to an ever larger extent come to rest on socio-economic variables. Economic strength and social cohesion represent today a far better measure of the balance of power and indeed of the degree to which states conduct power politics. The absence or demise of armed conflict does not eliminate competition among the US, Japan, and Western Europe; between France and Germany; or between the Eastern and Central European powers. But their foreign policy and the goal of power are inseparably linked to their domestic vitality.

Ideas. The area of ideas has undergone sweeping changes as well. With the threat of communism as an appealing ideology long gone, the power that threatened Europe with communism by force has now gone as well. The number of states that adhere to democratic values has grown.

As this process continues, we will witness the rise of a world community whose members generally adhere to common rather than conflicting values. However, although a more democratic world might tend to integrate politically, or at least pledge universal rights and the rule of international law, there are other forces that resist this logic. Sharing means giving up certain things, including political sovereignty, which ranks among the most strongly defended attributes of statehood. National values such as religion, socio-economic system, culture, and the like can, and in many instances do, take preference over the idea of a democratic international society.

The contest between communist and democratic ideas may be over, but there are other, primarily nationalistic, ideas countering integration, and generating fragmentation. John Gaddis sees here a task for the West:

This suggests . . . that the United States and its allies retain the interest they have always had in the balancing of power, but that this time the power to be balanced is less that of states or ideologies than of the processes—transcending states and ideologies—that are tending toward integrationist and fragmentationist extremes.[6]

Glory and greatness. As for Aron's third foreign policy goal, glory, many readers of his book in the past decades may have knitted their brows and asked themselves why *la gloire,* so reminiscent of kings like Louis XIV, would still be considered a fundamental and separate goal of foreign policy. Many would probably attribute this to a typically French preoccupation with national history, culture, and civilization, in short with a strong national identity. This was, indeed, at the time Aron wrote, still personified by that exceptional statesman, General Charles de Gaulle. When de Gaulle proclaimed in his addresses "*la grandeur de France*" ("the greatness of France") and closed by saying "*Vive la Gloire, Vive la France*" ("Long live Glory. Long live France"), one sensed his passion to convey his country's mission. ("*La Grandeur*" actually encapsulates that sense better than "*la gloire.*")

Those skeptical of past and present French glory or greatness were inclined to dismiss it as outmoded nationalism. For them, integration in Western Europe and

[4]Raymond Aron, *Paix et Guerre entre les Nations* (Peace and War Among Nations), Paris, Calmann-Levy, 1962, Ch. 3, pp. 81–102.

[5]See E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939, An Introduction to the Study of International Relations,* London, Macmillan, 1939.

[6]John Lewis Gaddis, "Toward the Post–Cold War World," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Spring 1991, p. 114.

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La Gloire: *a contingent of French-built supersonic Pluton missiles mounted on armored tanks rolls down the Champs Elysées on Bastille Day, 1987.*

—AP/Wide World.

the need to unite in the face of the Soviet threat did not offer much room to ponder over one's national identity. Yet, the sense of national identity and confidence was never absent, either in the East or in the West. In the West, feelings did not need to be strong and manifest, because few if any questioned these countries' proud, if not glorious past. Nor was the current course of cooperation and integration in dispute. There was no reason for national outbursts. Only when painful and controversial experiences occurred, like that of the US in Vietnam, could one detect nationalistic overtones and references to other glorious, historic occasions. Or conversely, the successful operations in the Falklands and more recently in the Persian Gulf have shown how quickly subdued national feelings can respond to a manifestation of glory and greatness.

In Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet Union, the glorious past, the greatness of peoples, was consistently denied, and national feelings were not only subdued, but rudely suppressed. The search in the postcommunist setting for an individual identity, based on the precommunist past as well as on restored beliefs in new missions, has already unleashed powerful, contesting forces. These peoples have difficult and sensitive questions to answer. For example, what is the place of the new Poland? Is it as an independent state, based on national strength and social cohesion; as a dependent part of the Western community; or as an equal partner in a Central European arrangement? Much more difficult are the choices for countries with multiethnic populations. There, national feelings may be hurt not only by frustrations in the conduct of foreign policy but also, and much more strongly, by ethnic strife and hatred, which may cross the border with neighbors and in turn further complicate the search for social cohesion and economic integration.

Nationalism is not a bad thing per se. A healthy dose may unify a country and provide confidence in its dealings with the outside world. But the reaction to the long-time denial of every glorious moment and of historic greatness, combined with a growing impatience with economic deprivation and a revived ethnic assertiveness, are quite likely to generate high-spirited emotions and nationalistic outbursts. Such developments, if not contained, may both be disastrous domestically and undermine integration internationally.

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The new search for a national identity is most dramatic in the liberated East, but the phenomenon is not an exclusive predicament of feeble, fledgling democracies. The strong German economy and the political triumph of unification cannot conceal the challenges of being, at last, a "normal" country. "Germany is the most sensitively balanced member of the Western alliance," writes David Marsh after his five years as correspondent in Bonn. As the failed coup in Moscow has illustrated, he observes, "if things go badly . . . well-off Germany will experience disproportionate pain."[7] By the same token, new demands placed on Western institutions like the EC and NATO are affecting their position and role in the larger international community and, in fact, occasion a great deal of soul-searching on the part of individual member states.

The changed emphases regarding these three foreign policy goals underscore the earlier observation that the international order has lost much of its impact on the conduct of foreign policy and that it is not so much governing elites as societal forces and processes that determine the dynamics of international politics. Socio-economic vitality, centrifugal tendencies in an expanding democratic world, and the influence of deferred glory and disruptive nationalism have become salient and at the same time capricious determinants of the foreign policy goals of national actors.

The apparent predominance, if not primacy, of domestic politics should be welcomed so long as the democratization process advances. That process, however, does exact a price in the international arena, for "the democratization of power at the national level reinforces the diffusion of power at the international level."[8] The globalization of domestic processes renders the balancing of integration and fragmentation a challenge of unprecedented complexity.

International Institutions and Security Arrangements

The democratization process and movement toward a market economy in the former Soviet Union are certainly not irreversible. The economic chaos and the lack of a central government may produce another revolution, and a Russian Robespierre may emerge; or the military, if still a coherent institution, may act as a praetorian guard. It cannot be excluded that "Russian chauvinism" and Russia's overwhelming power vis-à-vis most of the other former Soviet republics may lead to a renewed power struggle that may result in a repressive and authoritarian regime. One can only speculate about the outcome of the incredibly messy situation in the former Soviet Union.

With the pessimistic scenario, certain reactions are predictable: NATO headquarters in Brussels would revert to more traditional planning and urge, probably with a good deal of success, the member-states not to lower their defense budgets too abruptly; nuclear deterrence might largely remain in place, and the programs of military modernization envisaged earlier could triumph over strong domestic opposition; the CSCE process would undergo serious setbacks, and the Eastern and Central European countries would strongly insist on immediate action to integrate them into the Western community. It is a deplorable, uninspiring script for a 1990's re-run of the cold war.

Let us assume instead that the democratic forces are not ousted and that a long transition period lies before us. The former Soviet Union may turn into a workable confederation or even an EFTA-like loose economic organization linking 10 or more independent states. Existing institutions would then have to adapt themselves in an endless struggle of different views and interests. The Eastern and Central European countries would still insist on their earliest possible entry into the European Community (EC), but possibly press less to gain NATO membership. Intraregional cooperation could be extended to the Baltics states and some other neighboring former Soviet republics, and while considerable reservations would be maintained toward Russia, the CSCE framework could in all likelihood be used to lure potentially inimical actors into international discourse. The security relationship between the West and a strong military power in the East, e.g., Russia, could develop in an inclusive rather than an exclusive way. In this scenario, regional and local conflicts would occur, but no major war would be imminent. This process could over the long haul lead to integration and to Kantian progress toward peace.

This sketchy description of pessimistic and optimistic outcomes shows first of all how much of the burden to create a new security order rests on Western shoulders. The victory in the cold war, as in hot wars, leaves the combatants with an imbalance of power, with much

[7] *Financial Times* (London), Aug. 28, 1991. Also, Michael Sturmer has written: "What the German nation after Bismarck failed to cultivate was the management of power. . . . In European integration, the Germans sought prosperity; through the Atlantic Community, they found security. In 1990, however, they found themselves heirs to the post-Bismarckian Germany that failed to find its place in the world." *The European* (London), Oct. 11–17, 1991, "German Unification: Special Report."

[8] Samuel P. Huntington, "Democratization and Security in Eastern Europe," in Peter Volten, Ed., *Uncertain Futures: Eastern Europe and Democracy*, New York, Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1990, p. 48.

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depending on the wisdom of the victor as to how the defeated will recover. The question of war and peace does not end with victory, and as Versailles proved, exacting revenge is no guarantee that one's enemy will not recover. On the contrary, it would likely, as in the past, engender resentment and renewed aggression. In the present case, however, no hot war has been fought, and most important, the aggressive regime has replaced itself. There are no war victims, and democratic forces are begging for support in their efforts to make the changes irreversible. This gives all the more reason for the West to welcome and incorporate the *demandeur(s)*. Like Talleyrand in 1815, the minister of foreign affairs of Russia and representatives of the other republics should be included in the restructuring of the security order.

This leads to a second observation derived from the two scenarios, namely, that international institutions do matter. During the CSCE human rights conference in Moscow, then-Soviet foreign minister Boris Pankin made the following remarkable, alas hardly noticed, suggestion to the international community:

We are arriving at the conclusion that national guarantees in this area [human rights] are not sufficient. So we have to review the principle of noninterference in affairs of other governments.[9]

Pankin's revolutionary remark not only reflected his hopes regarding what cooperation in the CSCE might be able to accomplish, but also underlined the success and progress made by the CSCE process since 1975. The Helsinki Accord was an unremovable thorn in the side of the Kremlin leadership, and its infectious impact could not be neutralized, even in the darkest days of the cold war in the 1980's.

Other international institutions matter as well. The evolution of the EC is visible proof that countries that have been at war for centuries can live together in peace and prosperity. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank represent the trend toward a globalization of economic activities. The Council of Europe has effectively enforced respect for human rights. Finally, the existence of NATO and the solidarity of its members have always meant more than the establishment of a defense organization. Rather, voluntary membership and the principles of collective defense and nuclear risk-sharing have been forceful expressions of what NATO stands for.

A third, inescapable conclusion from speculation about the future of Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union is that the amount of time necessary to effect economic and political transition and to fully integrate the countries into a new security community will be discouragingly long. The economic recovery in Eastern and Central Europe, not to mention the former Soviet Union, will take one or two decades. Further steps toward a mature civil society may require another generation. In political terms, this seems an eternity. Such a prolonged transition, with all its ups and downs, will put to the test not only the vitality of international institutions but also the consistency of the policies of members of those institutions.

Reactions in the West

Expectations regarding external assistance are fairly high, sometimes very high, in Eastern and Central Europe, and probably in the former Soviet Union as well. The past two years have seen some clear expressions of disappointment in the East over the extent of economic assistance from the West and Japan. To be sure, some Western countries and organizations have done a great deal and have responded to the needs of the East far more in accordance with capabilities than have others. A paramount question is whether the Western approach rests on concerted action to bring about further integration in the West and, subsequently, between East and West. If divisive elements interfere with the integration process in Western Europe, the image of larger European integration becomes dimmer.

The debate on the pros and cons of "deepening" versus "broadening" the European Community tends to obscure the very real challenges that the post–cold war (dis)order poses to Western integration itself. The effect of Western leadership in the field of security will in large measure depend on common action of the West and continued confidence in its ability to guarantee security. Two major questions must be addressed in this respect. First, will the West be capable of remaining united as the process of change unfolds? Second, will it be confident enough to take some of the risks that are inevitable in that process?

Western security has been based on the bedrock of trans-Atlantic cooperation. The role of nuclear weapons provided by the US was the centerpiece of NATO's strategy and remained so in spite of the gradually diminishing credibility of the American nuclear guarantee. NATO's conventional capabilities were to play willy-nilly an ever more more important role, especially in light of the numerical superiority of the Soviet conventional forces. Despite reluctance on the part of the

[9] *The New York Times*, Sept. 10, 1991.

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An aerial view of NATO headquarters, Brussels.

—Archive Photos.

European member-states, the buildup of conventional forces has been impressive, as was the establishment of integrated military planning for peacetime and an integrated command for wartime.

These accomplishments are still valid. Nevertheless, NATO is "an institution under threat."[10] The loss of the enemy is a serious blow to NATO's raison d'être, even though the many remaining uncertainties justify a solid Western defense. Many threats, however, come from within. The member-states are drastically reducing their defense budgets, and the defense efforts are likely to fall short even of the reduced levels agreed to in the talks on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Such a shortfall would not matter at all if the allies were ready to promote a division of labor and embark upon task specialization. Given the poor record in this respect, however, one can expect little from this type of arrangement, even though the need for it is even greater than it was in the days of high spending. A rational integration of national contributions would not only save resources; it would also strengthen Alliance cohesion, first militarily, and indirectly, politically. Integration would prevent individual services from looking exclusively to increase their own share of the budget pie, which tends to promote a renationalization of the defense effort. This latter trend would undermine NATO's international structure and command and render its military organization—the strength of the alliance par excellence—less effective. Perception of the need to act together politically might in the end be lost in the shuffle.

The much-heralded multinational forces NATO now envisages are unlikely to offset this trend. Brigadier Geoffrey Van Orden, in his description of the Bundeswehr in transition, notes that these multinational corps "will have little effect on German national planning." His further remarks illustrate the prevalence of national considerations:

The concept of the proposed Rapid Reaction Force presented particular difficulties for the Germans. They were concerned about their lack of influence over what would probably be the most active and high-profile force on German soil. They were reluctant to see German units once again tied to fixed structures under foreign command in peacetime, and their dilemmas over possible involvement in operations

[10]Jan Willem Honig, *NATO: An Institution Under Threat?* New York, Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1991.

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outside the NATO area and over the creation of a force acceptable to the French were underlined. German preference would have been for ad hoc task forces to be created from earmarked units, to meet contingencies as they arose, and once ***a specific national decision*** *to contribute had been made.*[11]

Similar trends can be expected in other countries. The French went so far as to withdraw their troops from Germany, although the Elysée insists on anchoring Germany in Western Europe and perceives Franco-German cooperation to be the core of a future West European defense organization. The British and Dutch Defense White Papers envisaged changes in NATO's strategy, referring to the multinational forces and the likely future needs for an out-of-area capability, but the force structures of the two countries clearly reflect national preferences as well as the budget struggle between the services. A national rather than an alliance approach to defense planning is likely to prevail elsewhere as well, and this trend is bound to affect the cohesion of the Western defense organization.

US policy has obviously been crucial in alliance politics. Washington's leadership has worked well in the past, and the inability of the West European allies to establish a robust defense organization themselves pleads for a continuation of such "adopted" leadership.

The Bush administration envisages a role for NATO as a more political forum where the West, including the US, should coordinate its external relations. Yet, the chances that NATO will actually perform a greater political role are not very great. Earlier attempts in this direction were not successful, and the odds seem stacked against such a role now. As Jan Willem Honig concludes in his overview of NATO's past,

. . . the further the alliance tries to remove itself from dealing with military security cooperation, the greater is the resistance by individual allies. As a consequence, NATO has remained a much looser alliance of sovereign states than is commonly realized. The logical conclusion, therefore, would be for NATO to continue to do what it has done best: provide a coordinating framework for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area.[12]

US Preoccupations

The fulfillment of this task will be more and more difficult as member-states renationalize their defense planning and centrifugal tendencies put collectivity under more pressure. Preoccupation of the United States with other matters may also contribute to the rise of centrifugal forces and the decline of collective spirit in NATO. For one thing, the US finds itself preoccupied with other regions, e.g., the Middle East or the Asian-Pacific Rim. This came through in the analysis of prominent US strategists, entitled *Discriminate Deterrence,* that appeared in 1988. The report, which marked yet another step in the movement away from a clear US commitment in Europe that was inferrable from the debacle of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit at Reykjavik, the decoupling effect of the INF treaty, and President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, aroused great concern in Western Europe.[13] Rightly or wrongly, many Europeans perceived these developments as evidence that Europe was no longer the crucial region it had earlier been in US security calculations.

A second factor, also reflecting a longer-term trend, is the conviction of many in the US that Western Europe can do more for its own defense. The recurrent debates on "burden sharing" in the 1970's and 1980's brought this idea ever more clearly to the fore. Moreover, the "Fortress Europe" syndrome—the fear of the emerging economic strength of the EC—gives powerful ammunition to Congressional advocates of deep cuts in defense budgets, at least as far as the funds allocated to NATO are concerned.

A third and more recent argument for reduced US involvement in the defense of Europe is the urgent need to invest in the future of the US. Now that the Soviet threat has disintegrated, the "peace dividend" quite likely will be cashed sooner rather than later.[14]

Finally, the lessons of the Gulf war may lead to significantly different US force structures, particularly of the air force and the army. The proven effectiveness of stealth technology, the impressively expanded reach of bombers and stand-off weapons, and quick reinforcement capability are likely to encourage greater emphasis on CONUS (the Continental United States) as the base of future operations. Regarding the army, the emphasis will shift from heavy formations to lighter ones that are particularly useful in out-of-area operations. If large quantities of heavy armor should be necessary in the European theater, then the bulk of those forces would be fielded by the European armies. Indeed, the number of US troops in Europe may well drop

[11] "The Bundeswehr in Transition," *Survival* (London), July-August 1991, p. 361, emphasis added.

[12] Honig, op. cit., p. 37.

[13] *Discriminate Deterrence: Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy,* Co-Chairmen Fred C. Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1988.

[14] *The New York Times,* Sept. 5, and Oct. 6, 7, 1991; *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), Oct. 2, 1991.

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from almost 300,000 to some 50,000 in just a matter of years.

An essential part of NATO's strategy has always been the nuclear component, which in itself guarantees close involvement of the US. Although the history of extended deterrence (in which a Soviet ground attack in Europe faced the threat of strategic attack on the USSR from the US) has witnessed the gradual decrease of the credibility of nuclear employment, US nuclear weapons will be in Europe for a long time and continue to serve as weapons "of last resort," as NATO's London Declaration of 1990 proclaims.[15] Since this statement appeared, though, the political nature of nuclear weapons has become ever clearer. Targets in Central Europe for battlefield and tactical nuclear weapons have disappeared, and NATO finds itself relying increasingly on long-range and strategic weapons. Since it is far from certain that the European allies, particularly the Germans, would be willing or able to accept the deployment of a new generation of long-range nuclear weapons on their soil, the long-cherished principles of collectivity and risk-sharing in the nuclear realm is rendered almost meaningless. The US nuclear guarantee appeared to be increasingly embodied in weapons located in the US or at sea rather than in Europe.

This picture of a looming decoupling of US and West European security interests when it comes to deployment of nuclear weapons existed at the time of the coup in Moscow last August. Since then, the decoupling of the (Russian) nuclear capabilities and formerly Soviet conventional forces has increased reservations concerning nuclear deployments in Europe. Soviet conventional superiority has gone, and with it, the principal role of nuclear weapons in wartime, namely nuclear blackmail. Discounting the chance that one would start a war with nuclear means, nuclear blackmail is effective only after a favorable position is established in conventional battle. That condition for a real nuclear threat can no longer be imposed on the West by Moscow. One might argue even the opposite: the new balance of forces in Europe should enable NATO to think about war termination by conventional means, should deterrence fail. That very notion might still further enhance the existing reluctance to deploy (new) nuclear weapons in Europe and even increase doubts about the necessity of linking US and European security.

Obviously, force structures cannot be changed overnight, if for no other reason than the fact that it will take time to overcome bureaucratic resistance. In any event, arms control negotiations have always proven to be time-consuming. The trends described above are of paramount importance, however, for the future of the alliance and European security. As a matter of fact, the anticipation of these trends may already have had its impact on the security debate. When the process of disengagement actually takes place, the US contribution to NATO's defense cooperation will dwindle from overwhelming to marginal. We will witness a Europeanized NATO in which the US will simply play a role alongside the other allies.

Washington's Paradoxical Role

There is nothing inherently wrong with a new intra-Western balance of power, if the US accepts John Gaddis's advice that it concentrate on balancing the processes that lead to new relationships. However, it is paradoxical that US willingness to take up a leadership role in the period of transition toward the Europeanization of NATO would lead to a marginalization of the US in the future security order in Western Europe. That seems to defy the logic of power politics. It surely is contrary to the logic of the old security order. Yet, that order is no longer the only or predominant determinant of foreign policy. Foreign policy goals have changed as much for the United States as for anyone else, and the growing pressure from domestic priorities will exert its influence to turn Washington away from "the overachievements of the Persian Gulf war," as Edward Luttwak puts it. Luttwak observes:

Now, at the outset of the geo-economic era, US politicians are highly sophisticated in strategic matters but rather crude in international economics; the US has vast armed forces but weak banks and capital-starved industries, and it has more officials conversant with the politics of a hundred countries than business executives who can succeed in foreign markets.[16]

The United States is still the leader, the "big brother" to whom the European allies have been accustomed for so many years. It is too early to disregard that traditional US responsibility. But Washington and Brussels should also be aware that it is not too late to begin adjusting to the new realities of balancing power and process. NATO can be turned into a useful, albeit temporary, instrument if Washington decides to play an active role in

[15]Reprinted in *Survival*, September-October 1990, pp. 469–72.

[16]Edward N. Luttwak, "America's Setting Sun," *The New York Times*, Sept. 23, 1991.

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the Europeanization of NATO and in the ultimate integration of East and West.

From a military-operational and organizational point of view, it seems almost impossible to Europeanize NATO without US cooperation. The Franco-German brigade—recently elevated to a corps and destined to be the core of a future European force—may be considered a good, perhaps the only possible start, but it is a start from scratch without agreed doctrine, without standardized and interoperable equipment, literally without a common language. NATO's experience shows how long and challenging the road to integration of planning and procedures is. The Gulf war has revealed that 40 years of common exercises have been successful, but also that real action must take place under one strategic command.

The West European Union has no military structure, and its members simply lack the assets that the US alone was able to install in NATO. The acquisition and operation of large-scale systems, such as those for C^3I (command, control, communication, and intelligence) would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, without US technology and know-how, investments, and leadership. Finally, no matter what is left of the US nuclear guarantee, it exists. There is no guarantee that France will abandon its firm stance on the strictly national role of the *force de frappe*. As a matter of fact, the evolution of strategic thinking in the US and NATO regarding nuclear deployment in Europe may no longer be incompatible with French nuclear doctrine. Battlefield use of nuclear weapons has practically been forsworn, and NATO's tactical nuclear weapons, or what will be left, will carry more and more the French notion of a political-prestrategic warning. A Europeanization of NATO's nuclear deterrence, however symbolic, would require not only French and British, but also US, cooperation.

The role of the US as envisaged in this context would also involve active US participation in the CSCE process. Although Washington has never marched in the front columns to establish a "Common Pan-European house,"[17] there may be many good reasons under the new circumstances for it to use the CSCE as an instrument of US foreign policy. Despite CSCE's inherent weaknesses—weak institutionalization, decision-making by unanimous vote, and the lack of any peace-enforcing power—the CSCE process could be helpful in building inclusive relationships in Europe, relations that include the US and parts of the former Soviet Union. The prestige of the US is still very high in Eastern Europe, where it is seen as a useful hedge against too much German influence or a possible new Russo-German entente. Most important, the CSCE could be instrumental in reforming NATO and making the Europeanized Western alliance the major player in an all-European security order. NATO does have the teeth, if required, and—with the US—it has the capacity to provide leadership in the amorphous all-European community.

Western Europe's Role

In Western Europe itself, attempts to formulate a common security and defense policy have as yet hardly passed the stage of declaratory policy. The Yugoslav crisis is a case in point. Unlike in the Gulf war, where the United States assumed strategic leadership, Washington stayed away from direct involvement in Western attempts to mediate in the conflict and ensuing civil war between the Croats and Slovenes, on the one hand, and the "center" and the Serbs, on the other. Except for its participation in the CSCE consultations, the United States has basically left the handling of the crisis in the hands of the Europeans. The EC, under the temporary presidency of The Netherlands and supported in its effort by the CSCE caucus, tried everything last fall but failed to put palpable pressure on the warring parties.

The Dutch foreign minister, Hans van den Broek, was, admittedly, not only confronted with an intractable drama of hatred and bloodshed in Yugoslavia, but also found himself a representative of a divided EC. Among the 12 states, there is no clear leader capable of steering the other major players toward an unequivocal stand.

It is a mistake to look at Western Europe as one entity. While all EC members declare the need for a European security and defense identity, they do not agree on how to achieve it or how fast to go about achieving it. Some, like the UK, The Netherlands, and Portugal, reluctantly admit that "other European institutions such as the EC, WEU, and CSCE also have roles to play, in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these fields," but are quick and resolute in insisting to add in the communiqués that "NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty."[18]

France, on the other hand, consistently refuses to

[17]See Jenonne Walker, "Keeping America in Europe," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Summer 1991, pp. 128–42.

[18]NATO Press Communiqué, June 7, 1991; see also final communiqué.

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take part formally in the military structure of NATO, in spite of that country's de facto military cooperation in some important areas like air defense and in allied military headquarters like AFCENT (Allied Forces Central Europe). The French have even declined to participate in a Western Rapid Reaction Force, consisting basically of European units under British command, presumably because the establishment of such a force takes place in the framework of NATO. Paris also opposes the expansion and deepening of NATO's contacts with Eastern and Central European countries, as proposed by James Baker and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, pointing instead to the role the EC has to play in this respect.

France cannot ignore the importance of its security policy as an important power base from which to operate in the diplomatic arena. However, it marginalizes its role by recurrent contradictory actions, even obstinate behavior. Whether Paris likes it or not, NATO's fate is as crucial for France as it is for the other allies. Therefore, in the words of one observer, "it will probably become more difficult for France to preserve its national identity in an increasingly integrated Europe without redefining the security parameters which set its defense posture apart from that of its neighbors and give substance to the notion of independence in the realm of national security."[19]

In Germany, a curious blend of approaches emerges. Bonn stresses the importance of the Atlantic alliance, but does not want to jeopardize the Franco-German special relationship. Thus, Chancellor Helmut Kohl supports Washington in its wish to establish formal ties between NATO and the East European countries, but at the same time offers Mitterrand his support for a Franco-German corps as the de facto nucleus of a future European army. It will take a long time before a robust Franco-German corps, not to mention a European multinational corps, will be operational, but the Kohl-Mitterrand initiative represents a major political step in building a security identity.

Kohl's ambivalence, however, complicates any reading of the German position: he sides with the French President as to the need for a political union in order to push Western Europe toward one common foreign and security policy, but differs with the French on the role of the WEU. Whereas Paris considers that European defense organization too close to NATO and vehemently opposes even a move of its headquarters to Brussels, Kohl sees the WEU as the European pillar in NATO. At least for the time being, the two countries have managed to agree on the future arrangement that after 1996, the WEU would become part of the EC. Until that time, the WEU should apparently serve as a "bridge" between NATO and the EC. By then, an intergovernmental conference should determine the modalities of such a merger.[20]

Kohl's—and Germany's—oscillating views are determined not only by a traditional, still valid, wish to please as many capitals as possible, but also by a precarious political balancing at home. His government voices various preferences, ranging from a strong commitment to NATO and absolute US involvement, to a desired eastward extension of the EC, which would only complicate the problem of establishing the security identity of the Community. One finds the former view expressed very strongly in the defense ministry; the latter, has been expressed, more cautiously, albeit cogently, in foreign minister Genscher's quarters. The Chancellor's vulnerability vis-à-vis his Foreign Minister, whose support he absolutely needs to keep the coalition government alive, is compounded by uncertainties regarding the mood of the electorate in days of increasing socio-economic tensions. The aftermath of unification has proved less promising for the heralded first chancellor of a unified Germany and his party than it originally seemed. The foreign policy orientation of the voters is likely to lean toward Genscher's tendency to forge political settlements in loose—but popular and appealing—frameworks like the CSCE and to eschew firm and often costly German commitments in either the EC or NATO.

Genscher's course represents hope for change, but the multilateral character of his foreign policy may serve as a guise for a more and more independent German foreign policy. German internationalism is crucial for a stable European order, but given the many difficult choices between nationalist and internationalist options, it cannot be guaranteed.[21] A more independent

[19]Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "French Strategic Options in the 1990's," *Adelphi Paper No. 260*, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1991, p. 74.

[20]Hans Binnendijk, "The Emerging European Security Order," *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Autumn 1991, p. 74.

[21]Uwe Nerlich summarized the difficulties in early 1990 as follows: "Already Germany finds it difficult to redefine its national identity and to engage in a speedy transfer of sovereignty; to move its gravitational center Eastward and to reinforce Western commonality; to manage unification, i.e., build a common society, economy, and state compatible with the FRG tradition, and to remain an engine of European institution-building; to stay as a member of the Atlantic Alliance (in view of domestic pressures in favor of other outcomes), and to urge others like the United States not to dismantle it unilaterally; to contain what may become a new nationalism and to cope with reasserted nationalism on the part of others; to exercise increasing power with restraint and the expectation of reciprocity and be exposed to a potentially suspicious or hostile environment; to be assertive in order to cope with these problems and to reassure European partners. Uwe Nerlich, *The Atlantic Alliance at the Crossroad*, European Strategy Group, Paris, 1990, p. 13.

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course would reflect a change in emphasis from military to socio-economic factors in German foreign policy goals as well as confirm the rise of the importance of domestic politics in the formulation of foreign policy. The firm stance in the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, which forced the EC countries to follow suit, is a case in point. National interests indeed come to the fore in a fluid international and a more difficult domestic environment. The socio-economic consequences of German unification are bound to influence foreign policy, and according to Eckart Arnold, the probable outcome may not be conducive to a continuation of the constructive German role in the process of integration:

Thus, Germany will not be stronger but weaker for quite a time. Difficult shifts in German foreign policy do not therefore arise—as widely expected—from additional economic power. On the contrary, a potential lack of political stability and weakness at its economic base are the real problems of German policy, undermining its capacity for compromise abroad.[22]

This is not to say that such a tendency is an exclusive German problem. But the sheer weight of Germany makes its contribution (or noncontribution) to a new European security order a special case.

A European security and defense identity is far from formed, let alone agreed upon, among the European Community Twelve. The upheaval in the EC at the end of September 1991, caused by the maladroitly handled Dutch offensive to speed up the creation of a "federal" and more democratic community, speaks volumes. Majority votes in the EC have been steadily but slowly accepted in the economic realm, but the member-states jealously guard their veto right in matters of foreign policy, security, and law, which the Dutch presidency sought to bring under one single community structure. A role for the Europarliament commensurate with growing federalism seems to be an extremely remote possibility, which will have to wait until governments overcome their resistance to a loss of sovereignty. It will take a long time indeed before we see something of Jacques Delors's ambitious goal of "pooled sovereignty."[23]

Time and patience are key to recovery from the shocks that imperial decline in the East has wrought both in that part of the continent and in the West. Concerted action of the West cannot be taken for granted, no matter how urgent the problems in the eastern part of Europe. Yet the West bears great responsibility for reshaping the security order. Washington, Brussels, and Berlin are bound to lead in the process toward integration and progress.

[22]Eckart Arnold, "German Foreign Policy and Unification," *International Affairs* (London), No. 3, 1991, p. 470.

[23]Jacques Delors, "European Integration and Security," *Survival*, March-April 1991, pp. 99–109.

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Commentary

Security for the East Europeans

Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas

MY first remark occasioned by Peter Volten's thoughtful presentation concerns a certain inconsistency in the attitude of the West toward the postcommunist world. The main question of this conference and probably of all European (and global) politics—After communism, what?—seems to be getting appropriate attention only in its international economic and human dimensions.

Ways are being created for nations emerging from the former communist bloc to join the democratic community of Western Europe and the North Atlantic. Those who apply must still confront numerous obstacles, but the final goals have been defined and justifiable requirements have been set. New European democracies, if they conform to the rules of the market economy, can hope for association with, and subsequently membership in, the EC. And when they build democratic institutions and observe human rights, including minority rights, they will be admitted into the Council of Europe and a number of multinational fora engaged in cultural and other "third basket" cooperation.

Yet, there is no similar opportunity in the sphere of national security. Unfortunately, despite all their efforts and the changes they have undertaken, the Central European states do not find themselves in a more secure environment. Although they are the nations most exposed—in the geographical as well as the political sense—to the consequences of instability in the post-Soviet East and to the possible reappearance of aggressive regimes there, their security ties with the established democracies remain weak and vague. The West seems to ignore new realities and leaves defense of its own values (now shared by Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) to mechanisms that either do not exist (like the intended EC security arm) or that are influenced (like the CSCE) by governments of no democratic nature or legitimacy and of intentions not always benign and peaceful.

NATO's (and the WEU's) policy of nondifferentiation among the members of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization is broadly seen in the countries of Central Europe as proof of a lasting Yalta-like, Western-supported division of Europe. Failure to differentiate means failure to encourage change, especially among those who, like the Russian people, still have to make their final choice, a choice of geostrategic importance.

After communism, with one of the two poles of a once bipolar security order falling apart, there is a growing possibility that NATO will quickly become a victim of its own historic victory. The alliance will probably not survive the coming era of renationalization of security policies unless it is revitalized by a new raison d'être, new objectives, and finally, new members.

The raison d'être Central European supporters of NATO would suggest for that organization is, in fact, not a new one; rather, it is an old and forgotten one. It is based directly and exclusively on the founding values of the North Atlantic Treaty. At a time when several West European states have lost their interest in maintaining NATO, the new democracies need it as an alliance of all

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At the time of the conference, Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas was Deputy Director of the European Department in Poland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was responsible for relations with the Soviet Union and its component republics. He is now Director of Policy Planning. He was an expert on Soviet and Central European affairs with Solidarity from 1981 until 1989, and he served as international affairs expert to the Senate of the Republic of Poland in 1989–90. In the period 1985–89, he founded and edited The New Coalition, *an uncensored political journal promoting cooperation among the democratic forces of the Soviet Union, its European republics, and Central Europe.*

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European and North American democracies against chaos and against all threats that might emanate from regions not yet democratic or stable.

A new NATO defined in that old way would not constitute a new wall in Europe. On the contrary, it would be open to every nation that accepts the organization's founding values, and indeed, it would give strong incentives for nations to subscribe to these values. It would thus become a key element in a dynamic, successful, steadily expanding new Europe, or a real Euro-Atlantic community.

As in the case of the EC, one should anticipate that every candidate for NATO membership would have to meet a long list of requirements and recognize that it would have to undergo a period of adaptation. Countries would be required to have democratic government and civilian control over the armed forces, as well as strategies and military structures oriented toward collective defense. But once these conditions are met, there should be no line drawn to isolate those peoples who believe, not in dangerous alternatives, but in a free Europe and solidarity of democracies.

SECOND, I would like to present briefly a new foreign policy principle in effect in Central Europe. It is aimed at increasing international security in the former Soviet Union and at bringing security to all of Europe in the face of the potentially dangerous instability of that area.

Poland had such a principle in mind in 1990, when we developed and implemented a "two-track approach" to the central Soviet government and to the republics. The maintenance of parallel relations with the center and with the republics that were gaining more and more sovereignty and real power was intended to secure—doubly secure—good-neighborly relations under all contingencies. But under the present, post-coup conditions, we urgently need to place increasing emphasis on the track oriented toward the new states.

What we can offer the republics, the emerging states, is a favorable attitude, an endorsement of existing borders, close cooperation, early recognition, and, most important, a positive response to their aspirations to be part of Europe. This is what Poland is already doing, especially (for obvious reasons) with respect to Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. And what we can expect and demand in exchange is their compliance with European and other international standards, which are the only alternative to the extremely dangerous vacuum of rules that obtained after the failure of the Union. (Where such an unregulated state of affairs can lead is all too evident in the Yugoslav disaster.)

This is the heart of our new policy, which I would call one of "Europeanization." In the Polish view, all the complicated processes going on and all the international subjects emerging in the East should be taken—as tightly as possible—under the control of United Nations and European regulations and mechanisms, and should be influenced by, and ultimately included in, global and European institutions. Among the most important standards and mechanisms, we would count all three dimensions of the CSCE process (international security, economic cooperation, and human rights); the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and further CFE talks, especially on military and paramilitary personnel as well as the confidence-building measures addressed in the Vienna negotiations; and last but not least, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has not yet been signed by any post-Soviet republic. (Some of these republics have an opportunity to make political and economic profits through their membership in the nuclear club.)

Issues of minorities and borders—the clear possibility of ethno-territorial conflicts and wars between newly established states—are probably the most dangerous. They can be directly addressed by the principles of the Helsinki Final Act on condition that the states involved are admitted to Europe, are Europeanized in time, ahead of events, before the worst occurs. The outcome of the January 1992 Prague CSCE meeting seems to be a significant step in the right direction.

The realities of the long transitional postcommunist era will be no less difficult than the problems of communism, but the only escape from them is an escape forward, not a retreat to the discredited past.

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Commentary

Winning the Peace—Dilemmas of Post-Soviet European Security

David B. Rivkin, Jr.

THE fall of communism as a major ideological and geostrategic force was ushered in by the "velvet" revolutions of 1989, and was dramatically accelerated by the failed August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union. By now, except in China and a few repressive Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Third World, this ideology has been truly relegated to the "dustbin" of history. These developments are a watershed in world politics. Although they do not signal an end of history, as argued by Francis Fukuyama,[1] they do represent a *Sternstunde,*[2] with a plethora of political, economic, ideological, and military consequences.

Peter Volten's paper provides an excellent description of the security implications of the ongoing changes in the geopolitical landscape of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. As is the case with most historical phenomena, communism's collapse has engendered complex and somewhat contradictory consequences. To be sure, having sought, since the end of World War II, to contain Moscow and its satellites, the West can justifiably rejoice in the disappearance of the Soviet military threat, whether of the nuclear or conventional variety.[3] It remains to be seen, of course, whether senior Soviet military officers' newly professed interest in creating a much more decentralized, albeit still unified, military structure, patterned after NATO, can be realized, given the magnitude of the centrifugal forces at work.

As demonstrated by the recent "war of oaths" between Russia and Ukraine over the Black Sea fleet, even a scaled-down version of this concept—featuring unified control of all nuclear forces, and of long-range airpower, airborne troops, and naval assets—is unlikely to prevail. Although the original agreement on the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) specified that strategic forces were to remain un-

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[1]Fukuyama's provocative essay, entitled "The End of History," was published in the Summer 1989 issue of *The National Interest* (Washington, DC). It provoked a number of spirited rejoinders in subsequent issues of that magazine and in other fora. He eventually expanded the original article into a book-length treatment: *The End of History and the Last Man,* New York, The Free Press, 1992. As far as Peter Volten's own thinking is concerned, his embrace of Raymond Aron's "Power, Ideas, and Glory" matrix certainly puts him into the "anti-endism" camp. Volten also correctly points out that "the contest between communist and democratic ideas may be over, but there are other ideas countering [international] integration and generating fragmentation."

[2]The term "*Sternstunde*" ("star hour") was coined by Austrian writer Stefan Zweig to describe an event of such force and impact that it changes the subsequent course of history.

[3]The extent of the Soviet military threat in general, and of Moscow's ability to mount a successful blitzkrieg against NATO, has long been a matter of debate among Western analysts. Ironically, the final repudiation of the case made by Western doves—that the Soviets were neither capable of nor interested in launching a "bolt-out-the-blue" large-scale offensive against Western Europe—came when the Warsaw Pact collapsed. Lothar Ruhl found, on the basis of hundreds of thousands of "classified documents" from more than 120 command centers and archives of the East German National People's Army (NVA), that "although Soviet Warsaw Pact officials claimed publicly throughout the Cold War era that NATO posed a military threat to the East, Soviet and NVA forces made few defensive preparations and conducted few defensive exercises prior to 1988. Instead, their operational plans contained several options for offensive warfare against Western Europe." See "Offensive Defense in the Warsaw Pact," *Survival* (London), September/October 1991, p. 442. As far as the nuclear threat is concerned, although Russia is likely to retain some intercontinental nuclear forces, it is difficult to conceive of any scenario where it might decide to launch a nuclear strike against the United States or Western Europe.

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der a unified command, disputes immediately arose as to which forces fit that description. By January 12, 1992, the struggle over the control of the Black Sea fleet was over; arguably, however, that controversy was a harbinger of things to come.

Given the sentiments expressed by most members of the CIS, the most likely outcome is the complete breakup of the Soviet military establishment, with each former republic forming its own army. At times, Ukrainian officials have argued that they needed to create a republic force of as many as 400,000; however, economic realities are forcing them to scale down their military ambitions.

The demise of the Warsaw Pact—heretofore seemingly poised to march westward at a moment's notice—combined with Moscow's pursuit of a more benign foreign policy[4] also dramatically alters Western military requirements for various Third World contingencies. Just as significant—and here Fukuyama's thesis, stripped of its more extravagant trappings, is correct—is the disappearance of communism as an ideological force on the world scene. It is no longer capable of providing a viable model of governance for either the Third World or developed countries.[5]

BEYOND these generally favorable outcomes, the recent *Sternstunde* has, regrettably, also unleashed a whole host of troublesome developments, ranging from outright threats to Western security to more amorphous and uncertain challenges. Indeed, in several important instances, the same postcommunist phenomena have both negative and positive consequences.

Take, for example, the end of any serious prospects that the USSR would launch a deliberate nuclear strike against the West. The specter of nuclear Armageddon that justifiably dominated much of the post–World War II Western security planning has disappeared. Soviet decisions to reduce the alert status of its nuclear forces and to open ultra-secret nuclear installations to Western visitors, as well as Moscow's professed interest in renegotiating the 1972 ABM (anti-ballistic missile) treaty so as to allow joint strategic defense deployments are steps unthinkable only yesterday. Unfortunately, along with this momentous progress came a lot of other baggage, which collectively has strained the traditional fabric of nuclear deterrence. To begin with, the end of the Soviet threat has reinforced the already strong anti-nuclear sentiments among West European populations and their elites, placing in jeopardy both the preservation of NATO's nuclear posture, and, in the long run, perhaps even the viability of the British and French national nuclear programs.

Even more significant, the breakup of the Soviet Union has the potential for creating, at least temporarily, four new major nuclear powers—Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. To be sure, Russia and the other parties involved appear to be acting responsibly, while trying to develop some kind of collective control over the existing nuclear assets. The removal of the nuclear weapons from the non-Russian territories eventually won out as the preferred option, with all of the parties reaching agreement on this issue; the dismantling of tactical nuclear devices was accorded top priority. The fact that the Bush Administration stressed the denuclearization of non-Russian members of the CIS contributed to the progress made.[6]

It is difficult to predict, however, how all these good intentions will survive the pressures of nationalism, ethnic strife, and possible military conflict among different remnants of the Soviet empire. Predictions of a possible civil war have become a staple of many a Western pundit. Indeed, according to newspaper accounts, concern about this prospect has been expressed by senior US officials, including Secretaries James Baker and Richard Cheney, and CIA Director Robert Gates.

Particularly unsettling is the possibility that the military would become more involved in the domestic politics of the CIS. According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, this has already happened. Soviet officers in

[4]To be sure, Soviet foreign policy, even since the advent of "new thinking," has not been altogether devoid of anti-Western themes. Thus, for example, while Moscow failed to exercise its veto power in the United Nations Security Council to block military operations by the anti–Saddam Hussein coalition, its behavior in the waning days of the Gulf war was far from exemplary. Likewise, Moscow's newly professed enthusiasm about international organizations and international law has not been entirely selfless. Many a great power on the decline has rediscovered the virtues of multilateral cooperation in lieu of unilateral actions. However, whatever concerns one might have felt about Soviet foreign policy were put to rest after the events of last August. The breakup of the Soviet Union, the economic collapse of the Soviet economy, the imminent withering away of the Soviet military machine, and last, but not least, the pervasive internal strife that dominates today's Russian heartland make it most unlikely that Russia, or any other former constituent member of the USSR, will pursue a global foreign policy of an interventionist variety. This is not to say, of course, that such countries as Russia or Ukraine might not eventually re-emerge as major European powers, or that the former Soviet Central Asian republics might not play a prominent role in the affairs of the Near East.

[5]Still, it is conceivable that some revolutionary movements may continue to be inspired by various versions of Marxism, particularly a variety—e.g., Maoist or Trotskyite—that has rejected the Soviet brand of communist orthodoxy all along.

[6]In fact, the dynamism of the Administration's policy toward the non-Russian members of the CIS caused hard-line Russian newspapers to complain that Secretary of State James Baker "has traveled to more capitals of the former USSR and had spent more time in them than any of his Russian colleagues. By himself, Baker has managed to do more than the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and any of its envoys, who clearly prefer excursions to the West to trying to patch up holes left by the former Soviet government." See Viktor Linnik, "Ten Question Marks Remain After James Baker's Visit," *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 19, 1992.

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the Baltic republics are reportedly demanding a voice in any negotiation over troop redeployments. Meanwhile, "military personnel, including perhaps at least one senior commander, have joined with ethnic Russians in the Dniester region in an effort to obstruct Moldovan independence.[7] Military discontent seems to be running high, with "quality-of-life issues"—e.g., lack of housing for troops withdrawn from Eastern Europe—being as important as, if not more important than, traditional military concerns about the strength of the Soviet defense posture. Given the generational, ethnic, ideological, and other tensions within the military, it is also conceivable that instead of opting for any course of action as a unified institution, it might splinter, with different military leaders going their separate ways.[8]

One also must be concerned about the specter of nuclear terrorism. The possibility exists that nuclear devices could become tools in the hands of various radical movements that might operate on the territory of the former Soviet Union. It is also entirely conceivable that despite the best efforts of all concerned, some of the Soviet nuclear materials or technical expertise might find their way into the international markets, available to the highest bidder, including the numerous radical Third World regimes and terrorist organizations that have long expressed an interest in a nuclear bomb of their own. None of this, of course, is inevitable.[9] Indeed, in contrast to the erstwhile traditional calculus of deterrence, it is now very difficult to assign any specific probability to any of these contingencies; their import is sufficiently grave, however, to make them real challenges to Western security.

Nuclear matters aside, the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the USSR has left in its wake enough political, economic, and ethnic tensions to last a generation and fuel many an armed conflict. As is evident by now, the problems in the former USSR have not been resolved merely because the 15 former republics have been able to assert their independence from the Union. The events in Checheno-Ingushetia demonstrate that many of the republics contain restless minorities of their own, eager for various forms of self-determination, including outright independence. And the situations in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Crimea are symptomatic of the crazy quilt of territorial conflicts bequeathed by the USSR. It would be the height of optimism to hope that all of these problems can be resolved peacefully. Indeed, as Volten correctly observes, the foreign policies of the newly emerging states may well be shaped by the quest for glory, which could increase the prospects for ethnic bloodshed and cross-border violence.

It is also far from certain that genuine democracy and free-market economies can be established and maintained over the long haul in all of the former Soviet republics or in all Eastern and Central European countries.[10] Indeed, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, only three former Soviet-bloc countries have a good chance of successfully completing the transition to democracy: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.[11] Although communism is unlikely again to be embraced by many of the denizens of the former USSR, one can certainly envision regimes of an authoritarian stripe which might want to pursue an expansionist policy vis-à-vis their neighbors.

The course of Russian foreign policy is far from being set. As Brzezinski eloquently described in the article cited above, "the question dominating Russian politics is the very definition of Russia itself . . . [and] the answer is likely to be derived from an external issue: the course of Russian-Ukrainian relations . . . . A strong and stable Ukraine of some 52 million people would mean automatically that Russia had become a post-imperial state."[12] However, a good-neighbor policy vis-à-vis Ukraine will not come naturally to Moscow. To the extent that Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn accurately captures Russia's subconscious, it is significant that he, while calling for a decolonialization of the Soviet Union, has consistently maintained that Russians and Ukrainians are the same people and that Ukrainian independence is unthinkable.[13]

The possibility that Islamic fundamentalism, albeit of a different variety than that of Iran, might gain the allegiance of the political elites and publics in Central Asia is also quite alarming. In the long run, what transpires

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[7]RFE/RL Research Institute, *Soviet/East European Report* (Munich), Dec. 20, 1991, p. 4.

[8]Signs of tension within the Russian military establishment abound. For example, Aleksandr Rutskoy, Russia's vice president, warned that the military's patience was not unlimited and that its support of the CIS agreement was far from enthusiastic. The abrupt firing on December 7, 1991, of General Vladimir Lobov, chief of the General Staff, also attests to the ongoing dispute among senior military leaders. Likewise, the fact that both Gorbachev and Yel'tsin heavily courted the generals in the weeks preceding Gorbachev's resignation demonstrated the continuing importance in Soviet political life of the military's support.

[9]Significantly, both CIS authorities and Western leaders are working together to cope with this problem—a cooperation poignantly symbolized by Secretary of State Baker's visit to a Soviet nuclear weapons research facility during his recent trip to the CIS. Such notions as having Western facilities provide jobs for displaced Soviet scientists are being actively pursued, with a special Western center to be established in the near future.

[10]The possibility of a democratic political order's being subverted by economic privation and ethnic tensions is not entirely theoretical—the examples of both the Weimar Republic and Lebanon readily come to mind.

[11]"The West Adrift: Vision in Search of Strategy," *The Washington Post*, Mar. 1, 1992.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *Rebuilding Russia*, New York, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1991. The view appears to be shared by a number of prominent Russian officials.

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there may well affect the political destiny of such countries as Turkey and Pakistan, and of the Near East in general.[14] Even more fundamental, various developments in the CIS—ranging from clashes of arms to terrorism and flows of refugees—could adversely affect West European security.

WHAT about solutions? How can Western power and influence best be brought to bear to foster positive developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? Volten is accurate in portraying both the high expectations of Western assistance shared by peoples of the region and the strong political, economic, and institutional constraints felt by the Western political leaders in responding.[15] Compounding the difficult substantive issues are some serious institutional problems. As Volten points out, NATO, for decades a centerpiece of Western security strategy in Europe, is an "institution under threat." Everybody agrees that the West should still hedge against the possibility of military threats reemerging from within Eastern and Central Europe. The most likely threat scenario is not a deliberate aggression, but rather a military conflict involving East European states or CIS members that would spill over into Western Europe. It is difficult, however, to translate the hedging concept into a viable military strategy, or tie it to a specific force posture.[16]

Likewise, the expectations that NATO might be turned into a purely political organization are mostly just wishful thinking. To be sure, at least since the days of the 1967 Harmel Report, political considerations have been an important component of NATO's raison d'être. The Europeans felt that political and arms control dialogue with the Warsaw Pact had to supplement "forward defense" and nuclear deterrence in NATO's overall security architecture. Yet, NATO has always been primarily a military organization, and the prospects of successfully converting it into a more multidimensional entity are not great. In essence, trying to reform NATO too much is just as risky as not doing enough to tackle new geopolitical challenges.

In addition to NATO, there have emerged other institutions that might deal with European security issues —for example, the West European Union, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Community. Some bilateral arrangements also exist between West European countries, e.g., those between France and Germany. Unfortunately, the whole may be less than the sum of all these parts. In fact, to this point, the record of these institutions in coping with East European–related security problems has been uninspiring. Neither the CSCE nor the EC has been able to play a decisive role in the Yugoslav situation. Indeed, one can argue that the failure of the Europeans to take an early, strong stance against the Serbian invasion of Croatia was a symbolic and highly visible failure to deal with the first major post–cold war challenge to European security. Its implications may well be felt far beyond Yugoslavia, as other potential aggressors in Eastern and Central Europe may not be much deterred by the threat of West European sanctions or military intervention.

Moreover, the friction and the tensions among the conflicting institutional arrangements have led to a somewhat unfortunate preoccupation with issues of institutions and process—e.g., should the WEU become the military arm of the EC, or, should the CSCE become more institutionalized?—at the expense of substantive issues. All of this does not mean, of course, that the West has no options. What it does suggest is that along with the jubilation of winning the cold war, there is a real need for some serious thinking on how to organize Western security in the years ahead.

[14]Some Western scholars argue that fundamentalist Islam is incompaptible with "Western-style representative democracy." See, for example, Amos Perlmutter, "Wishful Thinking About Islamic Fundamentalism," *The Washington Post*, Jan. 19, 1992.

[15]These constraints, among other things, are attributable to the EC's continuing identity crisis, with different members espousing sharply divergent views on how the community should evolve in the years ahead, and on what roles should be played by individual West European states. While British opposition to the notion of a "federal" nature of the EC has been the most overt sign of intra-EC differences, there are arguably enough additional troubling issues pertaining to such questions as how to balance Germany's economic muscle, how to avoid turning the EC into a French-German political condominium where the influence of small members would be marginal, etc. And while preoccupied with the debates about the EC's "deepening," the community must deal with the problems of "broadening," as a number of Northern, Southern, and Central European states are clamoring for admission as full EC members. Granting "associate" status to candidates is clearly only an intermediate solution.

[16]Moreover, as evidenced by European reactions to US Vice President Dan Quayle's recent comments at the annual Wehrkunde conference in Munich, which described the close nexus between economic and security issues, hand-wringing and America-bashing remain popular with European pundits. In general, cataloging NATO's ills appears to be much easier than determining how to create a new European security architecture.

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International Broadcasting in a Changing World

Chase Untermeyer

There has been a lot of celebrating lately about the end of communism in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere, and that is quite proper, for we have much to celebrate (even while, through the champagne bubbles, we see the suffering of millions of Chinese, Cubans, Vietnamese, and others). If there has been a party, then it is time to turn off the lights and climb the stairs to nurse our heads. And as we climb, we are reminded of the famous poem by Hughes Mearns:

As I was going up the stair,
I met a man who wasn't there.
He wasn't there again today.
I wish, I wish he'd stay away.

The little man may not be named Karl or Friedrich or Vladimir because it is no longer chic to call oneself a Marxist or Leninist (though there are still Maoists on the loose, and murderously so, in places like Peru and the Philippines). But we know this little man: He is the same spirit who came to Karl Marx at his desk in the British Museum, and throughout human history, he has come and will come again and again—it is the call for the redistribution of goods by the state—either in its humanitarian version as a means of helping the poor or in its viler form as an expression of envy or revenge.

The Tenth Commandment has been in effect for 35 centuries, and yet men continue to covet their neighbors' belongings, which are made all the more attractive because someone else worked for them. Perhaps in recognition of the tides of history and this element of human nature, Lenin himself said in 1921:

Revolution never proceeds along a straight track with continuous expansion along the way. Instead, it is like a chain made up of outbursts and retreats, attacks and tranquility, during which time the revolutionary forces can strengthen themselves and prepare for ultimate victory.

In short, all that we have been celebrating has been the collapse of *regimes*, the most transitory of human devices. Other abiding dangers are still with us and can act very swiftly to spoil our party.

The Wall may be down, but the walls of hatred, envy, and distrust remain strong and intact to divide nations. Communist rulers may have been ousted, but the commissars of avarice, ambition, and cruelty remain very much in power, with all their privileges, easily able to oppress their own people or commit aggression against their neighbors. Their banners may lack hammers and sickles (or swastikas for that matter), but they can still cause mayhem wherever they are unfurled.

As proof of how quickly world conditions can change, let us recall the way things were in that last happy year, 1929. That was the era of glowing international cooperation, of disarmament, a time when there were grand treaties, sincerely signed, to outlaw war as a means of settling disputes. The biggest dispute was over the repayment of war debts, which was about as

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violent as a discussion of arrearages in a gentlemen's club. In 1929, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson closed down the State Department's so-called Black Chamber, its code-cracking office, because, as he explained, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail." Stimson was not a naïve man. He took this step because (in the words of his authorized biographer, McGeorge Bundy) "The world was striving with good will for lasting peace, and in this effort all the nations were parties."[1]

But, Bundy noted, the first two years of Stimson's secretaryship were separated from the second two "as light is separated from darkness." By 1931, he wrote, "three terrible facts" had occurred to change this peaceable world kingdom:

First, the rising storm of a worldwide depression knocked down the postwar financial system as a willful child knocks down a file of tin soldiers—by toppling the little fellow in the rear rank.

Second, in an outburst stimulated by suffering, and deriving strength from the apparent failures of peaceful leadership, the military leaders of Japan undertook a major adventure in aggression [by conquering Manchuria].

Third, and most terrible of all, it soon became clear that the climate of opinion in America was such that [the US] could do no more than dull the sharpest edges of economic disaster and military aggression.[2]

My purpose is not to suggest that 1991 is 1929—for a Republican, that brings quite a shudder—but to demonstrate how rapidly world conditions can change. Indeed, they can change much faster now than 60 years ago due to the tremendous progress in communications.

Which brings us to the role of international broadcasting in such a world. American and British broadcasters—the Voice of America, Worldnet TV, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the BBC—can take justifiable pride in our role in encouraging and spreading the triumph of democratic changes in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere. Already legend are Václav Havel's testimony that VOA broadcasts gave him hope in prison; Mikhail Gorbachev's report that he depended on VOA, BBC, and the Radios to give him word of what was happening back in Moscow during his forced convalescence in the Crimea last August; and Boris Yel'tsin's urgent instruction for the democratic forces of Russia to use the US Information Agency and VOA in particular to get the word out to his people that tanks were surrounding the Russian White House.

The question I am often asked is "What is the role of the Voice of America now that communism is dead or dying?" I reply that VOA was never intended to be a sort of verbal NATO, to resist communism or oppose the USSR. Its original purpose, when founded more than 50 years ago in the worst days of World War II, was to give the straight news of the world and to tell the story of America—and if in the postwar world, someone wanted to draw the conclusion that our system and way of life were preferable to that in the Soviet Union or China, then, well, that was the right conclusion.

Perhaps my questioners confuse VOA with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. They, too, are wholly funded by the United States government, but they are independent of the US Information Agency and are so-called surrogate broadcasters, who aim to act as Czech or Polish or Ukrainian radio stations in lieu of the real thing. The distinction has been defined this way: when VOA says "we" it means we Americans; when Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty say "we," they mean we Hungarians, we Uzbeks, we Romanians, etc.

Clearly, the Radios have successfully performed their mission, and we are within sight of the day when their missions can be successfully concluded. But not quite yet: most urgently the leaders of the new democracies in Eastern Europe, primarily Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, have begged the United States (meaning in fact the Office of Management and Budget) to keep broadcasting Radio Free Europe to their countries until they have developed their local media and a corps of independent journalists.

Another famous pair of surrogate broadcasters that are under the aegis of USIA are Radio and TV Marti, which, of course, broadcast entirely to Cuba. Radio Marti has been extraordinarily popular; almost 80 percent of the island's population are regular listeners. TV Marti is more limited because it only broadcasts two and one-half hours of predawn programming every day. But its programming has provided and will continue to provide solid news and information to those people who are willing to get up to watch it and are able to watch it despite the jamming.

There is a proposal pending for another sort of surrogate broadcaster, namely, a Radio Free China or a Radio Free Asia. A very broad coalition on Capitol Hill favors it; the Administration is officially neutral but has agreed to cooperate with a commission to study this question.

VOA is not engaged in a bureaucratic turf battle on this issue because we feel very strongly that what mat-

[1]Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, New York, Harper, 1948, p. 188.
[2]Ibid., p. 190–91.

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ters most is not what one agency or another feels in Washington but whether the listener in Shanghai or Pyongyang or Hue would gain more from having a new broadcaster or from having a strengthened Voice of America. And meanwhile, VOA continues to broadcast more than 21 hours a day to China in Mandarin, Cantonese, Tibetan, and English. I might add that only the English service is free of jamming.

In the postcommunist world of Eastern Europe and elsewhere, VOA and Worldnet TV have a continuing mission to help provide basic instruction in democracy-building and the mechanism of the free market. Even the most rudimentary things, such as how to run a meeting, how to get a loan, and what *The Federalist Papers* say, are very avidly listened to by our East European audiences.

To make the final point that the Voice of America is not an old cold-war tool, two recent examples having nothing to do with East-West politics or ideology demonstrate the abiding need for international broadcasting. The first is Haiti, where a democratically elected government was tossed out, and to this day the only reliable news and information the Haitian people can obtain in the language of Creole is from the Voice of America. The second is Burma, where Aung San Suu Kyi won the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize. Word of her success and what it symbolized to the people of Burma wishing for a democratic future were conveyed by the two international broadcasters in Burmese—the Voice of America and the BBC. When she won the prize, *The Wall Street Journal* said that it was uncertain whether Aung San Suu Kyi heard the report inasmuch as she has been incommunicado for two years. "But it is certain that Burma's 40 million citizens know of the award through the BBC and the Voice of America and are rejoicing. Any signal that the outside world knows of Burma's suffering can only encourage those who would end it."[3]

So even if communism is as dead as a Moscow phone line, there will be a significant, vital role for the Voice of America and all international broadcasters. As long as men insist on oppressing others, there will be a need for free, strong voices from afar to provide the news, and more important, to provide hope. As Archibald MacLeish once observed, "There are those who will say that the liberation of mind and of man is only a dream, and they are right. It is the American Dream."

[3]Cait Murphy, ". . . And a Beacon for Burma," *Wall Street Journal* (New York), Oct. 17, 1991.

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China: Transition Postponed?

Vivienne Shue

Accidents will happen. This is one of the axioms of human history that is neglected, sometimes, by social scientists. Our work, after all, is to make order out of the disorder of experience. We summarize trends, deduce patterns, trace lines of coherence and conflict, analyze processes, gauge probable outcomes, and such. Although some among us (still) seem to regret it, we are artisans much more than scientists in the kind of work we do. We draw strands out of the ubiquitous, but indiscriminate, social tangle, and from them spin out skeins of human action and belief, which we then knit together into stories of ourselves: sagas, some of them, others only parables. Accidents of history, like dropped stitches, mock our skill and make our handiwork look sloppy and uneven; so we try our best to avoid, or else to disguise, them.

During the early days of mounting opposition to the August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union, I was among those who were initially attracted to the theory that Mikhail Gorbachev had had a hand in encouraging the reactionaries to make a grab for power. I even imagined that he and Boris Yel'tsin might have planned the coup together. The ignominious failure of the conservatives played so directly into the reformers' hands—first, by shifting the domestic political discourse so decisively against the party and the KGB, toward constitutionalism and the rule of law, and second, by reopening the question of Western economic assistance—that it only made sense to suppose that such an outcome was not accidental, but created by design. After all, the experts on Soviet affairs and the press analysts had kept us well informed about the complicated processes that would follow if meaningful structural reforms were to go forward and about the enormity of the obstacles inhibiting those processes. It was asking a lot to believe that such arduous and ponderous social processes could be so suddenly accelerated by the snap decisions of a couple of tank commanders positioned outside the Yel'tsin White House.

However, by the time the apparently dazed Gorbachev made it back to Moscow, emerging but slowly from the time warp of his house arrest, not only were conspiracy theories getting tougher to cling to, the very manageability of political change seemed to be in doubt. The "contingency" of history is not often so visible to the naked eye as it was last August.

The experts on Soviet affairs had not by any means been proven wrong, of course. After the exhilaration of the crisis, almost all the deep structural problems and obstacles they had pointed to still remained behind to menace social peace and bedevil efforts at economic reform. If much about Soviet political life had somehow magically changed, so, too, did much remain sickeningly the same. Still, some of the political possibilities had been unalterably affected. The disestablishment of the party, the CPSU, in Russia was truly a political bolt from the blue. The consequences of that particular shock, when they are all finally played out, are going to be felt around the world. The sudden shame of the Communist party in Russia cannot but change history, for example, in China.

Nevertheless, the main aim of this essay is to explore why a political "transition to democracy" has not and is not likely to come quickly in China. Only toward the end of the discussion will we return again to consider how accidents of history may yet shape the future and hasten change in China.

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Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping.

—AP/Wide World.

Unwarranted Assumptions

The guiding assumptions underlying much commentary on Chinese affairs these days tend to fall into two broad categories. Some observers are convinced that the political reform process was abruptly and effectively halted on June 4, 1989; that the Chinese polity, the Chinese people, now merely mark time, in a kind of suspended animation, unable to press their own history forward, able only to wait for the death of Deng Xiaoping and for the opportunities his passing will present. Others appear to believe that the forces of political reform, already well-launched in China before the most recent crackdown, are in fact unstoppable, and that fits of repressive reaction, no matter how frequent or vicious, can neither long contain the Chinese people's righteous demand for, nor ultimately prevent their progress toward, freedom and democracy. Some analyses even seem to try to deploy both these sets of ill-fitting assumptions more or less at the same time.

That the polity and the economy of China are still in the midst of a momentous "transition" from Maoist state socialism is hardly open to question. The profound tides of social change entailed in this transition, tides unleashed nearly 15 years ago, could not have been and, indeed, were not somehow simply halted by the dénouement of the political tragicomedy played out so pathetically in Tiananmen Square in 1989. However much blood was needlessly shed, however many people still pitiably waste away in labor camps in reprisal for their expressed political opinions, and however much government credibility has been squandered in the unimaginative aftermath, we would still be unwise to lose sight of the fact that the Deng Xiaoping who approved moving against the students in Tiananmen Square is the same Deng Xiaoping, after all, who was responsible for initiating China's early and audacious moves away from the irrationalities of Soviet-style central planning as well as from the phony politics of China's early-1970's ultra-left socialism. It was Deng Xiaoping who, insisting on the pragmatic separation of politics from economics, authored the first several acts in the drama of the Chinese reform. And it is Deng Xiaoping who still intermittently intervenes from behind the scenes to direct reform, remaining apparently as committed as ever to his early script.[1]

It must be remembered that a transition away from state socialism cannot be assumed necessarily, or even very probably, to eventuate in the establishment of liberal democratic capitalism. Democracy is still rare in the world. And in those places where it has managed to prevail, it has come only at the cost of generations —sometimes centuries—of violence and conflict. Capitalism, to be sure, is the bloom of a hardier weed. But even it has repeatedly encountered difficulty rooting itself in Eastern, especially East Asian, cultures. We cannot ignore the fact that capitalism has most often managed to thrive in those cultures only in symbiosis with strong, even authoritarian, states.

And as for liberalism, well—one is tempted sometimes to conclude that it scarcely exists at all, in either the East or the West. Insofar as liberalism connotes certain understandings about basic human rights, tolerance, and respect for due process, there may be less real promise of inaugurating an era of international accommodation and liberal civic peace now, at the end of the cold war, than there was at the end of World War II. The crosswinds of racism, ethnic separatism, religious fundamentalism, and class bitterness now whipping over the territory of the collapsed Soviet empire, blow also across the Near East and into Asia, everywhere advancing mistrust over tolerance, dogma over curios-

[1]But as Nina Halpern has noted, "Those Chinese elites most committed to promoting economic reform have seemingly concluded that this requires construction of a more rationalized and tolerant—but still undemocratic—political system." See Nina R. Halpern, "Economic Reform, Social Mobilization, and Democratization in Post-Mao China," in Richard Baum, Ed., *Reform and Reaction in Post-Mao China*, New York, Routledge, 1991, pp. 53–54.

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ity, and political cynicism over social idealism. Only the Candides of the world can suppose that communism's fall is likely to yield a universal advance toward liberalism. And for China, in particular, the post-socialist possibilities that look most likely today are all highly illiberal.

True, marketizing economic reform—that is, transition from a centrally planned economy—has gone much further in China than in most of the old Soviet-bloc countries, although China still is far from having a market economy. Provincial bureaucrats and local officials continue to have enormous power and scope to influence, indeed to command, the pace and direction of economic activity within their jurisdictions. Still, experts on Chinese political economy now confidently estimate that "well over half" of all economic activity in China is "beyond the control of planners in Beijing."[2] Many base such assessments not only on the new production freedoms and property relations in agriculture, but also on the dramatic expansion of what has been called the "entrepreneurial portion of the manufacturing sector of the Chinese economy," including "urban collective firms, township and village enterprises, equity joint ventures, private firms, and so forth."[3] In a recent sketch of the new shape of the Chinese economy, Nicholas Lardy concluded that "almost half of manufactured goods [in China] are now produced in a market-like setting" and that "[t]he same transformation is under way in retailing and even construction. Less than a decade ago, 80 percent of all retail sales were made by state firms. By 1988, their share had fallen to less than 40 percent."[4]

But such tremendous realignments in the economy have brought in their wake even more challenging economic problems, as well as some very frightening and potentially destabilizing social dilemmas and political tensions. A partially reformed socialist economy is, almost by definition, riven with economic contradictions and social strains. It cannot but display a disconcerting mixture of heady growth and success, on the one hand, and desperate stagnation and failure, on the other. Suddenly expanded job opportunities are more than matched by rising rates of unemployment, for example. New market freedoms that benefit some produce the pains of inflation for others, and so on.

These contradictions together with the protracted fiscal crisis of the central state, the remaining large uncertainties surrounding the future of economic reform policy, and the attendant social malaise in China have combined with the frustrations of the stalled elite succession process to create a political situation that is highly incendiary. Precisely for this reason—given the interest of almost all parties concerned to avoid either a quick slip or a gradual slide into chaos—the careful consolidation of a more stable, more authoritarian form of state/bureaucratic capitalism seems a more likely evolutionary option than the emergence of genuine popular democracy and a free-wheeling market economy.

Now, history has shown us that bureaucratic capitalism can come in several varieties, some considerably less benign than others. Indeed, quasi-fascist elements already present in the political mix of Deng Xiaoping's reform—e.g. legitimation through the single dominant mass party, a pattern of state-corporate-military interpenetration and collusion, resort to a pervasive secret police system to enforce political stability, scapegoating, irredentism, and deployment of an ideology of militant nationalism and cultural purity—could well become even more fully developed in both the structure and the political culture of Chinese state capitalism as it matures.[5]

Furthermore, developing political tendencies such as these could well be accompanied by the reappearance of a national hero, a charismatic authority figure to head the state. An authority system of this general sort could come into being either with or without the installation of an overtly military regime.

The other likely alternatives for China are not necessarily any more desirable. One possibility, a very real one in the minds of many Chinese, is a violent disintegration of the nation: a civil war that would divide the country along its rapidly widening regional fault lines, as well as along lines of class interest and political conviction. The all-too-visible rise in social violence throughout the country during recent years has brought real anxiety about disorder to many sober minds. And the regionalism that still infests both the organization and the ideology of the Chinese officer corps, and which in turn is always reflected in the mobilization and

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[2]Michel Oksenberg, "The China Problem," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), 1991, p. 5.

[3]Nicholas Lardy, "Is China Different?" in Daniel Chirot, Ed., *The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline of the Left*, Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press, 1991, p. 149. Lardy highlights the contrast with the Soviet reform process: "In short, in the period during which the Soviets have been debating whether and how to privatize land and other state assets, the share of state-managed industrial output in China has plunged. The rising share of output produced by entrepreneurial firms is all the more extraordinary because it occurred in the decade in which the average annual rate of industrial growth exceeded 12 percent."

[4]Ibid. Lardy adds: "Only in transport does the state still dominate, largely because of the continued predominant reliance on railroads for medium- and long-distance transport." p. 150.

[5]The presence of quasi-fascist tendencies in present-day Chinese politics is alluded to occasionally by analysts, but has not been systematically addressed in the West. For a thoughtful treatment, which stresses the open-endedness of China's political options at present, and which touches on this question, see Edward Friedman, "Theorizing the Democratization of China's Leninist State," in Arif Dirlik and Maurice Meisner, Eds., *Marxism and the Chinese Experience*, Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1989, pp. 171–89.

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deployment of China's huge standing armies and other forces, adds yet more good reason to worry about the consequences if the center cannot hold.

In the wake of economic reform have come not only the new social problems and tensions referred to earlier but also some undeniably liberating social and political effects: greater physical mobility for farmers; foreign contacts for intellectuals; foreign trade for businesspeople and bureaucrats; the beginnings of a unified system of laws and a legal profession; and local elections with more candidates than positions to be filled. It is from trends like these that we may perhaps still draw some hope about a democratic transition. Let us hope then. But let us also be clear just how heavy are the odds of history and of human experience that are arrayed against our hope. For now, as we all stand together squinting into the future from the twilight of the 20th century—our century of brilliant, brazen capitalism on a world scale and of technological revolution and inspiring human attainment, matched by fabulous corruption and the deep depravity of power, our century of unprecedented violence, war, and social destruction, and of valiant struggles for freedom met over and over by brutal repressions and vicious tyrannies—none of us can take much comfort in old nostrums about free markets producing free men and democracy being the inevitable accompaniment of capitalism.[6]

Obstacles to Democracy: Lessons of Tiananmen

The obstacles to democracy in China are many and profound. By and large, the nature and extent of these impediments were already well known before Tiananmen. But the tragedy of 1989 and its political aftermath have served at least to throw these obstacles into even higher relief. Each of the domestic political factors and realities listed below forms part of the explanation for why a timely transition to democracy was not really in the cards in 1989; as well as part of the explanation for why such a transition is not appreciably more likely now than it was then.

The constituency for democracy. Those groups in China for whom progress toward democracy is a primary good are small and little organized. They do not form a coherent political body or movement. Groups of democratic enthusiasts and activists are often isolated from one another geographically and are also cross-cut by class and philosophical differences. Furthermore, the individual members of such groups are, generally, quite dependent on the state—its tolerance and its largesse—for their personal careers and futures. They have to be careful critics.

The chief proponents of democratic reform are found among students, the intellectuals, and the new entrepreneurial or business classes.[7] These three groups are all urban-based, and they do not bulk large in terms of the total Chinese population. Members of these three groups, it can be argued, are among the most favored beneficiaries of the Deng Xiaoping reforms, and therefore should be relatively content with the status quo. And indeed, significant subsets of people in these categories—especially perhaps those intellectuals who have managed to send their sons and daughters overseas to study thanks to the reforms, and those entrepreneurs who have managed to make small fortunes by filling key openings in the semi-reformed economy—express more complacency than protest where democratization is concerned.

But many others from these groups have been disappointed by the reforms of the 1980's. Students and intellectuals had high hopes that, as educated people, experts, and technicians, they would enjoy much more freedom in their choice of jobs, much higher incomes, and greater social prestige, as well as the satisfaction of being taken seriously by the state in its policy-making where science, education, technological modernization, and other matters were concerned. Yet, after more than a decade of reform, the majority of intellectuals still face unwelcome job assignments, professional subordination to party hacks with seniority, low pay, poor living conditions, declining social status, and little power to influence policy against the superior weight of the entrenched party-state bureaucracy. Likewise for entrepreneurial groups, early dreams of economic empires to be built in a free market environment have too often turned into nightmares of negotiating payoffs, kickbacks, bribes, and other special deals to keep the party-state's multiplying petty regulations and petty regulators at bay. The realities of the semi-reformed economy have made corrupt business practices not an option some business people choose to enhance their competitiveness in the market, but simply a necessity for enterprise survival.

[6] If what we think most pertinent are late-20th-century lessons from the Pacific Rim, then what we already know of the experiences of Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea should serve to confirm that the development of capitalist relations in society need not be quickly accompanied by the development of democratic institutions or values.

[7] The several social groups sketched here, their fortunes under the reforms, and their consequent political inclinations are discussed in greater detail in Martin King Whyte, "The Social Sources of the Student Demonstrations," in Anthony J. Kane, Ed., *China Briefing, 1990,* Boulder, CO, 1991, pp. 47–63. For more insight into the political thinking of the intellectuals, per se, see also Leo Lee, "The Crisis of Culture," in ibid., pp. 83–105.

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For students, intellectuals, and entrepreneurs, economic reform without significant political reform has already amply demonstrated its limitations. Many members of these groups do genuinely favor an accelerated political reform process. But they do not often make common cause. Even among these urban social groupings, lines of communication are not well developed and are frequently complicated by mutual dislike and mistrust. Intellectuals tend to regard the world of venture capital as uncultured and businesspeople as driven only by crass material interest, while crediting themselves and their students with loftier motives and values. For their part, entrepreneurs and business people view intellectuals as well-meaning but out of touch with reality, and when push comes to shove, always too willing and eager to serve the state. The protests of 1989 brought members of these groups together in the streets of Beijing and other cities. But in periods of ordinary politics, they do not manage to coalesce in civil organizations or even in identifiable political blocs.

Foes of reform. More important, the inclinations toward political reform manifest among the urban intelligentsia and business communities are more than offset by the indifference—or outright opposition—to further reform that emanates from other, much larger, groups in both urban and rural China. The vast army of people on the state payroll in China—especially state-sector industrial workers, low-level and middle-level party and state officials, members of the police force, and both military officers and members of the rank and file—all these groups have had reason to feel threatened by the economic reforms already put in place and are openly hostile to political reform ideas which might shake further Communist party dominance and the autonomy or solvency of the state apparatus.

State-sector industrial workers received long-overdue wage increases at the early stages of the reform process. But recent years have brought them face to face with much less welcome elements of reformism. There has been open worker hostility to the attempts to break the "iron rice bowl" by replacing guaranteed lifelong job tenure with shorter-term employment contracts, and by giving plant managers more authority to hire and fire and to allocate or withhold bonuses and other benefits. These initiatives, along with the heightening competition from non-state firms, the periodic spates of inflation obliging workers either to limit consumption or cut into savings, and new legislation permitting state enterprises to declare bankruptcy, have quite naturally produced a backlash of working class conservatism and nostalgia for the old securities of state socialism.

Middle- and lower-level state and party bureaucrats, the police, and the military have generally emerged from the Deng Xiaoping reform years with at best only marginal salary increases and many more reasons for apprehension and dissatisfaction than they had before. Since the market reforms began in the countryside and only later (and less powerfully) affected the cities and towns, urban petty officials have not enjoyed the freedom of their country comrades to quit their jobs and go into moneymaking enterprises. They have, instead, remained relatively low-paid cogs in the mammoth bureaucratic machine. Even the social prestige of their work and their personal authority and influence within their local jurisdictions have tended to decline. They have, in addition, been hassled by new demands to go back to school, to raise their technical or administrative proficiency, and to pick up the formerly lackadaisical pace of their work and learn to compete more for bonuses, promotions, and other benefits that previously were assured. The competitive, professional, juvenizing, and meritocratic aspects of the political/bureaucratic reform programs to date are all quite threatening to these groups, making them nostalgic for the old days when being "red" was better than being "expert" and when the party-state's authority seemed unchallenged and unchallengeable. These groups are highly suspicious of demands for "democracy," and are inclined to see such demands as a convenient cover for those whose actual motives are to unseat the party, take over the army, bring down the establishment, and undo all that socialism has stood for. By and large, members of these groups did not join the protests in 1989. And some who did held aloft posters of Chairman Mao.

Peasants and other rural people. Approximately 75 percent of the Chinese people still live and work in the countryside. That is about 825,000,000 people. Despite some concerted effort at population control in recent years, and despite the opening up of many new non-farm job opportunities in the countryside during the reform period, we nevertheless must estimate that there are at least 100 to 150 million more people dependent wholly or partly on farming now living in China than there were when Deng Xiaoping took power 15 years ago.

Chinese peasants today, as always, generally maintain a posture of knowing little and caring less about high politics or the great political issues of their time. When pressed on whether it would be desirable to have more democracy, they likely will say that they are for it in principle, but that having wise and able leaders is much more important than the extent of democracy for the welfare of the Chinese people. When the ruler is good,

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that is when the righteous demands of the people have the best chance to be heard. Chinese peasants today, like most peasants in the world most of the time, do not place democracy very high on their list of political values and demands.

This is not to say that they do not have political values and demands that would be well served by a more democratic system. China's peasants, both those trapped in the less rapidly developing sections of the country and those who have witnessed astonishing rates of economic growth and change in recent years, have many very real grievances and needs that now attain little if any expression in national-level politics. Victimization by corrupt local officials, vulnerability to capricious taxation, poor state planning and provision of basic farm services, continuing sub-standard education and health services in the countryside—these are but a few of the most pressing issues. But in the minds of most rural people, even such fundamentally important and, to them, burning, issues as these tend to be conceived in highly localized terms, and are not linked to national-level policy choices or political debates. To link these widespread peasant problems to the discourse on democracy in Beijing would take some very skillful coalition-building by democracy activists. And their work has been made harder by the fact that most people in China—both urban and rural—firmly believe that the greatest benefits of the Deng Xiaoping reforms, in terms of enhanced freedom, prosperity, and opportunity, have already accrued in the countryside. Most urban Chinese bitterly resent the newfound prosperity of farmers and small-town residents. And most peasants are well aware that urban resentment affords them little chance for a fair hearing either in the halls of power, or in the homes of "pro-democracy" intellectuals and business people.

Tactics of protest. Clearly, the raw material for social protest is in plentiful supply in China now. The galling irrationalities of the only partly reformed reward structure, when set in the larger Chinese context of enduring poverty and privation, unprecedented and increasingly unmanageable pressures on ever more scarce national resources, and widespread government corruption plus painful policy drift, make it easy enough to understand why social life in China is so riddled with resentment, mistrust, and apprehension. The great gloating mega-buck winners in the roulette game of reform are also plainly visible to all. They are the high-ranking military and civilian officials who early on sent their children and grandchildren abroad for study, and who now keep Swiss bank accounts and ride around in chauffeured Mercedes-Benz cars with dark-tinted windows, looking after their interests in diverse and lucrative foreign trade ventures. These crafty old communist regulars flagrantly utilized their privileged access to information, contacts, and resources to play all the crooked angles in the partially reformed economy. They and their children now enjoy fabulous wealth and personal pampering by Chinese standards. The nepotism and corruption of these high-ranking families have earned them the contempt they deserve from ordinary people who love their country but still must struggle daily for a decent life.

Not only the restless raw material, then, but also the corpulent targets for angry protest are clearly in place. The Tiananmen agitators, hoping to shock the phlegmatic gerontocrats back into some form of popular consciousness, could hardly have asked for a better-made issue or for a target group more worthy of shakedown. And, as Elizabeth Perry has pointed out in a very interesting recent study, it was precisely anticorruption that was in many ways the major theme uniting protesters from different social groups in 1989. She quotes Fang Lizhi:

"The corruption is so obvious now. People see it every day in their factories and offices. Everybody understands what is going on. The blatant profiteering of state officials is now the focal point of the movement because it is this profiteering that has directly led to the failure of the economic reform."

And, Perry adds:

An attitude survey conducted in Beijing at about the same time provided support for Fang's assertions; the overwhelming majority of respondents saw anticorruption as the most important goal of the movement and predicted that corruption was the most likely precipitant of future unrest in China.[8]

Yet even with the benefits of a seemingly paralyzed sitting government, worldwide satellite television coverage, spirit-galvanizing rock music, and sympathy-generating hunger strikes, the protesters ultimately failed even to wound their opponents with the weapons of their social anger. Before June, the 1989 phase of protest was dwindling in the face of official intimidation. It was finally put down with bloody force, force that, inside China anyway, was widely assumed to have been deployed both prudently and necessarily.

Perry argues that a good part of the explanation for

[8]Elizabeth J. Perry, "Intellectuals and Tiananmen: Historical Perspective on an Aborted Revolution," in Chirot, op. cit., p. 135.

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this can be found in the tactics of protest selected. The students assumed that prodemocracy movement leadership was theirs by right since only they could take the high road of disinterested principle. The moral imperative of their call for democracy, they believed, ought not to be sullied by association with the vulgar demands of other groups for mere material benefit. The workers and peasants of China, needless to say, have rich histories of militant protest of their own upon which to draw. But protesting students and intellectuals made little effort to reach out to groups like these, to educate themselves about worker or peasant grievances, or to make common cause with them in the streets.

In fact, Fang Lizhi and other movement leaders have expressed only horror at a democratic formula that would give equal voting rights to peasants.[9] The aim of reform, as Fang and many other Chinese "democrats" see it, is to achieve greater voice for people like themselves—educated, cultured people, people dedicated to modernization, to progress, and to the gradual process of guided popular enlightenment that will eventually take the danger of political atavism out of democracy. Indeed, many young Chinese intellectuals in the late 1980's were expressing unbounded admiration for what they called the "new authoritarian" regimes of South Korea, Singapore, and even Taiwan. A system of that sort, a benevolent dictatorship, headed by a single strong leader, but resting on the active participation of enlightened technocrats and experts—a "transitional" system that would not threaten but instead ultimately strengthen state power—that was what the majority of protesters were most hoping to see realized in China.[10]

Accordingly, the student protesters of 1989 first adopted not a militant but a remonstrating tone toward their rulers. They presented petitions and asked for a dialogue with those in power. They wanted to be let in; they wanted to be allowed to help their rulers rule, as they saw it, more wisely.[11] By doing so, they "engaged in an exclusionist style of protest that served to reinforce preexisting authority relations."[12]

The point of focusing briefly on a few of the weaknesses of the democracy movement is neither to lay blame nor to suggest that a broader alliance strategy would necessarily have succeeded somehow in toppling the government in 1989. As indicated, the forces of conservatism in the army, the party, and in society at large are much too broad and much too deep to be so simplistically dismissed. The point, rather, is to suggest that if democratic activists are ever to be a match for their opponents in the Chinese system, they are going to have to begin by broadening their alliance and by working out concrete policy proposals with wider relevance and appeal to the people. Yet since 1989, we have seen few signs of such a self-critical reassessment taking place among Chinese student leaders and democratic intellectuals. After more than two years of crackdown and recovery, the gulf separating the democratic intelligentsia from the masses of politically restive people in China seems as great now as before, maybe greater.

The Forces of Reaction

In the aftermath of the crackdown, a few other important lessons about Chinese politics also have been driven home. First, widespread popular fear of political chaos encourages a high level of tolerance for official coercion in the system. Whether it be capital punishment for people convicted of "economic crimes," or beatings and long prison sentences for democratic activists, the Chinese people at large do not shrink from harsh justice as meted out by the party-state. They support it.

Second, insofar as popular unrest is fueled by factors such as runaway inflation, soft credit, poor price regulation, and unemployment, the political situation is amenable to stabilization through better economic management. This has in fact been the heart of the leadership's response to the crisis of 1989, and by and large, its economic austerity and retrenchment measures have yielded good results.[13] Better management of the marketizing economy yielding steadier signs of healthy growth may be expected in China, as elsewhere in Asia, to contain or postpone popular demands for democratic freedoms. As Lardy pointedly notes:

No doubt over the long run a competitive market economy must be paired with a pluralistic political system. But authoritarian governments in East Asia

[9]See Perry, loc. cit., pp. 134–35; and also Richard C. Kraus, "The Lament of Astrophysicist Fang Lizhi: China's Intellectuals in a Global Context," in Dirlik and Meisner, op. cit., pp. 294–325.

[10]The clear resonance of these very-late-20th-century ideas and yearnings with Sun Yat-sen's early-20th-century political philosophy, especially with Sun's notions concerning a necessary period of "political tutelage" prior to the attainment of democracy, is most remarkable.

[11]As Perry, whose essay emphasizes historical continuities with student protests and Chinese intellectual proclivities of the past, points out: "Educated Chinese have tended to identify closely with the regime in power. For much of imperial history, this identification was of course institutionalized in the examination system; the highest honor for a Confucian scholar was to win an official position by an outstanding examination performance. Although a vigorous tradition of remonstrance did develop among Chinese intellectuals, it remained for the most part within officially prescribed channels. In contrast to early modern Europe, an alienated academy did not emerge in China until the 20th century under foreign tutelage." Loc. cit., p. 131.

[12]Ibid., p. 143.

[13]Lardy, loc. cit., p. 153 and passim.

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pursued market driven economic growth for decades without relaxing their hold on political power. Only after sustained economic growth had created per capita incomes several times those of present-day China did pressures for political reform become compelling.[14]

Third, if the 1989 political mobilization in China was unexpected and surprising to many, so too was the ensuing demobilization and apparent inertia. Even as runaways from the bloody scene at Tiananmen were still furtively making their way out of the country on the tenuous lines of an underground railroad manned by unusually courageous citizens, the great majority of people all over China were falling in behind the new official line. Most of them did so with little enthusiasm; some of them, with open disgust. But they did so. It is worth bearing in mind that a "civil society"—a sphere of non–state-dominated public activity, a vantage point from which it is possible to reject the state's claims to authority and legitimacy while, in this very act, reaffirming the value of alternative social organizations, units, networks, or rituals—such a realm has not yet developed in China to anything like the degree that it has in Eastern Europe or, for that matter, the former Soviet Union. People in China, especially urban China, either fall in with the official line or invite near-total social isolation and shunning. Truly independent, non–state-penetrated civil associations, ethnic and religious organizations, professional associations, women's groups, and self-help societies, for example, can provide individual members with an alternative sense of belonging, of purpose, and of social meaning which, when summed together, may serve as a countervailing force to official authority. More and more such groups are very gradually coming into being in China, but the activities of hardly any of them are as yet genuinely independent.[15] The weakness of civil society in contemporary China, and the tentativeness of its development so far under the reforms, will likely continue to contribute, in crises to come, to the ease with which the embattled state may put down its opponents in society.

Internal Causes, External Effects

The domestic logic impeding a democratic transition in China is then fairly clear. And it is the domestic logic that dominates. But international aspects of the situation are also important, and should not be allowed to go entirely without comment. Here, since space is limited, let us point to just three sets of sometimes overlooked international ramifications of the disaster at Tiananmen, ramifications that, in turn, are likely to feed back into future efforts to hasten democratic change.

The people living in the West who were hardest hit both by euphoria during the spring protests and by revulsion in its aftermath were undoubtedly the tens of thousands of Chinese students and scholars studying and working abroad. Many of them had earnestly intended to return to China to pursue their careers, but as a consequence of the post-Tiananmen political repression, they felt forced to make other plans for their future. Now almost none seriously discusses returning home. In losing these young people, Deng Xiaoping has sacrificed not only some of China's most sophisticated observers of the Western world, but also some of its own best, and best-trained, scholarly and scientific minds. The loss is significant. Yet, with every passing month and year, it becomes less and less likely that it can be recouped.

The remainder of the TV audience in the US, Canada, and Europe, it seems, was almost as deeply moved by what was presented to it as a noble, if youthful, struggle for freedom first toyed with and then trampled on by a handful of tyrants who should have retired 10 or 20 years ago. As a result, considerable complications have arisen in China's relations with most of the Western nations. In particular, the setbacks in scholarly, scientific, diplomatic, and commercial contacts have been serious. And as has been repeatedly pointed out to some (still!) uncomprehending members of the US Congress, such setbacks ultimately hurt the democratic forces in China much more than they harm the party-state establishment. Even more significant, for all of us perhaps, has been the more modulated nature of the Japanese response to Tiananmen. Already well ahead of all Western nation traders in the Chinese market, they have not let compunctions about human rights violations slow by much their cultivation of contracts or their rate of investment. With the Soviets out of the picture, and US and European traders and businessmen still scowling, the Japanese have been handed additional time and political space in which to consolidate their leadership as key foreign investors in China's future. This, in turn, is likely to have important effects both on the ultimate trajectory of foreign sector development in the Chinese economy, and on the receptivity of Chinese business to US and European trade and investment, once the rift is finally repaired and Western companies are prepared again to consider searching for Chinese partners.

[14]Ibid., p. 147.

[15]See my "State Power and Social Organization in China," in Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, Eds., *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in Asia, Africa, and Latin America*, forthcoming.

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Students carry the head of the "Goddess of Democracy" into Tiananmen Square.

—Reuters/Bettmann.

The effect of the 1989 crackdown on Hong Kong politics and economics has received somewhat more attention in the West than these first two issues. In Hong Kong too, quite interestingly, the change of mood seems to have worked to serve the purposes of Japanese venture capital. Business confidence sank again in fear of the communist future; crime and mayhem have risen markedly as the lame-duck British government has lost all popular confidence; and more and more Hong Kong people of talent and of means have determined to get out before 1997. This has opened the way for Japanese companies in the last two years to acquire attractive Hong Kong interests on very favorable terms. But still more significant, to be sure, has been the embittered reaction on the part of so many ordinary Hong Kong citizens, people with no realistic chances to escape. Increasingly, they are beginning to direct their fear and anger into anti-PRC, prodemocracy politics. The recent elections made the situation clear. Emotions are running high, and if Beijing missteps many more times before 1997, the return of Hong Kong to Chinese rule could yet become a very messy affair.

It may be useful to note, in this connection, the highly nationalistic content of the political rhetoric emanating from Beijing in recent years. As Maoism, Marxism, and most of the remaining theoretical underpinnings of socialism have so dramatically lost their credibility and power to persuade over the last decade, the Deng Xiaoping government has turned more and more to patriotic rhetoric and to nationalistic appeals for popular support. It rests most of its claims to legitimacy now, in fact, on patriotic sentiment and the pride and satisfaction all citizens are presumed to take in the modernization and strengthening of the nation's economy and in the enhancement of Chinese power and influence on the international scene. Especially since 1989, however, the resort to official nationalism has been turning more strident and has become more transparently instrumental. Nightly paeans of praise for the PLA on Chinese TV have constituted but one of the more obvious means to drive the message home. Literal orgies of nationalistic pride and glory are orchestrated to surround sports events, such as the 1990 Asian Games in Beijing. The tactic is familiar, even understandable, in the circumstances. And the Chinese people, generally speaking, seem quite responsive to the prods of official patriotism. This style of state legitimation, however, obviously runs the risk of raising the stakes extremely rapidly should the regime, perchance, run afoul of some international predicament that earns it embarrassment in the mishandling. Let us return briefly to this possibility at the conclusion.

Research and Understanding

The *Problems of Communism* conference organizers have asked that we address ourselves specifically to the scholarly agenda, now that 40 years of research are behind us, and the future all around seems so very much in doubt. The topics raised, and those not raised, in earlier sections of this paper should give a good indication of the directions and the analytic approaches that look, to this author at least, to be the most urgent and the most promising for grasping an understanding of events as they unfold in China.

What we most assuredly do not need, and always must be on guard against, are research agendas inspired by teleological approaches and assumptions. Analyses taking their key cues from supposed technological, demographic, or democratic imperatives must oversimplify reality, distort our data, and finally lead us astray. The future in China, as elsewhere, is open. Deep social structures and processes, on the one hand, and the deliberate (or the accidental) power of human agency, on the other, will in the future, as they always have in the past, engage each other in the making of history.

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We must also avoid approaches that treat China as a single economic, social, and political system. China encompasses many societies now, and many economies. And, as is true in most Third World countries, the juxtapositions, which can be astonishing, are also politically relevant and revealing. A wiry old peasant earning money he means to put toward the building of an ancestral temple in what his village geomancer has assured him is an auspicious location on a hillside behind his dirt-floored cottage, may sell his grapes in a Shanghai marketplace to a young woman in high heels, carrying a copy of the *Asian Wall Street Journal* under her arm, on her way home from her air-conditioned office where daily business is done by E-Mail while easy-listening music provides the background. We will need to study Chinese society and politics piece by piece and place by place. We will need not only more and more careful case studies, but also more cross-community, cross-regional, cross-class, and cross-generational research.

Giving recent social and economic changes their due is, thus, essential for understanding politics in contemporary China. But from what has been said in earlier sections of this essay, it should be clear as well that some of the standard old methods of sinological research have not yet, by any means, outlived their usefulness. For example, much about the future will depend on precisely how the next elite succession is handled. The dynamics of the power struggle at the top surrounding that succession can be expected to intersect with popular politics in the next crisis, as they did in the last one.[16] And since the military is sure to be in the thick of the play, special attention must be paid to its political interests, opportunities, and methods. Exactly what cards are held by key players at key moments in the final game can have decisive consequences for the future course of Chinese politics, hastening or postponing the crystallization of conditions conducive to a democratic transition.

Approaches deriving from the "peasant studies" and "peasant politics" literatures should also be utilized now more than they have been in the past. Studies of other Third World peasantries in the throes of rapid economic and social transition, of peasant political behavior in urbanizing settings, of peasant community and religion, of peasant protest, and of peasant political incorporation—these should be read again now both for methods and for insight that could shed light on Chinese dilemmas.[17] For insight into urban Chinese politics and change processes, however, some more explicit and more comprehensive comparisons with other reform-socialist countries may be most fruitful.[18] Post-Leninist systems in the midst of reform, even if vastly different in some respects, nonetheless do share certain important similarities and common problems which can be illuminated by comparison.

And for learning more about the dynamics of the democracy movement itself, the growing literature in comparative politics on social movements, especially the recent studies of popular protest cycles and reform, offers new perspectives from which to assess Chinese possibilities.[19]

The rich historical-sociology literature on the development of the modern state in Europe and elsewhere, and on the social and political transformations entailed in the evolution from feudalism to mercantilism and then to capitalism, can help us frame our questions about the bigger picture being reproduced, "with Chinese characteristics" of course, in the process of post-socialist reform.[20] And a recent offshoot of this "statist" literature, focusing more on the interactions between states and their societies in the processes of historical change and development, seems particularly adapted to analysis of

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[16]For a good recent example of precisely this kind of combined analysis, see Chu-yuan Cheng, *Behind the Tiananmen Massacre*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1990.

[17]For example, we should consider again such now standard texts as: James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1985; James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1976; Samuel Popkin, *The Rational Peasant*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1979; and Joel Migdal, *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1974. Also, Benedict Kerkvliet, *Everyday Politics in the Philippines*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1990; and Forrest D. Colburn, Ed., *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1989. For China itself, the recent very valuable literature addressing peasant politics includes, for example: Edward Friedman, Paul G. Pickiewicz, and Mark Selden, *Chinese Village, Socialist State*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1991; Philip C. C. Huang, *The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 1350–1988*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1990; Jean C. Oi, *State and Peasant in Contemporary China*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1989; Sulamith Heins Potter and Jack M. Potter, *China's Peasants*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990; and Helen F. Siu, *Agents and Victims in South China*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1989.

[18]See e.g., Victor Nee and David Stark, Eds., *Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1989; Václav Havel, *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central-Eastern Europe*, Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1985; David S. Mason, *Public Opinion and Political Change in Poland, 1980–1982*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984; Roman Laba, "Worker Roots of Solidarity," *Problems of Communism*, (Washington, DC), July-August, 1986, pp. 47–67; and Vladimir Tismaneanu, *The Crisis of Marxist Ideology in Eastern Europe*, London, Routledge, 1988. On some relevant problems of post-socialist transition, see also David Stark, "Privatization in Hungary: From Plan to Market or from Plan to Clan?" *East European Politics and Societies* (Berkeley, CA), No. 3, 1990, pp. 351–392.

[19]For an excellent review of this literature, see Sidney Tarrow, *Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cycles of Protest*, Ithaca, NY., Western Societies Program Occasional Paper No. 21, Cornell University, 1989. With specific reference to the recent protests in China, see also Andrew G. Walder, "Popular Protest in the Chinese Democracy Movement of 1989," Los Angeles, UCLA-CSA Working Paper No. 6, University of California, 1991.

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the central problems of Chinese politics at present.[21] It is this literature that may be most likely to help us pose our questions about changing state-society relations, about the requisites and the roles of "civil society," and about the nature of authoritarianism and the prospects for democracy in the Chinese context.[22]

But above all, perhaps, we need to frame our contemporary studies with more conscious and more sophisticated reference to Chinese history itself. This, after all, is the great "reality" in terms of which most Chinese political actors consciously and unconsciously conceive and execute their roles. It is to their own social history that they turn for metaphors and analogies, for wisdom, and for inspiration. Their history, both ancient and modern, is their best guide to present-day political conduct and possibility. And if we do not manage somehow to see and take account of this, too, then we must continue to find ourselves again and again surprised by the obvious.

China: An Accident Waiting to Happen?

If, as this essay has argued, a quick and decisive political transition is not in the cards, so to speak, for China—not very likely, that is, given the array of conflicting social forces and given also the ready options open to political power-holders at present—then might such a transition still not occur, as it were, by accident? If, as just recommended, we look to Chinese history as a guide, then surely the present era is most reminiscent of the last years of the Qing Dynasty, of the whole period from 1898 to 1919, in fact. It was then that a superannuated, corrupt, and dilapidated autocracy attempted to reform itself, and in the process invited both domestic discontent and international humiliation. Having lost nearly all support both at home and abroad, in the end the government was toppled quite by accident.[23] And soon thereafter the very credibility of the Confucian ideology, which had sustained the Chinese dynasties for so long, was also practically polished off as a result of some nationalistically inspired but profoundly iconoclastic student demonstrations for democracy which, in turn, ignited a nationwide movement for cultural renovation and political renewal.

Although the parallels may not all be precise or perfect, this is an historical analogy now made all the time in the minds of disaffected Chinese. It is not an analogy designed to leave one feeling entirely optimistic. The fall of the Qing, after all, did not speed China on a course toward democracy and peace, but threw it instead into a protracted period of unstable military dictatorships and civil wars. Nevertheless, it is the sudden unaccustomed absence of official orthodoxy in China today, along with the earnestly announced intention to reform, that forces comparisons with the last years of the Qing to leap to mind.

An accidental toppling could come in several ways. A bungling of the succession might be the most likely scenario, especially if in the emergency, a popular hero, a Chinese Yel'tsin perhaps, were suddenly thrust onto the stage. There is a positive dearth of charisma in the ranks of the Beijing leadership these days, and many Chinese citizens clearly long for a magnetic personality, a hero, at the helm. Alternatively, the ruling coalition might finally trip over its own nationalistic devices. A national humiliation of some sort could turn the tide of popular opinion sharply against the sitting government. A fiasco on the order of the 1979 Vietnam war disaster, were it not successfully covered up, might serve to erode citizen support for the top army commanders even as it undermined rank-and-file military support for the government. Short of resort to a shooting war, it is possible that mortifications of the nation might occur over the reacquisition of Hong Kong or, somewhat more remotely, over a crisis in Tibet or

[20]Just a few of the key works in this very large and still growing literature are: Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1944; Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, London, NLB, 1974; Charles Tilly, Ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton, NJ, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1979; and Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990*, Cambridge, MA, Basil Blackwell, 1990. For specific reference to China, see Vivienne Shue, *The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1988, esp. Ch. 3.

[21]See Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1988. With specific reference to China, see also: Prasenjit Duara, *Culture, Power, and the State*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1988; Oi, op. cit.; and Siu, op. cit.

[22]On state-society interaction and civil society in China, see the essays by Elizabeth Perry and myself in the forthcoming volume, edited by Migdal, Kohli, and Shue, op. cit. For two speculative studies of recent trends in China, see Margaret M. Pearson, "Managers in China's Foreign Sector: Do They Represent an Emergent Civil Society?" Paper delivered at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC; and Dorothy J. Solinger, "China's Transients and the State: A Form of Civil Society?" Hong Kong, USC Seminar Series No. 1, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1991. For historical perspectives on some of these same issues, see also William T. Rowe, "The Public Sphere in Modern China," *Modern China* (Beverly Hills, CA), July 1990, pp. 309–29; Mary Backus Rankin, "The Origins of a Chinese Public Sphere," *Etudes Chinoises*, Autumn, 1990, pp. 13–60; and David Strand, "Protest in Beijing: Civil Society and Public Sphere in China," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1990, pp. 1–19.

[23]As the story goes, when a revolutionary bomb factory was discovered in Wuchang, a list of revolutionary activists was confiscated with the goods. Rather than face inevitable arrest, the insurrectionist leaders staged a hasty uprising. No doubt to their unending surprise, the result of having had their hand forced became known as the "1911 Revolution," which brought down the last Chinese dynasty. See James F. Sheridan, *China in Disintegration*, New York, The Free Press, 1975.

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some misadventure involving Taiwan.

Such scenarios may seem far-fetched. But accidents should not be entirely ruled out. We have seen too many seemingly unshakable regimes collapse in recent months and years not to be tempted into imagining that despite all evidence and appearances to the contrary, it might yet happen in China, too. But as the Qing example reminds us, and as the agonies of the political scene in the former Soviet Union today show us plainly once again, the simple collapse of autocracy cannot in and of itself guarantee that democracy will rise in its place. Democracy may be quickly conceived in the modern world, but it is now, as it always has been, slow to be born.

Commentary

Prospects: Half Gloomy or Half Bright?

Roderick MacFarquhar

I WISH to express agreement with Vivienne Shue's final words. The problems of democratization are enormous, and when you think back to the struggles in the United States and in my country (England), one can see how long it may have to take. But what I want to talk about today is not necessarily transition to democracy, but transition out of communism.

And I want to suggest that the situation may be rather different from the one depicted by Shue. Her paper is elegantly written, and I accept, indeed, quite a lot of her depiction of Chinese reality. What I disagree with is the thrust of the conclusions that she derived from those depictions. And it is not really so much that she sees the glass as half full and I see it as half empty; it is that I think the glass is cracked.

Her paper, much of it anyway, could have been written before Tiananmen. Many of the conditions that Shue describes prevailed then, although they were, perhaps, a little bit worse than they are now in some ways (but not in others). Let me just say a couple of things about where I disagree with Shue about the way she depicts Chinese reality, before getting to the main point. On a number of occasions in the paper, she makes certain statements, some of which she repeated in her oral remarks about Chinese people's attitudes, saying, generally, Chinese people feel this or feel that.

They may well. I am not in a position to deny it. But I do not think she is in a position to assert it. For instance, she argues that the Chinese people are thought to particularly dislike unrest. But no one likes unrest. With the possible of exception of Chairman Mao, and a few other revolutionary leaders, most people, most of the time, in most countries, do not like upheaval. They just want to get on with the business of living. Being part of the mainstream in China—that does not make one any more or less likely to welcome events of the Tiananmen type.

Similarly, I do not think it is possible to say, on the basis of any evidence that I have seen, that the Tiananmen suppression was seen by the majority of people as both prudent and necessary. Maybe a lot of people did think that, but I do not think we know.

Let me turn to what I think is the main problem in the paper, namely, that it is a society-centered analysis that does not deal except in passing with the other part of

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the equation, that is, the state. It does not sufficiently address the question that if the conditions against the powers of social protest, against the force of society are so great, and if the social forces are so weak, why was it that Tiananmen took place. One possible explanation that Shue puts forth is the accident of history—that, perhaps, there was an accident that took place which led to the Tiananmen events. This does not, however, seem to be a strong line of analysis.

Of course, there was an accident. Hu Yaobang, the former general secretary, died on April 15. But what happened after that was not an accident. It was the result of certain events that had taken place in China over a number of years. If these events had not happened, there is no way that the students could have risen in April 1989. There is no way that the people of Beijing would have supported them. And what you would have seen instead would have been the mass forces of reaction against reform being mobilized by the government against the students. You would have seen workers in the state factories being marched out like the Romanian leaders marched out the miners not so long ago to defend the Bucharest regime. But they were not. You would have seen the massed ranks of the bureaucracy being marched out to defend the regime. They were not. And reason they were not was because they were supporting the students.

What happened in 1989 in Beijing, forget the other cities (there were about 100, I think) where demonstrations of one kind of another were recorded, was that the people of the capital, many of whom were totally dependent upon the state for their income, deserted the state. They sided with the students.

Now, I do not think anyone knew in advance what was going to happen. If you had said to a student on April 14, Hu Yaobang is going to die tomorrow, and asked, "What will you guys do?" he would have said he did not know. He would have said it will be sad if he dies. He should live a little longer. He was a nice guy.

For anyone to accurately foretell the reaction of the people to the events in April was impossible. One should not try to suggest how the Chinese people will behave or, indeed, how any people will behave in circumstances that are highly unstable, as Shue herself has very accurately portrayed.

What one has to say about the Tiananmen events is not that society rose in its anger, but that it weakly battled against the tremendous edifice of the state and then finally was suppressed, which is what Shue's presentation implies.

In my view, what happened was the result of 25 years of history, from the beginning of the Cultural Revolution onward. When Mao decided he had to change the nature of the party and used his prestige and a small cadre of allies to do so, he caused the much vaunted Communist party, with over 50 million members, to collapse. It did not have any kind of institutional life for a good two or three years. It simply did not exist. A small clique at the top connived and plotted against each other, but there was no party. Later, during the reform period, Deng Xiaoping continued to lead the country on a course of state self-destruction, something I have written about elsewhere but do not have time to detail here. By 1989, the edifice of the state was very weak indeed.

The party-state suffered a similar fate in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev attempted to initiate reforms and then Gorbachev hammered away at the institutions of the state, so that when finally the coup or the palace coup, whatever you want to call it, took place in August 1991, the party institutions were no longer strong enough to withstand the counterattack of the forces of society.

Much the same thing had happened in China in 1989. When the students protested against the state, they feared for their lives. They wrote their wills and marched down to Tiananmen Square, but the forces of the state did not respond. And the forces of the state did not respond because the forces of the state were weakened and split.

The army was split, and the Politburo was split, right up to the highest level. In the end, institutions of the state, of the party-state were put aside by a bunch of gerontocrats in their 80's, who used the last vestiges of their prestige and connections with the military to crack down on the demonstrations.

The June 4 crackdown was the last stand of a first generation of revolutionaries who were determined not to hand over what they had spent so many decades fighting and struggling and suffering for to a bunch of kids in Tiananmen Square. It is my belief, and Shue, I think, from her remarks about the succession, sees the possibilities of this, too, that the succession will be the watershed after which the chances of the state machine being propped up the way it was in June 1989 will gradually diminish.

After a collapse of what exists in China today, through some set of circumstances—and it will not be just an accident of history—there will come a time when the state structure, eroded by the actions of the state leaders themselves over the course of many years, will collapse. When this happens, China will face new possibilities. Although I would not preclude a brief interlude of military dictatorship, it is my sense that China is more likely to go in a hopeful direction, ultimately toward democracy, than back to a militant type of Maoist communism.

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Modernization and Revolution in Post–Cold War Asia

Thomas W. Robinson

The events of 1989–91 have unfolded with such rapidity that anyone attempting to analyze what may occur in the remaining states under Marxist-Leninist rule must be humble indeed. In 1988, no one foresaw any anticommunist revolutions taking place in Europe, Asia, or the Soviet Union. Yet three years later only five states—four of them Asian—out of the original 15 remained under sole communist party rule, and one was in transition to mixed communist-noncommunist rule.[1] One person's prediction, therefore, is as good as anyone else's. I thus have no particular advantage in pronouncing on the subject of the future of communist rule in Asia.

It may be more useful, therefore, to set forth a number of ideas, even if not original, on how revolution in the broadest sense relates to modernization in Asia and then to apply these ideas to the four remaining communist states there—North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. They can also be applied to the other Asian states that are under either military or authoritarian rule. All are entering the initial stages of what appears in every case to be a variant of the universal trend toward democracy and market economy.[2] Basically, the post-1988 world is experiencing the continuation of revolutionary modernization[3] and its extension to Marxist-Leninist states, and not just a wave of anticommunist uprisings. The roots of this revolutionary transformation go back at least to the beginning of the 20th century, and the dynamic playing out of its history forms much, perhaps most, of the story of the post-1917 world. The past three years are just the most recent chapter of this long process.[4] Although the suddenness of events that have transpired in this time period was unexpected, the events themselves were neither unique nor entirely unforeseen.

The three assumptions of revolutionary modernization are quite simple. First, as a result of a number of philosophical changes (the idea of progress and the notion of individual worth, to name two), of the spread beyond the West of the scientific approach to the natural and social worlds and of the rise of technology beyond a certain level, global revolution became inevitable.[5] This modern type of revolution threw off the shackles of traditional society and strove toward a better material and societal life. It was, therefore, unlike any of the "normal" revolutions that occurred previous-

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[1]The five states remaining under sole communist rule are China, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba. Cambodia occupies an in-between status.

[2]See Thomas W. Robinson, Ed., *Democracy and Development in East Asia*, Washington, DC, The AEI Press, 1991, for how these trends seem to be related.

[3]For analyses of "revolution and modernization," see Cyril Black, Ed., *Comparative Modernization*, New York, The Free Press, 1976; Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979; and Charles Tilly, *From Modernization to Revolution*, Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 1982. For a creative treatment of modernization in an international context, see Edward L. Morse, *Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations*, New York, The Free Press, 1976.

[4]Revolutionary modernization began with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and extended in the communist world to Eastern Europe and Asia after World War II. Modernization does not, of course, limit itself to communist revolutions. Other Asian examples of 20th-century revolution are the "four tigers" of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore; India; and the continued modernization of Japan.

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

Stage-one and stage-two modernization: at left, a view of the Kimchaik Iron Works in North Korea; at right, an assembly line at the Hyundai Motor Plant in Ulsan, South Korea.

—AP/Wide World.

ly in human history and ended up nowhere.[6] Second, and as a result, revolution in the 20th century became equated with modernization—economic, political, attitudinal, and societal. States and peoples became modern only because, and when, they underwent this kind of revolution. Third, it takes time for modernization to transform a traditional society—South Korea transformed itself in perhaps the shortest amount of time—a third of a century—and England took the longest—over three centuries.[7] Revolution as well as modernization must therefore be regarded as a process, not just an event, and it may well require a considerable period of time.

Five developments—when taken together—help explain what has been happening in the socialist world during the post-1988 period and may help predict what will take place there and elsewhere in the 1990's. First, the meaning of revolution in the late 20th century is the reverse of its meaning a century earlier. Previously, revolution meant an anti-Western, anti-capitalist uprising carried out to free subject peoples from colonial tyranny and the limitations of traditional society.[8] Marxism-Leninism in its political and economic form—totalitarianism and central planning—was one almost natural result. Now, however, revolution has come to mean anticommunism in both the political and economic senses, and therefore the universal embrace of its opposites—democracy and marketization.[9] The old,

[5]On the idea of progress, see Robert Nisbet, *History of the Idea of Progress*, New York, Basic Books, 1980. On Western scientific thought, see Hans Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1951. On technology, see Victor Basiuk, *Technology, World Politics, and American Policy*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1977; and John V. Granger, *Technology and International Relations*, San Francisco, CA, W. H. Freeman, 1979.

[6]This seems to be the lesson set forth in writings on world history, for instance those of Arnold Toynbee. It is also reflected in the works of almost all of the pre-17th century Western political theorists, who saw revolution merely as one element in a never-ending series of historical cycles.

The French and American revolutions were, of course, not meaningless. They initiated modern political development. But they lacked important economic consequences in the sense that the new regimes did not take industrialization—and hence rapid economic development—as a major goal. That had to wait until the emergence of industrial technology and anti-capitalist ideology. That meant the 20th century and the Bolshevik Revolution.

[7]These two examples point to another generalization: the acceleration of revolutionary modernization. Granted that "special circumstances" are present in most successful cases of modernization, it still appears true that latter-day modernizing states move increasingly faster than did their predecessors. The reason appears to be technology.

[8]See, for example, Cyril Black and Thomas P. Thornton, Eds., *Communism and Revolution*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1964; John Dunn, *Modern Revolutions*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972; Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown, and Co., 1966; and John W. Lewis, Ed., *Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1974.

[9]See George Hicks, Ed., *The Broken Mirror: China After Tiananmen*, Chicago, St. James Press, 1990; J. F. Brown, *Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1991; and Michael Mandelbaum, "The End of the Soviet Union: Coup de Grace," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), America and the World 1991/92, pp. 164–83.

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and false, dichotomy between modernization and democracy/capitalism now is not only broken but has been replaced by the explicit equation of one with the other.

Second, the linkage between economic revolution and political revolution is now clearer. At the beginning of the century, it was thought that political revolution would have to come before economic revolution, since colonialism and traditional societies were by their very natures unfit to lead peoples toward a better life. Anti-foreign (usually anti-Western) nationalism and either Leninism/central planning or state capitalism/authoritarianism was the result. Such governments and such modes of economic organization were efficient enough at the initial stage of modernization but at some point they became, in Marx's term, a "fetter" upon society. That point was approached, economically, once per capita national income rose to about US$1,000, urbanization neared the 40 percent mark, and a middle class began to appear and fundamentally alter the structure of traditional society.[10] The heavy state/party/personalist/military control of totalitarian or authoritarian regimes could not then continue to bring the fruits of the people's labors directly to them. Indeed, more and more was being extracted from the masses for the private benefit of the new ruling class and for state-directed military purposes.[11] Stage two of the drive to modernization thus emerged: further economic development and social betterment necessitated fundamental changes in the political and economic systems. And the globe's only known alternatives to totalitarianism/authoritarianism/militarism and central/planning/heavy state capitalism were democratization and marketization.

Third, the modernization process, once begun, is inexorable. Once the construction of a modern society, state, and people has been started, it is impossible to turn back, or stop for long. It is true, to be sure, that political and/or economic development can be arrested temporarily, but only for a relatively short time, because societal pressures for continued modernization are continuous. Moreover, for smooth modernization, political and economic development must keep pace with each other.[12] The penalties for halting modernization for an extended period are heavy, in terms of the high costs later of disjoint, uneven development. There are many examples of this, in Asia as elsewhere.[13]

Fourth, despite what I just said, uneven political and economic development is the norm during the modernization process until higher stages of both are reached. Only when countries have successfully crossed over to the second, democratizing/marketizing, stage of modernization do things tend to smooth out. There are many examples of this in Asia, most notably Japan before and after World War II and South Korea during the Third and the Fifth Republics. This "rule" is illustrated in Asian communist polities as well: the problem of political succession, i.e., the temporary halting of political development, causes a disjunction between what is an increasingly backward political sphere and an increasingly developed economic sphere that is escalating demands for marketization. Illustrations abound in non-communist states as well. The phenomenon of export-led growth, characteristic of the "Four Tigers" (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) pushed economic development ahead so fast that political development inevitably lagged behind, causing a crisis. The resolution of the resulting crisis, as demonstrated by the democratic transition in three of the four entities in the 1980's (Singapore lagging behind temporarily), highlights the need to bring political and economic modernization back into synchronization. Once this happens, relatively smooth modernization at higher stages should result.

There is one immediate and important implication of this idea. The transition back to even, matched economic and political development can, and most always does, involve breakdown—societal, political, and economic—as well as violence, just as the previous separation of the two components of modernization did. Breakdown and violence are precisely what occurred in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during the post-1988 period. In all probability, therefore, breakdown and violence will accompany the transition back to matched, even development in the remaining socialist countries in Asia (and in Cuba as well).

The fifth, and final, point concerns the pace and form of economic and political modernization. These are directly connected to the cultural tradition (religion, phi-

[10]I choose these three measures because they seem, together, to best capture the change-over from "stage one" to "stage two" of the modernization process and because they are readily measureable in most societies.

[11]For an analysis of totalitarian regimes that become dysfunctional, see Jan S. Prybyla, *Reform in China and Other Socialist Economies*, Washington, DC, The AEI Press, 1990.

[12]Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 1–92; S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (Chicago), July 1964, pp. 345–67; and W. W. Rostow, *Politics and the Stages of Economic Growth*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971.

[13]For example, the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev, China under Deng Xiaoping, South Korea under Chun Doo Hwan, North Korea under Kim Il Sung, the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos, and Burma under Ne Win. The list could be extended greatly, needless to say.

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losophy, etc.) of the people in question. A prime example is Confucianism in the case of China and, partially, Korea,[14] but all Asian traditional orientations contain some elements that are highly congruent with the demands of successful modernization and others that are not. However, it is important to note that there appears to be no traditional orientation that is strongly antithetical to modernization.[15] Thus, there are always enough elements supporting political and economic modernization that when the time arrives—either stage-one or stage-two modernization—they come to the fore. Thus, in stage-one modernization in China, personalism, collectivism, and the virtues of a rigid social structure were emphasized, while in stage two, the egalitarian political aspects of Confucianism, the work ethic, and the stress on education receive greater support.

An interesting sub-proposition also emerges: in stage-one modernization, two elements of the Western cultural tradition—colonialism and Marxism—supervene Asian cultural traditions, temporarily suppressing the nativist democratic elements contained therein and corrupting much of the rest of traditional culture. However, once the need emerges to transit to stage-two modernization (whether under colonialism or Marxism-Leninism), modernization brings forth those elements of traditional culture that favor democratization and marketization and combines them to overthrow the influence of party culture or colonial culture. And, just as in the case of the transition to smooth political and economic development at the higher stage of modernization, the release of these cultural elements from suppression can be both violent and disjoint, as we have seen in the socialist world.[16] That is precisely what happened in the socialist world in Europe, Russia, and Asia in the 1989–91 period. This phenomenon can be expected to occur as well in the remaining states under Marxist-Leninist rule.

Now let us see how these ideas play out when matched against the present situation in North Korea and Vietnam, and also in Laos and Cambodia. Because of the importance of the democratizing/marketizing impetus throughout Asia, it may also be useful to take a look at some other representative cases—Burma as a state presently under totalitarian rule, Bangladesh as an example of an authoritarian polity with a low level of economic development, South Korea as an instance of a country well into the transition to full democracy and a market economy, and the Philippines, a country presently, but not necessarily always, within the latter category.

North Korea is, of course, an important case, given the state of security relations on the Korean peninsula, Pyongyang's very bad international behavior, and the imminence (i. e., sometime in the 1990's) of the Kim Il Sung succession. Some things are obvious. North Korea is clearly on the verge of a stage-two, anticommunist prodemocratic/market economy revolution. Both per capita national income (in 1990, about $1,100) and the degree of urbanization (about 64 percent)[17] point directly to the likelihood of such a revolution, as does the fact that an anticolonial, prosocialist revolution took place over a half-century ago. But, numerous obstacles exist. Political modernization has been completely suppressed in North Korea for such a long time that pressures for further upward political movement are now severe, equaled only by the massive need to bring to the North Korean people the fruits of their economic labors. Moreover, communist rule in the North (particularly Kim's personalism) has so heavily damaged the positive elements of traditional Korean culture that the contradiction between the demands of further modernization and the capability of a post-Kim polity to meet them peacefully is also severe. As a result, the prospect of violence in the North attendant upon the political succession is very high.

Sensing this, the Kim regime has recently experimented with a mini-opening to the outside world so as to lessen its near-total isolation of the last several decades. Another important goal of the regime is to provide, to some extent at least, the kinds of consumer goods that due to extreme emphasis on capital investment, have never been available to the people.[18] In all probability, such a program offers too little, too late

[14]See Lin Zhiling, "Traditional, Modernist, and 'Party' Culture in Contemporary Chinese Society," in Lin Zhiling and Thomas W. Robinson, Eds., *The Chinese and Their Future: Beijing, Hong Kong, and Taipei*, Washington, DC, The AEI Press, forthcoming, 1992; Donald J. Munro, *The Concept of Man in Contemporary China*, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 1977; Joseph Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1968; and Hahm Pyong-choon, *The Korean Political Tradition and Law*, Seoul, Royal Asiatic Society, 1967.

[15]Compare Hajime Nakamura, *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples*, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1964, with Nicholas Berdyayev, *The Origins of Russian Communism*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1960.

[16]India-Pakistan at Partition in 1947–48 and Vietnamese resistance against France after 1945 are examples of violent disjunction in stage one modernization, while the rough transition to democracy in South Korea after 1979 is an exemplary Asian example of such transition in stage-two modernization.

[17]Nicholas Eberstadt and Judith Banister, *The Population of North Korea*, Berkeley, CA, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1992.

[18]Robert A. Scalapino and Hongkoo Lee, Eds., *North Korea in a Regional and Global Context*, and Lee Chong-Sik and Yoo Se-Hee, Eds., *North Korea in Transition*, both Berkeley, CA, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986 and 1991 respectively.

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North Korean leader Kim Il Sung reviews an honor guard of the Chinese armed forces on May 21, 1987, during his visit to China.

—Reuters/Bettmann.

and will only exacerbate the problem. The prospect in North Korea is thus for a high level of domestic violence, upon succession. Moreover, given the military tensions between North and South and the extreme nature of Korean nationalism, the probability of a new Korean conflict cannot be ruled out. Certainly, the prospect of a North Korean collapse and peaceful absorption by the South à la Germany is not great. Nor is the continuation of communist rule after Kim, either by his son or by the military (the only two nonconflictual possibilities) particularly likely. The long-term outlook for North Korea is quite bright, given its level of economic development, the inevitability of anticommunist revolution, and the undoubted, eventual re-unification with the South under a democratic capitalist system. But, the likelihood of the near-term danger of widespread violence in the North possibly spreading to war with the South is quite high.

In Vietnam, the situation is different. Stage-one modernization has not run its course. The country has only recently been re-unified, the anticolonial revolution has been too recent, and, as of 1990, the level of economic development (about $200 per capita) and the rate of urbanization (25 percent)[19] were too low to think of a successful anticommunist, prodemocratic/market economy revolution. Moreover, the strength of communist party rule is high and, despite the rejection of Marxism-Leninism by significant elements of the population (not just intellectuals and Southerners but also many very poor Northerners), the country is not approaching the transition to stage-two modernization. There may be violent opposition to the continuation of present policies, but it will, in all probability, be suppressed with relative ease.

The eventual emergence of a postcommunist society in Vietnam depends heavily on the continuation of rapid economic development and continued opening to influences from the outside, whether from noncommunist Southeast Asian nations or from the developed "West"—Europe, North America, and Japan.[20] A high level of economic, political, and social contacts between these parts of the world and Vietnam can both hasten the movement toward stage-two modernization and lessen the likelihood of violence and breakdown during the transition itself.

An interesting subsidiary thought emerges at this point: like many other nations undergoing rapid modernization, Vietnam may find it possible to move away from totalitarianism to democracy through the intermediate stage of authoritarianism. That is what seems to have happened in many countries in Asia and elsewhere,[21] and there is reason to think if authoritarianism emerges out of the ashes of Marxism-Leninism in Vietnam that such a transition might be less disjoint than if the country remains as isolated as North Korea. This is particularly so given the legacy of Vietnam's French colonial past and its American interlude, both of which may work to shorten the totalitarian period and soften authoritarianism in Vietnam.

A side-glance toward Laos and Cambodia is in order. Communist rule in Laos is derivative of communist rule in Vietnam. And although the traditional cultures of the two countries are different, their 20th-century experiences are similar.[22] If anything, Laos is even less far along in the modernization process than Vietnam. It has even lower levels of per capita national income and ur-

[19]Michael Malik, Ed., *Asia 1991*, Hong Kong, Far Eastern Economic Review Publishing Company, 1991, pp. 6–7.

[20]For the mounting literature on latter-day Vietnam, see the "Bibliography" section of Douglas Pike's *Indochina Chronology*, Berkeley, CA, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, quarterly since 1982.

[21]Larry Diamond, Ed., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia*, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1989.

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A tradesman's cooperative specializing in the manufacture of handwoven material and embroidery outside of Vientiane, Laos.

—Eastfoto.

banization ($15 and 16 percent respectively),[23] and hence is even less of a candidate for transition to democracy and market economy in the near future. Further, given its "captured" status (by Vietnam), in all probability Laos will not be able to pursue its own path to modernization, and its pace will probably be slower than that of Vietnam. If Vietnam suffered breakdown (the possibility of which I discounted above) or if Laos were to come under the influence of Thailand (which is now rapidly approaching a relatively smooth transition to full democratic/capitalist modernization), Laos could undergo rapid change. But the prospect of this is not good. Meanwhile, the best that can be hoped for in Laos is some sort of acceleration of stage-one modernization, perhaps under a modified Leninist rule, where some of the less severe aspects of party rule are combined with the more benign qualities of traditional Laotian quiescence. This would amount to authoritarianism with a socialist tinge.

Cambodia appears to be sui generis. Finally, after the murderous years of Khmer Rouge rule, a "peace process" seems near to bearing fruit after a long period of gestation. Does this mean that democracy is around the corner in Cambodia? If the ideas sketched out above have any validity, it is doubtful. Not only is Cambodia exceedingly poor (with a per capita income in 1990 of less than $150 and a very low degree of urbanization),[24] but other factors are also working against a transition to democracy, including the fact that its anti-colonial, pro-socialist revolution is not very long in the

[22]For 20th-century historical developments in Laos, see Martin Stuart-Fox, *Contemporary Laos: Studies in the Politics and Society of the Lao People's Republic*, St. Lucia, Queensland, University of Queensland Press, 1982; and Joseph J. Zasloff, *Laos: Beyond the Revolution*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1991. For Cambodia, see David Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1983; and Ben Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930–1975*, London, Verso, 1985.

[23]Malik, op. cit., pp. 6–7.

[24]Ibid.

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The Tuosleng museum in Cambodia, which displays thousands of photographs of the victims of Pol Pot's reign of terror. The museum is located on the site of a former death camp.

—Sovfoto.

past; the Khmer Rouge is still quite strong; economic development has yet to take hold in the country; and the four-sided coalition is anything but firm and is held together mostly by a temporary agreement among outside parties.[25] Prince Norodom Sihanouk is an essential figurehead, whose presence as head of state may be a necessary but hardly a sufficient condition for domestic peace. In any case, given his age and the volatility of the situation, he may not stay in office long. Thus, until rapid economic growth moves the country toward a stage-two political/economic transition, prospects for democracy in the country are poor. Perhaps the best that can be hoped for is a mild form of authoritarianism, continued United Nations–centered international involvement, and an opening of the country (as widely as possible) to international investment, particularly from Thailand and other ASEAN nations. If Cambodia follows this course, the near-inevitable violence characteristic of disjoint political/economic development could at least be minimized. But democracy is not likely during the near or medium term in Cambodia. Neither is full-scale Marxism-Leninism. Given Cambodia's recent past and international concern for the country, the best that can be hoped for is state capitalism under authoritarianism.

Having looked, albeit cursorily, at four Asian communist polities using the general notions previously developed, the question arises whether these notions can be used to assess likely developments in four non-Marxist Asian states: Burma, Bangladesh, South Korea, and the Philippines. If our general ideas are of any utility at all, the answer would have to be yes.

Burma is a noncommunist totalitarian state governed, against the wishes of its people, by the military. Its democratic leaders are either dead or in prison. Its economy is in shambles, the state is constantly threatened with ethnic conflict and division, and the govern-

[25]Recent articles in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong) on the Cambodian peace effort can be found in the issues for May 6 and 30, June 13 and 20, July 4 and 18, Aug. 8, Sept. 12 and 26, Oct. 3 and 24, Nov. 7 and 21, and Dec. 5 and 12, 1991, and Jan. 9 and 23, 1992.

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ment's foreign policy, such as it is, pursues isolation from the outside world.[26] With a per capita national income of around $200 and urbanization of only 24 percent,[27] it is one of the least developed countries in Asia. It is a clear case of arrested development after a stage-one anticolonial revolution. Although there are obvious democratic elements in traditional Burmese (mostly Buddhist) philosophy, the military has succeeded in suppressing latter-day democratic impulses (witness the elections of 1989 and their aftermath) and in stopping economic growth in its tracks for protracted periods.[28] The Burmese intelligentsia is virtually destroyed. Until the military either voluntarily gives up power—a highly unlikely event—or is overthrown by some violent popular revolution—which would probably require much bloodshed and a lengthy period to be successful—the country is not likely to move forward.

It is not clear, therefore, whether Burma has actually entered the road to modernization. Even if it has, this extreme case shows that, without even an attempt at economic development, it is possible, for a while at least, to avoid altogether stage-two modernization, and its attendant revolution. So Burma is a kind of negative proof of our original ideas. The question then becomes: how long will Burma stagnate? The answer, apparently, is indefinitely, as long as there is no outside intervention. If the international community were to intervene decisively in the Burmese political situation or if the international economy were to become so weighty that even Burma was forced to reform its internal economic order, things could change. However, short of these international developments, change does not seem likely during the 1990's.

Bangladesh is like Burma in many ways. It is exceedingly poor (per capita income is probably even less than $200 per year) and has only 13 percent urbanization. It is also governed more by the military than by civilian administrators, and obviously has not gone beyond stage-one modernization.[29] Matters are made even worse by the natural disasters that are periodically visited upon the country, and by vast overpopulation. In many ways, Bangladesh as a polity makes limited sense; it exists mostly because it is neither Hindi nor Buddhist (i.e., neither Indian nor Burmese). The country does, however, have two saving graces: unlike Burma, it is trying to develop itself economically, and, like India and Pakistan, its military as well as its civilian leadership (which admittedly is very thin indeed) knows that democracy is best for it and therefore, periodically, attempts to install and maintain such a form of government.[30] There is hope, therefore, for Bangladesh. Moreover, because economic development and political development in Bangladesh are not greatly out of kilter, it is possible to imagine a relatively benign movement, eventually, to and through stage-two modernization. But the economic distance in front of it is enormous. As long as the nation must depend mostly on its own resources and suffer a continuation of the natural disasters periodically visited upon it, reaching stage two will take a long time indeed.

South Korea is a more obvious, even a textbook, illustration of the notions developed above. With its per capita national income near $8000 and 70 percent urbanization, it is clearly well into stage-two modernization.[31] That transition was, of course, not easy, for economic development took place so quickly after 1962

General Saw Maung (right), the head of Burma's ruling military council, accompanies Thai General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh during the latter's visit to Rangoon on December 14, 1988.

—Reuters/Bettmann.

[26]See Josef Silverstein, *Independent Burma at Forty Years: Six Assessments*, Ithaca, NY, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1989; and Robert Taylor, *The State of Burma*, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1987.

[27]Malik, op.cit., pp. 6–7.

[28]See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 9, 16, and 23, June 6, Aug. 29, Oct. 3 and 24, Nov. 14, 1991, and Feb. 20, 1992.

[29]Malik, op. cit., pp. 6–7.

[30]For a history of Bangladesh, see Richard Sisson, *War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1990. For recent events, see *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Apr. 4, May 16 and 30, Aug. 8, Oct. 3, and Dec. 12, 1991, and Feb. 6, 1992.

[31]Malik, op. cit., pp. 6–7.

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that political modernization could not keep pace. Moreover, because of its two previous failed democratic revolutions and the existence of a major external military threat, military authoritarianism was the "natural" form of government during its early stage of economic development (1962–78).[32] Nonetheless, South Korea's strong Confucian tradition, its equally strong nationalism, and its surprisingly well-developed democratic tradition,[33] made it inevitable that the demands of higher levels of economic development would dovetail with the drive toward democracy to require a political transition. This transition did not come without cost, however, given the broad gulf between economic and political modernization under the Park Chung-Hee and Chun Doo-Hwan governments. A great deal of violence accompanied the transition, led at first by students and then carried out with broad worker participation.[34] In the end, however, genuine democracy emerged in South Korea, becoming more and more consonant with the advanced state of the economy. Given the re-integration of its economic and political institutions, South Korea will probably continue to be a successful example of political-economic modernization in Asia.

The future should be relatively smooth for the South unless the North collapses or civil war breaks out there and spills over into the South. This could obviously set back, or arrest, further modernization. But even if this worse-case scenario does not take place, South Korea will eventually be saddled with the high cost of the inevitable reunification of North and South. The North (like East Germany) will require a great deal of economic investment and political hand-holding once re-integration begins. This will surely require a great deal of sophistication and patience, to say nothing of hard work. Nonetheless, once the initial phases of re-unification are past, a united Korea will again become a clear illustration of the eventual combination of democratic political institutions and market-oriented economic institutions as the end-point of the 20th-century modernization process.[35]

The final noncommunist case is the Philippines, which is, at least in form, both democratic and market-oriented. The picture is complicated, however, in a number of regards. Democracy is, despite all the desires of the Filipino people and all the "training" they received at the hands of the Americans, still superficially rooted in the Philippines. The reasons are obvious. Most of the wealth of the country, be it agricultural or industrial, is in the hands of a few aristocratic families. Politics therefore tends to be family politics. Moreover, despite an early history of democratic regimes in the period after independence, Filipinos more recently have languished for nearly two decades under the Marcos dictatorship.[36] During this period, economic progress halted for such long stretches that by 1990, the Philippines, a country reasonably rich in natural resources and with a reasonably well-educated people, could only produce little more than $600 per capita in national wealth a year.[37] Moreover, it is not clear that Philippine political culture—the product of too much Spanish Catholicism and American colonialism—is innately democratic.[38] Finally, the country has suffered from a series of rebellions, both communist and secessionist, that have sapped national energy that should have gone into moving rapidly toward stage-two modernization.[39] All this produced a considerable gap between the polity and the economy that is clearly illustrated by President Corazon Aquino's lack of political courage to push strongly for thoroughgoing land reform. In order to "save" the Philippines from arrested political modernization (i.e., overthrow of democracy by a new military authoritarianism), there must be rapid economic growth. However, this growth is contingent upon land reform, most importantly, but also upon the creation of an investment climate that favors production for export. The latter could be assisted by a general decision by outside states to provide massive aid and investment to Manila. In general, however, the outlook for the country is not bright.

What conclusions can we draw concerning modernization and revolution in the remaining communist states of Asia (except China), as well as the vast major-

[32]Han Sung-ju, *The Failure of Democracy in South Korea*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1974; Edward R. Wright, Ed., *Korean Politics in Transition*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1974; and Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1968.

[33]L. L. Wade, "South Korean Political Culture: An Interpretation of Survey Data," *The Journal of Korean Studies*, Worcester, MA, The Hefferman Press, 1980, pp. 1–46.

[34]See Daryl M. Plunk, "Political Development in the Republic of Korea," in Robinson, Ed., op. cit., pp. 105–17. For recent developments, consult the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Apr. 25, May 9, 23, and 30, June 6 and 20, July 4, Aug. 8 and 22, Sept. 26, Nov. 21, Dec. 5, 19, and 26, 1991, and Jan. 9, 16, and 23, 1992.

[35]Han Sung-ju and Robert J. Myers, Eds., *Korea: The Year 2000*, New York, University Press of America, 1987.

[36]David Joel Steinberg, *The Philippines: A Singular and Plural Place*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1982; and Carl Lande, Ed., *Rebuilding a Nation*, Washington, DC, Washington Institute Press, 1987.

[37]Malik, op. cit., pp. 6–7.

[38]See the already classic work by Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: The American Experience in the Philippines*, New York, Ballantine Books, 1989.

[39]Carolina Hernandez, "Political Developmens in the Philippines," in Robinson, Ed., op. cit., pp. 171–92. Recent events can be traced in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Apr. 11 and 25, May 2, 16, 23, and 30, June 13, 20, and 27, July 4, 11, 18, and 25, Aug. 1, 8, 15, and 22, Sept. 5, 12, 19, and 26, Oct. 3, 17, 24, and 31, Nov. 14 and 21, Dec. 5 and 12, 1991, and Jan. 26, 23, and 30, and Feb. 6 and 13, 1992.

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ity of nations that live in noncommunist settings? Perhaps the following are appropriate:

- Democracy and a market economy are the inevitable, if still long-term, consequence of modernization. This seems the case whether the starting point is socialist or nonsocialist political revolution. Marxism-Leninism has been a modernizing force of great consequence during stage-one modernization, although it is hardly a necessary stage of modernization. It becomes an impediment to full modernization only later. The path to full modernization is reasonably apparent. There must be an anti-traditional political revolution in the first instance, a quantitative economic growth under some kind of strong central authority, and a progressive unfolding of a new society that will, eventually, take democracy and marketization as its most fundamental principles.
- Modernization varies from society to society. Uneven political and economic development is the rule rather than the exception. There will thus likely be lengthy periods of no progress produced by the disjunction between pressures for further economic modernization and the reluctance of the political system in stage-one modernization to undergo concomitant change.
- The pace of modernization will also vary in both communist and noncommunist polities, as much in the former as the latter. In both, the greater the disjunction between economic and political change, and the longer such disjunction lasts, the greater the instability and violence that accompanies the transition from stage-one to stage-two modernization will be. But the determinants of change generally are the same in both communist and noncommunist nations. Stage-one modernization under communism therefore is nothing more than a variant, if an extreme one, of the common path to constructing a thoroughly modern society, one that, throughout the world, has relatively similar characteristics.
- Modernization under Marxist-Leninist–style regimes during stage one is as efficient as, if more ruthless than, modernization during that stage under authoritarian, militaristic, or other types of regimes. It is only as stage-two modernization approaches that Marxism-Leninism seriously holds back further modernization and thus presents itself as a candidate for replacement.
- Once Marxism-Leninism is successfully put aside through revolutionary overthrow or collapse, further success in approaching full democratization and marketization depends on a broad variety of well-known factors. These include ethnic relations, size of country, type of culture (including political culture), religious and philosophical legacy, personality of the new leader(s), particular government and economic structure, and many international factors (interdependence, general shape of the international system, nature and growth rate of the global economy, degree and rate of transfer of technology and wealth, etc.). These are the same determinants that noncommunist nations must cope with. Once Marxism-Leninism is successfully overcome, therefore, and stage-two modernization takes firm hold, the differences between states having modernized in stage one via the communist path and those having proceeded along the noncommunist path will gradually disappear.

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Commentary

Modernization and Revolution in Asia

Robert A. Scalapino

I APPLAUD Tom Robinson's boldness in using the term "modernization" in his paper. I think it is probably time to begin, with great caution, a revision of the revisionists on that score. The term "modernization" was first advanced by American social scientists several decades ago, and it soon became highly controversial. Critics charged that it betrayed an ethnocentrism, a faith that all societies would follow the path of the United States or, more generally, that of the so-called "Western advanced democracies." They claimed that it took no account of the possibility that different values would emerge from diverse cultures and that those differences would dictate different paths.

There was another objection to the term "modernization." It stemmed from the concern that it was time-bound, that it posited mid-20th-century advanced industrial societies operating under democratic institutions as the final product of human accomplishment, ignoring the fact that change, whether "upward" or "downward," would not cease with the contemporary era. But, as a matter of fact, scholars did indeed begin to talk about post-modern societies in an effort to capture the issues and problems of these advanced societies in their most recent phases.

Of course, it is necessary to define "modernization," so as to make it as unbound by culture and time as possible. Modernization can be defined as a process whereby a given society or region adjusts to the requirements and the opportunities of the times, with the goals of advancing economic development, social harmony, and political stability—universal desiderata. It is an unending process because at each stage of any society's development and experience, new challenges are presented.

Nor should one assume that change inevitably brings either progress—using that term in a normative sense—or equal results on the economic, social, and political fronts. Robinson makes the latter point in the course of his paper. For example, he argues that there is an ultimate incompatibility between the economic goals of the Leninist states and the political means used to achieve these goals.

If one accepts the definition I have given of modernization, where does Asia stand today? First, let me suggest that we have a problem of terminology when it comes to "revolution," the second term in Robinson's title. The truly revolutionary societies are not those that have coveted and largely monopolized that term. Rather, it is societies like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and most of the ASEAN states, where social and economic change has been so rapid and enormous—not China, North Korea, or Vietnam—that warrant that appellation. Ironically, it is probably in North Korea that traditionalism in its most pervasive form can be found. And examples of backwardness projected forward can easily be seen in Hanoi and many parts of interior China. Indeed, it is because economic development has faltered, due to the progressively unfolding defects of the Stalinist economic strategy, that the search for a new economic program is so widespread today in the Leninist world.

Yet, the Asian Leninist elites, unlike their Western counterparts, have not lost control of the process of change, at least not yet. Although culture and the timing of development have played a role in these elites' ability

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to maintain control, the fact that the remnants of the first-generation revolutionaries are still in power in all of the remaining Asian Leninist states has also been a factor. These leaders insist that the cardinal Leninist political principles be upheld in the name of stability. With considerable validity, they assert that only if there is stability can economic advances be achieved.

What I find very interesting is that the utopian defense of Marxism-Leninism, i.e., that it is the highest form of human socio-political achievement, is rarely used at all these days. The defenders of Marxism-Leninism have shifted their emphasis. Today's defense is first on nationalist grounds: socialism is the chosen Chinese, or Korean, or Vietnamese way, a way threatened by imperialist intervention. Second, the thesis is that rapid economic growth requires an authoritarian political structure. It is not surprising that the Asian socialists assign the highest priority to economic growth, but, as Robinson points out, their efforts to promote growth while maintaining a hard authoritarianism result in a growing tension.

Development in the economic realm leads to diversity, inclusiveness, and porousness. Economic advances stretch regional, sectoral, and individual differences, which become increasingly difficult to handle under a centralized, rigid system. Moreover, improvements in livelihood—the spread of education and urbanization—increase demands for more genuine inclusion in the political process. Finally, such societies inevitably become highly susceptible to the external influences that are forwarded by the great communications-information revolution now sweeping over the world.

Thus, it is correct to point out that the uneven mix of factors in Leninist modernization will inevitably lead to progressive pressures for change. I would submit, however, that for many societies—particularly for the remaining Asian Leninist societies—democracy is not on the horizon. There is another, more likely political route, which I have defined elsewhere as "authoritarian pluralism," a term I much prefer to "state capitalism," because the latter captures only a portion of what is a more complex system.

Under authoritarian pluralism, politics is still very much constrained by limited, if any, choice and by substantial inhibitions on all freedoms—although the control is not as tight as under Leninism. Moreover, a civil society exists apart from the state and manifests its autonomy in such fields as religion, education, and the family. In the economy, the market plays a vital role, although the state exercises great power as planner and guide.

It is my view that authoritarian pluralism is more suited to the traditions and the stage of development of many of the emerging states than is parliamentary democracy. I would also suggest that we cannot expect full political convergence in Asia or elsewhere, given a great variety of factors, including scale, economic resources, and geopolitical circumstances. Other factors, such as tradition, also play a role. In my view, and here Robinson and I may have some differences, it is important not to view the economic factor as the sole variable or even the crucial variable in certain cases. Otherwise, how can you explain why India and Sri Lanka have democratic systems, whereas, a substantial quotient of authoritarianism continues to exist in Singapore and in Thailand, nations where per capita income is fairly high?

Let me conclude with a few remarks about modernization and the ongoing revolution in Asia's industrial democratic societies, since I am concerned about the problems that democracy faces in Asia and elsewhere. In some respects, the immediate challenges confronting the democratic societies of Asia are only slightly less daunting than those confronting the Leninist states. Profound changes are taking place in the lifestyles, social attitudes, and mobility of the citizenry at large that dramatically accentuate generational differences. They also raise questions as to whether responsibility can be advanced in tandem with rights and whether a sense of community can be maintained when the thrust is toward materialist-oriented individualism. It was precisely these factors that caused individualism and personal freedom to be regarded as selfishness in the traditional Asian context. Indeed, such sentiments formed the basis on which democracy was condemned in Asia.

Democratic politics, in my opinion, is threatened today by the same concerns—an image of selfishness and a picture of corruption and sordidness. I should hastily add that the corruption within democracy does not, in my opinion, equal the pervasiveness of corruption in Leninism, because that corruption extends beyond the material to all of the deceits that dominate various aspects of life in a hard authoritarian state. Nevertheless, in the further development—the modernization of contemporary democratic states—these issues must be tackled with the utmost seriousness. Otherwise, whether in East or West, coming generations are increasingly going to opt out of public politics, and new forms of elitist authoritarianism will prevail. We should never forget that there is no guarantee of a linear progression under any political system.

In sum, I would argue that democratic societies are only part way into the revolution of our times, not yet at its center. However, this revolution involves those who live in democratic systems, whether here or in Asia, more profoundly than the former Leninists because the latter have yet to reach modernity in its latest phase.

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The Decline of Communism and the Latin American Left

Jorge Castañeda

The fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has had profound consequences for the Left in Latin America. The most damaging effects lie in the Left's experience of defeat and in the end of its perceived connection with "socialism as it really was." The decline of socialism in Europe also marks the end of a mobilizing, effective vision of utopia that had functioned well in Latin America, albeit within strict limits, for many years. The events in Europe have caused a depressing sense of loss and devastating demoralization among the Latin American Left.

But significant long-term benefits could accrue to the Left as a result of socialism's defeat in Europe and the consequent severance of the umbilical cord between the Left and its allies in the former socialist world. No longer will the Latin American Left be associated with antidemocratic practices elsewhere in the world. Despite the short-term confusion and crisis that the fall of the socialist bloc—compounded by the electoral defeat of the Sandinista Front in 1990—have visited upon the Latin American Left, the partly involuntary break with the past and with the socialist world could open up broad and encouraging prospects for it in the middle and long term.

This promise is comprehensible only if placed in the context of two trends that have characterized the hemisphere over the past decade. Since the early 1980's, Latin America has been suffering from its worst economic and social crisis since the Great Depression. At the same time, despite serious, enduring shortcomings, the hemisphere has enjoyed its most widespread, substantive, and lasting process of democratization in the 20th century. The conjunction of both developments has opened up greater prospects for social change and political alternance today than at any other time since the 1930's. This in turn has allowed the Left to remain a central actor in hemispheric politics, despite the apparent obsolescence of leftist parties and movements in other parts of the world, and despite the devastating effect the fall of socialism in Europe has had on the Left's ideological viability and political standing.

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Socio-Economic Conditions

Latin America's economic and social debacle has three separate aspects—economic stagnation, social regression, and massive decapitalization. The economic numbers are the best known: in aggregate terms, the region's per capita Gross Domestic Product dropped 8.3 percent between 1981 and 1989. It fell in every Latin American country except Colombia (because of the effect of unreported transactions, i.e., drug money), Chile (which was coming out of an economic disaster during the previous decade), Cuba (where accounting discrepancies made reported gains suspect), and Barbados. In such countries as Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela, the drop was truly tragic—on the order of 23–24 percent. In others, it was simply dramatic; in Mexico, for example, GDP fell 10 percent. Finally, in some countries, such as Brazil, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic, the drop was negligible, but sig-

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naled the absence of any real economic improvement.[1]

The social consequences of the economic catastrophe were equally terrifying. Employment fell sharply in relative and often in absolute terms. Not only did the employment rate rise, but, more important, there were significant shifts from full employment to underemployment and a reduction in the hours worked by the underemployed (shifts from employment in the formal sector of the economy to employment in the informal sector helped cushion the impact of this trend but in a way disruptive of orderly economic life). In 1980, some 120 million Latin Americans, or 39 percent of the continent's population, lived in poverty; by 1985, the figure had grown to 160–170 million. Toward the end of the decade, it was estimated at 240 million. Unemployment and underemployment had reached 80 million, representing 44 percent of the labor force.[2] The real minimum wage for the entire region fell 13 percent between 1980 and 1987, but this aggregate figure masks profound differences among countries: in Mexico, Brazil, and Chile, the drop was 43 percent, while the real minimum wage actually rose in such countries as Argentina (where it is less representative than in other nations because it does not apply to all working people), Colombia, and Costa Rica.[3]

Simultaneously, the constraints imposed by Latin America's demographic structure—characterized by sharply lower mortality rates in the 1950's and 1960's, together with continuing high fertility rates—resulted in a hemispheric baby boom in the 1960's and early 1970's. During the 1980's, millions of Latin Americans of nearly all nationalities entered a job market that was extremely weak.

The effect of this scissors crisis—more people than ever looking for fewer jobs—cannot be underestimated. In Mexico alone, the yearly job deficit—jobs needed to absorb population growth minus jobs created—reached 750,000. The ancestral injustice of Mexican society attained prodigious proportions, making citizens unequal even in the face of death. According to the World Bank, life expectancy for the poorest 10 percent of the population was 20 years less than for the richest 10 percent.[4] In Brazil, the advances made in reducing poverty during the previous 20 years—the period known as the Brazilian miracle, when per capita GDP growth averaged nearly 5 percent per year—were virtually erased. Between 1960 and 1981, the number of poor in Brazil dropped from 36 million to 24 million, and, more strikingly, from 50 percent of the population to 19 percent. However, by 1987, there were 33 million individuals, or 25 percent of the country's inhabitants, living beneath the official poverty line.[5]

Favela de Catacumba, which overlooks fashionable Ipanema, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

—Archive Photos.

At the same time, real spending on education, health, housing, and assistance to the poor has plummeted. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, "In the last decade, spending on education as a share of total central government expenditure diminished in most of the countries. . . . In terms of Gross Domestic Product, the education sector suffered cuts in most of the 25 countries."[6] It was thus no surprise that exit polls taken during the 1989 Brazilian elections showed that approximately 70 percent of the voters had no more than an elementary education. Most had less.[7]

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[1]CEPAL-ECLA, *Balance preliminar de la economia de América Latina y el Caribe 1989* (Preliminary Balance Sheet of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean), Santiago, 1990, p. 19. Economic statistics in Latin America are often imprecise, and there may be minor discrepancies between these figures and those used elsewhere or provided by other sources. By and large, though, the CEPAL-ECLA figures, the numbers from the Inter-American Development Bank, those put together by the World Bank, and the statistics published by individual governments all coincide.

[2]Instituto de Relaciones Europeo–Latinoamericanos (IRELA), *Europa y América Latina en los 90* (Europe and Latin America in the '90's), Madrid, IRELA, December 1989, p. 6.

[3]Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1989 Report*, Washington, DC, IDB, 1990, p. 14.

[4]The World Bank, *World Development Report 1990*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 2.

[5]Ibid., pp. 41, 43.

[6]IADB, op. cit., p. 60.

[7]José Serra, "There Is a Way Out," *Veja* (Rio De Janeiro), Aug. 1, 1990.

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Half a century had elapsed since the continent had lived through such a sustained period of economic and social deprivation. Were it not for drug exports, emigration, and an income-reducing, but shock-absorbing, informal economy, the outcome could have been far more tragic than it was.

Democratization and the Left

On the face of it, the tensions resulting from this tragedy should have led to a hemisphere-wide social explosion of incalculable consequences. Perhaps the most important reason why this explosion did not occur was that during the "lost decade," most of Latin America was experiencing a striking process of democratic transformation, the most broad-based move toward democracy since the 1930's. With the exception of the US-supported, civilian-military regimes in Central America, where elections were held but meant next to nothing, and of Mexico, where change continued to occur at a snail's pace, democratization took place throughout Latin America. This trend involved much more than elections. It included a newfound respect for human rights in the former dictatorships of the Southern Cone, and the granting of freedoms to the press, the unions, and other sectors of civil society in Brazil and other countries.

On the basis of historical precedent, the twin processes of depression and democratization should have favored the Latin American Left. Although the Left has not always been successful in its effort to improve living conditions for a majority of the people when it has had a chance to do so, Latin America has tended to turn to it in times of severe, prolonged economic and social crisis presided over by regimes of the Center or the Right. The populist regimes of the Center-Left that emerged during or just after the Depression throughout most of Latin America—those of Lazáro Cárdenas in Mexico, Getúlio Dornelles Vargas in Brazil, and Juan Perón in Argentina, and the Popular Front in Chile—are eloquent testimony to this historical trend.

Likewise, although the Left's democratic credentials have not always been impeccable, it has suffered far more than parties on other parts of the spectrum from authoritarian rule. Most of the assaults on the institutional order in the hemisphere have been directed against the Left. Coups d'état with enduring consequences, such as those in Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1973, Uruguay in 1974, and Argentina in 1976, were all carried out largely because of the military's perception that democratic practices were favoring the Left and could have led to its eventual accession to power.

Indeed, there are sound reasons to believe that the succession of military takeovers in Latin America over the past half century can be accounted for by the fact that representative democracy permitted the majority of the population to express their will. "Modern," "First World" political procedures, without previous restrictions (poll taxes, literacy tests, gender exclusions, property requirements, etc.) or tricks (electoral fraud, massive manipulation of a large rural vote, etc.), and the absence of social structures characteristic of the First World—a large, educated, urban middle class, a small upper class, with only a minority of the population living below the poverty line—are an explosive combination. It does not suggest that "the poor are not ready for democracy"; it simply means that letting the poor vote, and allowing their votes to be counted, leads to new demands and policies that in Latin America have historically tended to bring about military coups and the end of democratic rule. As Peru's Julio Cotler, one of the hemisphere's most distinguished specialists on democratic transitions, has observed, representative democracy permitted the open expression of the economic and social demands of masses of people who had previously been disenfranchised. They voted for the Left, which in turn frightened the monied classes, creating economic chaos and virtually inviting the military to take matters into its own hands.[8] This is precisely why the process of democratization has been characterized by false starts and frequent retrogression.

However, although the conditions seem ripe for a swing to the Left, it must be noted that in the past, there have been occasions when democratization and economic regression have not brought the Left to power. Similarly, today, in Mexico, Brazil, and Peru, regimes espousing conservative policies have been elected or have acceded to power. Left-wing forces have been defeated in Nicaragua and Chile. In other elections, it often seemed that even when left-leaning contenders were in fact the winners, they proceeded to implement the platform of their conservative rivals. This happened in Argentina and Venezuela, and may well end up occurring in Chile.

Although the "objective conditions" for change in the hemisphere are as favorable to the Left's prospects as they have ever been, the "subjective conditions" are very unfavorable. In the short run, as shown by the way the Nicaraguan elections helped to plunge the Left into a collective depression, the effects of the new world order are perceived as highly damaging and even disastrous. The traditional, orthodox Left in Latin America

[8]Julio Coltler, interview with the author, Lima, Peru, June 1, 1990.

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has also been devastated by the collapse of "socialism in one region" and by the profound reforms carried out by Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. These changes destroyed the traditional communist parties, most of which had been severely weakened in recent years anyway. It severely affected the Castroist, political-military organizations that sprang up in Central America in the early 1970's and reached their maximum strength at the beginning of the 1980's. It also struck the new movements of a social democratic bent —both the more radical ones (as in Brazil) and the moderate ones (as in Chile and Mexico)—that had emerged in recent years and that were presumably better equipped to deal with the convulsions in Eastern Europe. Finally, the events in Europe have also had a serious impact on traditional Latin American social democracy, which is strongly rooted in such countries as Venezuela, Jamaica, and Costa Rica.

The Left's Response

Initially, the traditional Left responded to the changes in the socialist world in a simplistic, formalistic way, insisting that they were nothing more than additional proof of socialism's vitality and its capacity to renew and transform itself. The parties and regimes on the Left that were most directly affected were the ones that reacted most quickly, superficially, and pessimistically. Conversely, those parties and movements least associated with what was once known as the "International Communist Movement" were able to respond in a much more positive and optimistic fashion.

It was thus quite understandable that Fidel Castro adopted the most direct and critical stance, because Cuba suffered severely from the effects of change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In a speech notable for its explicit, reflective tone and for its timing—it was given in November 1989, immediately after the destruction of the Berlin Wall and the "velvet revolution" in Prague, and immediately before the US invasion of Panama—Castro distinguished three kinds of effects those events had on Latin America in general and on Cuba in particular. Castro's first point dealt directly with the economy: "From the crisis in the socialist camp, we can expect only negative consequences in economic matters for our country."[9] Castro then gave his analysis of the origins of the situation in Eastern Europe: "The systematic destruction of the values of socialism, the insidious work carried out by imperialism, together with mistakes, have accelerated the process of destabilization in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. . . . The socialist bloc virtually does not exist anymore."[10] The Cuban leader then summed up the broader geopolitical consequences of the collapse of the communist world: "The acceptance of the principle of universal intervention by one great power is the end of independence and sovereignty in the world. . . . If events continue along their present course, if the United States is not forced to abandon these notions, the bipolar world we knew in the postwar era will inevitably be transformed into a unipolar world under American hegemony."[11]

The traditionalist communist parties of Costa Rica, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Argentina responded in a more nuanced manner. In a joint declaration made public in early 1990, these parties, while acknowledging that "*perestroyka* emerged as a necessity for facing the crisis of socialism and renovating it," also criticized the turn of events in the Soviet Union:

We are concerned that perestroyka *is being distorted, that it is being separated from its purpose of offering more socialism and more democracy; that within* perestroyka, *supporters of capitalist currents are gaining ground, as is the case with the separatist, counterrevolutionary nationalist currents attracted by convergence with the United States and the capitalist powers.*[12]

Most important, these five parties recognized the consequences of events in Eastern Europe:

These problems have had a contradictory effect on the revolutionary and progressive forces in Latin America: in some cases, they have brought demoralization and stimulated ideas far removed from our needs and transplanted from European processes; in other sectors, they have served to reaffirm socialist, revolutionary, and anti-imperialist convictions, together with a clear determination of creative independence.[13]

Other communist parties or their leaders adopted stances that were much more supportive of *pere-*

[9]Fidel Castro, "Speech Before the Remains of Those Fallen in Angola, December 7, 1989," *Proceso* (Mexico City), Dec. 11, 1989, p. 39.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid., p. 40.

[12]Humberto Vargas Carbonell, Rigoberto Padilla Rush, Narciso Isa Conde, Schafik Jorge Handal, and Patricio Echegaray, "Open Letter to the Revolutionary and Progressive Forces of Latin America and the Caribbean," March 1990.

[13]Ibid.

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stroyka and Mikhail Gorbachev. Perhaps the best example was the Brazilian Communist Party, whose current leader, Roberto Freire, went so far as to say that "the fall of the Eastern Bloc is one of the best things to happen to socialism in many years."[14]

The End of a Paradigm

For all of Latin America's leftist political movements and ideological currents to a greater or lesser extent, the collapse of socialism has meant the loss of a paradigm—the reference point for conceiving of an alternative to Latin America's current state of affairs. In Eastern Europe, the paradigm simply evaporated; what was known as socialism in those countries has for all practical purposes disappeared. Similarly, the extraordinary transformation in the Soviet Union and changes in China represented a drastic break with the past, a shattering disavowal of socialism as it had existed since its inception. Finally, Cuba, which became part of this paradigm even though its revolution was originally viewed as a break with or major revision of the type of socialism that existed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, was, because of its crisis and acute isolation, rapidly becoming irrelevant. Even the Cuban Revolution's impressive achievements in education and health and in eradicating extreme poverty came to be perceived as unviable. Even worse, such achievements were often seen as undesirable, being deemed too costly, too state-centered, and too dependent on foreign and local subsidies to be sustainable in the long term or applicable elsewhere.

The paradigm had been fundamental for the Left in Latin America. It was not applied mechanically; each Latin American leftist party, movement, government, or intellectual added, subtracted, or rectified certain of its aspects. The blueprint was adjusted to local conditions, as certain unacceptable features were eliminated and other, necessary, features were added. Yet, the underlying reference to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Cuba was always present. Whatever criticisms parties or individuals on the Left may have addressed to "really existing socialism" over the past 30 years (and these criticisms were often profound, substantive, and severe), they were all formulated within the framework of the socialist paradigm.

Today, the very idea of a complete alternative to the status quo has lost credibility. It is virtually impossible for the Left to escape the existing parameters of contemporary Latin American reality. Moreover, the idea of revolution itself, central to Latin American radical thought for decades, has lost its meaning. In Argentine historian José Aricó's words, "The transfer of the paradigm from old thinking to new situations is necessary because the idea of revolution has been shaken from top to bottom by the collapse of the East."[15] The end of this idea does not stem from the elimination of the socio-economic conditions that were thought to make revolution inevitable and desirable. As noted above, if anything, those conditions are present today in Latin America as they never were before. But the idea of revolution has withered and virtually disappeared because its outcome has been deemed undesirable. Perhaps more important, the February 1990 Nicaraguan elections showed that revolutionary outcomes are also reversible.

Previous setbacks for the Left in Latin America could be explained away by military treason (Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1973), American duplicity (Guatemala in 1954, Grenada in 1983), or errors and naïveté on the part of the Left. But in the 1990 Nicaraguan elections, the Sandinista Liberation Front was rejected by the people themselves, albeit under duress or perhaps even blackmail. The Front's defeat demonstrated that the revolutionary process could be freely and peacefully rolled back, with the consent or even enthusiastic support of those whom it was originally intended to benefit.[16]

Revolution has become dystopic; but revolutionaries deprived of utopia are an inconceivable species. People do not die, go to prison, resist torture, or devote years to fighting for something that cannot be visualized in concrete terms, and whose outcome is reversible. Under these conditions, revolutionaries cannot survive, or they can survive only in extreme circumstances like those of the Peruvian highlands. *Sendero Luminoso* may well be the last "pure" revolutionary organization in Latin America, largely because its isolation from the rest of the hemisphere makes it impervious to the consequences of the disappearance of the revolutionary paradigm, and with it, of the corollary notion of permanence.

The hypothetical end of the idea of revolution does not represent any kind of end of history, but it does represent what could be called the end of a certain idea of

[14]Roberto Freire, interview with the author, Recife, Brazil, Aug. 14, 1990.

[15]José Aricó, interview with the author, Buenos Aires, Dec. 10, 1989.

[16]To be sure, the dissolution of the idea of irreversibility affects mainly what Salvador Samayoa of the Salvadorean FMLN has called "revolutionary elites"—students, intellectuals, and professional cadres. The poor peasants of Chalatenango are far less affected by the idea of a reversible historical process and by the collapse of the philosophical foundations of the idea of revolution than the former Jesuit student radicals of the Universidad Centroamericana. Salvador Samayoa, interview with the author, Mexico City, Aug. 31, 1990.

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Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega (right) congratulates opposition presidential candidate Violeta Chamorro on her victory in the February 25, 1990, Nicaraguan presidential elections.

—Bettmann.

history, an end to the idea of the future. Since the early 19th century, and especially since the emergence of socialist and subsequently Marxist thought, the idea of a qualitatively different and implicitly better future has been a constant feature of progressive, anti-establishment political movements. In addition to Marxism, Roman Catholicism and the Latin intellectual's despair over a repugnant status quo were other streams that fed the river of contemporary Latin American left-wing thought. The worse the present appeared, the more important the idea of a qualitatively better future became. The future was not simply more of the present, but a substantively distinct, ontologically superior state of existence. (The notion of progress was, of course, central to this strain of thought, but the progress it involved was never linear in nature.) The future represented redemption, revenge, and a final reckoning where good would triumph over evil, the poor over the rich, the autochthonous over the alien. The disappearance of the Left's paradigm has left Latin America, so to speak, without a future. The only thing left to fight for is a future that is simply the present, plus more of the same.

It is important, nonetheless, to qualify the conceptual, emotional amputation suffered by the Left, even beyond acknowledging that it affects revolutionary elites far more than the "masses." As Mexico's most distinguished and successful writer of detective novels has phrased it: "The fact that the revolution is impossible does not make it morally less necessary, nor the reasons for revolt less urgent, even without an alternative. The PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party] are [sic] still scum, and the country they propose is still a mixture of economic misery for many, social misery for the majority, and moral misery for all."[17] The rationale for revolution, from 17th century England to Romania at the close of the second millennium, has always lain as much in the moral indignation aroused against an unacceptable status quo as in the attraction of a blueprint for the future.

The most powerful argument in the hands of the Left in Latin America—or anywhere else—has never been, and in all likelihood will never be, the intrinsic merit or viability of the alternative it proposes. Its strong suit is the morally unacceptable character of life as the overwhelming majority of the region's inhabitants live it. If the Latin America Left were to forsake this moral outrage and surrender the moral high ground to the cold imperatives of Realpolitik, it might win kudos in scholarly journals and in the pages of the international media, but will certainly lose the votes and sympathies of the people.

Latin America's poor, like the poor everywhere, are neither spontaneously revolutionary, nor consciously aware of their tragic fate. Emigration, mobility, the rural exodus, religion, violence, and the myriad shapes and forms of the ideological acceptance of the status quo ensure that revolts will be few and far between. But this opaque relationship to reality works both ways: the decision to accept life as it is with resignation cannot be more rational than the decision to rebel against a situation that suddenly appears unbearable, even though it is only marginally worse than before. To the extent that the appearance of the inevitability of the present is central in the Latin American acceptance of the present, events in Eastern Europe and the Left's dilemma in devising a new utopia for the end of the 20th century constitute a serious obstacle to its attaining mass support and accession to power. But insofar as the experience of moral offense in the face of massive poverty, injustice, squalor, and oppression is a factor that moves men to revolt, the disappearance of the socialist world is a secondary factor in determining the fortunes of the

[17]Paco Ignacio Taibo, II, interview with the author, New York, Oct. 10, 1990.

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Latin American Left. It would only become decisive if it led the Left to abandon its moral vocation, its role as a voice for the dispossessed, and transform itself into a rational, orderly, and "realistic" option, different from the rest of the political spectrum only in its traditions and style.

The Moderate Left

The passing of the paradigm will be felt by sectors of the Latin Left other than those directly identified with Soviet-style socialism. Indeed, the collapse of the Soviet, East European, and Cuban models has helped discredit themes and policies that were equally dear to, or identified with, the moderate, quasi-social democratic Center-Left, which was traditionally nationalistic and progressive, but never state socialist or "Marxist-Leninist." The discredit emanating from the defeat of socialism in Europe most relevant to the moderates concerns a principle shared by every segment of the Latin American Left—an emphasis on the role of the state in economic and social policy.

Protected, state-sponsored industrialization, a large state-owned sector in the economy, across-the-board subsidies, and the pretense of a social safety net had been salient features of Latin American postwar economies. However, already before the collapse of socialism in Europe, a shift from state-sponsored, protected, inward-looking, subsidized economic development to the "free-market" model had begun in Latin America. Free-market policies, wide-open trade and investment approaches, and total reliance on the private sector owed their newfound popularity more to the desire to follow a worldwide trend, and to the failure or exhaustion of previous approaches, than to a careful analysis of whether the policies intended would actually work. However, the appeal of such policies was buttressed by the perception that they had worked in countries like the United States and Margaret Thatcher's Britain, and that they were also responsible for success stories in South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.

The failure of socialism in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Cuba appeared to provide additional evidence for the failure of statist economic policies. Moreover, the abandonment of centralized economic planning in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union came to be viewed as a reason for drastically reducing the role of the state in the Latin American economy.

The existing models were associated with the Left and failure, while the new, supposedly modern alternative was identified with success in other countries and with the Latin American Right (the fact that in Brazil the statist model had been put into practice by the military, and that in Mexico it was implemented by the PRI establishment, was simply ignored). Nor was it taken into account that countries like the "Asian tigers," not to mention Japan, had not followed radical "free-market" policies at all, and that Ronald Reagan's and Margaret Thatcher's economic success was both relative and dubious. The costs and consequences of the Reagan administration's policies became apparent by 1990, and the extent of privatization in Great Britain and the true dismantling of the British welfare state turned out to be less significant than originally thought.

Moreover, the identification of the "statist, populist, closed-economy" policies of Latin America with the socialist economies of the East was inappropriate. Even the most statist Latin American economies were characterized by large private sectors. Important spheres were dominated, sometimes overwhelmingly, by foreign investment. The only fully socialist economy in the hemisphere was Cuba's, but it was a striking exception. In many cases, the state-owned sector of the Latin economies was bloated, but nowhere was it the dominant behemoth that it was in Eastern Europe.

Likewise, the free-market policies advocated for Latin America by the international financial community were also incorrectly associated with the free-market experiments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. With the exception of Cuba, Latin American economies already featured market-pricing mechanisms, albeit with subsidies, controls, and distortions, and consequently the application of any kind of shock therapy could only be limited to certain goods and services.

Equally important, the free market was not truly working anywhere in Latin America; its only showcase was Chile, and there the results as well as the methods were questionable at best. Nor could the free-market alternative be implemented by all countries at the same time. Almost by definition, it required abundant resources from abroad—just as the preceding model did—which could not be simultaneously available to all Latin American economies under any conceivable scenario. As the years went by, it became readily apparent that even those countries most likely to receive foreign funding were not obtaining it at the pace or in the amount that they had expected.

Nevertheless, the Left found itself in a no-win situation. Either it stuck to its guns, which were not really its own but foisted upon it, and defended the indefensible —a state-run, closed, subsidized economy in a world in which such practices seemed totally obsolete. Or, it turned around and supported the opposite—modern, competitive, free markets. In the latter case, it ended up imitating or being assimilated by the Right and losing its

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raison d'être. Like West European social democratic parties, the moderate Left in Latin America "succeeded" only when it implemented the policies of its adversaries, and was condemned to failure when it applied its own program.[18] The entire process contributed to the impression that the Left was devoid of any theoretical or policy alternative at all.

The only possible alternative the Left might offer was particularly difficult if not impossible to sell politically. In the infrequent instances in which the Left actually had the chance to come to power—in Mexico in 1988, in Brazil in 1989, and to some extent in Chile in 1990—its implicit alternative was nothing more or less than an adjusted middle-of-the-road economic policy, although it was intrinsically different from radical free-market policies. The alternative called for more debt relief and less debt service—a difference of degree, although with qualitatively distinct effects. It included demands for more spending on education, health, housing, sewage treatment, drinking water, etc., and revealed a heightened concern for social justice, but within the limits imposed by the scarcity of resources. It called for less dependence on the private sector, local or foreign, and a larger and more important role for the state in the economy; but the state was to be different—democratic, accountable, and honest. It obviously did not call for total state control over the economy, and it did not seek complete elimination or marginalization of the private sector, but it did require a totally new relationship with this sector, a stance as removed from the traditional Left's baiting and hostility as it was from the Right's pandering and systematic submission to blackmail. It did call for a selective opening of domestic markets, and avoided full protectionism, which had never really existed in the first place. It also sought a new relationship with the United States, rejecting both the ostracism of that country by the traditional Left and the Right's willingness to subordinate the region to Washington.

Paradoxically, the Left, always known for its extremism and improvisation, was in fact proposing a moderate, long-term, unspectacular course that sought to improve the living standards of a majority of the population slowly and modestly, but consistently and effectively. The Right, traditionally prudent, had become the advocate of "revolution," albeit a conservative one—of dramatic gestures, and quick, radical solutions.

Prospects for the Left

During the past 30 years, the forces of the Left in Latin America have found themselves in the forefront of the struggle for democracy in their respective countries, whether that struggle took place against military dictatorship, despotic oligarchies, or one-party authoritarian regimes. In that sense, the Left—from the most moderate, traditional social democrats to left-leaning social democrats, orthodox communists, and armed insurgents—was democratic at least insofar as its avowed aims were concerned. Whatever conclusions could be drawn from their support for antidemocratic practices in other countries, and whether or not these democratic parties and movements would respect political and civil liberties if they had attained power, in one Latin American country after another, the Left was on one side and the authoritarian forces were on the other. The closing of parliaments, the disappearances and torture of dissidents, the closing of newspapers, and the harassment of intellectuals in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and all of Central America (with the exception of Costa Rica) were the work of the Right, not of the Left. The reason was simple and obvious: the Right was in power, the Left was not.

But the Left's close ties with the Soviet Union, and above all with Cuba, Nicaragua, and the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador, made its democratic credentials suspect in the eyes of the Right, the media, and the United States. This has been a central and recurrent theme in the overall conflict between the Latin American Left and the United States since the 1940's. The Left's failure to dissociate itself from the undemocratic practices taking place in Cuba and Nicaragua tended to confirm the conviction in the eyes of many that the Left's commitment to democracy was superficial, and that it was more than tenuously linked with totalitarianism. This made it easy to identify the Latin American Left with the collapsing regimes in Eastern Europe: the road to Prague, Bucharest, and Moscow was seen to run through Havana and Managua. It also made it easy to declare the Latin Left irrelevant: it had become obsolete now that democracy and the free market had won out elsewhere in the world. Latin American intellectuals, parties, movements, and governments of the Left were on the losing side; their adversaries, on the winning one.

Nevertheless, there is a silver lining in the evaporating socialist cloud: the Latin American Left has finally been relieved of three arduous and largely impossible tasks that it had been charged with in the past. First, it

[18] "The Left has lost it sense of mission. Ever since it learned that a political platform cannot in itself alter exchange rates or the rate of inflation, the Left has become reluctant to raise expectations or to speak of social projects, fearing that it may be branded an irresponsible dreamer by its adversaries. Socialists in Europe have had shining successes, but I'm not certain what they had to do with 'socialism.' It is as if socialism can serve all other ends except its own." Régis Debray, "Identity Crisis for the Socialist Left," *The San Francisco Chronicle*, Mar. 7, 1990.

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no longer has to demonstrate that it is not pro-Soviet or pro-Cuban, and that its accession to power in any given country would not turn the unfortunate nation into a Soviet satellite. Second, the Left has been absolved of the duty of showing, a priori, that it will not transform every nation it governs into an authoritarian wasteland, a tropical, Andean, or meridional GULag. Third, the Left need not continue to prove that it is not perceived by the United States as a mortal enemy, and that its rule would entail Washington's ostracism and embargoes, with credits drying up and Contras blooming in every field and jungle.

The "triple absolution" is a direct effect of the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union as a superpower. The accusation that a left-wing or left-of-center government would immediately transform a given country into a Soviet client state is no longer credible anywhere in Latin America. And while some sectors of the Left are still perceived as favorable to Cuban hegemony, the Cuban model has been also rapidly losing credibility.

Similarly, because of the radical reforms in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the scarecrow of a "totalitarian nightmare" has in a sense ceased to function in most Latin American nations. It is increasingly difficult to accuse any political force of seeking to implant a system that no longer exists, and whose proponents have acknowledged its own perfidy. The Nicaraguan elections complemented this process. For the first time, a revolutionary regime in Latin America left power through peaceful, electoral means. Previously, leftist governments emerging from a revolution or an electoral victory had either never abandoned power (Cuba), or had been forced out by violent, unconstitutional means (Guatemala in 1954, Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1973, Grenada in 1983). The clean elections held by the Sandinistas and their ensuing acknowledgment of defeat not only helped to establish their commitment to democratic processes, but also helped to show that at least some organizations on the Left have come to understand that the way power is achieved is not unconnected to its exercise.

FMLN guerrillas fire at the Salvadoran army from behind a barricade in the city of San Miguel.

—Bettmann.

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Thousands rally in support of Luis Inacio "Lula" da Silva of the Partido dos Trabalhadores *in Brazil.*

—Bettmann.

Finally, now that the United States itself has ceased to see a Soviet threat behind every Latin American revolutionary or social reformer, the idea that a government of the Left will necessarily entail conflict with the neighbor to the North has been losing its validity. A government of the Left or Center-Left may be sincerely perceived as likely to bring about economic chaos and social upheaval, or it may be politically portrayed as likely to do so, but it can no longer be portrayed as automatically guaranteeing tension in a country's relations with the United States. The US may abhor the Left's social and economic policies, and may prefer other kinds of regimes (it probably always will), but it will probably not be openly hostile to new leftist governments in Latin America. Moreover, because of shrinking US resources and because of greater competition for these resources from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Washington's aid to Latin America will diminish. The difference between what pro-US, right-of-center regimes and nationalistic, left-of-center regimes can hope to receive from the United States will inevitably shrink.

The two countries where the Left or Left-of-Center is stronger than ever are Brazil and Mexico, where it is newly born and homegrown, fully identified with the push for democratization, and totally devoid of debts, links, and emotional attachments to Cuba and the Soviet Union. Well before the Gorbachev Revolution in the East, Mexico's center-left Cuauhtémoc Cádenas, who obtained between 31 percent and 40 percent of the vote in the July 1988 elections (depending on whose figures one believes), and Leonel Brizola's *Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro* and Luis Inacio "Lula" da Silva's *Partido dos Trabalhadores* in Brazil, which together gathered 48 percent of the vote in the 1989 presidential elections, won popular legitimacy for being democratic rather than communist, dedicated to the pursuit of national interests rather than pro-Soviet, and neutral vis-à-vis the US rather than anti-American.

There are other examples, though not many, and not as definitive: the renovated Socialist Party in Chile, along with the *Partido para la Democracia,* is perhaps the most important one. The Chilean democratic tradition, together with the defeat of the Allende movement and the ensuing exile of most Chilean socialists, had a positive effect—together, they prompted Chilean leftists to change their attitudes on the key issues of de-

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mocracy, links with the USSR and Cuba, and relations with the United States. In addition, Augusto Pinochet's free-market economic policies induced many on the Left, particularly those within the Socialist Party, to review their entire approach to economics.

For the Chilean, Mexican, and Brazilian parties and their supporters, as well as for leftist intellectuals, the collapse of the socialist world is far from being a disaster or cause for depression. Rather, the end of the cold war will complete their liberation from constraints that they had already partly thrown off. Because these parties had few or no roots in the deceptively fertile soil of Latin American Marxism-Leninism, the revolutions in the East were a welcome event, not a setback.

For the first time since the beginning of the cold war, the Left in Latin America faces the possibility of contending for power on a level playing field. In a continent where nearly three-quarters of the population are poor and have become poorer during the last decade, the Left can finally compete on its own terms and with its own platform—democracy, sovereignty, economic growth, and social justice—all in the service of improving the lot of millions of Latin Americans excluded from the benefits of previous booms and current experiments. If it succeeds, it can reasonably aspire to govern most of Latin America's societies before the close of the century. If it fails, it may be forever erased from the political map.

Commentary

A Different Future for the Latin American Left?

Mark Falcoff

THE paper by Jorge Castañeda is one of the most thorough-going and even merciless examples of self-criticism from a Latin American intellectual associated with the political and cultural Left that I have ever read. Although—perhaps predictably—I disagree with many of the details of Castañeda's analysis, I do accept his fundamental proposition, namely, that the end of the cold war may indeed prove positively liberating for the Latin American Left by:

- freeing it from the need to carry water for the Soviet Union or other Marxist-Leninist systems or ideologies;
- decoupling its domestic agenda from geopolitics, thereby neutralizing the potential for conflict with the United States;
- allowing it to debate its core issues—property and social power—on their own merits rather than as part of a rigid ideological schema.

The interesting question here is why Castañeda greets these prospects so tentatively, and why, moreover, he describes the Latin American Left—from social democrats to Castroites—as "depressed" and "demoralized" by them. Elements of an answer are found scattered throughout his paper, but in no place are they coherently drawn together. Let me try to do this for him.

In the first place, neither past nor present Latin American experience suggests a direct and simple linkage between economic deprivation and radical politics. I

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would go even further—there seems to be almost no relationship whatever. Castro's regime in Cuba and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua were brought to power not by poverty, but by the alienation of the influential urban middle class. Some regimes that Castañeda classifies as "progressive"—such as Juan Perón's first government in Argentina (1946–55)—were seen as thoroughly "right-wing" at the time; others, such as João Goulart's in Brazil (1961–64) and Salvador Allende's in Chile (1970–73), were put into power by a Center-Left electorate fully half of which expected something very different from what it got (and immediately took fright once these regimes revealed their true colors).

This does not mean, of course, that given the increasing poverty of certain Latin American societies, the Left might not yet come to power under its own banners after other options have exhausted themselves. That is, if the current wave of "free-market" experiments in Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, and elsewhere fail to produce results, one would have to assume that if formal democratic institutions remain intact, a left-wing alternative would eventually be given a chance.

But why hasn't it happened yet? Given the economic and social regression that has marked the continent over the past decade, combined with increasing opportunities for popular political expression, one would have expected left-wing candidates in recent electoral races in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and even many Central America countries to have done far, far better. To explain why they have not, Castañeda points to "subjective" circumstances, as well as to the possibility of emigration (combined with overseas remittances for those who remain home), rural exodus, religious feeling, and police brutality and right-wing violence against left-wing forces and individuals. Undoubtedly, all of these factors have a neutralizing effect on potentially radical or revolutionary sentiments and activities. But Castañeda seems to be missing a crucial subjective variable—as long as Latin America has at least one foot in Western culture, it will continue to aspire to evolutionary policies and individual improvement. Only when it has abandoned all hope of this possibility, and accepts unhesitatingly its place among the losers of history (or as Franz Fanon put it, "the wretched of the earth"), will it be willing to discard all inhibitions and rush into an open-ended revolutionary adventure. Until that point is reached, we can expect Latin electorates to be remarkably reluctant to plunge into a political void just because it is advertised as the opposite of the status quo.

Moreover, since only a minority of the Latin American Left could be described as Marxist-Leninist in any meaningful sense, one would think that the recent events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would have had little or no impact upon more moderate sectors. Yet, Castañeda says, they have had a devastating effect, even upon social democrats. But why is this the case? First, because unlike in Western Europe, there has never been a serious showdown between orthodox and revisionist Marxists in Latin America such as occurred in Germany in the debate between Karl Kautsky and Eduard Bernstein in the late 19th century. Rather, the division within the Latin American Left has been between the "populist" and the more rigidly Marxist wings (between Perón, Vargas, and Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia on the one hand, and their respective Marxist parties on the other).

Second, precisely because the Latin American Left has been so weak and disorganized these last 50 or 60 years, socialists and communists could not afford to disagree over matters of high principle (democratic centralism, loyalty to the Soviet Union, etc.) as they did in Germany, France, and Italy, where the concrete opportunities to come to power through the ballot box pitted utopians against pragmatists (or "maximalists" against "minimalists"). Meanwhile, the enemies of the Left often failed to recognize any distinction between its democratic and nondemocratic sectors, and during periods of authoritarian rule persecuted both with equal brio. This had the effect of pushing the victims into each other's arms, and creating a common political culture of persecution which was so embattled that it could not afford the luxury of critical thought.

There is a third reason why the non-Marxist Left has taken the collapse of communism so hard—and Castañeda lightly touches upon it when he refers to the intellectual traditions of Latin American Catholicism. The fact is that Latin American intellectual culture remains highly derivative of European traditions. Since the 17th century, the principal problem for Latin American thinkers was to "locate" their world in the larger chart of European culture. In the 17th century, it was Counter-Reformation Catholicism; in the 18th, the Enlightenment; in the 19th, positivism; in the 20th, liberalism, then Marxism, and now liberalism once again. None of these currents is wholly relevant to the unique necessities of the hybrid societies of Latin America. We are still waiting for sui generis ideologies to make their appearance.

Further, Latin American political culture and particularly the culture of the Left is profoundly Hegelian—always looking for the "world spirit" to which to attach itself. It is also strongly eschatological—that is, it requires a secular version of the Last Judgment, the Resurrection. This has rendered the Left particularly vulnerable to events elsewhere—what might be called the Zeitgeist. Certainly, the spirit of the times is not very

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favorable to the Latin American Left nowadays.

It is possible, however, to push this point too far: Castañeda is wrong to see the current wave of liberalism in Latin America as a purely "ideological phenomenon." He himself admits that it has been helped "by the failure of the past in Latin America as well as in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union," a caveat that nullifies this argument. Surely, the performance of "really existing socialism" in countries like Cuba and Nicaragua is not ideological but concrete.

In fact, over the years it has been the *Left* in Latin America that has been largely an ideological phenomenon; where else, after all, could Marxism become a serious political force without an industrial proletariat, or, where an industrial proletariat existed, fail to capture a minimal amount of political power? On the other hand, what might be called the *myth of the Left* has significantly benefited from the fact that so few socialist parties or movements have ever actually come to power, or if they did, were deposed before they had to accept full responsibility for their policies (Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, Allende in Chile, Goulart in Brazil, Maurice Bishop in Grenada, etc.).

Finally, the end of the cold war has deprived the Latin American Left of its principal enemy—the United States. Or rather, it has deprived the Latin American Left of an excuse for not coming to power, or for failing to succeed when it does. For, quite bluntly, the United States does not much need Latin America anymore, and is not likely to devote the kind of resources, policy energy, or political capital to prevent left-wing regimes from coming to power or staying there that it did even three or four years ago.

The importance of this point can hardly be overestimated. The Left in Latin America has never derived its principal intellectual and cultural force from social injustice, but rather from wounded national self-esteem. It is not surprising, therefore, that with the exception of Chile (and perhaps to some extent Brazil), leftism in Latin America has been an elite phenomenon, reflecting the educated class's anger, hatred, envy, and resentment of the United States. The sources of this feeling are many, and predate the actual appearance of Marxism. But the Left derived much of its appeal not from any particular interest in the Soviet Union or the Soviet bloc—but rather from its capacity to harm US interests. And certainly, it was such global interests rather than an intrinsic concern for any Latin American country or countries that provoked the Alliance for Progress, counterinsurgency programs, "soft" loans from the Inter-American Development Bank, or periodic rituals of self-flagellation in Washington. Nothing will be capable of arousing such concern in the foreseeable future.

Castañeda devotes much attention to the argument that the Left in Latin America draws its strength not from the alternative it proposes but from the unacceptable nature of the present. Insofar as "squalor and oppression" are factors that move men to revolt, he says, the disappearance of the socialist world "would only become decisive if the Left were to abandon its moral vocation, its role as a voice for the dispossessed . . . different from the rest of the political spectrum only in its tradition and style." Up to a point, I agree. There is no reason to think that the Left will disappear as part of Latin American political life. But in a radically different moral, cultural, and geopolitical context, it will face more serious challenges—both in and out of power—than it ever has before. It will be forced to fashion more credible alternatives when in opposition, and to govern more responsibly when in power. It will be compelled to find resources—including ideological resources—from within Latin America rather than elsewhere. And it will depend for its mystique on the better life it can offer its own people, not the damage it promises to inflict upon others more fortunate. These are tall orders. They justify the unease and apprehension that pervades Castañeda's paper.

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The Postcommunist Third World: Focus on Africa

Colin Legum

The collapse of Soviet communism has had its reverberations in the Third World, although political developments in various regions, including Africa, anticipated this event in many respects. The demise of the Soviet system brings to regions like Africa relaxation of superpower confrontation, but it also raises the specter of US dominance or of its converse, a sharp decline in First World interest in the future of the continent.

Even before the collapse of communism in the Soviet bloc, radical left movements in the Third World, like their European counterparts, had shed their illusions about the Soviet model of Marxism-Leninism. (Earlier, the vogue that "Maoist thought" had enjoyed in the 1960's had already lost its allure as China under Mao Zedong's successors became self-absorbed with its own modernization.) This disillusionment coincided with and was deepened by the economic crisis that began to grip most developing countries, especially those in Africa, in the early 1980's. Marx's prediction that the growing impoverishment of the proletariat would provide fertile soil for revolution was proved wrong, even in relatively industrialized societies such as India, Egypt, and South Africa, as well as those of Central and South America. The only two notable exceptions beyond the periphery of the Soviet empire were Cuba and Vietnam, which for particularist reasons embraced Marxism.

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Latter-day Marxist-Leninist ideologues were also proved wrong in two of their predictions. The first—propagated by the Comintern and later by the Cominform—was that the demise of Western colonialism would result in the emergence of new states hostile to their old imperial masters and to Western capitalism. Instead of widespread hostility, the post-colonial mood in the Third World was characterized by ambivalence toward the West. Far from rushing to embrace Moscow, the great majority of newly independent states, led by India, chose to join either the British-centered Commonwealth of Nations or the Francophone community centered in Paris. In order to assert their independence, they created the Non-Aligned Movement to distance themselves, at least in theory, from both superpowers; this was buttressed by regional organizations such as the League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity. However, almost without exception, they joined the Western-controlled World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and became associated with the European Community through the Lomé Treaty. This tied them to (entrapped them in, according to radical leftists) the Western capitalist international system.

The second serious error made by Marxist ideologues was their confident prediction (on which Soviet foreign policy toward the Third World was based) that the "inevitable crisis" in economic relations between the capitalist world and the developing nations in the post-colonial world would result in a breach between the West and the South and would produce a powerful anticapitalist movement that would benefit the Soviet Union. This scenario has not materialized, although some of the issues addressed by this analysis persist, which could point to a future West-South conflict of interests that could shape the future foreign policies of

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governments of the South and political developments within Third World societies. Conflict between the West and the South over economic relations is likely to become sharper, not easier, in the postcommunist era.

Third World Reactions to the Collapse of Communism

The collapse of the Soviet empire was welcomed almost unanimously by Third World leaders—the exceptions being pro-communist parties and regimes heavily dependent on Soviet support. The most frequently cited reason for this welcome was that it marked the final end of the era of nuclear confrontaton and of superpower rivalry for influence in the Third World, which had always been seen as a major destabilizing factor there. It had produced or contributed to such traumatic events as the wars in Korea and Vietnam, conflicts in the Middle East, and civil war in Angola and Ethiopia. Superpower rivalry also subjected Third World countries to pressures to take sides and to shape their foreign and economic policies to ensure a flow of financial and military aid from either the Western community or the Soviet bloc.

However, many Third World leaders (not just radicals) qualified their welcome of the Soviet collapse in two respects. The first and most frequently expressed worry has had to do with the likely impact on international affairs of the emergence of what is described as "monopower hegemony," in other words, the hegemony of the United States. Interest now focuses on the way Americans will use their unchallenged military power to pursue their interests worldwide, for example, possibly by seeking to impose their ideas about the all-important virtues of private enterprise by linking aid to the building of capitalist economies.

This concern is tempered by the realization that US military power is not matched by economic power. This gives rise, however, to an opposite concern: that trade rivalries between the United States and the enlarged European Community, on the one hand, and between the United States and Japan, on the other, could lead to an economic war among the rich industrial nations with damaging consequences for the international economic climate, and thus further diminish the possibilities of developing a new system of world trade less harmful to Third World interests. For example, there is the chronic controversy over the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which is seen as a trade war in which the richer nations seek to advance their competing interests, while paying scant regard to improving trading opportunities for developing countries.

Another cause for concern that has been expressed is that with the processes of democratization and marketization in Eastern Europe, there will be a tendency on the part of Western countries (especially the European Community) to divert more of their economic and other resources to that region at the expense of aid and debt relief for the developing nations.

The most immediate impact of the collapse of Soviet power has naturally been felt by the communist parties and Soviet-supported regimes in the Third World. Most of these communist regimes have begun to effect reforms in their command-economy structures and have embraced, at least in principle, the idea of pluralist politics. This has been notable in Mongolia, while Vietnam has moved toward a market economy. But their cautious reforms to date have resembled more the half-hearted reforms of Bulgaria than those of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. For other communist regimes, e.g., those in China and North Korea, there is the dilemma of whether establishing a free-market economy is compatible with refusal to create an open political society.

The communist parties of the Third World can be classified in four groups: the pro-Moscow parties that have consistently hewed to the Moscow line through all its vagaries; the anti-Moscow parties (Trotskyites) loyal to the Fourth International; the opportunistic parties that embraced Marxism-Leninism mainly because this ensured Moscow's support for their achievement and maintenance of power; and the "rhetorical" parties, which used the class rhetoric of Marxism-Leninism without ever seeking to establish vanguard parties or implement socialist policies. These have all reacted in different manners to the Soviet collapse.

Opportunistic and rhetorical parties. Let us address the last two categories first. The parties that relied for their power almost exclusively on Moscow were the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, led by ex-President Mengistu Haile Mariam; the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA); and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). None of these parties could survive the removal of the Soviet crutch, a development that was implicit in Mikhail Gorbachev's new direction, although FRELIMO, which had been denied effective Soviet aid soon after gaining power in Maputo, had begun to shift away from Moscow already in the time of Leonid Brezhnev.

Mengistu's party in Ethiopia was the only one in Africa that appeared to be seriously committed to building a communist state through "revolution from the top." Its oppressive methods, backed by Soviet military and economic aid matched only by that given by Moscow to

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Rebel troops atop a truck mounted with an anti-aircraft gun in Revolution Square in central Addis Ababa attempt to maintain order in June 1991 in the wake of the overthrow of the Mengistu regime.

—AP/ Wide World.

Vietnam and Cuba, unleashed growing nationalist opposition from the Eritreans, Tigrayans, Oromos, and other ethnic communities. Once Moscow began to lose faith in Mengistu's ability to survive and scaled down the level of aid, his regime crumbled rapidly.

An interesting aspect of the negative impact of Soviet policy in supporting an unpopular regime was Mengistu's loss of support from genuine Marxist movements. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) grew in strength under Marxist leaders during the time of Emperor Haile Selassie, while the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) was launched by young student Marxists. When Moscow took the side of Mengistu, both movements became alienated. The EPLF quietly abandoned its Marxist policies and became an openly nationalist movement committed to democratic principles. The TPLF went through a more tortuous process, first denouncing the "Soviet imperialists," then finding a model in Albania as an anti-Moscow communist regime, and finally embracing democratic principles based on the right of all ethnic communities to self-determination. Today, the EPLF heads the government in Eritrea, and a TPLF-dominated government is in power in Addis Ababa. There are two political lessons in these developments. The first is that unpopular minority regimes cannot be kept in power through external support, no matter how generous; and the second is that in the contest between nationalism and communism, the former is the stronger.

In Angola, the MPLA was helped to power in its conflict with Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) through the military intervention of the Soviet bloc and Cuba. In classic cold-war fashion, UNITA (despite its own leftist leanings) was able to attract anticommunist allies, notably South Africa, the United States, and Zaire. Because the MPLA gained power while the country was at war, it never had a chance to establish itself as a vanguard party—it relied instead on its army and on an elite bureaucracy. At a time when both sides in the civil conflict had reached a state of deadlock, Gorbachev became engaged with the United States in brokering a peace that the Cubans had no option but to join. Deprived of Soviet and Cuban support, and heavily reliant on important trade links (especially in oil) with the West, President José dos Santos pragmatically accepted the principle of pluralist democracy as the basis for a peace settlement with UNITA.

Although the Marxist rhetoricians in the people's democratic republics of Benin and Congo were never to be taken seriously, at the height of the cold war both regimes

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were seen as "stepping stones for Soviet expansion." However, their flimsy power bases melted away at the first challenge of popular democratic opposition.

Nonruling pro-Moscow parties. The nonruling pro-Moscow communist parties in the Third World never achieved the significance of their counterparts in Western Europe, itself an interesting phenomenon demonstrating the lack of appeal that communism held for the oppressed in the poorest of societies. The communist parties played a significant role in no more than a dozen countries throughout the Third World. Their biggest following was in India, where, at different times, they captured two state governments. The communist forces in India were continuously weakened by internal division, which produced two major rival communist parties riven by conflicts over ideological interpretations of Marxism-Leninism and their attitudes toward changes in Moscow's relations with New Delhi. In more recent times, communists have become a factor in the politics of Nepal. Their challenge in Indonesia was smashed by ruthless methods made easier because of the communists' alleged links with China, a factor that also led to the communist downfall in Malaya. Despite the active encouragement of Cuba, communists of the Western Hemisphere achieved power only by establishing united fronts in two countries—in Chile under Salvador Allende, and in Nicaragua under the Sandinistas. In Africa, there have been only two significant communist parties—in Sudan and South Africa.

For all the parties faithful to Moscow, the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev spread confusion about their future role. While most of the parties initially welcomed *glasnost'* and the revitalization of Marxism-Leninism offered by Gorbachev, the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union forced into the open the issue of whether pluralist democracy is in any way consistent with a belief in the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and whether a command economy was necessary. The abortive August 1991 coup against Gorbachev brought a brief moment of hope that communism could still be saved; but it also threw into bold relief the differences within communist ranks about the need for a fundamental reappraisal of the whole basis of Marxism-Leninism.

In Nepal, for instance, where the communist party (United Marxist Leninist—UML) has 69 out of 205 deputies in the parliament, news of the attempted coup found party leaders sharply divided. Writing in the Bangladesh weekly *Dialogue,* M. S. Jose said that "after days of living through a state of semi-shock," the UML lashed out against Gorbachev. Party leader Man Mohan Adhikari declared that "from the very beginning, the party had been studying the so-called *glasnost'* and *perestroyka* policies of Gorbachev" instead of blindly supporting them; its conclusion was that his policies "not only diluted the principles of Marxism," but would ultimately lead to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Adhikari added that the UML "strongly opposes the installation of capitalism in the Soviet Union and deplores the baseless rumors that Marxism-Leninism has failed." His views were opposed by a mainstream in the UML that welcomed Gorbachev's reforms; but a more extreme view was expressed by another leading UML figure, Mod Nath Prasit, who titled a contribution he wrote for a party organ "The Great Contribution of Lenin Will Never Be Erased by Traitors."[1] The Nepalese communist factions—mostly under Indian and not indigenous Nepalese leadership—closely parallel those in India, and the arguments for and against Gorbachev and whether Marxism still has a future form the core of the post mortems conducted by Indian communists.

Three issues dominate the heart-searching debates currently being conducted in Third World communist parties, and are no different from those dividing communists in Western Europe. These are: Has Marxism-Leninism failed only in the USSR, and what are the reasons for its failure there? What lessons are to be learned from the Soviet experience? Deprived of their international center of allegiance, how can communist parties make themselves relevant in their own societies?

The final outcome of this debate has a special significance for South Africa, as the South African Communist Party (SACP) is probably in a better position to play an important domestic political role than is any Third World counterpart. The SACP and the Sudan Communist Party are the oldest parties in Africa, both having been formed in 1921. Before it was banned in 1960, the SACP was a relatively insignificant political force, but its committed stand against racism had earned it respect among Black South Africans. This was turned to good account when the African National Congress (ANC) in exile embarked on an armed struggle under the leadership of Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo in 1962. Spurned by Western governments (with the exception of Sweden), the ANC turned to Moscow for support—mainly military, to build up its armed wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK). The SACP, a hard-line Stalinist party, played a key role in brokering the alliance between the ANC and Moscow. Its reward was the creation of a united front with the noncommunist, nationalist-oriented ANC. Through Leninist tactics, the SACP succeeded in establishing a dominant position in the exile councils of the ANC as well as in MK, where it was able to secure all

[1]See the Jose article in *Dialogue* (Dakka), Sept. 27, 1991.

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

Joe Slovo, then secretary general of the South African Communist Party, addresses a rally in Cape Town on April 29, 1990, after returning from 27 years in exile. On the left is Nelson Mandela, deputy president of the African National Congress.

—Reuters/Bettmann.

except the very top position. For example, Chris Hani, who is the new secretary-general of the SACP, held the number two position in MK. Its close ties with the ANC gained the SACP a measure of popularity especially among young Black South Africans. However, tensions between the nationalists in the ANC and the SACP persisted below the surface.

The SACP can claim credit on two counts: since its leadership was mainly White and Indian, it contributed toward strengthening the ANC's commitment to a nonracial post-apartheid society; and it strengthened the faction in the ANC that favored a negotiated political settlement. This latter stand was determined by the SACP's Leninist support of a dual political strategy: first, to win the liberation struggle, accepting that this would probably result in a bourgeois government; and second, to build on the success of this struggle to launch a national democratic revolution as classically defined in post-Leninist strategy.

Before the first objective was achieved, the SACP was "sold out" by Gorbachev's withdrawal of support for armed struggle; but the SACP could justify itself by rightly claiming that it saw the armed struggle as only a means toward achieving a negotiated settlement. What it felt harder to reconcile was its future relationship with Gorbachev's Moscow, and especially his denunciation of Stalinism, whose policies had been loyally defended by the SACP. Its principal theoretician, Joe Slovo, produced a lengthy apologia for the party's failure to understand what had gone wrong in the USSR under Stalin, entitled "Has Socialism Failed?"[2] His conclusion was that socialism had not failed but that serious errors had been committed in building a top-heavy bureaucratic state with a centralized command economy sustained by repression. The lesson to be learned, he concluded, was the need for multiparty democracy and a mixed economy to ensure the success of socialism. Slovo's analysis and prescription for the future policies of his party won general acceptance with the movement, but it was heavily criticized by a formidable veteran, Harry Gwala, who wrote: "No doubt, there were many excesses committed during the time of Stalin, but who is not wiser after the event."[3]

The crucial problem facing the SACP is its future role once a democratic constitution is finally agreed on through the negotiations in which the party is currently actively engaged in partnership with the ANC. Nelson Mandela has made it clear that while he values the past alliance with the SACP, his ANC is not committed to socialism and that the two parties would go their separate ways once a new constitution has been achieved.

After their return from exile, both the ANC and the SACP embarked on recruiting a mass membership of their own. At the last count (September 1991), the SACP claimed to have 15,000 members, with an immediate target of 20,000, as against the ANC's immediate goal of 1 million members.[4] The chances of the SACP's winning a substantial number of votes in a post-apartheid democratic South Africa are minimal; however, the party has made substantial inroads into the nonracial labor confederation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Five of that confederation's leaders are on the SACP's new Central Committee. The party has also attracted a number of intellectuals of all races. But its most significant gain has been to secure as its new secretary-general, Chris Hani, a key figure in the Congress's guerrilla army. There was a tug-of-war

[2]"Has Socialism Failed?" Joe Slovo's report to the 1989 conference of the SACP, held in Cuba. Printed in *Weekly Mail* (Johannesburg), May 1989.
[3]*The African Communist* (London), No. 23, November 1990.
[4]*Third World Reports* (London), Dec. 11, 1991.

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between the SACP and the ANC over Hani's loyalty; in the end, he chose the Marxists. Although there can be no predictability in politics, it seems most likely that the SACP and the ANC will be in conflict once the negotiations over a new constitution are completed.

In line with the communist parties of Western Europe, the SACP chose to describe itself as "a democratic socialist party," but a party conference in December 1991 resolved to delete the word "democratic" on the claimed ground that socialism was by definition essentially democratic. Although the conference abandoned the idea of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" for South Africa, it reaffirmed support for Marxism-Leninism and for a command economy. But it also affirmed support for a multiparty political system.[5]

Such seemingly contradictory policies have been resolved by the kind of hybrid system found in the West Bengal state of India, where the Communist Party of India (Marxist)—the CP(M)—has been in power for 15 years, having won five successive multiparty elections (the most recent in late 1991). The West Bengali political system shows little sign of being influenced by the Marxism-Leninism unfailingly espoused by its principal ideologue and party leader, Biman Bose. It also appears to have been untouched by the upheavals in the Soviet bloc.

Bose's explanation for this is that "we have applied Marxism-Leninism in our concrete situation and never depended on either the Soviet or Chinese model."[6] He attributes the party's success in regularly winning some 60 percent of the vote of a population of 68 million, not to ideological propaganda, but principally to its land reform (not land nationalization) policy, which has provided land for 2 million peasants and quadrupled agricultural wages in 10 years. The communist government has done nothing to stifle dissent or undermine the pluralist political system, which enables opposition parties to win 40 percent of the vote regularly. It promotes a market and mixed economy, and fosters good relations with the business community (Bose's son is even a director of a multinational business company).

In sum, the Bengali communists are pragmatists rather than ideologists; all that is visible of their Marxism-Leninism is its rhetoric; for the rest, it is distinguishable from West European democratic socialism mainly by the fact that in dealing with a vast population of landless peasants, it has given priority to the rural sector. Bengali communism is essentially a nationalist movement, which has never tied itself to either Moscow or Beijing. Such a national communist party, stripped of all but the verbiage of Marxism-Leninism, offers a possible model for South African communists and others in the Third World.

The Trotskyite and other anti-Moscow parties are really too marginal to merit discussion here. Some doubtless took pleasure in the demise of their ideological rival. To others, the development was largely irrelevant.

Africa's Second Liberation

If Marxism-Leninism is largely absent in large segments of the Third World, the struggle for political democracy and prosperity goes on. Nowhere is this clearer than in Africa. The continent is currently engaged in what has come to be known as the Second Liberation Struggle. The first liberation was that from alien colonial rule; the second liberation is from the indigenous rule of the first two generations of post-colonial regimes. These regimes, with only a very few exceptions, have been characterized by single-party or military rule; a few were despotisms. Although multiparty democracy was the bequest of the departing colonial rulers, they had not laid the groundwork for a democratic tradition. In Africa, the colonial system established the "nation-state" before the emergence of "nations." The other result of colonial policy was to create mono-economic systems leaving the new states dependent on one principal agricultural export crop or on mineral extraction; the rural economy was largely neglected; industrial development was rudimentary; the post-colonial economies were closely tied to those of the metropolitan powers; education and health services were minimal; and transport and other infrastructural development were seriously neglected.

Nation-building began only with independence, leaving the post-colonial governments to deal with the complex difficulties of welding nations from a plethora of major and minor tribes (156 in the case of present-day Tanzania). Tribal politics was the natural consequence of what had gone before. Since all the newly independent states were headed by Western-educated modernizing elites, their economic priorities were determined by the needs of urban societies, the drive for industrialization, crash programs for education and health services, and the aspiration to free themselves from foreign economic control. Because of the destabilizing effects of tribal politics and the mistaken belief that rapid economic development was obstructed by "time-wasting" oppositions, the post-independence regimes, with few exceptions, embraced the idea of the single-party state. Most of the ruling parties were al-

[5]Ibid.
[6]*The Guardian* (London), Feb. 10, 1991.

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so internally undemocratic. In many cases, where the single party failed to reconcile tribal and regional differences, the military took power "to save the nation and produce law and order." Furthermore, because the institutions of the single-party states and military regimes lacked checks and balances, the institutions themselves became distorted and consequently inefficient; and there were no safeguards against the corruption and abuses of human rights that have long been endemic in developing societies, worldwide.

Africa's postindependence governments chose diverse roads to economic development. Some—like Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria—espoused the virtues of free enterprise and capitalism; most opted for a system of centrally controlled mixed economies; and a few embraced the concept of "African socialism." All proved equally ineffective in promoting economic growth and development. One feature was common to all—the creation of a myriad of state corporations. National control over "the means of production and distribution" owed less to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism than to the perceived need to ensure central control over the planning of economic development and to ensure the elimination of "neo-colonialist" domination of the major commercial enterprises.

African socialists presented the growth of state corporations as an essential requirement of their policies. In fact, the proliferation of these corporations did not produce a socialist type of economy but developed instead an anarchic system of state capitalism, the hallmark of most African political systems. A poor country like Mali ended up with over 70 such state corporations. Each tended to develop into new bases of political and economic power and major sources of patronage. While some of these corporations were efficient and profitable, the great majority were neither. By and large, the state corporations proved a brake on development and became such powerful vested interests that most governments had difficulty in controlling them. They came to be marked as major targets for attack when privatization became the vogue.

During the anti-colonial struggle and immediately after independence, ideas about the need for African socialism were widely propagated, but without agreement over what the term meant. One political school, led by the first president of Guinea, Sékou Touré, wrote in Jesuitical fashion about the need to dress Marxism-Leninism in African garb. Tom Mboya, the young Kenyan leader who was assassinated soon after independence, described African socialism in terms similar to the principles and practices of the democratic socialist parties of Western Europe, but adapted to the special needs and culture of the continent. He rejected Marxism, as did Julius Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania. Addressing students at Cairo University in the early 1960's, Nyerere dismissed the "scientific socialism" of Marxism as being "neither scientific, nor socialist."[7] Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first president, developed his own eclectic political philosophy of "Consciencism," which found little support. This, too, was the fate of "Humanism," the political philosophy of President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, which derived from Christian, Gandhian, and democratic socialist ideas.

In those heady early days of the anti-colonial struggle, the only feature common to the rival concepts of the nature of African socialism was the rejection of the idea of the universality of democratic socialist principles. This was due, in part, to a wish at the time not to appear to be copying Western ideas, and in part, to the felt need to adapt socialism to the special needs of developing societies and local cultures. In fact, none of the postindependent political systems bore much resemblance either to African socialism or to democratic socialism. A singular exception was Tanzania, where Nyerere's philosophy of egalitarianism was adopted as a national ethic and has remained the aspiration of the ruling party.

Acceptance, by some, of the universality of democratic socialist principles has come only with the failure of the different political systems in the continent. However, the new generation of democratic socialists is swimming against the strong tide of capitalist ideas exemplified by the creation of a free-market economy and privatization of state-controlled bodies. The conflict between advocates of a capitalist model of society and pragmatic democratic socialists can be expected to dominate the political debate in the new phase opened up by the Second Liberation, as is already evident in countries like Zambia and Zimbabwe. It is also central to the current debate about the shape of a post-apartheid South Africa. With the evisceration of communism, Marxism is unlikely to be a seriously divisive factor in the socialist camp except in those countries (like South Africa) where the claims of communist parties to be democratic and socialist will come under serious scrutiny.

Africa's Future Political Map

Predicting the course of events in developing societies has always been a hazardous enterprise. For example, not a single scholar among the eminent writers on pre-independence Africa predicted that the military

[7] *Towards Ujamaa* (London), 1965.

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would become the major political factor that it did. The only predictable factor was that tribal and regional interests would become important in the struggle for political power.

However, with the experience of 30 years of independence, it has become possible to identify more clearly the sources of conflict, the consequences of the disruption of traditional societies, and the difficulties in the way of achieving sustainable economic growth. A new sense of political realism has replaced earlier illusions about the peace and prosperity that were expected to come with independence. For example, the initial ambition to concentrate resources on building industries—neglecting the rural sector in favor of developing urban areas—was finally shattered by diminishing food production and negative economic growth in the 1980's.

The likely political developments as Africa enters the 21st century will be determined by the success of the new generation of political leaders in dealing with the major problems now facing the continent. Some of the principal problems include:

- A population growth of about 3 percent a year will require annual economic growth of at least 5 percent to sustain just the present low level of national expenditure on such vital needs as education, health and other social services, investment in infrastructure, and new inputs into the agricultural sector.
- The social and economic problems of rapid urbanization have produced a growing class of an unemployed and socially alienated proletariat in cities which have grown from relatively small towns into sprawling urban agglomerations. This new class of frustrated and poverty-stricken urban dwellers, most of them encamped in squatter towns around all the major cities, are a breeding-ground for dissent and a potential prey to the rhetorical promises of populists.
- The economies of a number of countries with small populations spread over huge territories are basically nonviable, leaving them with no hope of development except perhaps through the creation of regional economic groupings. The whole continent, in fact, depends for its development on the establishment of regional economic institutions as envisaged by such groupings as the Union of Maghrib States, the Economic Council of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Cooperation Conference (SADCC), and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) of East and Central African states. Whatever the promise of these embryonic organizations, their initial performance has been uninspiring.
- The debt burdens incurred primarily in the early decades of independence, which currently absorb between one-quarter and three-quarters of the foreign exchange earnings of many countries, are unsustainable.
- The present system of international trade, which discriminates against the export products of developing countries, and which contributes to the chronic trade deficits of most African countries, constrains the import of machinery and materials essential for development. This situation compels countries to give priority to expanding export crops, which skews economic development and frequently contributes to devoting fewer resources to food production for local consumption. Unless the present international system of trade is reformed, making it easier for developing countries to gain access to the markets of the industrialized world and to ensure more equitable and less erratic prices for their exports, there is bound to be an accentuation of rancor against Western nations, which will be reflected in the policies of African political parties. This issue, along with the policies of the IMF and the World Bank, as well as of the European Community, are likely, more than anything else, to determine the attitude of the new generation of African political leaders toward Western nations and toward capitalism.
- The growing lack of employment for educated young Africans, especially university and secondary-school graduates, is already a source of radicalization, as is now being witnessed in countries like Kenya, Senegal, and Côte d'Ivoire. The issue will be exacerbated by a slow rate of economic growth and by a further expansion of the number of educated people. It is likely to be a malcontented intelligentsia rather than a *lumpen-proletariat* that will determine the degree of future radicalization of politics.
- The current surge toward more open, more democratic government has already begun to release new, often militant, political forces. The establishment of democratic forms of government will make conflict-resolution easier, but it will also usher in a new period of political turbulence such has not been seen since the last phase of the anti-colonial struggle. Although the creation of democratic political systems offers the only sure way of eventually achieving political stability, the next decade is likely to see even greater political instability, until there has been time to establish a democratic tradition.
- The ravages of AIDS in a dozen African countries may be expected to slow down population growth but at a terrible cost in suffering. In countries like Zambia, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Zaire, AIDS sufferers include professionals and technicians in the middle class. The disease will also impose an unbearable burden on health-care budgets. In South Africa, it is estimated that if the AIDS epidemic continues at its present projected

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At left, Zimbabwe's health minister Dr. Timothy Stamps examines an AIDS patient in Harare; at right, slums near Nairobi, Kenya.

—AP/ Wide World.

rate of increase, ministering to the needs of AIDS victims alone will consume the total current health budget.

In addition to these major challenges—most of them requiring deep structural changes in the economic and political systems, and in continental and international institutional relations—there are a number of other pressing problems, such as those presented by adverse climatic conditions, which affect not only the Sahel region, but the entire Sub-Saharan continent; the future of Africa's 10 million refugees and possibly even more people displaced internally from their homes; the insatiable demand for more and better education and health services; deteriorating environmental problems; and the social problems developing in the smoldering slums of all large cities.

How can we expect African governments and nonpolitical leaders to cope with these challenges in the coming decades? Is the continent indeed a basket-case, as some would argue; or can it regain the early promise of the first decade of independence when, it is important to recall, the annual economic growth rate of the continent averaged 4.5 percent, and reached 8 percent in a number of countries? The steady decline from this relatively high performance to negative growth is generally attributed by Western analysts and commentators to such causes as flawed economic policies and priorities; inefficient government and maladminstration; the misuse of foreign loans and economic aid in nonproductive development; extravagant expenditure on armies and military materiel; civil wars and other forms of unrest; and, always, corruption.

There is no doubt that all these elements, to a greater or lesser extent, contributed to the continent's economic decline. However, they do not offer a sufficient explanation. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), based in Addis Ababa, has noted the following additional reasons for what went wrong after the promising start—which lasted from the 1960's up to 1973, the year when the world price of oil quadrupled, with a devastating effect on the great majority of non–oil-producing African countries (it was also the start of a new seven-year cycle of drought).[8] World prices for the kind of commodities exported by developing countries fell, while the cost of imported industrial goods rose substantially as the industrialized countries passed on their higher cost of oil. The failure to sustain agricultural development and the drought conditions combined to turn most of Sub-Saharan Africa from countries of food sufficiency, albeit at low levels, into food-importing countries, which diverted precious foreign exchange to pay for essential food supplies. Foreign exchange balances—hit by the cost of food imports, higher oil

[8]UN Economic Commmission for Africa (ECA) annual reports for 1980 and 1981, Addis Ababa.

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prices, and the rising cost of capital goods and essential supplies, such as fertilizers and chemicals, were further depleted by the burden of servicing the foreign debt. New capital investment dwindled, and Africa became a continent which annually exports more capital than it obtains.

The ECA reports further stress that as wealth drifted abroad, internal wealth also decreased, so that by the mid-1980's, average living standards in the continent had dropped back to where they had stood in the mid-1960's. Unemployment rose, and famine stalked many countries.

Economic and political discontent produced violent conflicts in a score of countries, which led to heavier investment in the military and growing abuse of human rights; the Horn of Africa was wracked by civil war, as were Nigeria and Chad, though for shorter periods; much of southern Africa became destabilized as a result of the conflict with apartheid South Africa and the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique. The cold-war period of Soviet-Western rivalry intensified and complicated these conflicts as the major powers backed opposing sides and poured in military supplies (in the case of the USSR, military aid greatly exceeded economic aid). By the end of the 1970's, the failures of single-party and military rule were too obvious to ignore: Africa's leaders began to demonstrate their awareness of the economic crisis in the continent, though not yet of the political crisis.

A summit meeting of the members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) held in Lagos in 1980 adopted a Plan of Action, which focused on the agricultural needs of the continent, stressed the importance of African self-reliance, and assigned an appropriate role for assistance from the international community.[9] This was followed up by the adoption of the African Economic Recovery and Development Plan (AERDP), which was submitted to the United Nations for debate. The plan was endorsed by an overwhelming majority of members, but although its objectives were praised, the donor countries withheld pledges of specific amounts of aid proposed to help fructify the plan.

After initial resistance, by 1987, all the major African countries accepted the structural adjustment programs (SAP) proposed by the IMF; these emphasized, inter alia, the need for financial discipline, national budgets that were more in balance, encouragement of a market economy, dissolution of state corporations, encouragement of a private sector, proper rewards for peasants by bringing the prices they receive for their products more closely in line with world-market prices,

[9]*The Lagos Plan of Action*, Addis Ababa, Organization of African Unity, 1980.



An Ivory Coast planter with his cocoa crop, which in 1989 was selling on international markets for the lowest price in about 14 years.

—Reuters/Bettmann.

and the scaling down of subsidies for basic essentials.

However, one key explanation offered by the ECA for economic failure was not yet fully grasped: the inextricable link between economic development and democratic government. This lesson finally sank in only at the beginning of the 1990's, when the Second Liberation begun to surge throughout the continent.

Political Prognosis

Africa is now engaged in a democratic revolution. The battle cry is multiparty parliamentary government. This demand has echoed from Algiers to South Africa down the length of the continent, and across it from Cape Verde to Madagascar. Most governments have already given in to this demand, at least in principle. After Kenya was recently forced by internal and international pressures to opt for a multiparty system, only Malawi, among Sub-Saharan states, still adamantly remains opposed. Libya continues to hew to the idiosyncratic line of Muammar al Qadhafi, while an Islamic fundamentalist regime in Sudan remains committed to establishing a theocratic state (a course that the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria also envisages).

However, there is a world of difference between conceding the right to multiparty politics and the creation of

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meaningful democratic systems. The right to political opposition is only one facet of a democratic system; its effectiveness depends on the adoption of freely negotiated constitutions that incorporate such fundamental principles as separation of powers among the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary; freedom of political association and fair elections based on a universal franchise; human rights enforceable by law; press and academic freedom; independent trade unions; a neutral army; and the right of habeas corpus.

It is only if such principles are provided for in a constitution that multiparty systems will lead to democracy. There is a danger that the euphoria produced by gaining only the right to political pluralism without achieving the other essential political conditions for democracy and effective economic reform will result in the Second Liberation ending up in a cul de sac blocked by a wall against which democracy will be crushed in its nascence when patience runs out. If this were to happen, we could see the rise of even tougher military regimes than in the past, on the lines of the Greek colonels, the Argentine army, and Pinochet's Chile, or possibly a new rash of despotic regimes, or a renewed interest in anticapitalist policies based on "rectified Marxism"; or in predominantly Muslim countries, the creation of theocratic states.

Therefore, the transition from undemocratic to truly democratic systems will be critical for the future shape of political developments in the continent in the next two decades. Although, as already mentioned, it is certain to be a time of considerable political turbulence, it also holds great promise. The struggle for democracy is already beginning to steer Africa away from the earlier sterile debates about the virtues of single-party states. It took 30 years of independence to teach that there are no short-cuts to economic growth, nor any easy ways of reconciling tribal and regional differences—especially not through repression—and that the principles governing parliamentary democracy are universal and not just applicable to Western societies. The experience of Eastern Europe undoubtedly helped to bring this truth home to the Third World; but I would reiterate that the collapse of communism was not what has driven Africa to pursue a new political direction. The Second Liberation, in fact, preceded the changes heralded by *glasnost'* and grew out of local experience.

The establishment of a democratic political system is a prerequisite for steady, balanced economic growth, but it is not itself a guarantee of economic recovery at a level that will release sufficient resources to deal with the backlog of urgent problems related to employment, education, health, and housing. For democracy to become firmly rooted in African soil requires two economic conditions. The first is to provide convincing evidence that the economic decline of the last two decades is being reversed, giving hope for the future and replacing the present widespread malaise and discontent with a new mood of confidence. The second condition is to see that once economic growth is restored, the newly available resources are distributed more equitably than in the past.

At this point, one can hear the voice of skeptics. Is democracy possible in underdeveloped, poor countries? Is "the African tradition" (whatever that might mean) compatible with democratic practices? Is it possible to achieve a fairer distribution of economic resources compatible with conditions for economic growth?

To deal with the first question, one should remember that modern democracies grew out of poor and often backward societies. It was the release of new social and economic forces that nurtured the growth of democratic ideas. A country like India, one of the world's poorest countries measured by per capita income, has succeeded in maintaining a vigorous democratic system, flawed though it may be. Measured in terms of actual and potential economic and other resources, the majority of African countries are not intrinsically poor.

The second question has a tinge of racism, based on an assumption that Black peoples are incapable of good government. There is no such thing as "an African tradition." The continent's traditional cultures have varied greatly in different societies and at different periods. Many of these societies had strong democratic traditions. Contemporary evidence that multiparty democracy is possible in Africa is provided by the fact that four countries—Botswana, The Gambia, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe—have maintained pluralist parliamentary systems without a break since independence, and a fifth (Senegal) has done so with only a brief deviation. (President Mugabe's attempt to turn Zimbabwe into a single-party state was defeated by popular opposition.)

As for a third question, whether a more equitable distribution of available economic resources might impede economic growth, this proposition is democratically unsound and economically fallacious. Research shows that growth in developed countries is a function of the degree of equality of incomes. Japan's economy has grown most consistently fast over the past 25 years, and maintains the lowest ratio between top and bottom incomes of any country. A similar pattern is observed in the Scandinavian countries, irrespective of whether they have left-wing or moderate right-wing governments. Ordinary common sense dictates that an economy cannot develop when a large and growing proportion of its people cannot afford health care, education, decent shelter, and everything else that makes

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for a productive population. Widening the gap between top and bottom incomes is a recipe for stagnation; reducing the gap creates growth in a market economy. Social equity and growth go together.

The importance of laying emphasis on this argument is not only economic; it is already a crucial factor in determining political party divisions in Africa. The leftist and liberal parties base their programs not only on economic growth but on the need for a more equitable division of resources, whereas right-wing parties would give top priority to the creation of wealth. These groupings also differ over the role the state should play in controlling and directing the economy, although the need for a market economy and a private sector is no longer disputed and the idea of a central command economy died with the collapse of communism.

The predictable pattern of future political developments in Africa is that the rival parties will closely resemble those in Western Europe: right-wing pro-capitalist parties; liberal centrists favoring private enterprise but accepting a role for state intervention in the economy, and committed to traditional liberal values; and left-wing parties divided between militant radicals and democratic socialists; with the joker in this pack being the erstwhile communists, presenting themselves as democratic socialists.

The balance of forces among these parties will be different in various countries. It is most unlikely that we will see the emergence of a dominant strand of either left-wing or right-wing governments in the continent. Deprived of a counterbalancing power centered in Moscow, the foreign policies of both left-wing and right-wing governments will be determined by their perceptions of how the different centers of power in the West respond to appeals for aid and investment.

Finally, a new political phenomenon has to be reckoned with: religious politics pursued by Islamic fundamentalists. Religion has in the past played no role in Sub-Saharan Africa, despite the numerical dominance of Muslim and Christian communities in different countries. However, in recent years, the call to Islam promoted by Muammar al Qadhafi, the example of Iran, and most important, the role of the Muslim Brotherhood (the Ikhwan) show signs of winning a response in some countries. Religious politics have become a new feature in Nigeria, the continent's most populous state. It is not yet an important factor, but it is already a disturbing element. There are similar stirrings among such predominantly Muslim states as Mauritania, Senegal, Chad, and Mali. Recent attempts have been made to introduce Muslim politics into Ethiopia and Eritrea. A major breakthrough for the Islamic fundamentalists occurred in Sudan, where a long-standing civil war between the mainly Muslim North and the mainly Christian and animist South has been seriously complicated by the decision to turn the country into an Islamic republic based on fundamentalist principles. The *eminence grise* behind the present regime in Sudan, Dr. Hassan el-Turabi, has set up a Center to Promote Islam designed to advance the cause of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the continent. The growth of Islamic fundamentalist forces is proving to be a seriously disturbing element in the Maghrib, where they gained a major triumph in Algerian elections at the start of 1992. Although Libya and Iran espouse different brands of Islamic political ideas, both are equally engaged in "capturing Africa for Islam." Indeed, Qadhafi already proclaims that Africa is an Islamic continent.

Islamic fundamentalism has its deepest roots in political frustration and social alienation, manifested in a rejection of Western ideas and values. Unlike other political ideologies, which attract mainly the intellectuals, it appeals to commercial, professional, and academic types, as well as urban workers. The danger is that unless the new wave of democratic leaders can succeed in diminishing the existing strained feelings of frustration and alienation, discontented Muslims (not just in Africa) may increasingly turn to Islamic fundamentalism. (An example of what might happen in a Muslim society after the collapse of communism is the sudden growth of Islamic fundamentalist forces among Palestinians in the West Bank. This entirely new development occurred after the failure of the *intifada* campaign and the change of Moscow's policies in the Middle East. There are few better examples of the outcome of years of political frustration than the nascent growth of this ideology among Palestinians.)

To sum up, the future political landscape of Africa is bound to be determined by whether three key goals are attained: success in achieving sustainable economic growth, more equitable distribution of available resources, and creation of viable democratic institutions. With the promise of pluralist political systems throughout most of the continent, the political divisions among pro-capitalist right-wing conservatives, liberal conservatives, democratic socialists, and Marxist socialists are likely to become sharper. The division of power in different countries will depend much more on the state of their economies than on radical ideology, especially after the collapse of communism in the USSR and Eastern Europe, and of apartheid in South Africa. One necessary caveat is the possible ideological challenge of Islamic fundamentalism in the dozen or so countries with predominantly Muslim populations.

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Commentary

Africa in the Postcommunist World

George B.N. Ayittey

I WOULD preface my remarks by saying that I am in general agreement with most of what Colin Legum has said, particularly with his observations regarding developments in Africa. I will elaborate on some of the latter points from an African perspective.

A careful study of the post-colonial history of Africa reveals three central political facts. First, there has been a deep-seated fascination with socialism. Second, communism per se has never been a serious threat in Africa. And third, the basic problem of Africa is statism: whatever the ideological professions of African governments, most —even so-called capitalist states—have been characterized by heavy state interventionism.

It is important to distinguish between socialism and communism if one is to understand the political economy of Africa. It is not difficult to convince Africans that communism is unworkable and will fail in Africa, but it is a challenging task to persuade Africans that socialism has been a disastrous failure. Socialism has various aspects: philosophical, economic, and political. Few would question the philosophical tenets of socialism: equity, fairness, and caring or compassion. But socialism as an economic ideology entails varying degrees of state/government ownership of the means of production and intervention in and control of economic activity. The degree of government control and participation may vary greatly from one socialist system to another. Communism is an extreme case, entailing total state ownership of the means of production, rigid control of the economy, and the institution of a communist party dictatorship. Each type of economic system requires a peculiar type of political system. Totalitarianism is the political system that goes hand in hand with communism, whereas authoritarianism goes with many forms of socialism.

Let us now turn to a brief discussion of the three characteristics outlined above. At the conclusion, I will suggest several possible African approaches to solving Africa's contemporary challenges.

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Africa's Fascination with Socialism

After Africa gained its independence in the 1960's, the new leaders faced the daunting task of developing the continent and delivering the goods to their people. There was widespread belief among African leaders and intellectuals, and even American development experts, that the state had to assume a predominant role in economic development. It was argued that markets were underdeveloped; infrastructural facilities were inadequate; capital or funds were insufficient; the middle class was non-existent; the colonial economic structure had to be transformed; and so forth. Africa could not rely on free markets and private enterprise, it was claimed, but needed the state to spearhead economic development. The United States Agency for International Development, the State Department, and specialists on development from Harvard University supported these arguments, and hence, large aid resources were channeled to African governments.

It was widely held that in order for the state to initiate development, it needed wide-ranging powers to marshal resources. Rubber-stamp parliaments declared one-party states and conferred extensive powers upon

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African heads of state. Other leaders simply arrogated additional powers unto themselves. If a piece of land was needed for highway construction, it was simply appropriated by the state. In this way, all African governments, regardless of their professed ideology, came to assume immense powers. There were tyrannical regimes of both the Left and the Right, but the leftist ones were more numerous since most African countries took the "socialist" route after independence. (Only a few countries, such as Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, and Senegal, went the "capitalist" route.)

The fascination with socialism seemed to have emerged during the struggle for political independence and freedom from colonial rule in the 1950's. Many African nationalists harbored a deep distrust and distaste for capitalism, which was identified in their minds, as in the writings of Lenin, with the evils and exploitation under colonialism and imperialism. Freedom from colonial rule was consequently interpreted as freedom from capitalism as well. Socialism, the antithesis of capitalism, was advocated as the only road to Africa's prosperity. A wave of socialism swept across the continent as almost all the new African leaders succumbed to the contagion copied from the East.

Varieties of socialist ideologies proliferated in postcolonial Africa. These ranged from the "Ujamaa" (familyhood or socialism in Swahili) of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania; the vague amalgam of Marxism, Christian socialism, humanitarianism and "Negritude" of Leopold Senghor of Senegal; the humanism of Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia; and the scientific socialism of Marien N'Gouabi of Congo (Brazzaville); to the Arab-Islamic socialism of Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya; the "Nkrumaism" or "Consciencism" of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana; and the "Mobutuism" of Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire.

Although there was a general disposition among African leaders to erase the "exploitative, capitalistic tendencies of colonial structures," there were sharp individual differences among them on the need for doctrinaire socialist ideology. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, generally regarded as the "father of African socialism," was convinced that "only the socialist form of society can assure Ghana a rapid rate of economic progress without destroying that social justice, that freedom and equality, which are a central feature of our traditional way of life."[1] Under Nkrumah, socialism as a domestic policy was to be pursued toward establishing "a complete ownership of the economy by the state."[2] A bewildering array of legislative controls and regulations were imposed on imports, capital transfers, industry, wages, the rights and powers of trade unions, prices, rents, and interest rates. Some of the controls had, to be sure, been introduced in the colonial period, but these regulations were retained and expanded by Nkrumah. Private businesses were taken over by the Nkrumah government and nationalized.

Nkrumah was in a hurry to transform Ghana into a socialist state: "We must achieve in a decade what it took others a century," he asserted.[3] He was intolerant of criticism. Opposition deputies were traduced in the media as the "party of divisiveness" bent on a course of deliberate sabotage of Ghana's construction efforts. They were to be eliminated. Accordingly, in July 1958, Nkrumah passed the Preventive Detentive Bill, which gave his government sweeping powers to imprison without trial any person suspected of activities prejudicial to the state's security. With this vague definition, anybody could be picked up, since any private activity could be interpreted as prejudicial to the interests of the state. The insidious march toward dictatorship thus began:

The news media next came under the complete control of Nkrumah's party. Journalists were gagged, censorship was established, and editors who criticized the government were hauled into jail. Any opposition to Nkrumah's dictatorship was brutally suppressed. Finally, in 1964, Nkrumah declared Ghana to be a one-party state and himself president-for-life. Ghanaians soon tired of Nkrumah and his rhetoric. In 1965, he was overthrown in a military coup.

Nkrumah's "socialist" experiment was a miserable fiasco. Worse, his ideology had degenerated into "Swiss bank socialism." While he was preaching socialism, his ministers were busy importing Mercedes-Benzes and gold beds into Ghana and stashing millions away in Swiss bank accounts. Back in 1962, a member of Ghana's National Assembly, B. E. Kusi, excoriated these so-called socialists:

Many children go about in the streets because they cannot get accommodation in secondary schools, while those ministers who are in charge of the money send their children to international schools and to university. Most of them ride in Mercedes-Benz 220's and yet call themselves socialists. This is very bad. If we want to build a socialist country, then we must let the president know that we are serious about the use of public funds and that we do not pay mere lip service to socialism.[4]

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[1]Seven-Year Development Plan. Accra, Government of Ghana, 1963, p. 1.

[2]Kwame Nkrumah, *Revolutionary Path*, New York, International Publishers, 1973, p. 112.

[3]Idem, *Ghana: An Autobiography*, London, Nelson, 1957, p. 8.

[4]Rolf Italiaander, *The New Leaders of Africa*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1961, p. 75.

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President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania.

—AP/Wide World.

When Ghana gained its independence, it boasted foreign exchange reserves of US$400 million. By 1966, it had run up a foreign debt of $858 million. The state farms Nkrumah set up could not produce enough food to feed their own workers, let alone the nation. Between 1950 and 1965, food shortages appeared, and local food prices doubled. Unfortunately, Nkrumah's policies were emulated by many African countries. In one country after another, economic ruin, dictatorship, and oppression followed with deadly consistency—in Angola, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

For his part, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania misread the communalism of African traditional life as readiness for socialism, to which he had been first exposed during his schooling in Scotland. He castigated capitalism or the money economy, which in his view, "encourages individual acquisitiveness and economic competition." The money economy was, in his view, foreign to Africa and could "be catastrophic as regards the African family social unit." As an alternative to "the relentless pursuit of individual advancement," Nyerere insisted that Tanzania be transformed into a nation of small-scale communalists."[5]

In the rest of Africa, socialist transformation meant the institution of a plethora of legislative instruments and controls. All unoccupied land was appropriated by the government. Roadblocks and passbook systems were instituted to control the movement of Africans. Marketing boards and export regulations were tightened to fleece the cash-crop producers. Price controls were imposed on peasant farmers and traders to assure cheap food for the urban elites. Typical were developments under Sékou Touré's program of "Marxism in African Clothes" for Guinea:

Unauthorized trading became a crime. Police roadblocks were set up around the country to control internal trade. The state set up a monopoly on foreign trade, and smuggling became punishable by death. Currency trafficking was punishable by 15 to 20 years in prison. Many farms were collectivized. Food prices were fixed at low levels. Private farmers were forced to deliver annual harvest quotas to "Local Revolutionary Powers." State companies monopolized industrial production.[6]

Sékou Touré once declared: "We prefer to live in poverty in liberty than riches in slavery."[7] However, private farmers and traders saw no liberty under his rule. When confronted about his drift toward dictatorship, his response was one of verbal acrobatics overspiced with befuddled logic:

Before independence, there were 12 political parties in Guinea. Now there is only one: Le Parti Democratique de Guinée *(PDG). Anyone who says I am a dictator because we have only one party and no opposition doesn't understand what we are trying to accomplish. The party is not a goal, but a method to achieve the goal of human freedom. Our constitution permits complete freedom for the existence of Opposition parties. However, in the last election, 91 percent of the people voted for the PDG. The Opposition received only 5 or 6 percent of the votes, and decided to join our party. This meant reconciliation, and two of their leaders received responsible posts. Actually, the Opposition's point of view can be expressed much better within the party than from outside it.*[8]

His illiterate peasants understood all too well what he was trying to accomplish and the "human freedom" he

[5]Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism,* Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1962, p. 15.
[6]*The New York Times,* Dec. 28, 1987.
[7]Italiaander, op. cit., p. 36.
[8]Ibid., p. 41.

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was trying to achieve. By the time of his death in March 1984, "more than one-fifth of the country's population —some 1.5 million—[had] fled into exile."[9]

In 1973, Tanzania undertook massive resettlement programs under "Operation Dodoma," "Operation Sogeza," "Operation Kigoma," and others. Peasants were loaded into trucks, often forcibly, and moved to new locations. Many lost their lives in the process; to prevent return of peasants to their old habitats, the government bulldozed abandoned buildings. By 1976, some 13 million peasants had been forced into 8,000 cooperative villages, and by the end of the 1970's, some 91 percent of the entire rural population had been moved into government villages. All crops were to be bought and distributed by the government. It was illegal for the peasants to sell their own produce. So much for Nyerere's principles of democracy: freedom of the individual, including freedom to criticize the government, and "the opportunity to change it without worrying about being murdered." So much for his vaunted rhetoric about African familyhood. In reality, he only meant the "family" of his own creation with him as the head. He was perfectly willing to destroy the indigenous African family by forcibly resettling peasants against their will.

In Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile Mariam overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 and assumed power. The ailing emperor was suffocated with a wet pillow and his body was buried in an unmarked grave. Scores of his relatives were murdered or chained to walls in the cellars of the imperial place. Thousands of suspected "counterrevolutionaries" were gunned down in the streets. More than 30,000 people were jailed. When a member of his own junta questioned the wisdom of such terror tactics, Mengistu pulled out his revolver and shot him in the head.

In March 1975, all land in Ethiopia was nationalized under the Land Reform Act. A "villagization" program was instituted, under which Mengistu proposed moving 34 million people (roughly 75 percent of the total population of Ethiopia) into state-controlled communes "guarded" by the army, 300,000-strong—the largest in Africa. With the help of massive amounts of Soviet arms (see below), the Mengistu regime carried out indiscriminate bombings, shellings, and slaughter of civilians. Even famine relief centers in the north and along the border with Sudan were bombed and burned.

Villagization was touted as necessary "to move the population away from areas where the soil was degraded to combat the erosion of agricultural land. In addition, resettlement was to provide new opportunities to people in areas affected by drought and to those in highly crowded areas where land holdings were shrinking." As an Ethiopian government official put it: "It is our duty to move the peasants if they are too stupid to move by themselves."[10] True, soil erosion and land degradation were problems. But the stupidities of the Mengistu government in attempting to solve those problems were worse than the peasants' lack of vision. Even if relocation was necessary, conditions in the government camps were poor and unsanitary, resulting in the deaths of more than 150,000 Ethiopians. Once in the cooperatives, peasants were forced to walk as far as five miles to and from the fields every day at gunpoint. They were ordered to turn over all their produce to the state and attend indoctrination seminars that praised the Mengistu government.

In 1984, a year in which 1,000 Ethiopians starved to death, Mengistu spent $200 million to celebrate the 10th anniversary of his revolution, complete with the consumption of 500,000 bottles of Scotch whiskey, crates of caviar, salmon, lobster, and French cham-

On September 11, 1984, the tenth anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution, a monument is dedicated to Karl Marx in Addis Ababa.

—Eastfoto.

[9]*Reader's Digest* (Pleasantville, NY), July 1985.

[10]Quoted in *Time* (New York), Aug. 4, 1986, p. 32.

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pagne. Ten million dollars went to redecorate statues of Marx, Engels, and Lenin visibly placed in Addis Ababa, the capital.

As Dr. Aradom Tedla, former director general of the Ministry of Law and Justice, pointed out, "The Mengistu government is one that is systematically oppressing religion, denying starving Ethiopians food, brutally relocating and 'villagizing' millions of people, and persecuting political suspects through false trials—which mete out death sentences and long prison terms indiscriminately."[11]

In 1986, Mengistu declared:

We are now on the threshold of the formation of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The constitution was drafted by representatives of the people themselves. It has been submitted to all Ethiopian citizens including those living abroad, and it will be promulgated after it is put to a referendum. Such democratic participation is unparalleled in the history of Ethiopia. Once the constitution assumes its final shape, Ethiopia will never again be ruled by the personal absolutism of any one individual or a handful of individuals.[12]

And in the capital, Addis Ababa, an arch leading into Revolution Square proclaimed: "THE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM IS INEVITABLE!" What was inevitable, rather, was the failure of socialism. In fact, in Africa, "socialism" was the *wrong* ideology as a solution to the *wrong* problem in the *wrong* place at the *wrong* time. Wherever it was applied, it brought in its wake economic atrophy, repression, and dictatorship.

The "Communist Threat" to Africa

In the 1960's and 1970's, various American administrations, agitated by the specter of the spread of communism to Africa, sought to limit Soviet-bloc influence on the continent. The USSR and its allies were to be kept out of Africa, if possible, or at least prevented from holding sway over the policy decisions of individual regimes. A corollary of this was that Africa should be encouraged to retain strong bonds to the West, both diplomatic and economic. For Moscow, Africa had only marginal strategic importance and perhaps modest ideological significance (there was by and large little need for the continent's minerals). The goal was to persuade Africans to stop exporting strategically important materials to NATO countries, exports that African countries, regardless of ideological stripe, had every economic reason to increase. In the attempt to draw African countries from the Western embrace, the Soviet Union also provided some economic aid and tutelage, which expanded markedly in the Khrushchev era.

A consensus has emerged that although US policy on the continent has not been a great success,[13] the communist threat in Africa was greatly exaggerated due to intelligence failure. If the Americans did not succeed, neither did the Soviets. According to one respected observer:

The Soviet Union has done little to draw Africa to its side. Much of what it has attempted has been ill conceived and ill executed, half-hearted and meanly meagre, or plainly conditioned by non-African considerations (notably by power struggles in the Middle East and Indian Ocean).[14]

Or, as a regional magazine declared in 1988,

This [Soviet] policy was short-lived and ineffective because the gains in political influence were insignificant in comparison to the amount of money spent. Two major blows to Soviet influence in Africa came with the fall of Nkrumah in Ghana and Keita in Mali.[15]

Initially, Moscow was exceptionally ignorant about Africa. Unlike other Europeans, the Russians lacked a store of accumulated information from traders, missionaries, explorers, and colonial administrators. To be sure, the fact that Russia had not participated in the scramble for Africa in the 1880's was of some initial advantage. A further attraction between Africa and the Soviet Union was the notion that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." In countering "American imperialism" in the 1950's, the Soviet Union built a special university in Moscow (eventually naming it after Congolese client Patrice Lumumba). Scholarships were granted to students from developing countries, and by the end of 1981, 34,805 African students had been trained in the USSR.[16]

Beyond the anti-colonial issue, the Soviet Union had a chance to build a position on what may broadly be

[11] *The Washington Inquirer*, July 18, 1986. Dr. Tedla was arrested on Dec. 19, 1979, and charged with "anti-revolutionary activities." In early 1980, he was released, and on July 4, 1980, he escaped on a 14-day cross-desert trek to Sudan from where he then proceeded to the United States.

[12] *Time*, loc. cit., p. 34.

[13] See, for example, David A. Dickson, *US Foreign Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa*, Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1985.

[14] Peter Calvocoressi, *Independent Africa and the World*, New York, Longman, 1985, p. 88.

[15] *West Africa* (London), Dec. 12–28, 1988, p. 2320.

[16] Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 92.

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On July 24, 1961, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman Leonid Brezhnev and President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana sign a joint Soviet-Ghana communiqué.

—Sovfoto.

called the left-wing ground in Africa. As observed above, many of Africa's new leaders described themselves as "socialist." However, Moscow failed to benefit from this potential: "To Africans, the Soviet Union appears a cynical great power, not a warm socialist friend."[17]

From the outset, Moscow had ideological misgivings. In the 1960's, many Soviet writers and scholars detested the notion propounded by African intellectuals about an "African socialism" that was somehow different from other kinds of socialism. Ultimately, to the Soviet observers, there was only one true socialism—the Marxist and scientific variety:

> *The prevailing Soviet view from the late 1950's held that true Marxist and scientific socialists were rare in Africa: there were nationalist socialists, fake socialists, and renegade socialists. Examples of the last two categories were Leopold Senghor, whose socialist talk was the merest figment, and Felix Houphouet-Boigny, who had succumbed to the temptations of capitalism. Both were proceeding in the wrong direction on the wrong road. Nationalist socialists, on the other hand, could be on the right road. The signs of grace by which they could be spotted included state control of industry, banking, and foreign trade, and the communal ownership of land. These nationalist socialists belonged to a section of the bourgeoisie which was progressive and revolutionary and had chosen the path of "noncapitalism"—a favorite phrase with Khrushchev. In the opinion of some Soviet writers, although by no means all, this noncapitalist path could lead a state to true socialism, bypassing or skipping the capitalist phase which classical doctrine regarded as a necessary stage on the way. The nationalist or progressive bourgeoisie comprised the intelligentsia and also sections of the officer class.*[18]

Finding no true socialists in Africa, Moscow had to make do with nationalist socialists or coalitions of progressive or noncapitalist forces. One was Nkrumah of Ghana. Although Nkrumah was, "in Soviet eyes . . . a typical product of the wrong section of the bourgeoisie who had won power by his readiness to do a deal with the British and whose sympathies therefore were more than half in the wrong camp,"[19] he had the virtue of be-

[17] Ibid., p. 91.

[18] Ibid., p. 93.

[19] Ibid., p. 95.

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ing virulently anti-American. The same was true of Sékou Touré of Guinea. Along with Modibo Keita, these two were slated to receive Lenin Prizes at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in December 1961 (actually neither Touré nor Keita actually were ever awarded their Prizes).

But the Soviets proved ignorant of local conditions, and their designs in Africa came to humiliating defeats. In December 1961, Sékou Touré expelled the Soviet ambassador, Daniel S. Solod, for complicity in a "communist-inspired conspiracy." During the Cuban missile crisis the following autumn, he refused the Soviets the use of the Conakry airport the Soviets had built. In Ghana, Moscow's ventures came to grief when Nkrumah was booted out in 1966. The new regime of General Joseph Ankrah was publicly and abrasively hostile to Moscow and expelled all Soviet experts (about 1,000) together with the bulk of the Soviet, Cuban, and Chinese embassy personnel and the entire East German trade mission. In 1968, Modibo Keita, too, was removed in an army coup.

These failures caused the Soviets to revamp their African policies in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Moscow began to place new public emphasis on economics as opposed to politics. According to the Soviet government newspaper *Izvestiya,* the new Soviet approach was based on "genuine equality, complete respect for national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutual benefit."[20] But in spite of the rhetoric, Soviet economic aid did not amount to much. In fact, the principal basis for Moscow's influence was its officially strident support for African independence and its military support for political clients.

Indeed, the bulk of Soviet aid to the continent was in the form of military equipment, and military advisers and experts. Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique received substantial Soviet military aid. For example, Mengistu of Ethiopia received in excess of $5.8 billion in military weapons between 1975 and 1990. Angola received at least $700 million annually in military assistance from the Soviet Union in the 1980's.[21]

The Soviets provided little by way of economic assistance to Africa. The bulk of its paltry economic aid went to its ideological allies Vietnam and Cuba. In 1985, for example, aid from the Moscow-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) to sub-Saharan Africa totaled only $300 million. Of this, Ethiopia received by far the most (57.9 percent). Next was Mozambique (13.8 percent), followed by Egypt (6.6 percent), Madagascar (4.2 percent), Angola (2.8 percent), and Tunisia (2.1 percent). This sum came to only 5 percent of bilateral and only 3 percent of total aid flows to sub-Saharan Africa.[22] The amount of Soviet humanitarian assistance to Africa was minimal.

Furthermore, Moscow enforced severe restrictions on the economic aid that flowed to Africa. Loans and trade credits supplied could only be spent in the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries. In addition, the Soviets supplied the technical personnel and the equipment for project construction. Repayments of loans were often by barter, to the decisive advantage of the Soviet Union. For example, in Guinea, Soviet help in building a bauxite plant at Kindia was to be repaid with deliveries of 2 million tons of bauxite ore a year for 30 years, assuring the Soviets a steady supply of the mineral. Interestingly, when an American company, Agripetco, tried to reach a similar agreement in Ghana in 1980, there was an uproar and charges of "American exploitation."

How such an arrangement could hurt Soviet clients in Africa can be seen in the case of Ghana, which was to repay Soviet loans in kind, by exports of commodities such as cocoa. The Soviet Union had little use for Ghana's cocoa and therefore re-exported it, thereby helping to push the world market price of cocoa down in the mid-1960's.

In addition, much of the Soviet aid to Africa was used for highly visible, low-return public projects related to infrastructure, such as roads and stadiums. The Khrushchev government rigidly stressed the need for a planned economy dominated by the state sector. The Soviets argued that only a strong state sector could check the machinations of Western capitalists in Africa. As we shall see below, this emphasis on statist approaches proved contrary to the long-term economic interests of African states.

Despite the rhetorical alliance of the Soviet Union and Africans on the issue of anti-imperialism, Soviet penetration of the continent was impeded by serious cultural obstacles. For all their antipathy to former colonial masters, the new leaders of Africa were generally more attuned to the West. They spoke French and English, not Russian. They were familiar with the roads to Paris and London, not Moscow or Muscovite ways. Though they could make new friends in Moscow, few of them, in fact, had any there. For many ex-British colonies, association with the new Commonwealth was

[20]Cited in *West Africa*, Dec. 12–28, 1988, p. 2320.

[21]See Michael Johns, "Gorbachev's Holocaust," *Policy Review* (Washington, DC), Summer 1988, p. 73. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev indicated that the military alliance between the two countries would not be renewed upon its expiration in 1991.

[22]*West Africa*, Dec 12–28, 1988, p. 2320.

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more comfortable than with the Soviet bloc; for the French, the franc zone even offered some economic protection that Moscow could not provide. All the new African leaders were in pressing need of developmental aid, but as noted, Moscow provided little.

Moreover, there was Russian racism and distrust. Officially, there was no racism or discrimination against blacks in the Soviet Union, but in buses, trains, taxis, and bars, black Africans were referred to as "monkeys" ("*obez'yany,*" a play on the word "*abissintsy,*" or "Abyssinians"). Even in the mid-1980's, African athletes participating in an International Sports Festival in Ukraine faced an 8 p.m. curfew because of local fears regarding putative "insatiable" sexual appetites. As this account summarizes,

the images of Africa that were fed to Soviet and Eastern European people were not essentially different from those fed to Western citizens. Westerners justified their exploitation of Africa and Africans by seeing it as the "white man's burden" to "liberate" these people from their African ways. The Eastern bloc, though not exploiting Africans directly, also sought to convince their own working classes that it was their international duty to "liberate" these people from Western capitalist oppressors.[23]

In attempting to check Soviet-bloc expansionism in Africa, the West had unwitting help from a very unlikely source, China. China's conception of the world was tripolar: the USA, the USSR, and the Third World.[24] In the postcolonial era, the Third World was seen by China as an adjunct of the West. China competed with the Soviet Union to see who could do more to detach this appendage by supporting liberation movements in Africa. In the early phases, China was the more aggressive, more revolutionary. It denounced Moscow as reactionary and revisionist, and moved to train and arm liberation movements in both colonial and independent African countries. Beijing also strove to outdo the Soviet Union in nonmilitary aid.

The driving forces behind China's engagement in Africa had little to do with Africa, Calvocoressi asserts:

Like Moscow's, [Beijing's] interests in Africa were primarily extraneous to Africa. The first of these concerns was to seek international recognition for Mao's communist regime and, more specifically, votes at the United Nations which would be cast in favor of the transfer of the permanent Chinese seat in the Security Council from Taiwan to China proper. A second concern, which arose when Sino-Soviet friendship turned into Sino-Soviet rivalry, was to make trouble for the Russians. The conflict between [Beijing] and Moscow, unlike the (ideological) alliance between them, could be furthered in Africa.[25]

At first, China's anticolonial stance was welcome to African liberation movements, but as Beijing grew increasingly concerned with offsetting the threat of Soviet "social imperialism," the attraction wore off. As early as 1963, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania complained of a new scramble for Africa between the Soviet Union and China. Furthermore, the Chinese were no more immune to blunders than the Soviets. For example, China unwisely meddled in the Burundi ethnic feuds. In 1953, it backed the Tutsi expedition to the extent of training a number of Tutsi in China in guerrilla warfare. The subsequent massacres earned China much opprobrium. China also supported the Biafran secessionists in Nigeria's civil war (1967–70) simply in response to Moscow's support of the federal government in Lagos. Similarly in Angola, China supported the FNLA (Front for the Total Liberation of Angola) because Moscow was backing the ruling MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola).

In Mali and Congo-Brazzaville, China made some headway. But a spate of military coups brought new rulers distrustful of China. Only in Tanzania did China achieve some diplomatic and ideological success. It agreed to fund and build the 1,200-mile Tan-Zam railway line at a cost 166 million pounds sterling free of interest. The railway was both an engineering and a political achievement. It was completed two years ahead of schedule and was much touted as a model of what foreign aid could do for Africa. However, as Tanzanian management resulted in poor maintenance, degeneration of service, and perpetual bottle-necks at the Dar es Salaam terminal, the Chinese suffered undeserved bad publicitiy in connnection with the railway.

All in all, China's achievements in Africa were minuscule. Unfortunately, the West did not see it that way. In the words of Calvocoressi, "Whereas in the 1960's, the West reacted with hysterical alarm to the appearance of the Chinese in Africa, Africans themselves judged more realistically that the Chinese are nice people from

[23]*New Internationalist* (London), September 1990, p. 12.

[24]Zhao Ziyang tried to picture China and Africa as members of the same Third World, united in poverty. For example, he referred at one time to the experience of some 64,000 Chinese coolies who had been rounded up by the British at the turn of the century to work in the mines of South Africa. Ten years later, when their labor was no longer needed, they were deported with little or nothing to show for their suffering.

[25]Op. cit., p. 100.

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a long way away who behave more agreeably than Russians or American but have even less to offer."[26] Ironically, the real gainer from China's involvement was probably the West, as Beijing's efforts undercut Soviet machinations without resulting in a significant permanent Chinese presence.

The Plague of Statism

Whatever the ideological pronouncements of African governments or the specter of "communism," it is the interference of the state that has been a major problem in Africa, even in South Africa. With enormous economic and political powers concentrated in its hands, the state became a prize for which various groups competed. Those groups who managed to capture the state monopolized it and used its powers to advance their selfish interests. In South Africa, the state was monopolized by whites (apartheid); in Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda, the state was captured by the military; in Burundi and Zaire, the state was captured by a minority tribe (Tutsi and Gbande respectively); in Mauritania and Sudan, the state was monopolized by Arabs (Arab apartheid); and in many other African countries such as Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia, the state was captured by a single political/ideological party. Obviously, the real solution to Africa's ills is the movement to a situation in which no one individual or group, regardless of religion, race, or ideological predilections, can capture the state.

So pervasive was state interventionism that by 1980, almost every African economy was dominated by one large sector— the state sector, created by a maze of laws, controls, and regulations. Public sector expenditures in 1986 were more than 27 percent of GNP, compared with only 19 percent in low-income countries outside Africa. The state sector had become an albatross, characterized by a huge civil service, overlapping bureaucracies, stifling red tape, hideous waste and corruption, and hopelessly inefficient state enterprises (SE's). Many of these enterprises were acquired haphazardly with little planning and foresight and were overstaffed with party functionaries. In the early 1980's, there were more than 3,200 SE's in Africa. Their collective performance was nothing short of scandalous. Here are some examples:[27]

- A state-run shoe factory in Tanzania consistently operated at no more than 25 percent of capacity.
- For 14 months, from November 1978 to January 1980, the State Jute Bag Factory in Ghana was closed due to a shortage of raw materials. Yet the 1,000 workers received full pay for the entire period of closure.
- In Niger, the cumulative deficit of 23 loss-making SE's exceeded 4 percent of Niger's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1982.
- In Tanzania, between 1976 and 1979, one third of all SE's were losing money.
- In Togoland, the losses of just eight SE's reached 4 percent of GDP in 1980, while in Ghana 75 percent of SE's incurred losses.

Many of the SE's were set up with foreign loans and aid. But in many cases, the investment decision was poorly appraised and riddled with graft and corruption. Examples abound:

- A cement plant serving Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo was closed in 1984 after only 4 years in operation.
- A 1987 evaluation of rural development projects in Africa financed by the World Bank revealed that half had failed.
- After Somalia built a plant to box bananas in 1976, it was discovered that the production level needed for the plant to break even exceeded the national banana production.
- In 1975, Tanzania built a $2.5 million semi-automatic bakery in Dar es Salaam with Canadian aid, but there was no flour with which to make bread.
- When Ghana's state-owned Sugar Factory at Asutsuare was built, it stood idle for more than a year because somebody forgot to include a water-supply system.
- Ghana's state-owned shipping company, Black Star Line, had so many redundant employees that 254 workers were paid for three years (1981–84) simply to stay home.

The state-owned railways, which were once the backbone of Africa's transportation system, are now in shambles. In the period 1985–87, only two black African railways out of 22 derived any modest financial surplus. In 1985, out of 9 railways for which reliable data are available, one had operating costs that alone accounted for 90 percent, another, 50 percent, of revenue. Ghana Railways, which used to carry 2.6 million tons of freight in the early 1970's was carrying only 0.4 million tons by the middle of the 1980's. Nigerian Railways experienced a 33 percent decline in traffic

[26] Ibid., p. 101.

[27] The examples that follow on inept economic operations and flawed investment decisions are taken from an article by the author, "A Blueprint for Africa's Economic Reform," *Journal of Economic Growth* (Washington, DC), No. 3, 1987, pp. 3–12.

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from 1979 to 1986. In Sudan, 40 percent of exports were carried by rail in 1980, but by 1986, the railway's share had fallen to 5 percent. Staff costs of railways absorb up to 75 percent of revenue in some cases. Nigerian Railways for example had six times the staff per traffic unit of European Railways in 1987.[28]

The civil service in African states has experienced phenomenal growth. In Ghana, the civil service increased at a rate five times the growth of the labor force—14 percent each year between 1975 and 1982. In The Gambia, the civil service doubled between 1974 and 1984. By 1986, in Guinea, the wages of the 75,000 civil servants accounted for 50 percent of state current expenditures. In the Central African Republic, civil service salaries absorbed 63 percent of current revenues. More than 20 percent of Ghana's civil servants were declared superfluous. In February 1987, some 30 percent of the staff in all the ministries in Sierra Leone were considered useless.[29]

The paraphernalia of controls created immense opportunities for graft and corruption. Africans had to bribe their way through an arcane maze of stifling state controls. To build a house in Egypt, for example, required permits and approval in 32 separate stages in 1982. In Ghana, the standard bribe for the procurement of an import license was fixed at 10 percent of the anticipated imports. Corruption and embezzlement became so endemic that they undermined efficiency and productivity. Upon the payment of a bribe, some foreign suppliers were able to unload useless and obsolete equipment in Africa on credit. Many of these malpractices were investigated. Ghana, for example, has set up more than 130 commissions of enquiry since 1957. But instead of dismantling the socialist interventionist control machinery that breeds corruption and inefficiency, African governments generally sought to cure the malady with more controls.

Indigenous Solutions

A consensus has now emerged that African governments have failed their people. Said a Lesotho chief: "We have two problems—rats and the government."[30] An increasing number of Africans are now advocating a return to Africa's own indigenous roots. I have written a book *Indigenous African Institutions*,[31] and would like to discuss briefly here two possible indigenous solutions to the urgent problems facing the continent. The first solution is to abolish the state altogether (some African tribes did exactly that in the past), or to have a very weak center as in a confederation. The second is to return to Africa's own indigenous economic ideology.

Stateless societies. Centuries ago, it occurred to many Africans that the state was evil and not at all necessary for the maintenance of law and order. In fact, they decried the state as necessarily tyrannous, and dispensed with centralized authority (a chief or king). Yet, they managed to preserve peace and order among their communities. These people still exist today: the Abesheini of Kenya, the Igbo and Tiv of Nigeria, the Nuer of Sudan, and the Tallensi of Ghana, to name only a few. Their "stateless" or acephalous societies were the subject of intense early European curiosity.

Baffled by the absence of the "state," European colonialists dismissed these people as "primitive communists." The Europeans had it in their head that any community must have a political ruler. In the "stateless" societies where there was none, the colonialists insisted on creating "chiefs" or "strongmen" (saddams) for these backward people. But in "blissful ignorance," the people promptly "destooled" (removed) such "colonial" or "canton" chiefs. Such was the fate, for example, of the "government" *mantse* of the Ga people (Ghana) and the *akill* of the Somali. But the force of colonial arms prevailed and most of these "chiefs," with the awesome colonial might behind them, regained power and became corrupt and despotic.

Subsequently, the European colonialists installed an autocratic state and called the resultant system capitalism, replete, toward the last phase of colonialism, with marketing boards and controls on prices, imports, and exports. The African nationalists who took over after independence retained the basic structure of the interventionist colonial state and expanded its scope enormously, calling it various African "ism's" such as "Marxism in African clothes." (Meanwhile, in South Africa, the Afrikaner tribesmen were doing precisely the same thing—creating state enterprises and interventionism, and price, rent, import, export, and foreign-exchange controls—under a system called apartheid which they vigorously defended as capitalism!)

In traditional Africa, where political entities encompassed several ethnic groups, the most common form of political association was the confederation. This form allowed for much local autonomy, which explains why more than 2,000 tribes still exist in Africa today. Strong, centralized rule was the exception. Indigenous African empires, such as Asante, Ghana, Mali, Songhal, and

[28]See John R. Nellis, *Public Enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa*, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 1, Washington, DC, 1986.

[29]Ayittey, loc. cit.

[30]*International Health and Development* (Washington, DC), Spring 1989.

[31]Hudson-on-Ardsley, NY, 1991.

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Great Zimbabwe, were all confederations. It is to such forms that Africans might today repair in order to ease the burdens and distortions created by the overly centralized state.

Back to indigenous economic roots. The second solution is to return to Africa's indigenous economic roots. Socialism as practiced by African leaders can never be justified on the basis of African tradition. Africa's indigenous economic system, however primitive or backward it might have been, was never "fundamentally socialist" as was assumed by such African leaders as Nkrumah and Nyerere. Africa never dispensed with private ownership of property, free enterprise, or free markets. The means of production in traditional Africa were not owned by the chief or the tribal government. Certainly, all the cattle in Zululand do not belong to the Zulu Chief. Nor do the huts, hunting gear, machetes, and other agricultural implements or farm produce. Even land, erroneously characterized as "communally-owned," is not owned by the chief. He only holds land in trust, granting usufructural rights and only evicting individuals who abuse the land. Every black African will affirm that chiefs do not fix prices on the village market; one bargains over prices. Nor do African chiefs operate tribal government enterprises to the total exclusion of their subjects. Businesses and commercial enterprises (goldsmiths, bakeries, sculpturing, trade houses) are privately owned. Africans do not ask for permits from their chiefs to operate them. In fact, one notable feature of the indigenous African economic system is the absence of pervasive economic controls and regulations. So why impose on black Africans an economic system that is alien to their culture?

True, African peasants are communalistic and socialistic in the sense that they pool their resources together to build and care about their neighbors and family members. But so, too, do many rural folk in the West who also pool their resources together to rebuild after a calamity (earthquakes, tornadoes, floods). But that hardly makes them "socialists." Communalism does not necessarily imply communism or socialism. Failure to make this important distinction led many African leaders and experts astray.

Profit, for example, was not a concept alien to Africa. The Asante call it *mfaso*. But the traditional practice was to share it. Under the *abusa* system of the cocoa farmers of West Africa, profit was divided into thirds: one third to the workers, another third to the owner of the farm, and the remaining third was set aside for farm maintenance and expansion. In the West, profit was appropriated by capitalists; in the East, by the state. In Africa, the natives shared it in a system that exploited no one. This is the same profit-sharing scheme that the Japanese successfully used to engineer their economic miracle. The so-called "backward" peasants of Africa had been using this scheme for centuries before more "advanced" systems were imposed upon them.

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Commentary

Africa after Communism

Paul B. Henze

LIKE Colin Legum, I recognize that generalizations about a continent as large and varied as Africa are always subject to challenge. All the details never fit. It is not the exceptions, however, but the common features and basic trends of African experience over the last three decades that must concern us here. Black Africans have continually stressed their shared traditions and feelings of togetherness. In international politics, more often than the inhabitants of any other part of the world, they have developed a habit of asserting themselves in continental terms. The fact that Africans' pan-Africanism has always in some measure been superficial—it has developed very little political and economic underpinning—cannot obscure the fact that these attitudes persist, both in Africa and in the world outside it. This is part of the psychological reality that African countries and those concerned with the continent elsewhere in the world must continue to take into account. To an extent greater than in most of the rest of the world, each African country's performance has an impact on the attitudes and behavior of the rest of the world toward all African countries.

Africans are by no means solely responsible for another notion that has colored judgments about the continent's performance over the past 30 years: that Africa's failures were all caused or compounded by "superpower competition." The West, but particularly the United States, is alleged to share responsibility with the former Soviet Union for militarizing Africa and making it a battleground in the cold war. We hear this allegation more frequently these days from Western journalists and academics than we do from Africans. The case rests on emotional prejudice and flimsy arguments that cannot stand up to a serious examination of the facts.[1] The historical record, now being bolstered by hard data coming out of Moscow, demonstrates that it was the Russians and their radical Arab friends that supplied the overwhelming proportion of the arms with which Africans killed each other with so much zeal during the 1970's and 1980's.[2]

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Communism's Failure in Africa

The failure of communism in Africa has at least two major dimensions. In the first place, it is a manifestation of the Grand Failure[3] of communism in the world at

[1]For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see my recent book, *The Horn of Africa, from War to Peace*, London, Macmillan, and New York, St. Martin's, 1991, Ch. 4, "Arms and their Social and Economic Effect," which includes military aid statistics not only for Horn countries and Kenya but for Africa as a whole. It cites evidence that by the latter half of the 1970's, the USSR was supplying more than half of all arms imports into Africa while total US arms supplies to Africa amounted to less than 10 percent of those the Soviets supplied and were well below the amounts supplied by France, West Germany, and Italy. While the Soviets continued to supply massive amounts of arms to Africa through the 1980's, American deliveries slowed to a trickle.

[2]A bankrupt Soviet Union and its successor republics can presumably no longer afford to donate arms to Africa, but some misguided Middle Eastern states continue to do so, so the problem is not entirely overcome. New, democratically-oriented African leaders are likely to see arms more as a burden on their economies rather than as a solution for their difficulties. Nevertheless, arms manufacturers in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union may be driven by desperate need for foreign exchange to continue to peddle arms in Africa. Fortunately, Africans' capacity to pay for them is likely to remain extremely limited.

[3]Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure—The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century*, New York, Scribner's, 1989.

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large, above all in the Soviet empire, its fountainhead. Soviet communism failed for two basic reasons: (1) it proved incapable of generating support from the working class, on which it claimed to be based, or from any other segment of society except the parasitical *nomenklatura*, which it created; and (2) it was unable to establish or sustain an economy that could satisfy popular expectations for modernization and material progress. These failures were long obscured by Soviet leaders, who were initially successful in creating a political system that maintained an illusory stability based on police terror and military power. This kind of system was bound to be brittle, and increasingly, everyone within it, including its leaders, was forced to recognize its failings.[4] What was so long challenged by communists themselves, by many Western intellectuals, and by a vocal minority within the professional Sovietological fraternity is no longer subject to debate, as this conference has demonstrated: communist totalitarianism was based on utterly fallacious concepts and assumptions. It had an inherent tendency to degenerate from within. Above all, communism lacked the capacity to cope with the consequences of the electronic revolution that swept the world during the final quarter of the 20th century. But even if the electronic revolution had not had such a rapid and decisive impact, communism would have soon succumbed to its own incapacity to generate wealth and maintain economic momentum.

But what about communism in Africa? It was in no sense an indigenous African phenomenon, but rather was a European intellectual import. It was grafted onto indigenous political and social traditions which had to be twisted to fit communist dogma. It did not put down deep roots. Communism (and related forms of totalitarianism) attracted many African intellectuals because of its seeming simplicity; its bogus claim to be an infallible formula for political and social liberation and material progress had enormous appeal. In practice, however, these claims were relatively quickly exposed as empty, though in areas of frustrated political development, such as the Republic of South Africa, communism continued to have some appeal because all other avenues for effecting change were barred until recently.

The real appeal of communism to most African leaders, whether they were in power or desired to seize power, centered on a mix of three pragmatic factors: (1) it provided a seemingly respectable recipe for taking and/or exercising power in the name of the "broad masses" while excluding them from all meaningful political and economic processes and, thus, justified an extraordinarily pernicious form of elite governance with no provision for orderly change of leadership; (2) communism and its milder undemocratic, authoritarian variations, such as "African Socialism," were thought likely to attract substantial economic aid from the Soviets, Chinese, Cubans, East Europeans, or some combination of all of them;[5] and (3) even if economic aid did not materialize, Moscow and its satrapies proved to be a reliable source of military aid and support for security services—on which most communist-type regimes in Africa were increasingly dependent.[6] For communist-type movements not in power, Moscow remained a source of overt and covert political and propaganda support as well as a source of arms and military advice long after Beijing abandoned this role.

The purely ideological appeal of communism was always weak in Africa and became weaker as African leaders, many of whom had been sincerely convinced that some version of a totalitarian communist system not only was the wave of the future but would enable them to overcome most of the political and economic challenges they faced, found that it failed to deliver what it promised. Leaders and ideologues in Africa who called themselves communists produced almost no serious revisionist thought of the kind that flourished in Eastern Europe from the mid-1950's through the mid-1970's. It is difficult to find duller reading than African communist ideological journals. The pragmatic appeal of communism nevertheless persisted. The most extreme example of adherence to it is undoubtedly Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia. His was the last major government in the world to set up a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party (in 1984) and the last to declare itself a "People's Republic" (1987). It is not surprising, given such political myopia and obduracy, that Mengistu was the last African leader still calling himself a communist to topple from power (1991).

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[4] *I anticipated this failure in* "The Spectre and Implications of Internal Nationalist Dissent," in S. Enders Wimbush, Ed., *Soviet Nationalities in Strategic Perspective*, London, Croom Helm, 1985, pp. 1–35.

[5] African authoritarian leaders professing "socialism" also had considerable appeal for progressive socialist governments and so-called liberal non-governmental groups in all Western societies. For a long period of time, Nyerere's brand of African Socialism brought Tanzania more economic development assistance than was received by any other African country.

[6] It is interesting to speculate whether or not Moscow might have maintained support for some pro-Soviet African regimes if it had not been faced with serious financial constraints. Even without economic assistance, Ethiopia's Mengistu, with vastly increased military aid and direct deployment of Soviet manpower, might have been kept in power for another year or two, perhaps longer. Likewise, one can speculate, the MPLA might have been enabled to continue its fight against UNITA in Angola. However, in light of what we now know of the deteriorated condition of the Soviet economy as well as the decline in morale of the Soviet army and ruling elite by the late 1980's (resulting in part from the futile intervention in Afghanistan), such speculation becomes quite academic.

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Ideological Evolution of Ethiopia's Liberation Fronts

For a decade and a half, Ethiopia offered the remarkable spectacle of a dogmatically Marxist-Leninist regime in Addis Ababa opposed by several groups of insurgents who claimed to be equally good, if not better, Marxists. Frustrated Soviets, enlisting the assistance of Italian and East German communists, tried repeatedly to bring all these warring Ethiopian Marxists together, to no avail. Two groups, the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrean Popular Liberation Front (TPLF), steadily gained strength and territory and in the spring of 1991, forced Mengistu Haile Mariam to flee the country.

An increasingly sharp divergence between rhetoric and reality developed as these movements took and held more territory. The TPLF appears to have shed much of its Marxism as it took control of most of Tigre and began to administer the province. When it organized parallel movements that enabled it to advance into Amhara- and Oromo-populated regions (which eventually led to the creation of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front—EPRDF—the group that heads the new Ethiopian government), it did not rely on Marxist rhetoric or Leninist methods. Much of its appeal derived from the fact that upon taking over territory, it rapidly liberated rural populations from the Derg's intrusive and corrupt system of regimentation and control. Now in power in Addis Ababa, the EPRDF leadership has committed itself to multiparty democracy, privatization of the economy, and a pluralistic society, despite occasional echoes of socialist dogma from lower levels of the organization. Why some of its spokesmen abroad persisted until 1989 or 1990 in expressing admiration for Albanian communism remains a mystery.

In contrast, some elements in the EPLF leadership experienced considerable difficulty shedding their commitment to Marxism. The movement was slower to abandon "socialist" principles in practice than its Tigrean counterpart. As it took control of much of Eritrea during the late 1980's, the EPLF was tolerant of private enterprise but showed little inclination to encourage a pluralistic society or multiparty political system. Its basic model appeared to be the kind of rural self-sufficiency the Chinese communists developed in Yan'an in the 1930's. Since assuming power in Asmara in 1991 and transforming itself into the Provisional Government of Eritrea, the EPLF has committed itself to introducing full democracy, but only after a referendum has endorsed independence in 1993. With respect to the economy, it has become a champion of private enterprise and seeks foreign investment. It has moved faster in issuing economic proclamations than the EPRDF-led government in Addis Ababa.[7]

Social and Economic Failure

Without exception, communist, communist-type, or communist-inspired regimes in Africa failed dismally in their efforts to implement progressive social and economic policies, and none was able to sustain any of the modest temporary successes it might have achieved. Schemes for collectivizing agriculture and villagizing rural populations alienated a major proportion of the peasantry, who might otherwise have remained politically neutral. Nationalization of commerce and industry prevented rational development and reduced productivity and potential for trade. Attempts to enforce nationalization and regimentation and/or compensate for failures necessitated continual expansion of a bureaucratic *nomenklatura* that became increasingly corrupt and inclined to rely on intimidation and terror to maintain its status and privileges.

Communist-type regimes also proved surprisingly inept in dealing with, or even understanding, the ethnic, religious, and caste tensions that afflict most African societies. Indeed, such tensions were in actuality often exacerbated by communist techniques of leadership and administration. Authoritarian parties found themselves impelled to rely on minority individuals and groups for cadres. As they became more oppressive, they resorted to subtle (and sometimes not-so-subtle) exploitation of ethnic and religious tensions to maintain their hold on power. Ethnic-, tribal-, and clan-based corruption mushroomed. Economic deprivation intensified ethnic and religious resentments. Leaders of African states emerging from communist-type totalitarianism—like their counterparts in the former Soviet Union —must now confront situations where exacerbated ethnic and religious relationships poison society and frustrate their efforts at laying the groundwork for a rational political process.

No aspect of the demise of communist-oriented authoritarianism in Africa is of greater significance than its failure to generate economic momentum or even to prevent economic crisis and degeneration. African gov-

[7]Both movements experienced internal dissension as they shifted ideological direction. The internal ideological evolution of both the TPLF and the EPLF is one of the most fascinating aspects of the demise of communism in Africa, but it has been difficult to obtain details on how it occurred. Presumably, as both movements evolve in their positions of power, we will see further evolution and political scientists and historians will have the opportunity to clarify the processes that occurred during the 1980's.

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ernments, lacking a large resource base and compelled to depend on a small and often ill-trained educated class, were poorly equipped to take on the task of planning and managing entire economies. Ideological zeal and lust to exercise power led communist-oriented leaders to reject the cautions of wiser counsellors (both African and Western) to avoid trying to "plan" everything. Communism encouraged delusions about the efficacy of centralized state management of agriculture, industry, and trade. Bureaucracies expanded exponentially while bureaucratic efficiency declined. Bureaucrats inept at management nevertheless were extraordinarily skilled at graft and diversion of funds to themselves and friends. State enterprises took on vast numbers of unnecessary employees as they produced less and less. Agricultural production declined and trade atrophied.[8] Thus, Africa in the post-communist world faces, on the whole, problems of governmental reform and economic restructuring that are more acute than in any other region except the former Soviet empire itself. In many African countries, economic and social problems have become far more serious than they were at the time of independence.

Challenge for Africa

Communism is not, however, entirely responsible for Africa's bad reputation in the world. The failure of African states to capitalize on independence to establish stable political systems, productive economies, and just societies is so widely recognized that the modest successes of some African states during the past 30 years tend to be overlooked. The world is tired of Africa's problems and failures. Africa's major challenge during the decade ahead is to command sufficient attention on the world scene to be taken seriously and bid successfully for a share of the aid and investment that developed countries will be providing. Africa is no longer in competition only with the rest of the Third World for resources. Its major competition now comes from the very countries that were once widely regarded as alternative benefactors, i.e., the former Soviet Union, the countries of Eastern Europe who have liberated themselves from communism, China, North Korea, and even distant Mongolia, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Cuba, as soon as it rids itself of Castro, will become a competitor as well. The challenge African leaders now face is to make their countries attractive enough to remain in the resource competition.

Aid provided by governments and international organizations will not be enough. Private investment of the kind that energizes productive processes by utilizing African talent and inspiring entrepreneurs will be the key to success. Communism is irrelevant to the tasks that need to be undertaken. Communism cannot inspire or motivate people to greater productivity. Its arrogant bureaucrats enforcing rigid dogma deaden minds and stifle creativity. Its professed egalitarianism, even if applied honestly, can only redistribute poverty. Communists in Africa can base an appeal only on frustration or false promises. They can mobilize no external resources for African development. They have no constructive role to play.

One wonders, given African disillusionment with communism and the inability of any former communist state to provide support, whether any communist parties can survive except under very special conditions, such as those in South Africa. But, even in South Africa, it is difficult to envision how communism can continue to have much relevance as that country develops a multi-ethnic political system. In some countries, parties that attempt to capitalize on what little remains of the communist legacy will have minimal popular appeal, because the number of party members and individuals who benefited from communist rule, e.g., in Ethiopia, was comparatively much smaller than in Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union. They do not command enough strength to organize and compete in multiparty elections.

Colin Legum provides an excellent description of the change in attitudes that is widely apparent among Africans at all levels of society—from intellectuals and political elites to youth, from businessmen to farmers and traders. Not only has dogmatic authoritarianism failed in Africa; endlessly expansive and intrusive government has also failed. Africans need and are only able to afford government that satisfies the priority needs of their societies and leaves them free to farm, trade, build, manufacture, and organize with as little governmental interference as possible. Foreign governments, international organizations, investors, and foundations will increasingly concentrate on helping Africans help themselves. Africans, in turn, must concentrate on demonstrating that they are worth helping.

Exaggerated Dangers?

Colin Legum raises two other points on which I would like to comment. I agree with his characterization of the majority of single-party regimes in Africa, whether

[8]This sad sequence of events was not confined to communist-oriented governments in Africa, though regimes which claimed to be communist or were supported by Moscow offer the most extreme examples. Economic decline resulting from governmental overmanagement of economies, and resultant corruption and inefficiency, has been characteristic of all authoritarian regimes in Africa.

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Marxist or otherwise, as military-oriented despotisms, but I wonder whether the danger that this mode of African political leadership might continue indefinitely is not largely over. The world is unlikely to be as tolerant of the pretensions of despotic leaders as it was during the 1970's and the 1980's. Many inept and oppressive African governments survived because of anti-colonial sympathy and the indulgence—and consequently support—of international organizations, Western governments, the Soviets, or some combination of all three. Some were very skillful at casting themselves in the role of competitors for Western vs. Eastern favors. Most of these ploys are much less likely to be successful during the 1990's and seem unlikely to be revivable in the 21st century.

Western democratic countries, especially the United States, are now much less eager than they were two or three decades ago to recognize countries that aspire to independence. The former Soviet republics are being held to requirements for practice of democracy, observance of human rights, social justice, and implementation of rational economic reforms as a condition for diplomatic recognition and membership in international organizations. If such reguirements had prevailed as a condition for maintenance of international recognition of most African governments during the 1970's and 1980's, few would have qualified. Absolute notions of noninterference in internal affairs and of economic aid "without strings attached" have been under challenge for several years and are no longer universally sustainable. Alert African (and other Third World) leaders are already taking such considerations into account.

Finally, there is the issue of Islamic "fundamentalism." I prefer to term it "extremism," since it is more often a perversion of the original principles of Islam than a return to them. It is important for Africans and Westerners to distinguish between Islamic extremism and legitimate forms of Islamic assertiveness and pride. Encouragement of Christian-Muslim tensions will benefit no one in Africa. I am disinclined to see Islamic extremism as a great danger for most of Sub-Saharan Africa unless states led by Islamic demagogues—e.g., Libya, Iraq, or Iran—interfere by supporting clerical extremists or by delivering arms to disaffected tribal groups.

Since communism no longer provides a good excuse for tyranny, some authoritarian-inclined political and military leaders in Africa may see Islam as a respectable substitute and employ Islamic rhetoric to advance their own narrow political agendas and frustrate those who oppose their political and military adventurism. Africans who succumb to their blandishments will be guilty of even greater gullibility than those who fell victim to the appeals of communism.[9]

[9]Fortunately, both the lack of resources to support subversion or even to maintain propaganda operations and the fear of internal manifestations of Islamic extremism—which have taken particularly acute form in parts of the North Caucasus and Central Asia—seem to preclude the possibility that any significant elements in the former Soviet Union or the Russian republic would be interested in encouraging Islamic extremism in Africa.

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